Leaderboard

I used to be an airman and now I'm a field-grader with 25 years nearing retirement. I can say without hesitation that none of the above would have happened in the mid-80's when I was an airman, when BTW the drinking age on base and off base (in some states) was 18. The reason why? Leadership and accountability from the junior NCO corps, specifically E-5s. Let's pretend for a minute it's 1985... That airman puking in the hallway? I'm certain that night you describe there was an E-5 or even a senior E-4 in the area. Did he/she just leave that airman behind puking up his guts in the hallway? I'm sure of it. That E-5 should have grabbed two of that airman's boozehound buddies, had them take the puker to a bathroom stall to purge what was left of his intestines, then have them mop up the mess and put their buddy to bed. The puker gets his ass chewed by said NCO the next morning and the two unfortunate puke moppers are now owed a big time favor the next time the boys decide to tie one on. No LOCs, no LORs, no A15s, no officers or first shirts involved and no $7/hr maid having to clean up some asshat's puke. The junior NCOs take care of their own airman with the authority granted them by the UCMJ. Can't handle the responsibility of telling a drunk 19 year-old to shut up and go to bed? Kill yourself. Same deal for the second floor rail puker, the loud lobby fighters and certainly the jackass who uttered the 'N' word. Be a ######ing NCO and take care of business. I'm curious, GasMan, surely you are an NCO or even an officer? Why didn't YOU take care of it? Not my job? I'm not their supervisor? Bullshit. As an NCO, you're every airman's supervisor. But see, today's junior NCO force wants to be their airman's buddy, not their superior. They cower behind a closed dorm room door while airman puke, break shit, fight and disturb folks in crew rest and then complain the next day about "today's airmen." I truly believe drinking and having fun are part of the process of airmen maturing and that's where the junior NCO force comes in; to allow them to have fun but to step in when it gets out of line and protect your airmen from themselves. The worst ass chewing I ever saw given was from a E-8 I've know for 22 years. We were loading the jet at big AMC base in Germany when there was a problem with the load. The two APS airmen out at the jet ran our SRA loadmaster some lip about some obviously jacked up cargo while my SMSgt buddy watched (he was giving the SRA a checkride). The SMSgt stepped in and asked for the duty officer. An APS E-5 shows up (apparently he was the DO) and asks what the problem was. As the E-8 loadmaster explains that the load was jacked up and the two APS airmen refused to fix it, the exasperated E-5 looks at the E-8 and says, "I have no control over these guys." No shit. Commence mentoring session. Airmen (and junior officers for that matter) reflect their supervision. Attitude reflects leadership. IOW, shitty NCOs, shitty airmen. The next time a SSgt complains about "today's airmen", remind him whose airmen they really are. Edited to reflect that a SMSgt is an E-8, not an E-7. I'm retarded.

Rainman, I think there is a major difference between CAF and MAF operations that you are not taking into account, and also a major difference between when you and Clearedhot were opening up the war in 2001/2003 versus the sustainment operation it is today. Like someone on this board once said - you knew it is no longer a real war when services and the Chiefs/SGMGs started showing up. Back to my point. In the MAF world out in the desert, very rarely is the "combat" a life or death situation supporting the kids on the ground. More often than not, we are flying around planes that are 50% full, with dudes going home for R&R, or moving backlogged cargo into theater - old tires, generators, spare parts, etc. Every once in a while, we bring stuff that you can assume will have a relatively immediate, tangible impact on the mission - ammo, food, and water. I was also once told by a CC in the desert that "you will know it when you see it" with regards to a no-shit life or death scenario mission that must be accomplished. In four deployments, I have seen 3 or 4 such missions. The rest of the time, we are literally fighting dogshit weather, 0% illumination in mountainous terrain, and all kinds of threats just to bring in a palette of toilet paper (have done it first hand) or a palette that one of our loads marked on the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd time we brought the exact same palette into and out of the same LZ. Leaning forward and taking more risks in the name of this sustainment war, in my MAF airframe, is all good - until something goes wrong and the bosses have a reason to hang you. Then you see guys getting Q-3s (back to one of the main topics of this thread) given to them for pushing the envelope too hard to get a 3/4 empty plane into an LZ to bring 12 dudes out on R&R. Don't get me wrong, I love this plane and this mission, but 95% of the time, it can wait another day. That's my point. I am not talking about training "harder" on TTPs or anything like that. My guys know their shit just fine. I am talking about AFI and min-equipment limitations. I have seen the Herk sitting on an LZ, with engines running, with an MEL clean kill. The crew could accept the risk of the faulty equipment and get the palette of unused cement (seen it) back to the MOB without batting an eye - until something goes wrong, or the plane tells on us for flying with a MEL required item that is not functional. That's where Champ's concept comes in about how much is your boss really going to back you when you are knowingly violating a black and white AFI? Another example is all of the IFR/VFR rules we train for at home. Again, not life or death/guy on the ground needs us-type calculated risks. We are talking about getting an empty plane back from shithole/mountainous terrain airport to other shithole airport in Afghanistan. Is an H-model Herk really going to make 400'/NM on three engines? Or is the 45 minutes straight of flying in the soup "VFR" through mountains really legal? Those are the types of extra risks I see being taken in the name of combat all the time in the desert. Again, it all fine and dandy until something goes wrong and the boss asks 'why the fuck did you take that risk just to move 5 contractors when they could have taken the next scheduled airlift Herk out of there a few hours later, or the next day? That's what I think this thread is about - leadership defining and backing the crews up in an environment of increased calculated risks. I see guys getting lulled into thinking that they can take increased risks only to get burned when something goes wrong. Unfortunately, I have seen leadership turn their back on dudes way too many times in those situations.

Speaking of WTF...WTF happened to the posts of Lt I have to much time on my hands, so I became a NFL cheerleader. I'm pretty sure it was on this thread!

Did someone call me?

Not shenanigans on Stan-Eval's part, but seemed like an appropriate place for the question: Had a form 8 check recently, ended up Q1 with a pair of downgrades for being a bonehead at the right time and place. How much do downgrades on a form 8 checkride matter? Obviously no downgrades would have been much better, but is this something that's going to have an impact down the road?

Checks...that means 2/3 of the misconduct is caused by sober people. Seems like you should be working on the bigger portion of misconduct, the "sober" ones.

The problem in the Herk community is that there are Sq/CC and DO's that will never have an "A" Code on the flight orders and never be in that position you just described. But they are very good at micro managing their people and armchair QBing every situation their young AC/IP's experience when they are the "A" Code. They're called Navs.

Easy way around that one. Go to 17's or be a J pilot. No Nav!!! I keed, I keed.