Went through the linked 390+ page "report" (more of a collection of paperwork along with a relatively short report). Since I know most of you are lazy, here's what I got out of it:
Student up front was doing well, but struggling through low levels (specifically turns), paired up with an instructor EMCO that while he had 1500+ hours in the jet, had low time (pretty much just the instructor EMCO recertification) over the last year and a half going into the flight. Executing low level turns (two uncalled turns in a row), the aircraft started nose slicing into the turn (due to over bank most likely) and it wasn't recovered from quickly enough. The back seater tried to eject, but far too late, front enders never pulled handles...outside the envelope anyways I'm sure.
They identified a number of causal factors mostly tracing back to documentation of performance, missed opportunity for remedial training, and waiving/combining of syllabus events, mostly focusing on the students performance and the instructor EMCO's scan in that flight regime.
It's a morbid double edge sword, a testament to our training that creates solid IPs (that this type of tragedy doesn't occur more often), while at the same time highlighting the all to often lack of effort IPs put into additional one-on-one training and filling out grade sheets completely and correctly. There aren't many people that would say the average IP is underworked, and it's damn hard to focus on paperwork after a debrief. Making the kind of cuts to the Air Force we're looking at, we need to be damn careful we don't exacerbate this delicate balance of safely creating the people that keep us safe.
Sad story,
Bendy
EDIT: Changed IP to EMCO (Thanks ExBoneOSO)