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Showing content with the highest reputation on 07/09/2015 in all areas
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Another option would be to stop treating people like shit and let them do what they signed up to do (fly airplanes). But only feasible COAs are COAs I guess.3 points
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Here's the closest flying boat in reality: ShinMaywa US-2. Operated by Japan and in production. It's a little smaller than a C-130J, but uses a variant of the AE2100 engines and 6-blade Dowty props.2 points
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War is Boring is really on a tear for the F-35, another article this one saying it's the next 105 (which gets more abuse for its performance than it deserves IMO given what it was tasked to do, the restrictions on ROE and concentration of enemy AAA, SAMs and MiGs) but another for the pile: https://medium.com/war-is-boring/the-f-105-was-the-f-35-of-the-vietnam-era-51863811024a Respect the Thud, it was given a man's job2 points
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From the weird side of aviation... According to the web site, the idea of an Amphibious C-130 was considered back in the early 70's... or is it fake? Can't tell these days... Anyway its an interesting diversion. https://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/a-c-130-hercules-amphibian-makes-too-much-sense-to-be-t-17166105311 point
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Post WW2, the AF was ran by bomber generals with the cold war in full swing. Their opinion was the next war would be nuclear and conventional capability wasn't required, including weapons and training for ACM. Therefore, we certainly didn't need a cannon on a jet or train to use one. We've been the only stealth player in town but I'm thinking others will join us. At that time, what is our advantage relative to our adversaries?1 point
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The 10 year commitment permits Big Blue to treat people like ^^^that^^^. Two things will keep people on AD: increased control of their career or command. Nobody joined the AF for the 9 year bonus. Source the ANG/AFRES for staff and deployment shortfalls (1-3 year API-8 AGR tours to staff or AFCENT with $35K/year, for instance). Make UPT/IFF nothing but FAIPs and Reservists with the "requisite" AD chain-of-command. Put the entire RPA mission on the ANG. Let guys/gals get their airline/consultant/lawyer job after 2 assignments and flood the ANG and AFRES TFI units with mid-level O-3s off AD who have 20+ years of part-time service left (all the while maintaining RAP). Let the AD careerists focus more on flying and deployed staff and less on AADs/exec jobs/non-denominational winter solstice parties. Reward that smaller pool with command. Every USAF AD flying squadron should have an associate reserve squadron. Let them be the gray hairs. Reducing the commitment to 6 years essentially creates the defacto warrant officer program we've all thought of as the solution to the overall retention problem, as long as the reserve component is expanded to absorb the RAP commitment of maintaining an effective CAF/MAF/ATC.1 point
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Maybe it's a good thing for our overall effectiveness that so many pilots are getting out. IMO, sufficient talented guys/gals stay in for a full career, including command, to maintain adequate mentoring and leadership of the punks/FNGs. Pilots transitioning to the reserve component refresh the Guard/Reserve with the diverse experiences of different techniques and tactics found throughout active duty fighter squadrons. Speaking from my own experience, the last decade and a half of stagnated airline hiring, plus the 10 year commitment, created an huge backlog of pilots who would have preferred a 6-8 year commitment but had nowhere to go except for the next PCS, especially considering many folks were (are) only 6-9 years from an AD retirement by the end of their commitment. Hence, very little attrition of 11Fs from AD and the cultivation of a poisonous "career" culture that's distracted us from focusing on killing the enemy. Not everyone can be the commander, but the Air Force is essentially forced to tell us that we can all make O-6 in order to keep us motivated (promotion, influence, pay, etc...). The absolute best thing the Air Force could do is drop the 10 year commitment back to 6 or 8 years, with the implied understanding that many pilots will eventually transition to the ANG/AFRES, and promote the fact that AD is a great way to see the world, fly fighters full time for a couple of assignments, then transition to a second career in your early 30s (with the help of the 9/11 GI Bill) and continue to fly fighters in the ANG/AFRES. In the end, the AF essentially maintains its 11F experience level throughout all 3 components, AD becomes less backstabbing as the stakes of the "career game" begin to vanish, and the USAF maintains an equally effective fighter force at a much lower cost. Flame away...1 point
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I said Budda's plan would be a massive improvement. I don't believe the AF would be able to pull it off without f-ing it up, though.1 point
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Damn near every dude I know who has taken the bonus in the past several years has ended up on a 365 within 2 years of taking the bonus (some < 1 yr). Many of the bros and I 100% believe bonus = auto 365, and for that reason alone we will not take the bonus. Tac is right - if this "auto 365" went away, I bet there would be more bonus takers/rentention. Everyone wins - except the AF is retarded and will therefore continue to not get it.1 point
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The F-22 was junk for a while, hell, the F-16 was junk for a while. Give it time, it can't all be Ironman on day 1.1 point
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This concept has been argued on here before. Basically, the Marines don't trust anybody else to provide air support because everyone abandoned them in WWII, so they want their own stealthish fighter for denied airspace. The whole line of reasoning on the F-35B is full of contradictions. The MEU will be hitting the beach and launching F-35s off of a Navy LHC, but for some reason the Navy forgot to send a carrier to take down the IADs first. Pretty unimaginable, especially since the LHC will need the regular contingent of cruisers and destroyers for protection against subs and stuff. Okay, let's assume the carrier broke down or sank enroute, and the Marines still need some jets to kill things with radars; that's why they're stealthish, right? Well, first of all, I'm saying stealth-ish because, since they have no internal gun, they'll be carrying a gun pod. They're also going to have a shit ton of external stores because there are only six of them on an LHC. Six fucking jets. Which means two flying, two turning/on alert, and two broken. So possibly only two jets ready to fight with, best case with no bombs or tanks, ten AMRAAMs amongst them. I'm no fighter guy, but I bet they would have a hard time dealing with, oh I don't know, ELEVEN airborne threats. Well that's what the Navy and Air Force are for right? Then why do we need F-35Bs? Radar-guided pop up threats only? The whole thing is nuts. The Marines would be better off flying Hornets or F-35Cs off the big boat while flying as many Cobras as they want from the helicopter boat. And of course the B-model has had enormous development costs while making the A and C-models fat and worse overall.1 point
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I think the argument that it can't "dogfight" the F-16 is moot. It wasn't designed for that. The F-16's aerodynamic design is superb and it's newer engines give it a turn capability difficult to match, especially for a VTOL/STOL, LO designed strike aircraft. But, I think we all know that. I don't doubt we need next generation strike aircraft like some here have advocated, but I think this plane is poor value for the cost. Why make a VTOL/STOL aircraft LO? If we are going to put aircraft at austere airfields that require that capability then those very aircraft will most likely be vulnerable to attack from the surface or air. The attack on the Marine Air Squadron in Afghanistan is still raw and I'm also reminded of what a determined foe can do in moving artillery into difficult positions like the North Vietnamese did against the French at Dien Bien Phu. One can argue the planes would be in hardened shelters. Well if you can build hardened shelters then you can lengthen a runway. Also, it is poor design to make such a pricey aircraft to be used for carrier ops single engine. How many will be lost due to low power emergencies vs those we could save if there was a #2? Also, how will they conduct buddy refueling ops? As of now, the USN uses F-18's with external bladders to refuel others (so I was told by a Hornet pilot). Will the F-35 be able to do that once the F-18's are retired? And one last question, how effective will it be against a large mobile force that is invading friendly territory? What if there is weather? Will the CFACC risk these high priced assets in order for them to accurately engage the enemy? And now, one last point. It is poor strategy, IMHO, to use high priced weapons/aircraft to destroy $5000 trucks with a machine guns mounted in their backs. When we utilize them in combat vs low tech adversaries, we risk giving away footprints, flight profiles, data link info, etc. to potential higher-tech adversaries. I believe the F-35's LO technology will be obsolete before the entire buy is complete and we will be stuck with an air-frame that we have to hang pods from that doesn't perform as well as it's predecessors. My 2 cents (from an ORF) Regards, RF1 point