We are the ones choosing to use 138$ mil jet to do what simpler & cheaper platforms can do. And we're hitting them in small numbers because we chose not to strike when they were in massive convoys in open territory. So I copy that frustration, but that isn't an "unwinnable war," that is us making stupid decisions about how to wage war.
I don't disagree, but it's presumptuous to assume the policy end is unattainable before we even give it our best shot. And giving it our best shot means, partly, keeping our best talent in the fight. Do you think that experienced school grad will influence national security strategy from a position on a staff? We're already sending credible guys to staff but our approach to VEOs hasn't been changing.
I get where each of you are coming from, but we're all products of our experiences to some extent. And my experience is constantly working for commanders downrange who are unwilling to change their approach but repeatedly disappointed in the outcomes. This isn't an "I'm right & you're wrong" discussion and I appreciate your views. Big picture all I'm saying is: after 14 years of failing to produce desired results from combat, and doing so with the most educated force in history, we might entertain the potential that something about our officer production formula is wrong since we seem to be producing people who do the same things. And those things aren't working. And if those things can't work.... Why aren't we producing people who have the balls to say that at expense to their career?
Also I don't want to go to staff!