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Showing content with the highest reputation on 06/10/2016 in all areas
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Bingo...our generals aren't advocating/using resources correctly. We send B-1's at a cost of $69k plus per flight hour to do XCAS in Afghanistan. After 15 yrs, we should have 6-9 sq's of A-29's doing that stuff. Instead our inept leadership wants to do it with F-35's because they learned Cold War techno-strategy at PME but can't critically think/adapt. If our generals were held accountable like civilian company management, they'd all he fired for severe incompetence or in jail for defrauding shareholders (aka taxpayers in this case).6 points
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TT, I was expecting that reply. But we've treated these expanding wars as a sideshow for years, to our national detriment. The USAF is leading the preponderance of KS activity. We don't get a pass on the outcome. Vietnam was a war plan authored with fail above our level, but we still have tons of L2 about our own failed implementation practices. If we're being tasked incorrectly, and we are, where are the GOs advocating better usage? It's a cop out to blame politicians when our leaders are the ones championing shitty practices. Where is the AT-6 or equivalent? Where is the advocacy for better intel analysis practices? Where is the equitable distribution of work load? Why do I see so many O4/5's who haven't deployed at all while others have done a 1-1 for a decade? we suck, and it's our fault. Until we have done everything in our power to be better, it's wrong to blame politicians. Yes, building a Jeffersonian democracy in a culture thousands of years entrenched in tribalism is stupid. Where are the GOs saying that? I could go on and on, from streamlining the strike approval process to ending dumb ass wasteful 365's, to constantly sending brand new know nothing BPZ never deployed types to command units downrange allowing them to check the command box without ever judging the merit of their work. WTF are we doing? From strategy to administrative implementation, we suck. The line guys are kicking ass. The institution is failing. And there is value in saying that fact, because until we acknowledge our failures we can't hope to fix anything. It's past time for us all to be on the same page: we are losing wars, the enemy is gaining ground, and it's our fault. So what do we do about it?5 points
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You can be a sitting WG CDR at 24 years as an IPZ guy your whole career. AFSOC just had one picked up for a star. The problem isn't the math, it's the erroneous assumption that BTZ is required to compete for GO. di1630s post was so incredibly spot on. The facts are undeniable after 15 years of losing wars: we suck. Much like an alcoholic must first admit they have a problem, our force, at every level, needs to accept the reality that we are not accomplishing the tasks set before us. There should be a firestorm of debate about why, and a willingness to examine and scrap all aspects of our institution that have brought us defeat. Instead no one is talking about this, they all want to preserve the system that did them a solid despite the fact we are failing. The careerists all keep chugging along "mentoring" younger people to be like them. Disgusting.3 points
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Maybe we should start considering people for leadership positions based on things other than how fast they make Lt Col or Col.3 points
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More sh-t about career development....you'd think our mission was to produce generals and compete jointly by Chang's take. Personally, I'd rather get some competent leadership who knows how to win fights vs make rank by getting "pushed through the career pipeline" Currently our leaders cannot: -Effectively manage personnel -Efficiently procure new weapons systems -Retain most valuable talent -Formulate a winning strategy in the Middle East -Understand the most used mission set in the past 20 years (CAS) But damn, they did a helluva job making rank.3 points
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This USAF senior leadership stuff is way out of my lane but I seem to remember "off the top of my head" one USAF General that had a wee bit of influence (four years worth) of setting the stage for this quagmire. This guy (short excerpt from wiki); General Myers became the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs on October 1, 2001. In this capacity, he served as the principal military advisor to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council during the earliest stages of the War on Terror, including planning and execution of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. On September 30, 2005, he retired.2 points
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I get what you're saying, but I don't see how failures in Iraq and Afghanistan (the 15 years of losing wars you refer to) indicate failures within the Air Force. Somehow, I don't think the strategic decision to put a helluva lot of boots on the ground in Afghanistan, in order to try to turn it into a modern Jeffersonian democracy, was driven by Air Force leaders. Likewise, was it not the ground planners' responsibility to win the argument that they needed more soldiers/marines for the Iraq invasion, in order to forestall an insurgency? Somehow, during all this, I don't recall the CENTCOM commander billet being filled by an Air Force general. I absolutely believe that we need to have competent Air Force senior leaders in positions of authority in the joint arena--and we need adequate numbers of quality folks in value-added joint FGO billets--in order to keep our civilian masters and morons in other services from dragging us into more quagmires (which no amount of airpower--whether A-10s or F-35s--can unscrew). GC/our overall senior leaders' approach to growing/placing leaders--not ones who fit a magical formula and timeline, but folks who truly get the proper employment of airpower and who understand that the social justice and square-filling culture they're implementing is antithetical to taking care of people--ain't helping our cause. Neither is the failure to provide adequate incentives to keep people in, nor is the failure to eliminate the many needless irritants that drive people with better options away from the service. Beat up our senior Air Force leaders all you want--they provide plenty of material--but I don't see how they can be blamed for getting and keeping us in ground force-centric quagmires. TT2 points
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This is correct. The first example offered in the JTR covers this situation: "The long-term lodging cost is $95/night for each full day of TDY (on a monthly/yearly lease) and the daily lodging tax is $0." In the table that follows beneath, it lists $198 as the normal lodging per diem rate. The example traveler is entitled to 55% per diem and will receive $108.90 toward lodging costs. EDIT: This *only* applies to FLAT-RATE per diem TDYs. These are TDYs in excess of 30 days. If your TDY is 30 days or less, you fall under normal per diem rules.1 point
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Copy - cleared hot Just two cents worth of opinion but of all the problems with the AF, that we have an X type of general for decades running it is the problem, in reality as we are a large organization with a diverse set of missions, we need a leadership cadre with a diverse career / operational background. Generalists not specialists in charge. I doubt we need dudes who spent the majority of their careers in the CAF, MAF, SOF or Strategic parts attaining the highest levels of qualification, we need smart, fast learners to gain experience and insight, then move to another major section of the AF to gain experience and insight there as they move towards upper leadership. Being a 4 ship flight lead is a good indicator of a smart guy but those particular smarts may not make him/her a great GO, same would apply to a formation air drop qual'd MAF pilot. Leadership has to have the strategic ability not necessarily the tactical ability. Can't agree more on the failure of CAF leadership on the epic fail to not acquire a low cost COIN / permissive environment platform and the MAF dropped the ball too by its epic fail on a light intra theatre mobility platform. A prestige thing I believe, CAF generals think it is beneath the AF to fly an A-29 and MAF generals didn't want the Army to get a C-27 and then they shit canned it for spite, but I'm not cynical, not one bit...1 point
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1 point
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Damn - had not heard of that crash, very rough week. Canadian Snowbirds did a great line abreast missing man formation for Blue Angels #6 https://www.avgeekery.com/no-greater-friend-canadian-snowbirds-fly-missing-man-formation-honor-fallen-blue-angels-6/ One other addition: Fat Albert flew him home with a fly over of P-Cola and down the beach with #5 on the wing, Godspeed... https://www.pnj.com/story/news/military/2016/06/07/blue-angels-fat-albert-fly-pilots-body-home/85550446/1 point
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Mostly what pancho17 said. The hard deadline for packages was 27 May, but Recruiters and their bosses probably wanted the paperwork early so they could review everything at their level first. The "board" reviews the packages for about 3-5 days in the beginning of the month and provides their list through the chain to the 2-star at AFRC, who ultimately authorizes it. This routing and review usually takes the rest of the month, as admin folks (legal, medical, personnel, etc) verify records as needed and the bosses make decisions. Results are typically published in the first or second week of the next month, and filtered through the unit commanders/recruiters to notify their individual applicants.1 point
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Caption should read "In this photo Maj Jack "SAM" Nelson demonstrates to the crowd the approximate size of the cajones required to pull off this astounding feat of airmanship." And yes, the U2 pressure suits are specifically designed to accommodate cajones of that magnitude.1 point
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Beyond maximizing the remaining years of service before mandatory retirement, why does the USAF need to make GOs so early? If by accelerating an officer, the service necessarily truncates meaningful joint time, and that lack of joint time is a reason the USAF often loses to the other services in filling key joint GO billets, then would it not make sense to slow the timeline ever-so-slightly? Superficially, the reasoning for a pole year at 24 years reads like a tautology. The USAF needs GOs at the 24-year point because it needs GOs at the 24-year point.1 point
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Jack is the very definition of a good dude and I'm proud to call him my friend. Glad he made out alright with this one. Could have ended up much worse for sure, but he's always had the mad skillz, so I'm not surprised.1 point
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It's difficult to push our very best through significant jobs positions because they're all breaking the gate down to get out. That's why it's hard to get good senior leadership. Fix retention and you'll suddenly find a wealth of great leaders available Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk1 point
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Do the math, di1630: Take the number of throttles in your cockpit, Multiply that by the number of ejection seats. Then take THAT number and multiply it by the number of vertical stabs. If your final product is anything greater than one, you play the skin flute.1 point
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Highly doubt it would simply be an issue of running tanks dry. That being said (Causal factor) Mishap aircraft was a delicate single engine F-16 "lawn dart"1 point
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I gotta start using this one more often, should definitely go over well in the debrief... Sent from my SM-G920V using Tapatalk1 point
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Actually he is right. How are we going to get anyone to come if people are always talking about how bad it is. Maybe we should delete some of these opinions so as to not scare new people away Sent from my SAMSUNG-SGH-I747 using Tapatalk-1 points
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pretty sure that you NEVER get to keep the extra lodging allotment. MI&E, yes. lodging, no. if DTS is being handled correctly you will need a receipt for all lodging, and in turn you need to change your expenses portion for lodging from $105 / night to the actuals. anything else and you risk getting audited/in trouble. the only time that flat rate lodging is allowed (and you keep the difference) is when you are getting a 55% rate (due to being TDY over 180 days)-1 points