I would argue that some AF units dedicated to SOF support already excel at what the author is calling for with BAI.
Despite his robust background in the subject (-15E WSO patch, DARPA fellow, etc.), he may have never really seen that side of the coin before. Not that air guys supporting SOF didn't get dynamically re-tasked often, but I personally didn't feel like "detailed integration" was missing all that often between myself and the ground forces. Other air players were a different ballgame - fighters would routinely blast into the stack right off the tanker and be tasked to gets effects on the ground very quickly, which I'm sure is not an easy task.
BL: Being centrally controlled and bounced between numerous conventional units on a ad-hoc basis produces a far different experience than being directly chopped to a TF and working for the same people day-in and day-out, rotation after rotation. This BAI-like experience already exists in DoD and the author can get hooked up with some of the guys who are writing the book on it.
Edit to add: my response above was apparently to this article: https://warontherocks.com/2016/06/how-afghanistan-distorted-close-air-support-and-why-it-matters/
Somehow got my wires crossed...
Others nailed it re: the OP article. CAS in a high treat environment, to me, is a zombie requirement that needs to die a real death. If we're doing CAS or have ground forces in those environments for that matter, we've ticked up massively already.