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Get rid of half the white force, especially the "wing commander". He generates a bunch of useless PIA queep like the day before MSN/CC brief. Also, he has way too much power. How is it that some random O-6 can sit a squadron because they didn't show up for a practice brief when the MSN/CC cleared them off? 100% true story. Stop letting a dozen guys speak at the end of the brief and debrief. I got it, you have birds on your shoulders or you went to WIC when I was in elementary school, good for you, now sit down and stop talking. Info-aggressors - complete waste of manpower. If the bad guys are attending our briefings, the war is over anyway. Stop with the absurd scenarios. I get that if we train to harder missions than we'll execute in wartime, we stand a better chance of everyone coming home. But launching F-16 blk 40 units to do DCA against the hordes of Su's with better ECM pods than we have is absurd. In combat, we'd have FR busted like a big dog, retrograde as fast as possible, and let the patriots target them.

As this is a thread on what is wrong with the AF, I offer a movie on that theme, basically about a GO trying to cover up his crime, using his power and influence and the culture of officers that sometimes fight it and others that enable it. Sole Survivor from 1970. Found on Youtube - worth 1+30 of your time if sitting SOF, faking work, etc...

Me thinks you know something.

I knew him well and bought into his BS when he was a Colonel. He gave some great speeches when he was the Commandant of the Weapons School and acted as if he genuinely cared, turns out it was nothing but empty words. Get out...as soon as you can...seriously, run for the door while you still have an option, it is only going to get worse.

Update the EW range. Reduce the number of players. Make the scenarios more about basic integration with other platforms than trying to solve WW3 with poor assumptions and invalid lessons learned. In other words, go back to the roots of why RF was started. Solving WIC level scenarios with a group that typically doesn't even have the deconfliction solved by the final coord isn't the way to go.

Pile on to Smokin; Only let Tower, Departure/Arrival, Link-16, my brother's kids, etc talk in the debrief if there is something to actually talk about. If >80% success rate for your AOR just go find the flight(s) that were the problem and debrief them individually. Ive been in RF debriefs where I've had to leave for crew rest not even knowing if we "won" or not, let alone some form of a tactical lesson learned or how we'll win next time. But I knew that we nailed our taxi time and that we had 96.69% of players on the net. If Red has physical access to my MPC printer(s) then debrief SF and the contract security at RF-N building, not the MSN/CC in the mass debrief. Integration of the "fake-Flag" and the real Flag can't carry over. If I knew we had 69 TLAMs and CALCMs then I wouldn't rage into satan's asshole alone and unafraid so don't bitch when I don't ALR-abort and 4th-gen dies whole-sale. White force needs more authority/willingness to stop the paintrain of a barely-out-of-4FLUG MPC if it's going completely off track when an A1C doesn't pass a paragraph-long "note" regarding an Intel piece that changes the cluster-F'd vul of putting C-130s, B-52s, and other non-raptor formations well within MRIR of every SAM on the planet. Having the "academic situation" before the execution and debrief to save the entire vul from a complete waste of time to something we can learn from brings it out of Fraud Waste and Abuse land. Less players is great. Ability to threat react would be awesome Im 4th gen. I would learn a lot more from just watching the MPC, execution, and debrief than needlessly shoving every MDS the Air Force and our partners have to offer in the NTTR in a 1.5hr range time and losing whole-sale just because somebody thought we absolutely had to have a C-130 air drop on Stonewall at vul start with every 4.5Gen threat and medium range advance SAM on range awake. Dumb. And stop sending units to the Palace Station. Nobody likes that place.

If we are going to have IPOE DLOs for recce/PED players then we should provide reasonable time for IPOE. 1/2 hour prior to the vul for collect that we call IPOE is insufficient. Happy to work/fly a full day on the Saturday/Sunday prior to each week for pattern of life development (yes this requires $), and to get collect that (should) have been conducted years in advance. The "all the information required has been provided" game renders ISR contributions largely OBE when the sensors on our tac assets push. Good for demonstrating that ISR has a long way to go WRT integration? Yes, absolutely. Good for the warfighter's understanding of what ISR provides prior to night 1? Not at all. Good for exercising ISR processes and skills? Not under the current construct. A small investment here would pay huge dividends if we're serious about replacing the white card with real recce capes.

Yeah, they released a guide that has a flow chart of the steps and does a good job or army proofing who does what at every step.

The new PSD Separations guide says no less than 180 days. If anyone wants it, it really helps clear up the PC process just PM me. I tried to press to test the sub 180 and had AFPC kick it back with a RFI for a new separation date. It delayed my PC process by about two weeks.

Objectifying women? Viewing them as sexual objects without thinking of their aspirations, their potential, or their names? That's deplorable...

I know a guy who got picked up on his 8th look at last years board.

I know the 5ATZ guy in question. The AF finally got it right. Line number 1. Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

On that idea, a good article from National Review: https://www.nationalreview.com/article/419278/why-america-has-lost-the-will-to-win-wars And his response to comments on the article is worth a read also: https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/411333/responding-atlantic-yes-military-has-problems-it-really-losing-wars-david-french Not to steal the author's thunder (Iraq vet with deployment in 2007) - he hits home some major points that are some of the reasons we can't seem to get these conflicts done, but his most important point (IMO) is we set the bar too high. From the second linked article / response: Since Vietnam (perhaps even since Korea), the Left has done a very good job of delegitimizing military efforts (or even diplomatic efforts) that don’t end in a state of quasi-utopia. It wasn’t enough to oppose the Soviet Union. We also had to make sure that our allies were sufficiently virtuous. It wasn’t enough to resist North Vietnamese aggression. South Vietnam had to be a model democracy. It’s not enough to depose Saddam Hussein. His replacement had to usher in the Middle East’s first (non-Israeli) enlightened democracy. While — ideally — we certainly don’t want to replace evil with a separate evil, the objective of the United States military is not to increase earthly virtue but to defend the Constitution by deterring and, if necessary, defeating the enemies of the United States. That last bolded statement is perfect, we have mistakenly taken on too much (the military) into our mission set. Post conflict, it is not or should not be our mission to set up a government / society that we find to be an improvement or morally superior to the one we just defeated, we are not there to "fix" the defeated so that they are better and one day thank us for changing them. Keep it simple: Defeat the enemy. Secure the objective(s). Establish a sustainable, tolerable authority that is allied to our interests. GTFO. These articles count Korea as a draw, I would put it in the win column and I would further use it as a template for how to do things: Kick the shit out of the enemy. - Done. More could have been done but things could have gotten out of hand (nukes, full on war with China, Russia, etc.), they got a bloody nose, commander's intention met. Don't get too ambitious, win what territory, concessions, etc. you need to call it good and secure those. - Korea south of the 38th parallel free and secure? Good enough. Keep your expectations of behavior realistic and minimal when you stand-up your proxy in the newly secured objective. - SK gov. was a not so nice authoritarian gov. for a number of decades, let it be. As time went on, we slowly and smoothly got them to a better place. GTFO - Still working on that, but it is sustainable at least and the SK's do foot some of the bill.

His speech to my SOS class was god awful, he probably single handedly validated most of the CGO's decision in the room to leave this failing force ASAP. Someone asked the question about a pilot shortage and his response in a nutshell : "there is no pilot shortage, stop your whining." Noted General sir.

Absolutely, but not in the current climate with a complete lack of will to win, massive amounts of CYA, dickless leadership abounds, etc. Tac Airlifter nailed it - when are we going to start wanting to win again and start re-thinking the way we are playing this game? Until we stop this bullshit idea of "we're not at war" war, it will not get better.

We already have several platforms shooting a ~$22K weapon...fairly cheap way to kill shitheads/Hilux in comparison to the other precision guided options. The current manned and unmanned ISR doing the HVI hunting/killing mission are very good at it. The only thing missing right now is faster transit speed, but it's only a matter of very little time until we field an RPA that can do 350 kts in transit, problem solved. I'm not so sure the proverbial we aren't trying to solve a problem that doesn't really exist. I don't see us not completing the kill chain because of a lack in capability from an MQ-9, U-28, etc. What is going to change if we introduce something additional? Because the number in the win column is pretty large, and I think the only major, limiting factor on its rate of growth is asset availability, not a large capability gap.

1. Too many players with too many "Red Flag-isms" (i.e. self-inflicted pile-ons to 11-214). I've been to 6 RF-A and 2 RF-N. The one's at Alaska are far better because they don't try to jam way too many jets in the airspace and they use 11-214/don't arbitrarily add on. I get it that we want to get everyone a swing at the bat, but the training factor is very watered down when you have a 20 ship SEAD package where 8 will do (as an example). It is deconfliction flag to an extent - and that is not good tactical training. Mitigate this by allowing less squadrons (may not be possible, I get it) and/or potentially lengthening vuls to allow multiple pushes....or instead of one long vul, do 2x back to back morning vuls and 2x back to back afternoon vuls. 4 vuls a day, but close enough that it really is 2x goes for MX, just with 45 min in between launch of one 4 ship and the other. Debrief each separately so the first guys aren't waiting another 1-2 hours for debrief to start. Run the debrief efficiently - stick to timeline limits, shot val rules, etc...you miss a shot by > 10", fuck off we're not going back. 2. Brecky hit PR - the CAF sucks ass at PR...probably the thing the CAF should be the most embarrassed about it's lack luster performance in...and I'm looking at every fighter pilot out there, I don't care what you fly, you have a role in supporting PR events, so put some damn work into supporting the PR plan, not being a shitty/useless OSC, etc. A pre-planned PR vul can speed things along to not drag out a training vul, but real time shoot downs can at least exercise initial OSC/AMC duties, and the pre-plan can be the next day to get that guy (i.e. for range time you can't shoot a guy down 30 min into vul west of the container and have Pedro push from El/Cal, I get it). No tanker - shit happens, wave the "ALR exceeded, I'd abort in real life" card and then go execute for training. Copy all, it'll be 2x60s and some Sandys against the world...and they'll probably get shot, but there's still training to be had. 3. Focus on basic integration in OCA/DCA/DT vuls. Johnny CAF isn't going to solve the F2T2EA problem for ALRS, in fact, he's going to fuck up the mission planning whole sale and lead an abortion the next day. That's not his fault - in real world, he'll be handed a plan, and he won't be the guy leading the whole thing anyways. Leave "next gen" problem solving to WIC advanced integration phase. Let the CAF figure out how to put a cohesive plan together that defeats the Nellis IADs, destroys appropriate-to-the-scenario targets, and gets everyone back home. I agree the threat level needs to be increased, but the point is basic integration...it is trying to do too much and has negative effects when we try to force the "WWIII" problems on the line CAF guy. There's a reason not every CAF dude is read into CW, etc...he doesn't need to be, the right people need to be who will be planning/have a unique understanding of the capabilities and can leverage those with their squadrons come execution day. 4. Airdrop guys - If they're not getting enough LFE training (are you guys really being left out of RF-N that much?), get them in there. It's not difficult to add an air assault, SOF resupply, etc. into a couple OCA vuls per week. I'm not saying it needs to be a full on JFE vul, but at least get a couple MAF/AFSOC assets doing a resupply on the west side of Belted or something along those lines. It'll be great training for them, but also for the SEAD and ESC guys who have to keep SA on a C-130 at 300 ft, protect him, and have a gas/TOS plan to not lose coverage. And at worst, the C-130 does its mission, there is zero interference with the rest of the war raging overhead and if he gets shots, well there's going to be some good lessons learned for the CAF guys who probably didn't have a good plan to begin with. To minimize the "everyone gets a trophy" thing, don't do MAF and PR in the same vul. Watch out for that dick head Roland guy. 5. Three weeks is long - but if you keep doing three weeks, consider making the third week dissimilar BFM/ACM week. When that square peg doesn't fit the round hole of airspace scheduling, etc. for every jet out there, make some CT-ish DCA vuls, i.e. smaller vuls where nobody is doing a MC upgrade, you can have a North and South vul, etc. Northern Edge in AK does a lot of this...i.e. first vul of the day is the WWIII problem, second vul is all CT. Some squadron gets tagged for MC, they're given the assets and range space/time, go from there to plan/execute whatever you want within some constraints (for safety, etc.) Airboss can make sure it doesn't get out of hand/go down some road it shouldn't. There will still be a lot of learning, but with less of the "RF bullshit" attached, and everyone is less "burned out" at the end.

Actually care about the entire PR mission set from report to reintegration. There are a bunch of times that the helos are still in the wrong side of the fence and the fighters are popping beers at the bar. If it requires cycling off the tanker more than planned to provide OSC or RESCORT then so be it. This is in the weeds but pick a survivor from a strike package flight and have their Bros on the radio talking to their "wingman" instead of random guy with a CSEL.

It's clear that USAF needs to establish separate boards for rated officers. Tell me why I'm wrong, please. Sent from my iPhone using Baseops Network Forums

Escaping that black hole was a great feeling! Sent from my iPhone using Baseops Network Forums

An incase anyone was wondering, Karma 52 was the callsign of the F-111 lost during El Dorado Canyon, not the F-15E during OIF. Cap-10