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This seems appropriate

We had a plan for optionally manned... Obviously this program was and is personal to me. In the simplest terms, the Tactical Tanker debate comes down to one core issue: vision. For years, we’ve all acknowledged the “tyranny of distance” in the United States Air Force fight—especially across the vast operating areas of United States Indo-Pacific Command. Distance is the pacing threat’s greatest ally. It stretches logistics, constrains sortie generation, limits persistence, and ultimately caps combat power at the worst possible time. The Tactical Tanker concept directly attacked that problem. If I could distill the entire discussion down to the basics: it was about putting more gas forward. Not incrementally more. Not marginally more. Transformationally more. The modeling—while I can’t share specifics here—showed roughly three times the fuel offload at the IPs compared to the current construct. Three times. That’s not a tweak. That’s a different fight. More fuel forward means: Fighters push deeper without sacrificing weapons. Bombers retain flexibility instead of flying razor-thin margins. Tankers operate with more options instead of predictable orbits. The entire air campaign gains elasticity instead of brittleness. In a Pacific scenario, fuel is range, range is presence, and presence is deterrence. The Tactical Tanker fundamentally changed the calculus of how airpower could be projected and sustained. And yet, the conversation kept getting stuck. Specifically—on the boom. The boom became the intellectual gravity well. Instead of stepping back and asking, “What does tripling fuel forward do to the operational problem?” the debate narrowed into technical objections and legacy expectations. The inability to zoom out and process second- and third-order effects stalled momentum. That’s not a knock on anyone’s professionalism. It’s a reflection of institutional inertia. Large organizations optimize around what they know. They protect existing paradigms. They scrutinize deviation more harshly than stagnation. But transformational capability rarely fits neatly inside legacy mental models. The Tactical Tanker wasn’t about replacing the fleet. It wasn’t about novelty for novelty’s sake. It was about solving the INDOPACOM logistics geometry in a way that current constructs simply don’t. At some point, we have to ask: Are we optimizing for yesterday’s constraints—or tomorrow’s fight? Because in the Pacific, fuel isn’t a support function. It’s the strategy.

Heard back from AFPC this morning that my dates are flowing through the system. Going to Laughlin mid-May with IPT projected for the end of June at Prescott.

Fat Amy got her first kill. A yak130.

ADMIN NOTE: This thread is being absorbed into 'The Iran Thread"...

So far, this wins the award for coolest thing to happen in this war. What a fucking day to be a submariner!

Squids are VERY excited today...one of their attack subs torpedoed an Iranian Frigate. The Skipper had the stones to come to periscope depth and film it....epic! iGGQpwCNXNAdL1R1.mp4

Not odd if the Hornet driver has some questionable loyalties... There is an effort to contain some of the details in order to limit the obvious bad press and political consequences. Complete $hit, rip the Fing band-aid off and call it what it is.