Zero

I'm about halfway through it-- very well written. One thing that I would have liked to see early on was specifics when talking about how pilots find themselves in situations and don't trust the automation or vice versa. You go into the specific accidents later, but I think that a specific example--not a full blown incident-- would really help seal the narrative and "proof" at that early junction. For example-- was watching Air Disasters the other night and it gave the example where the captain's ADI went bad but hte co-pilot's and the standby were still receiving good data. The Captain absolutely failed the Recognize-Confirm-Recover piece-- never recognized and saw that his ADI indicated nose up and climbing, and he pushed it immediately into a dive from which they ultimately couldn't recover. That being said, that's the pilot in me talking-- I think that the academia world might not understand it-- especially for an education doctorate and it might be overkill at that point that potentially loses your audience in the jargon. If that's your target audience to get through the dissertation, it's probably good. If you're writing it for the aviation community, I think you could expand a little right there if you wanted to. Page 34-- you're referencing Air France and you mention Air Force training-- typo or deliberate? Nicely done-- I look forward to getting through the rest of it tonight or tomorrow. Cheers, Zero

Standard playbook across the force for the last 20+ years... 1. Cut to the bone. 2. Demand Congress pay for newer and more expensive toys since you're now below critical capability and stalling. 3. Get denied. 4. Act surprised. Gnash teeth and tear garments at AFA. 5. Get promoted. 6. It's somebody else's problem. Return to step 1.

Back around the late 2000s (2008ish I believe), there was a sudden push to revisit the “heritage and importance” of scarves. Funny to see it come full circle in the opposite direction, but that’s what happens if you stick around long enough to see yourself become the villain. Drew some ‘toons about it back in the day— definitely a few options that could be 36-2903 compliant.

Get ready y'all... we're living out the book "Catch 22."

Here's a solution that I've thought on for awhile... leave the GOs in place until they solve the problem. Make tours task-oriented rather than time-dependent. Nothing gets solved because nothing HAS to get solved-- it just depends what you can "say" you've done to your boss and on your OPB. And the bloated staffs with career civilians know that they just have to mind the clock until the latest guy goes away. That's why we've been talking about the pilot retention crisis for TWENTY YEARS. Capt Zero remembers the first visit from The Bobs asking why we CGOs thought our peers were getting out-- back in 2004. And it wasn't a new problem then. Starting at DO, you should be given a task to complete. For most DOs and CCs, that will be a full deployment cycle-- 2 years. Take a squadron from reset through ready. Do a good job? Move up and on. Don't do a good job? Thank you for your service. Same for every O-6 and up. Here's your tour-- here's what I need you to do. You have four months to tell me how long it's going to take. Do a good job? Move up and on. Fail? Thank you for your service-- it's time to retire / fire. Make it about what you actually get done, not what you say you've done. Will never happen-- because most GOs have risen on their ability to say what they've done-- the system worked just fine for them, so why would there be an impetus to change?? There are some out there who can walk the walk and have the stories to prove it. Too many are just paper tigers, with their accomplishments being as thin as the OPBs they're printed on.

Mission success! A184C0B3-2E8C-49E1-ACE0-7C5ED5C4793F.mov

Appreciate the words Springer-- definitely a ton of work, most of it dealing with USAF bureaucracy, but totally worth it to honor an warrior's legacy. We've got at least two jets now, hoping for two more ponied up soon to round out a four-ship. DFW ATC has been amazing-- said we could get a few thousand feet for the pull up-- for a Hog, that's all we'll need. We make the run right across the southern approach / departure corridor into DFW, which should be interesting to say the least but those guys have been unbelievably helpful so far. If we can get a tanker to help us out with a pre and post TOT topoff, that would be greatly appreciated and thanked with the appropriate gift of some fine adult beverages delivered to the crews. You know, for the effort. It's a Friday afternoon flight, so we'd take that into consideration in the selection of fine beverages to say thanks with.

We started tackling that piece right away— and you’re right, the USAF hurdle is the biggest. Whereas our own service puts all kinds of red tape around it, the first thing the guys at DFW said to me was “We do this all the time— we’ll get you everything you need to make this happen.” Can’t say the same for Big Blue, but they did say that it should be streamlined since we already have the jets lined up insofar as a unit that wants to do the flyover.

Baseops never disappoints... thanks all-- got in touch with the right people. Now for the seventh consecutive miracle... and that is to get maintenance to pony up some jets.

Long shot, but I know there are experts here who might be able to help. BLUF: Long-time A-10 leader passed away this week, and is being interred at DFW National Cemetery next week. We're looking to see if we can get a 4 Ship flyover but have no idea where to start with the airspace. That cemetery is 10nm SE of the eastern runway at DFW, so airspace should be simple. Right? Coord through official USAF channels to approve it is underway, but would like to know if anyone has any words on where to go otherwise; ATC POCs to coord and/or approve, or even just to find out if there's no way to proceed. They've done Memorial Day flyovers there, but I'm sure they have plenty of time to coord in advance for something like that whereas we have a week. Any point-outs are greatly appreciated, even if it's to show that it's unpossible so we can plan for an alternative COA here at Moody. Thanks in advance. Cheers, Zero

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1. Sex with the wrong person. 2. Money 3. Offended the wrong person. It's usually #1. I've long thought that Big Blue should publish leadership mishaps like we do for aviation, with the same level of privilege protections and the overall intent that we can learn from the mistakes of others. You don't have time to make them all yourself, so might as well learn from others. One could make the argument that the information eventually comes out, but I'd counter with the same "links in the chain" that safety discovers. How many times in a leader's past did we have a chance to avoid the catastrophe waiting in the wings? How can we learn to break that chain earlier in the sequence? If you fire someone, I think you should have to write that report. Might keep a Bob busy enough to cancel one of the BS meetings that we love so much.

Ahhh USAFA... like Big Blue, never passes up an opportunity by throwing money at problems in the attempt to get someone else to clean their house... What the Academy never seems to comprehend, or maybe even just acknowledge, is that a major contributing factor to many of their "problems" is that the place is full of cadets. (Yes, Edward Longshanks 'Braveheart' reference for the other grey-beards in attendance). Cadets are going to make mistakes-- a population demographic of 17-23 year olds, under intense pressure daily (debatable-- it was FAR tougher back in the day!), with limited and regulated pressure-relief options, suddenly given the anonymity of social media and intense social issues streaming around them-- some are going to make bad choices. If you read the referenced articles that came out of VMI back in 2020 (there are free ones that can be found other than the Washington Post's paywall), you can see the genesis of this issue-- apparently it's not relegated to the East Coast, but USAFA believes they have a problem. So, what would this silverback recommend? Lean into it. Get ahead of it. Build a center specifically to address these types of things-- call it the Character and Leadership Center. Build an old-school sundial to mark the location. Wait, they already did that? Seriously though-- I'd direct AOCs to get on the app and OBSERVE. DO NOT INTERACT! Look for the leadership lessons and get to the root causes of the statements rather than taking a comment purely at face value. Publish the quotes internal to your organizations and get your cadets talking about them. It has to be a conversation-- cadets will tune out a lecture. They're experts at it. All college students are. Like the Dodo of old, the cartoons we published were generally attacking an issue that we had at the time. E-Dodo, in some ways, made things worse by removing the oversight of the official publication. There were times that we pushed the limit just for the purposes of pushing the limit-- the kid in the back of the classroom who yells "F#CK" just because he knows he'll get a laugh and the punishment will be worth it. But does it contribute anything meaningful? But we also dealt with serious issues through humor and wit. Our idea was that if you could laugh at something, you could address it and move on. Unfortunately, the expletives for laughs ruined some of that credibility. Not all-- not every artist went down that same rabbit hole. Like the best instructors know-- look at what the student asked, then look at what they DIDN'T ask in that question. Same with statements made via this social media outlet-- look past the words and look at the issues that they're really commenting on. They're tough issues-- EXACTLY the kind of thing I want officer candidates working through in an ACADEMIC environment. Realize that some are going to take it too far-- it's a given with that age group. Expect it-- lean into it. Get ahead of it and show them where the off-ramps are before they run themselves too far in the heat of the moment. Some will no matter what you do. The ones that exhibit TRUE toxicity can be shown the door before they end up on the COMMANDERS ARE DROPPING LIKE FLIES thread. It's hard-- leadership is hard. Contracting out a solution will seem easy-- it's specific, measurable, and will seem attainable as printed on OPBs that get people promoted and off to their next assignment while the true problem still festers. Cadets will go deeper underground once the contractors show up on the threads. They'll spoof and move on. And contracting out leadership will only make the problem worse. But Zero, isn't your idea what they're trying to get at? Provide the examples so the Character and Leadership Center / AOCs can do their job? Maybe. But why use a middle-man then? And the worst part of the contract is the direction to de-anonymize the users. That's going to push them further underground and make your problem a maneuvering target. They're YOUR cadets. And guess what? This solution works for ROTC. It works even if there ISN'T an actual problem! It gets our future officers talking about what's going on around them. Too many instructors think that such discussions are a third-rail that carries the potential as career-ending suicide. Maybe. Maybe not if you do it right. Doing nothing or ignoring it is FAR worse in the long run. Lead them. Teach them. Cut the ones who don't make the grade. Remember that they're kids, and their vectors need to be adjusted. Mine sure did. I'm thankful for the mentors I had at the joint and every assignment afterwards who took the time to keep the engine running, but in a constant and consistent state of adjusting that thrust.

I'm glad that Donk and Billy Bob's sortie still stays in the forefront-- those two did a hell of a job that day. There's a podcast out there with the two of them talking for a couple hours about the mission and its impacts. I was in the 75th with them at that time, and I'm glad that they all got the recognition they deserved for the job they did that day. A funny story about the mission-- Billy Bob comes up to me and tells me that I need to see one of his passes from the sortie because he almost hit a bird while rolling in for a strafe pass. Seemed a little odd, but we watched the tape a few times, and sure enough, that "bird" had a little orange burst of fire in the center of it... damn airburst right in front of him as he's down the chute. Sobering moment to say the least... I think that coincided with the moment that the adrenaline had finally started to wear off from the mission. There's a painting in the 75th commemorating that mission, but there's a big problem with it-- it's TOO clear. The visibility was absolute dogshit that day-- foggy, hazy, low ceilings... and a good deal of AAA to boot. We watched some of the passes where BB is calling out the ground references that he knew would walk him to the target... and the tanks come out of the haze at damn near min range-- he's still on the trigger as the rounds are impacting almost immediately. They did what they had to do. And the JTAC controlling them that day was one of our pilots serving as a BnALO on the ground for the entire fight. Great story all around. I don't remember the ROE discussion being a huge issue, or maybe that's just for a couple of reasons. First, from the time we arrived in theater, our leadership made it very clear that they had our backs in the fight, so long as we could explain what and why we were doing something. If we decided that we needed to hang it out for the guys on the ground and could explain ourselves, they'd go to the mat for us. So there was that level of mutual support within the squadron that had come to be expected and established. Second, Donk didn't make it a big issue-- he explained what he did and why he did it and he stood up straight willing to accept any decision that was made knowing that he had done what needed to be done in the moment, and they were successful doing it. His combat leadership was unparalleled-- I'll never forget the speech he gave on the C-5 headed over. Every senior officer on base had put in their two cents, and I couldn't tell you what they said just a few hours later. I can still hear Donk's "We are going into harms' way" speech almost 20 years later. I clearly remember our Group Commander, Coach, getting on the bus and sending us off with one word.... "ATTACK!" We were fortunate to have him as our DO, and Bino as our CC for that fight. Under their guidance was when we really coined and instituted the phrase "Shark Standard," which was more an expectation and a guiding challenge than it was a statement. That phrase told you that you had a standard to live up to, not that you were automatically assumed to be the best or even worthy of it-- you had to prove it every day, in everything you did. I like to think that we did, and it was because of leaders like that who not only set that standard, but lived it for all of us to see and try to follow and keep up with. Donk's one of those leaders who if he said we were trekking to the seventh level of Hell, I'd ask what time the brief was. That's the spirit of ATTACK.