Zero

Mission success! A184C0B3-2E8C-49E1-ACE0-7C5ED5C4793F.mov

Appreciate the words Springer-- definitely a ton of work, most of it dealing with USAF bureaucracy, but totally worth it to honor an warrior's legacy. We've got at least two jets now, hoping for two more ponied up soon to round out a four-ship. DFW ATC has been amazing-- said we could get a few thousand feet for the pull up-- for a Hog, that's all we'll need. We make the run right across the southern approach / departure corridor into DFW, which should be interesting to say the least but those guys have been unbelievably helpful so far. If we can get a tanker to help us out with a pre and post TOT topoff, that would be greatly appreciated and thanked with the appropriate gift of some fine adult beverages delivered to the crews. You know, for the effort. It's a Friday afternoon flight, so we'd take that into consideration in the selection of fine beverages to say thanks with.

We started tackling that piece right away— and you’re right, the USAF hurdle is the biggest. Whereas our own service puts all kinds of red tape around it, the first thing the guys at DFW said to me was “We do this all the time— we’ll get you everything you need to make this happen.” Can’t say the same for Big Blue, but they did say that it should be streamlined since we already have the jets lined up insofar as a unit that wants to do the flyover.

Baseops never disappoints... thanks all-- got in touch with the right people. Now for the seventh consecutive miracle... and that is to get maintenance to pony up some jets.

Long shot, but I know there are experts here who might be able to help. BLUF: Long-time A-10 leader passed away this week, and is being interred at DFW National Cemetery next week. We're looking to see if we can get a 4 Ship flyover but have no idea where to start with the airspace. That cemetery is 10nm SE of the eastern runway at DFW, so airspace should be simple. Right? Coord through official USAF channels to approve it is underway, but would like to know if anyone has any words on where to go otherwise; ATC POCs to coord and/or approve, or even just to find out if there's no way to proceed. They've done Memorial Day flyovers there, but I'm sure they have plenty of time to coord in advance for something like that whereas we have a week. Any point-outs are greatly appreciated, even if it's to show that it's unpossible so we can plan for an alternative COA here at Moody. Thanks in advance. Cheers, Zero

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1. Sex with the wrong person. 2. Money 3. Offended the wrong person. It's usually #1. I've long thought that Big Blue should publish leadership mishaps like we do for aviation, with the same level of privilege protections and the overall intent that we can learn from the mistakes of others. You don't have time to make them all yourself, so might as well learn from others. One could make the argument that the information eventually comes out, but I'd counter with the same "links in the chain" that safety discovers. How many times in a leader's past did we have a chance to avoid the catastrophe waiting in the wings? How can we learn to break that chain earlier in the sequence? If you fire someone, I think you should have to write that report. Might keep a Bob busy enough to cancel one of the BS meetings that we love so much.

Ahhh USAFA... like Big Blue, never passes up an opportunity by throwing money at problems in the attempt to get someone else to clean their house... What the Academy never seems to comprehend, or maybe even just acknowledge, is that a major contributing factor to many of their "problems" is that the place is full of cadets. (Yes, Edward Longshanks 'Braveheart' reference for the other grey-beards in attendance). Cadets are going to make mistakes-- a population demographic of 17-23 year olds, under intense pressure daily (debatable-- it was FAR tougher back in the day!), with limited and regulated pressure-relief options, suddenly given the anonymity of social media and intense social issues streaming around them-- some are going to make bad choices. If you read the referenced articles that came out of VMI back in 2020 (there are free ones that can be found other than the Washington Post's paywall), you can see the genesis of this issue-- apparently it's not relegated to the East Coast, but USAFA believes they have a problem. So, what would this silverback recommend? Lean into it. Get ahead of it. Build a center specifically to address these types of things-- call it the Character and Leadership Center. Build an old-school sundial to mark the location. Wait, they already did that? Seriously though-- I'd direct AOCs to get on the app and OBSERVE. DO NOT INTERACT! Look for the leadership lessons and get to the root causes of the statements rather than taking a comment purely at face value. Publish the quotes internal to your organizations and get your cadets talking about them. It has to be a conversation-- cadets will tune out a lecture. They're experts at it. All college students are. Like the Dodo of old, the cartoons we published were generally attacking an issue that we had at the time. E-Dodo, in some ways, made things worse by removing the oversight of the official publication. There were times that we pushed the limit just for the purposes of pushing the limit-- the kid in the back of the classroom who yells "F#CK" just because he knows he'll get a laugh and the punishment will be worth it. But does it contribute anything meaningful? But we also dealt with serious issues through humor and wit. Our idea was that if you could laugh at something, you could address it and move on. Unfortunately, the expletives for laughs ruined some of that credibility. Not all-- not every artist went down that same rabbit hole. Like the best instructors know-- look at what the student asked, then look at what they DIDN'T ask in that question. Same with statements made via this social media outlet-- look past the words and look at the issues that they're really commenting on. They're tough issues-- EXACTLY the kind of thing I want officer candidates working through in an ACADEMIC environment. Realize that some are going to take it too far-- it's a given with that age group. Expect it-- lean into it. Get ahead of it and show them where the off-ramps are before they run themselves too far in the heat of the moment. Some will no matter what you do. The ones that exhibit TRUE toxicity can be shown the door before they end up on the COMMANDERS ARE DROPPING LIKE FLIES thread. It's hard-- leadership is hard. Contracting out a solution will seem easy-- it's specific, measurable, and will seem attainable as printed on OPBs that get people promoted and off to their next assignment while the true problem still festers. Cadets will go deeper underground once the contractors show up on the threads. They'll spoof and move on. And contracting out leadership will only make the problem worse. But Zero, isn't your idea what they're trying to get at? Provide the examples so the Character and Leadership Center / AOCs can do their job? Maybe. But why use a middle-man then? And the worst part of the contract is the direction to de-anonymize the users. That's going to push them further underground and make your problem a maneuvering target. They're YOUR cadets. And guess what? This solution works for ROTC. It works even if there ISN'T an actual problem! It gets our future officers talking about what's going on around them. Too many instructors think that such discussions are a third-rail that carries the potential as career-ending suicide. Maybe. Maybe not if you do it right. Doing nothing or ignoring it is FAR worse in the long run. Lead them. Teach them. Cut the ones who don't make the grade. Remember that they're kids, and their vectors need to be adjusted. Mine sure did. I'm thankful for the mentors I had at the joint and every assignment afterwards who took the time to keep the engine running, but in a constant and consistent state of adjusting that thrust.

I'm glad that Donk and Billy Bob's sortie still stays in the forefront-- those two did a hell of a job that day. There's a podcast out there with the two of them talking for a couple hours about the mission and its impacts. I was in the 75th with them at that time, and I'm glad that they all got the recognition they deserved for the job they did that day. A funny story about the mission-- Billy Bob comes up to me and tells me that I need to see one of his passes from the sortie because he almost hit a bird while rolling in for a strafe pass. Seemed a little odd, but we watched the tape a few times, and sure enough, that "bird" had a little orange burst of fire in the center of it... damn airburst right in front of him as he's down the chute. Sobering moment to say the least... I think that coincided with the moment that the adrenaline had finally started to wear off from the mission. There's a painting in the 75th commemorating that mission, but there's a big problem with it-- it's TOO clear. The visibility was absolute dogshit that day-- foggy, hazy, low ceilings... and a good deal of AAA to boot. We watched some of the passes where BB is calling out the ground references that he knew would walk him to the target... and the tanks come out of the haze at damn near min range-- he's still on the trigger as the rounds are impacting almost immediately. They did what they had to do. And the JTAC controlling them that day was one of our pilots serving as a BnALO on the ground for the entire fight. Great story all around. I don't remember the ROE discussion being a huge issue, or maybe that's just for a couple of reasons. First, from the time we arrived in theater, our leadership made it very clear that they had our backs in the fight, so long as we could explain what and why we were doing something. If we decided that we needed to hang it out for the guys on the ground and could explain ourselves, they'd go to the mat for us. So there was that level of mutual support within the squadron that had come to be expected and established. Second, Donk didn't make it a big issue-- he explained what he did and why he did it and he stood up straight willing to accept any decision that was made knowing that he had done what needed to be done in the moment, and they were successful doing it. His combat leadership was unparalleled-- I'll never forget the speech he gave on the C-5 headed over. Every senior officer on base had put in their two cents, and I couldn't tell you what they said just a few hours later. I can still hear Donk's "We are going into harms' way" speech almost 20 years later. I clearly remember our Group Commander, Coach, getting on the bus and sending us off with one word.... "ATTACK!" We were fortunate to have him as our DO, and Bino as our CC for that fight. Under their guidance was when we really coined and instituted the phrase "Shark Standard," which was more an expectation and a guiding challenge than it was a statement. That phrase told you that you had a standard to live up to, not that you were automatically assumed to be the best or even worthy of it-- you had to prove it every day, in everything you did. I like to think that we did, and it was because of leaders like that who not only set that standard, but lived it for all of us to see and try to follow and keep up with. Donk's one of those leaders who if he said we were trekking to the seventh level of Hell, I'd ask what time the brief was. That's the spirit of ATTACK.

I highly recommend this book to get an idea of what China has been doing for the last 23 years: unrestricted.pdf (oodaloop.com) Unrestricted Warfare, written by two Chinese Colonels back in 1999. I call this a "no respect bunt." After coaching youth baseball and softball for the last 10 years, I see two scenarios where teams bunt-- the classic move the runner into scoring position by sacrificing your batter, or the "no respect bunt." In other words, I know you can't defend this, so I'm going to keep doing it and putting my runners on. These two Colonels believe that it doesn't matter if they lay out their strategy-- we can't defend against it. The kicker is the date that this was published... realize that they've been executing this gameplan for two decades. "I'm going to TELL you that I'm going to bunt... and you still won't / cant stop it." Whether you agree with it or not, it's a very interesting read-- elements of Sun Tzu's "know your enemy..." They've done their homework on us for sure, and I would argue that they know us far better than we admit to knowing ourselves. For me, the most eye-opening part of this book is that they appear to have taken a strategy from our Cold War playbook, and I'm honestly afraid that we're unwittingly playing right into their hands-- spending ourselves into irrelevancy. They discuss the dependency on technology extensively, and that's coming from a late-90s perspective when we were still discussing Desert Storm as the game-changer of warfare. The argument can be made that one of the tactics we successfully employed in the Cold War was forcing the Soviet Union to collapse under the weight of its attempt to keep up with us militarily and economically. Trying to keep up with us militarily ultimately collapsed them because their economy could not keep pace with our ability to spend. The opposite perspective can come into play there as well in that we saw a perceived (or actual) advance in their capability, and we were able to out-produce them, which seems to be a common play today. We see China produce a handful of "fifth gen" airplanes (let's call it 7% the size of our 5th Gen fleet), and our military industrial complex spins into high PRF and proclaims that the sky is falling and we've lost our edge, leading for new calls to "outspend" our adversaries. That's not just the AF-- I've seen many articles detailing the "fact" that China has the largest navy in the world now. But when you look at those numbers, you see that they only have 3 carriers, none of which are nuclear powered and must be refueled every six days. I'm not discounting them outrightly, but I am contending that there's A LOT more than just numbers. But it depends on what your agenda is with respect to how you interpret those numbers. There are hints in this publication that this is a deliberate strategy on the part of Chinese to get us to succumb to our own tendencies. Remember that one of the tenants of Sun Tzu is to win without fighting. They don't NEED to beat us militarily, but if they can get us to collapse under the weight of our own natural tendencies, that's perfect for them. The CCP sits on a precarious perch of their own, as has been discussed extensively in this thread. Unrestricted Warfare shows that if they can engage across the spectrum, and you can take this battle plan and see that they've done just that for the last twenty years, then they can attain a significant advantage without competing toe to toe. China also has the advantage of playing the long game-- that's culturally significant throughout history. We update our approach every four years, and you can make the argument that we have a difficult time of seeing past the next election cycle, be that one or two years depending on the level of office.

You’re on to something there— that same thought process propagates through so many aspects of Corporate Blue’s culture— leadership is hard… management by processes is easy. It’s yet another by-product of the risk-averse mindset that’s risen to many corners of the top. Crafting that true “art” of war seems to be fading from the culture day by day.

Good video Clark— thanks for posting. It’s nice to see actual experts discussing the big issues instead of some computer-voice-overs created by DCS gamers claiming to be credible sources of information. One major item missing from the discussion, as always though, is actual A-10 expertise and experience. Here are my thoughts on the video, for what it’s worth… this discussion and a couple bucks will get you a halfway decent cup of coffee… this is gonna be a long read, so you might as well grab a cup of joe before settling in… Carrol and Herzinger hit on a key concept in the discussion of transferring ANY aircraft to Ukraine— the proficiency and ability to sustain the assets logistically. Even if we’re discussing F-16s, which fit the billet of multi-role needs of that nation, comes with a hefty price tag in terms of ground-based requirements. They jokingly refer to a HAZMAT program to deal with the hydrazine, to which the Ukrainians would probably scoff, but those are long-term, very real considerations. Do they have fuel trucks that can hook up to these fighters? What munitions are you giving them? How many crew chiefs and specs are you sending to get trained in the US? ANY transfer of aircraft in terms of hardware of this caliber will not produce an immediate effect on the battlefield, and in fact, as I mentioned briefly, can very well be a net DRAIN on their forces as they try to sustain something that is 100% foreign to them. Multi-role works best for smaller air forces— they HAVE to live in that realm. Hell, multi-role is a cornerstone of our programs, but I don’t believe that EVERY aircraft needs to be born and employed under that mantra. We have that luxury as a force that we can have specialization— though the budgeteers might disagree, we as an American Air Force have that ability whereas others do not. You could say the same for our approach to CSAR— we have the luxury and budget to dedicate such forces to the mission. “Give us an aircraft solution similar to the HIMARS.” That’s just not going to happen with western equipment for the reasons listed above and in their presentation. Now, back to the A-10. These guys are qualified experts in their field— Carrol world-renowned. But not in the A-10. If you think that MANPADs make brick walls and close off airspace to A-10s, then you’re not familiar with the Hog’s current suite of defensive systems, tactics, or weapons availability. If you throw out pics of KC’s battle-damaged A-10 and say that this proves the A-10’snvulnerabilities, then you don’t know the context of that situation. Anyone know how many passes that formation made prior to that hit? 5. Down the same ‘chute, same angle, while carrying 4x Mk-82s. Well that doesn’t sound smart now does it? It’s what they had to do. US forces were pinned down across the river by Iraqi forces under a bridge escarpment, and the only way to hit those Iraqi’s was to come in at a relatively low angle, from one direction, multiple times trying to get gun and rocket passes under the bridge with effective effects based on that battlefield terrain. A-10 defensive systems were not automatic at that time, and they became predictable due to the requirements of the troops on the ground. That hit aligns pretty well with the historical averages going back to Desert Storm— no A-10 has ever been hit on its first pass, and it’s usually around that fifth or sixth attack in the same area that gets them. The jet wasn’t carrying precision munitions that might have allowed for more standoff at that time either— they were A-10As, and precision engagement wouldn’t start for a few more years. The point is, in every discussion about hits that the A-10 has taken over the years, there’s A LOT of context required. The experiences over the Republican Guard in 1991 come up often in this realm, but without getting into that right now, the discussion needs to start with the question, “Why were A-10s operating in that environment at that time that led to those losses?” It’s a great story that adds so much more to the understanding of what led to those hits. William Smallwood does a great compilation in his book, “Warthog—Flying the A-10 in the Gulf War.” A stat you don’t see thrown around often— did you know that we lost just as many F-16s as A-10s during Ops Desert Shield and Desert Storm? Which brings me to the point of the SU-25s getting their “asses handed to them,” so why would anyone want something similar? I haven’t seen the numbers lately, but during the first three months of the war, SU-25 loss rates were comparable to all other fast-movers. If you classify the Frog as its own entity vs all other fighters, you’ll see that more traditional fighters were lost than -25s. Personally, since such a distinction is made between the Frog and all other fighters in terms of survivability, I think this is a fair comparison that proves that the Frog is being lost at a slightly lower rate than other, faster fighters. I also am not impressed by the tactics, training, or the apparent lack of effective equipment on the Frogs for that matter. If you read up on the SU-25SM (Russia’s “best” Frog), you’ll see that it boasts some pretty impressive equipment— on paper, it looks like it’s on par with US gear. But videos of Frogs in action shows that either this equipment (such as automatic counter measures) either doesn’t work, or the pilots don’t operate them correctly. So I think that it’s a natural attempt, but ultimately incorrect comparison between the battlefield employment of SU-25s to A-10Cs. The quote that the A-10 was “deemed unsurvivable in the 1980s” just shows the lack of familiarity with what upgrades have been done to the jet since then. I honestly think that many of the “pundits” commenting on the A-10 think that all she does is employ the same tactics, with the same suites and weapons as she did in 1984. While we’re still VERY good at those tactics, the envelope, effectiveness, and survivability has grown exponentially since then. If you want an interesting read, check out Douglas Campbell’s book, “The A-10 and the Close Air Support Debate.” There are passages and quotes in there from the 1980s that I swore were date-stamped 2013 the last time we had this discussion. Carrol makes the point that you can’t have an air threat and do CAS— I agree. In fact, that’s written in the JPUB. I do NOT agree that you need a limited MANPAD or even SAM threat, particularly when you’re talking about what would REALISTICALLY be associated with front-line units in a CAS fight. Carrol and Herzinger both hint at the cynical nature of this original discussion— a desperate long-ball to try to affect a final solution on the A-10. That knife kind of cuts both ways when you’re offering it to someone else, and you kind of get caught talking out of both sides of your mouth. “Hey, this jet isn’t good enough for us, but I think it’s just what YOU need in the same fight that I just said it wouldn’t be able to fight!” WTF? Let me close with this (the old man will stop yelling at clouds for the day). There are a lot of people with a lot of opinions about the A-10 who don’t have the familiarity with what the airframe can actually do. I’m reminded of a story from about ten years ago when a VERY senior civilian DoD member who was actively advocating for the divestiture of the A-10 was given a tour by one of the Hog units. Upon learning about the defensive capabilities of the Hog, this VERY senior civilian was shocked—this person had no idea about what upgrades and capabilities the aircraft actually possessed. And yet here that person was repeatedly professing the lack of survivability of the aircraft, advocating for a solution without being given the full information. We just shook our heads then as we do now. If you know, you know.

Alright... I'll come out of retirement for this one... been watching the discussion for awhile now, so I guess it's time to weigh in. Be careful where you get your sources from-- the "anonymous Hog Driver" quoted by The Aviationist in the 1945 article is a long-time F-16 pilot who only recently converted to the A-10... and is a big advocate of a particular unit converting back to Vipers in the near future. The discussion of the gun seems shocking to anyone who's never flown the A-10... ermahgerd.... you mean it's not good against armor in the face? As Paul Harvey so eloquently put it... and now, for the rest of the story... The study referenced here and many other places is based on the LAVP (lot acceptance verification program) that began in 1975. The study was written in 1979, but the bulk of LAVP occurred between 1978 and 1980. Why does that matter? Because the systems on board the A-10 at that time were DRASTICALLY different than what is on the aircraft now. The aircraft at that time were non-LASTE (Low Altitude Safety and Targeting Enhancement), meaning that the pilots essentially employed iron sights without the benefit of PAC (precision attitude control, which essentially ”locks” the primary flight controls to hold the pipper on the aimpoint and get better bullet density). In other words, the system has gotten BETTER over the years. MUCH better. Some quotes from the test: “Only 93 passes were made in high-rate due to restrictions; and all passes after November 1979 were further limited to low-rate, 1 second bursts. Although not ideal for bullet density, all ammunition fired for LAVP was pure API, not combat mix.” In other words, the results were limited by the test parameters of the time. Even given those constraints, “Of first importance, all the Pk’s were HIGHER than expected; and the low-angle were comparable to the high angle.” A final key note relates to the non-LASTE nature of the test: ”hits usually did not occur after the 25th round fired.” That’s a situation that has been rectified with modern upgrades to the airframe. As the text follows, “ LASTE enables burst length and density to INCREASE through the use of a constantly computed impact point (CCIP) and PAC“. In other words, the gun was good back then, it’s even better now. For the "shocking" part... ALL Hog Drivers are taught that we don't shoot tanks in the face if we can avoid it-- that's where the machines are designed to be the most effective in terms of armor, so naturally we train to hit them from the side, top, or rear. You don't always get that option in combat, so M or F kills are just as acceptable-- any EFFECT that degrades the enemy's ability to fight is a positive step in combat. If you think that Pk of 1.0 is widespread, you're watching too many movies and not spending enough time in the vault. Here's another kicker: the gun isn't the first choice against armor for many Hog Drivers. Gasp! The maverick missile, which was designed simultaneously with the A-X program as a PRIMARY munition for the new A-X, provides much better effects, some standoff, and precision capability. Given the right circumstances and approval, the Hog can sling six of those, rifling three on a single pass. Think about that-- a PLATOON or armor, completely wiped out by a single Hog on two passes. A 4 ship can render a battalion of armor combat non-effective on 2 passes with that loadout, and we haven't even gone to the gun yet. Now, back to the original discussion of the thread. Could the A-10 survive and be effective in Ukraine? Absolutely. In American hands, in the American way of major combat ops. Turns out, the Hog community has been training side by side with every aspect of the USAF in major exercises for the last 40 years. If the Hog was truly an unsurvivable liability as proven in every Red Flag and ME (now WSINT) vul, you bet your ass that Corporate Blue would have trotted those stats out immediately. I can recall many a RF vul thinking to myself as a Sandy One... "gawddamn... I'd have my hands full after this round..." ... and none of them were Hogs. Our way of fighting is an overwhelming, integrated approach to these kind of operations. Hogs might be slower, so we launch first, land last, and often times can make it happen without siphoning off tanker gas that the other guys need. If you haven't read many of the open-source articles written by some Hog Drivers that occasionally pop up, then you may not be familiar with the applications currently being explored out west-- adding SDB (16 per jet), MALD, and potentially JASSM to the Hog makes it an incredible support asset that makes 5th Gen even more lethal-- freeing them up to do their thing while the swine saturates the battlefield. And the kicker is that even once the Hog launches all that "new" stuff, depending on the loadout, she still has enough weapons to engage up to 20 targets. Each. Now, if you send the Hogs into a fight alone, with less-than-optimum weapons, without SA, without SEAD (neither side has dedicated SEAD/DEAD assets), without effective tactics (both sides are, shall we say, less than impressive), and without training (how long does it take to train up ANY pilot to this level of warfare), then the results will be predictable. And I'll throw it out here since it's been floated on other sites: you send the Ukrainians ANY of our fighters, give them minimal time to get fam'd with it, maybe don't provide them the best weapons we have, and the results will be the same-- disaster. Tactics, training, and operational integration are key to major combat ops. They don't have it, so it really doesn't matter WHAT weapon you put in their inventory.

I had made the comment in the squadron that the Ukrainians didn't have SEAD... ...and then I saw the tractors. Ukrainian Weasels: "You call, we haul."