TnkrToad

What I'm hearing from this is that Big Blue (and in particular HAF A1M) is choosing to be reactive rather than proactive. I don't think we have enough time to let this play out. From the example I tried to lay out earlier (when I say "you" below, I mean A1M, which presumably you belong to): Before you even built the current & next FY's ACP programs: - You knew the manning picture for 11Ms--and were tracking inventory by MWS and year group (better known as Red Line/Blue Line Chart) - You knew the raw data on the RL/BL chart for 11Ms is misleading, because all manner of 11Ms are filling non-11M billets, because other pilot communities (I presume 11F, 11S and 11H--the last time I saw a RL/BL chart was a long time ago) were hurting - You knew (and have acknowledged above) that airline hiring was increasing--and would remain high for the foreseeable future--and you further knew what the ACP take rates looked like in the late 90s, during the last big airline hiring boom - You knew (or darn well should know) how many 11Ms are eligible for the ACP in a given FY, and hence should have had a target 11M take rate in mind -- Based off of how few eligibles there are in some communities (I used tanker bubbas for my example, but I suspect they're not the only year/MDS group that needs a pretty high take rate to make the Red & Blue lines match) Given all that you knew/should have known, you forewent the opportunity to better incentivize heavy guys from the year groups currently eligible for the bonus to stay in. As discussed in my previous post, the consequences for failing to retain talent will stay with us for a very long time. Not only that, if the anticipated hemorrhaging does happen, you won't even start to correct it until 2 FYs from now. This doesn't make me feel all that optimistic. This might begin to explain frustration you're hearing from dudes like General Condition, me, perhaps others. Please help me understand if I am somehow wrong on any of the above.

I think you're right--in my opinion, a more-targeted bonus by itself wouldn't help. Multiple better-targeted milestones might do the trick. Seems to me if board instructions were written to effectively shape the Air Force toward what it really needs, a more optimal mix could (would?) result over time. Consider the opportunities to shape the AFSC mix in the force: - O-4 promotion - IDE selection - ACP program - O-5 promotion - Command selection - SDE selection Seems like the ACP program (and perhaps command selection boards, but by that point it's probably too late) is the only one that intentionally shapes the AFSC mix in the pilot community--and as discussed, it probably doesn't do it specifically enough. I'm not a personnelist, but it's pretty clear to me what we're doing right now ain't working. Well played

You might be surprised to read that we're in violent agreement in many respects--but I think there's a fundamental misunderstanding. I don't have a whiteboard with lots of colored markers, so I'll try to explain with words--and I think I can tie it into the toxic leadership thread while doing so. I will use the tanker bubbas to illustrate the point, but you can apply the overall argument to examine other communities: - The fighter community is hurting overall and the heavy community not so much--overall. We agree here. -- Raw numbers-wise, I'd assume the tanker community is healthy (but I'm not at a flying base right now and likewise don't have access to the Red Line/Blue Line charts at HAF A1M that show overall inventory) - The ACP program seeks to manage overall manning by only affecting one year group at a time (those reaching the end of their SUPT commitments in a given FY) - The question is, how is this going to play out for the current group of eligibles--and those who will later have to work for them? - Here we go, then: -- Small year group of tanker eligibles this year, of which surprisingly few are to be found at tanker bases --- Small overall number is presumably due to mismanagement of force shaping programs, since Big Blue was pumping out plenty of tanker dudes 10 years ago or so --- Small number at tanker bases is likely due to what you described--they've been farmed out all over the Air Force (and a small number are in IDE/other places for bright and shiny types) to compensate for overall shortages in other pilot communities Extrapolate this small number of tanker bubbas (77 eligibles this year) out over the next 8-10 years or so: - A third--but likely more--separate and go to the airlines, leaving 50ish - 15% or so don't make Lt Col--bringing the number (optimistically) that stay in 'til 20 yrs active service down to perhaps 45 - Half of those guys elect to retire at or shortly after the 20 yr point (airlines are still hiring)--maybe 22 left from that whole original year group even meet the O-6 board - Half of those guys get passed over for O-6, leaving maybe 12 to fill O-6 and above leadership positions--not to mention staff billets, PhD instructors at USAFA/AWC/SAASS, etc. -- Limited choices rarely lead to great results You can quibble over the numbers a little bit, but this is why I am concerned about tanker manning Given that many of these guys will have spent much of their careers outside of the tanker community--after all, the fighter, AFSOC, etc. communities are too thin overall--the tanker community ends up with leaders who either: - Are great guys who manage to stay in despite being overworked, and somehow make the cuts for promotion and command -- There are a number of guys in this category, but they won't comprise the majority of the 12 "survivors"--and even if they did there still wouldn't be enough to go around - Nominally hail from our community, but haven't seen a tanker in XX years, because they've spent their lives in school and staff -- There is a disproportionately high number of folks in this category - Come from another tribe (other heavy community, or worse bombers or fighters) and wreak havoc due to their ignorance/arrogance--because folks at HAF A1M and AFPC were too busy looking at the forest to see that the trees were dying -- I'm obviously not a Herc dude, but is it possible that this is how Rat became the leader he is--because Force Management policy gave us no one else? Seems to me that the ACP program could be used to try to mitigate these concerns, by focusing on actual manning/undermanning on a true per-year-group basis. That didn't happen this year or for next fiscal year, which is unfortunate to say the least. Make sense? Big picture enough? Rant off.

Dude, I'm not angry. If you're General Chang operating under a different pseudonym, I'd be unimpressed . . . but that's a different matter. I'm trying to point out what seems to be a logical inconsistency, and since you claim to be close to the process, I'm asking you to help me understand--and I think it would help others on the forum, too: - The point of the ACP program, as I understand it, is to properly balance the force--by MWS. That makes good sense to me - The data points, as I understand them, indicate that the heavy community--or at the very least the tanker community--is looking pretty numerically unhealthy. That makes me concerned - In consideration of a hiring boom, in which it would seem to me that heavy drivers will more easily be able to secure Guard/Reserve jobs and/or airline gigs if they separate, it seems heavy guys should be even more incentivized to stay in - Given the above, I would expect to see the ACP program offering added incentives for heavy drivers to stay in . . . but the actual program seems to indicate the opposite: from the data points I already noted, the seemingly healthier Viper community (with 117 eligibles this go-around) is being offered added incentives to stay in, while the seemingly anemic tanker community (with 77 eligibles) gets no such consideration. This I just don't get Any constructive insight you have to offer will be very much appreciated. I'm obviously more concerned about the tanker community, and curious about the relative health of the year group that's eligible this year, but any factual insight you can offer will be very much appreciated. Cheers, TT

I get that the numbers will keep going up--I guess I didn't make my point clearly enough. Since you're apparently a policy wonk, maybe you can help with this: - The number of ACP takers won't go any higher than the total number of eligibles - Looking at the tanker community at least, the number of eligibles seems surprisingly low -- According to the AFPC stats, only 77 total KC-135 pilots total are eligible (40 less than the F-16 community's 117 eligibles) --- We live in a weird world if the Viper community is 50% bigger than the tanker community -- McConnell--a super tanker wing, in a command where tankers comprise a significant amount of the mobility fleet, only has 3 eligibles. This makes zero sense to me -- The other tanker bases don't seem to have many eligibles either, esp since many of the other tanker bases (Kadena, Mildenhall, MacDill...) have multiple MDSs Question for you, rtgators--where the #%^* are all the tanker bubbas? I remember plenty of copilots flowing into flying squadrons 10 years ago. What has Big Blue done with them all? To tie this more clearly to the ACP discussion--if Big Blue has mismanaged the tanker community (which appears to be the case, given low numbers of eligibles), I sure hope the take rate increases dramatically over the next month or so. Posted from the NEW Baseops.net App!

The ACP take rate stats are updated as of 27 Aug While I fully understand that, like Double Jeopardy, the scores can really change, the sorting by base and Majcom is interesting: - The lowest take rates by MAJCOMs are for ACC & AMC--two of the three largest MAJCOMs by pilot eligibles, with take rates (thus far) of 14.02% and 16.67%, respectively. Doesn't seem all that inspiring. - AETC has a whopping 26.05% take rate thus far--but given that they own those currently in IDE, this seems low -- It's interesting that Altus only has 1 out of 18 takers so far--I assume that's a bright-and-shiny IDE select type One question for other tanker dudes out there: how in the world is it that there are only 3 ACP eligibles at McConnell--a super tanker base? The other tanker bases, as far as I can tell, don't have a whole bunch of eligibles either. - Where are the tanker pilots from this year group? Have they all gotten out already, are they already stuck in staff purgatory, or what? Just curious.

If there are any personnelist types out there, please correct me if I'm wrong, but it appears to me that the actual potential promotion rate dropped by 10% (from 85% to 75%). The reason the IPZ rate dropped by "only" 7% is that there were proportionally fewer BPZs and APZs selected in this board, as compared to the last.

The outlook for MAF leadership does look bleak, but it seems to me that the damage has been/will be done in a way that our senior leaders will fail to recognize it and do anything about it: - The lower overall promo rate for pilots of all types is down, from 74.7% in the last board, to 70.3% in this board - Best I can tell, the promotion opportunity for this board was 75%, whereas it was 85% in the previous board (BPZs & APZs reduced this and last boards' IPZ rates to 67% & 74%, respectively) - MAF pilots typically fare worse than those from other MDSs, so the MAF pilot promo rate is likely going to be even worse than the overall - Throw in the improving outlook in the civilian sector, and many of those the Air Force doesn't force out/encourage to get out through promo boards and force management programs will punch when they hit retirement eligibility at 20 yrs - The problem is that there will still be enough high-speed MAF types that get promoted and choose to stay in that MAF leaders will remain unconcerned about the health of the leadership pipeline or the ability to fill Joint & HAF staffs. Furthermore, they won't worry too much about having enough pilots overall, since long SUPT commitments will ensure that flying wings/groups/squadrons have plenty of bodies to hack the mission. What senior leaders will likely fail to realize or appreciate is how few experienced senior O-4 and O-5 types will exist in operational staffs, at the Wing through MAJCOM level. Taken together with a rapidly aging and retiring government civilian population where most corporate knowledge resides, this will mean that there will be precious few who know how to translate our leaders great ideas into actionable plans that wings and below can execute -- The relatively small group of MAF pilots selected for O-5 will, by the time they meet their O-6 board IPZ at 20+ years, will consist almost entirely of bright-and-shiny IDE/SDE types, PME/USAFA instructors (read people who have good deals and are happy to stay where they are) and dead weight (those who somehow got selected for O-5 but contribute little to the mission) The result will be a MAF community that (from everything the leaders can quantify) will have what it needs: an adequately large pool of future senior leaders and enough pilots to hack the mission. What, pray tell, do you think TACC is going to look like 5ish years from now? We won't be able to fight our way out of a wet paper bag, because the Baby Boomer generation civilians where most corporate knowledge resides will have retired, the Reservists who came back on active duty will have hit 20 yrs of AD time and retired (or gone back to their Traditional Reserve and airline jobs), the bright-and-shiny types will be too busy going to school and promotable staff assignments, and hardworking/competent/but not promotable beyond O-5 types will have taken their 20 yr retirements and will be walking into airline jobs. The pool of retired MAF Navs (another great source of GS civilian types) will be drying up if not completely dried up, since they've been replaced by avionics. Bottom line, in the not-too-distant future (if it's not here already--I'm too far removed from the real world), the guys responsible for making leaders' dreams into operationally-executable reality will mostly be a bunch of dead-weight senior O-4s and O-5s . . . aided by a much smaller number of dedicated, competent but grossly overworked O-5s who are trying to keep the ship afloat. edited to add a little more verbiage

PM sent. Apologies to all for long rant earlier. While AFPC and Big Blue more generally have more than their share of faults, there's an under-appreciated element that impacts with our lives: screwed up joint command & control relationships (of which C2 of Mildenhall tankers is emblematic). Looking forward to offline discussion with Tnkr.

Not trying to pick on you, but for the tanker dudes on this forum, just want to correct a misunderstanding. The below is a bit of a rant, but I hope some will find it educational): - Deploying crews from Mildenhall at that time is an example of the Air Force doing something right - During the timeframe in question, Mildenhall planes and pilots were literally flying half as much as those in AMC . . . despite the fact that AMC units were getting flooded with copilots as well - Prior to the decision to deploy crews (but not jets) from Mildenhall, the average pilot there--based on annual flying hour program and number of pilots--would fly about 150 hours per year in Mildenhall jets. The vast majority of the flying done by Mildenhall crews were local sorties, so TDY rates on a per-aircrew basis was insanely low. The jets weren't exactly overtaxed, either; they flew on average just over one hour per day -- The "fix" for this was to put two copilots on each sortie, so one could log useless "Other" time, and hence double the flight hours that could otherwise have logged - With the 80+ pilots sitting at Mildenhall (none of them deploying downrange--aside for individual taskings from the AEF Center), and such an abysmally low flying hour program for the number of pilots, deploying Mildenhall crews was way overdue - I have trouble buying in to the notion that 80+ pilots (read 40+ pilot teams) were incapable of handling the pressure of 9+ sorties/day. This "extreme" number of daily sorties was only met on weekdays. Weekend requirements were far from onerous - Based on my rough math, Mildenhall pilots--without the AOR deployments--could expect to fly less than a 3.0 sortie once a week (unless they hopped on an additional sortie to log Other time), and when said individual did go TDY, as indicated above the locales weren't all that bad - Meanwhile, in mother AMC, crew dawgs were gone 180 days/year, sitting homeland defense alert when at home (in addition flying operational and training missions), and when they did deploy they generally went to crapholes. Their flying experience might have been too weighted toward standardized missions in the AOR, but at least they were flying real operational missions (not "operational" missions flown round-robin from home station to refuel German fighters) -- Once Mildenhall took on the burden of deploying a meager amount of crews downrange, the average copilot might deploy on one 90-day deployment per year. That deployment would more than double the flying hours that said copilot would have gotten at home station Bottom line: the notion that the Mildenhall pilots and aircraft situation was anything other than a gross waste of resources--both before and after supporting downrange requirements--is still poorly understood among tanker crews (at least those who got to enjoy the good life at Mildenhall) Here's the real issue: the tankers at Mildenhall are owned by EUCOM (via USAFE), rather than TRANSCOM (via AMC). - In the '06-'08 timeframe, EUCOM clung to its toys and people (Mildenhall tankers and crews), with the result that AMC aircraft and crews' utilization rates had to take up the slack that Mildenhall and (probably Kadena, although I don't know their story) could have helped take up. Mildenhall crews benefited from screwed up Combatant Command relationships - If Mildenhall crews truly are getting crushed relative to their AMC peers (sounds suspect, but I'll give them the benefit of the doubt), I assume that the same screwed up COCOM relationship is again to blame. The perception among Mildenhall crews that they are overworked can only be due to one of two reasons: -- They really are overburdened relative to AMC crews, and USAFE/EUCOM staff are unwilling or unable to get additional people and planes CHOP'd to theater to meet requirements. Given that EUCOM staffs are largely populated by Army dudes, it wouldn't surprise me to hear that the EUCOM staff is tone deaf to reason and logic. -- Mildenhall aircrew perceptions are inaccurate. USAFE/EUCOM staff can't get more people or planes into theater, because there's no logical basis for doing so. I don't know enough about the current situation to determine which of the two possibilities is more true I know I'm just picking on Mildenhall, but I suspect that Kadena tankers and crews were just as grossly underutilized--if not worse--than Mildenhall ones during the '06-'08 timeframe (if not for long after that). I hope one day we'll finally figure out how to reasonably spread the pain among stateside and overseas based tankers (and other platforms, too). NKAWTG, Tnkr Toad

There's one thing that I think needs to be understood in all this (and this will kind of bleed into the Force Shaping and Pilot Bonus threads)--and that is demographics. In my estimation, it has more to do with the mess the Air Force finds itself in than individual leaders' decisions. Here goes: - Leader selection: -- Our current batch of Air Force four-stars entered the Air Force between 1976-1980, and our current O-6s entered generally between 1983-1991 (pin-on somewhere around 22 years & stay as late as 30 yrs) -- Peak hiring in the last hiring boom was between 1996-2000ish -- What this means to me: Our current four-stars hit 20-year retirement eligibility, and our much of our current O-6 leadership hit bonus eligibility in the midst of the hiring boom and stayed in, while their peers were getting out in droves -- What this means to me is that Big Blue had a smaller pool of candidates from which to select future senior leaders, and it is quite possible that there was a decrease in quality as a result. Dudes that might have stayed in and made the Air Force a better place pulled chocks instead Note: I have no solid evidence of this, but choosing leaders from a smaller "gene pool" has to have a qualitative impact Looking forward: - Baby boomers are hitting age 65 in ever-increasing numbers; the peak of the Baby Boom was in 1961 (4.3 million--will hit 65 in 2026), so they'll be leaving huge holes in the workforce well into the future (for we pilots, as we know this translates into significant hiring) - At the same time Boomer retirements accelerate, those Air Force officers who were born in the worst of the Baby Bust years (lowest births in 1973, with only 3.14 million) will hit 20-year retirement eligibility (born in approx '73, commissioned in approx '95, retirement eligible in '15) - The year groups in and around the '95 year groups were ones in which Big Blue grossly underproduced pilots--and in particular produced way too few 11Ms To sum up: - In the next several years, rapidly increasing demand (most importantly pilots in our example, but they'll need experience across disciplines and industries) will be met by some of the lowest numbers of recently-retired Air Force pilots (and in particular mobility pilots) in many years - Historically high demand will meet historically low supply, which will lead the majority of those who stuck it out 20 yr retirement to walk into the readily-available airline--and other--jobs out there. Given the inevitably small (sts) number of pilots that bother to stay in past 20 yrs and thus meet their O-6 boards, how much quality control do you think Big Blue is going to have? If the bumpy ride we've had in the Air Force over the past several years is in any way due to poor quality control (driven by low numbers of folks who stayed in during the late-90s as stated above), then we're in for a really bumpy ride over the next decade and a half or so. - I guess the good news is that if you're a 15-20 year O-5 type and you've played the game reasonably well over the past several years, you'll have a historically good chance at making O-6. You won't have any competent minions (read grey beard O-4/O-5 types), since they'll find much greener pastures outside of the Air Force, you won't have any money for your organization, and you'll deal with senior leadership that for the most part has destroyed institutional morale . . . but you'll have some really cool, shiny birds on your shoulders. Good luck with that. I hope we get some combination of competent/inspirational leaders and useful bonuses to ensure that we retain what leadership talent we have. Rant off. Edited for a math error

Reserve component pilots are on average more experienced than their active-duty counterparts. Pilots with higher experience levels require fewer training events per month/quarter/etc. than those with lower experience levels. Lower numbers of requirements directly translate into lower flying hour requirements.

Although I'm a heavy guy by background, it's been a long time since I was in mother AMC--I guess this is why I'm posting here; I'd like to stay in touch with reality. Not much of the ACP thing has made sense to me lately--for the heavy community or otherwise. The only reason for the 62ish percent take rate in the heavies (at least so far as I can tell) is a combination of school selects and good deal assignments. Below is my completely unscientific thinking: - 20 of the 62 percent are IDE/crossflow/WIC/overseas assignment/other extended-ADSC types. They've already "sold their souls" to Big Blue, so taking the bonus is a no-brainer - A further 10 percent are the "bottom of the barrel" types that have nowhere else to go; better to stick with Big Blue's jobs program than risk life in a competitive marketplace - Maybe another 20 percent are folks that have it good and figure it will remain so. After all, it's AMC types that're filling all the SUPT, OSA, USAFA, etc. billets, because the other communities can't afford to let their folks go. Problem is they're helping everyone but AMC - The last 12 percent are perhaps the mission-oriented, good dudes that, although they weren't selected for school and their lives suck due to high opstempo, are nonetheless sticking it out because they still believe in the mission Again, I have no clue as to whether/not I'm even close to right on the above percentages, but I think the concept is reasonable. Problem is, there aren't enough bodies in the last 12 percent group to get the MWS expert, IP/EP, ADOish types that you need. My assumption--those of you in heavy squadrons right now tell me if I'm wrong--is that quality O-4 types no longer exist in flying units. They're either at school, on staff, flying white jets, or are deployed . . . leaving CCs & DOs that's spent so much time out of the cockpit they don't know the mission, and nobody that does know the mission well enough to make the squadron run smoothly. The inmates are thus left to run the asylum, as a bunch of Capts/Lts try to hack the mission without the benefit of graybeard types around to mentor them. My $.02. Take it for what it's worth.

On further reflection, I don't see how Cannon could be the cause of a significant drop in AFSOC take rates--Cannon wasn't exactly new in FY13. Any effect Cannon had on folks' willingness to stay in should likewise have depressed take rates in prior years as well. - Only way Cannon could have had an effect in FY 13 is if new missions/aircraft were moved there in the past year, or if Cannon leadership/local conditions in Clovis suddenly sucked worse than in prior years - If Cannon is truly the reason for worsening take rates in AFSOC, then that community is screwed. AFSOC's already undermanned--if Cannon's the problem and it ain't going away, then I don't see how that command will ever get healthy I might be over-analyzing year-to-year trends in various communities, so I'll step back & make this bigger-picture observation: The last time the ACP take rate was below 65% was FY02. There's a continuing downward trend, from 76% in FY10, to 70% in '11, to 67% in '12, to 62% in '13. Not a good sign, in my estimation.

Funny, I just double checked--the "Initial RPA" take rate for the fighter CSOs (18/33, for a 55% take rate) was lower than that of the fighter pilots. Still doesn't change the 57% take rate for fighter pilots I cited earlier.

Not getting what you mean about Navs--what do they have to do with pilot ACP take rates?

Just looked at the AFPC website, and the data they posted is current as of today. Assuming there's no rush between the posting today & midnight when they formally close out this FY's ACP, here's what I make of the raw data available. BLUF, doesn't look great for Big Blue: - Take rate is down overall from last year (62% from 66%) -- It's way down from FYs 10 & 11, when it was 77% & 70%, respectively - Take rates decreased for four of the five largest pilot communities (Mobility, Fighter, Spec Ops, C2ISR) -- Large percentage losses from large communities means significant losses overall -- Fighter take rate only decreased slightly, but given low manning in the community & added incentives to keep them in through additional bonus options, not a good news story for the pointy-nose guys - SOF & C2ISR communities saw double-digit decreases in take rates -- SOF down to 55% from 73%, C2ISR down to 64% from 80%; since AFSOC in particular is grossly undermanned to begin with, again not a good sign -- Should I assume Cannon is the reason SOF's got a low take rate & MC-12 is the reason for C2ISR? - Weirdly, the two communities with the healthiest take rates (CSAR & Bomber--91% & 74%, respectively) are the redheaded stepchildren of ACC. Somehow, being unappreciated seems to make folks wanna stay in. I don't get it. - The one ray of sunshine I found is that the take rate for RPA types increased a bunch (up to 59% from 49%)--I guess the new bonus options really did matter to them . . . So, take rates are down despite additional ACP incentives, and at a time when the airline hiring's only just getting started. What's AFPC gonna do next year to improve retention in the midst of increased airline hiring & further hits to the Air Force budget? I look forward to reading AFPC's Retention Report when it eventually comes out--can't wait to see how they're gonna spin this. Cheers, TT

Not sure why Red Line/Blue Line would or should be FOUO . . . I can understand why the Air Force's internal deliberative processes (What do the numbers mean? What policy should we pursue as a result? How to do we "sell" this to internal and external audiences?) might be FOUO--folks don't need to see all the sausage-making in progress. There's no logical reason to withhold the raw data, though--it's not deliberation or policy, just fact. When you do get a chance to look over the Red Line/Blue Line (even if you can't post it), I'd be curious to get your inputs as to: - Why special treatment for 11Fs only, when the 11S & 11H communities' respective manning numbers are worse? - Is there any validity to GC's assertion that we've got a "glut" of 16-20 year group guys . . . how could there be, when those year groups represent the "pilot bathtub" created by previous senior leaders? - Why is Big Blue senior leadership so dismissive when concerns are raised about 11M manning, which is already going in the crapper? -- To keep this on the Promotion topic, where do you think you're going to get your future MAF leadership? --- Almost all the "fat" year groups for heavy guys are ones that haven't reached the ends of their SUPT ADSCs . . . how many do you think are going to stick around & try for O-6 and higher when 1) They've gotten crushed their whole careers TDY & deployment-wise, 2) Airlines are hiring in droves the year they reach bonus eligibility, and 3) Even if they do stick it out 'til 20 the airlines are still hiring like gangbusters? Kinda hard to be selective when the number of O-6 billets you need to fill equals the number of folks meeting the O-6 board in a given year.

Problem is 41 pages, with nobody yet able to provide a rational, numerically supported rationale for the ACP/ARP. Given that promotions, Palace Chase, ARP, RIF, VSP, SERB and IDE/SDE are part of the same force management continuum, it's natural that there'll be crosstell between the two threads. - Just as Big Blue uses promotions (timing and rate) to control for surpluses or shortages, so it also uses (or should use) Palace Chase as one of the tools, along with ACP, to control for surpluses/shortages, respectively, in the years between those promo boardsg in -- Promoted too many to Capt/Maj? "Fix the glitch" by slashing the ARP program/encouraging Palace Chase. Not enough staying in? Shut off Palace Chase/beef up the ARP - It's totally reasonable for pilots to expect Big Blue leadership to encourage Palace Chase . . . assuming said leadership is rational and if there is in fact a glut of pilots - Problem is GC seems thus far to be impervious to reason and is incapable/unwilling to provide data to support any of what he's saying Given that a picture is worth a thousand words, and you purport to be in senior leadership, can you not post a reasonably current "Red Line/Blue Line" chart, showing pilot requirements vs inventory, by year group and pilot community? - This discussion would make a lot more sense, and (assuming Big Blue is making rational decisions based on those charts) you'd get a whole lot more buy-in from the crowd here - Problem is you'll have to explain how/why pilot requirements vs. inventory is so screwed up . . . then you'll have a have a really hard time explaining why the "just trust us" mantra you & GC have been pushing has any credibility (after all, it was senior AF leaders that created the "pilot bathtub" in the mid-90s year groups, the VSP debacle and all manner of other tomfoolery) Is it possible to provide any stats/data that supports the force management policies that Big Blue leadership is enacting?

GC--Funny, I always thought honesty was the best policy . . . Try this: - Post current "Red Line/Blue Line" charts that show overages/shortages of pilots by year group, broken down by AFSC—11F, 11M, etc. -- You're making policy decisions (ARP/VSP/RIF/SERB/Palace Chase/promo board dates and rates) based on these numbers anyway--what's the harm in posting? -- You'll in fact get better buy-in, not only in this forum, but across Big Blue, since folks will see the rational basis for the policy decisions you're making . . . this, of course, assumes that policies rationally correlate with the data you post (which is a stretch, I’ll admit) - Shape--and publicly discuss the rationale for--promotion rates, ARP, SERB, based on this data -- If there truly is a glut of FGOs (I suspect the glut is in the 20+ yrs of service crowd, not the 16-20 (at least in the pilot force--due to A1 "pilot bathtub" tomfoolery for the mid-90s year groups), then SERB those guys. They’ve already reached retirement age, they are by definition redundant, so what’s the harm? Likewise, for undermanned AFSCs provide bonuses for the year groups that are short. --- Folks will get it if you show them the facts. Given the poor policy decisions in the past, "trust us, we know what we're doing" is going to fall flat Best part is the problem will self-correct over time. Folks in overage year groups/AFSCs will either preemptively get out or steel themselves for the possibility/likelihood of being passed over—and hence will be unlikely to complain when the inevitable happens. Those in SUPT will compete all the more rigorously to get into shortage pilot career fields, knowing that promotions and financial incentives will surely follow. You wanna get USAFA cadets motivated to fly? Show them, through words, actions and statistics that they’ve got bright futures ahead of them: - Due to shortages of 11Fs in younger year groups, those who do end up getting a fighter stand a great chance of staying in the cockpit for a long time (due to shortages, hard to justify releasing to staff). If Big Blue is smart, higher promo rates and bonuses must surely follow . . . dudes get the best of both worlds—rage around the skies and get paid handsomely to do it—what’s not to love? - Folks in overmanned AFSCs will know that Big Blue will rationally choose to let them Palace Chase to fix the imbalance. If they suck, they’ll perhaps be motivated to work a bit harder, knowing that RIF/being passed over hangs over their heads if not enough get out on their own If cadets felt they could count on A1 to be rational, now would be an awesome time to go to SUPT.

GC apparently isn't coming back to this discussion, so pointless to respond to him personally, but gotta make some observations about what he's saying: - He says essentially that Big Blue must be reactive (can't predict the future, so at best can only react to the recent past--i.e., current manning & prior years' ACP take rates) - Large numbers of retiring Baby Boomers from the workforce in this and for the next many years has been foreseeable for, I don't know, about the last 65 years or so . . . and BTW, they're going to vacate jobs across the economy, not just the commercial airline industry - Funny thing is that 11Fs eligible for the bonus this year ('01/'02ish year groups) are in fact "healthy" according to the "red line" requirements vs. "blue line" inventory. Big Blue is pretty well screwed for later year groups, but that would imply that they're figuring this FY's bonus on predictions of future 11F manning . . . weird - It's also funny that when the mid-90s (read "pilot bathtub") year groups, which were undermanned from the outset, came up for bonus eligibility they were offered none of the same special ACP options we're seeing now. Again, A1's logic is at best horribly inconsistent - GC cited record ACP take rates (historical data) to validate his points, but ignores the most relevant data points--ACP take rates in the late-90s. If he's playing "hear no evil/see no evil" with hard data, and as I assume works in A1M or somewhere in that vicinity, then one must assume that our senior leaders are equally as clueless or intentionally ignorant as GC appears to be . . . which is scary - Mr. Market can and does react to supply/demand imbalances way faster than Big Blue, which should be a concern for everyone. A low FY13 ARP take rate due to Big Blue's dithering (but explained away by the program's late release, not market forces, pilot frustration with Big Blue, etc.) will likely be followed by a roughly-equivalent program in FY14 which could prove disastrous. - If it is true that C-17 dudes (for instance) at the unit level are getting crushed, yet all the metrics that GC and those of his ilk indicate that they have enviably low TDY rates, and no effort is made to reconcile those opposing realities, then Air Force policy will remain unchanged, 11Ms will grow more bitter and getting out will all the more viable -- What happens when in FY14: --- The ARP remains unchanged from FY13, leaving little additional incentive for 11Ms/11Ss/11Hs/11Rs to stay in . . . and again doesn't even publish it until halfway or more through the FY, by which time too much damage has already been done --- The commercial airline industry quickly ramps up its hiring (no more furloughees, improving economy, etc.), incentivizing folks to depart Big Blue . . . while all manner of other commercial and government entities are competing for the same bodies--the Air Force bureaucracy works at its standard pace . . . Nero (Big Blue) fiddles while Rome (the pilot community) burns --- Continuation of sequestration-driven cuts further erode QOL in the Air Force . . . I've seen no indication that members of Congress are going to start cooperating together in the near future --- Promotion boards get pushed even later or promo rates get reduced to fix the "glut" of FGOs . . . since Big Blue doesn't dictate different promo rates based off of AFSC, prized 11Fs/others from short-manned pilot communities get schwacked at the same rate as personnelists/mx officers/etc.--which further convinces those "on the fence" that the future in Big Blue ain't as bright as it once seemed I'll give you a hint, from one who experienced going through SUPT, and then was in an 11M flying squadron in the late 90s: - In the flight room there's at least as much discussion about who's hiring/how to write app's (if not more so) than there is about flying . . . which not only encourages/enables lower current year ACP take rates, but plants the seed for future retention problems by raising a bunch of youngsters who are all too aware of the future ahead of them on the outside - Problem is, those coming eligible for the bonus in the next few years have a heckuva lot more flying experience than the early-90s year group dudes did when they were making the decision whether/not to punch . . . thus making them that much more valuable - Ever read "Tipping Point" by Malcolm Gladwell? Big Blue's taking a huge risk that it'll be able to stem the tide of 11Xs departing before the exodus takes on a "mind of its own", with 11M squadrons turning into giant airline lead-in programs I hope Big Blue isn't counting on another 9/11, another increase in airline pilot retirement age (anyone want a 69 yr old pilot on your next United flight?), or some other anomaly to slow/stop the bleeding. I don't want any of my above "doom and gloom" predictions to come true . . . but GC's comments, lack of inspiration or a viable plan from senior leaders, everything I know and have seen about large bureaucracies and well-known facts about the economy/Boomer retirements/sequestration are major causes for concern. Yet again, I hope that someone on this board who is in fact a senior leader (or has valid insight from one) will either A) explain why my logic is wrong, or B) if I'm right tell me what if anything Big Blue plans to do about it.

Not really--the point is this: Flying and staff billets coded as 11G (T-6, Pueblo, USAFA, MC-12 flying billets; all manner of staff billets; ALO billets--jobs that can be filled by pilots from any community ) should be proportionally filled by pilots from all the various communities. Due to shortages, Big Blue has wisely elected to disproportionately man these billets with 11Ms (or not fill them at all), in order man ops flying squadrons. This makes sense--good on the A1 types that are doing the best they can to man billets with the best-qualified folks available for those billets. Check with your bros in the aforementioned billets--T-6 sq's, MC-12s, dudes at Pueblo & USAFA, etc., and ask how many 11Fs (or 11Ss/11Hs) they have in their squadrons. I think you'll find crazy lots of 11Ms, with the other communities few and far between or totally absent. The problem, as I perceive it--and neither GC nor anyone else has even tried to disprove this--is that HAF/A1M doesn't seem to be taking this into account when making decisions WRT to the ARP. Net result is communities such as the 11Ms getting crushed, with little incentive to stay in due to A1M looking at the wrong metrics. Try on these metrics: ACP take rates for FY '97-'01 (the last big hiring boom) were 35%, 28%, 42%, 32% and 30% (33% avg--half of the "record high" retention GC quoted). BTW, these metrics were for pilots as a whole--which community do you think found it easier to go from a large, multiengine airframe in Big Blue to a large, multiengine airframe in the civil sector? What happens to not only AMC, but also AFSOC, ACC, AETC, COCOMs, etc., when they not only fail to get the 11Fs with 12+ yrs of service they want, but don't get pilots at all . . . because the 11Ms have all jumped ship at their first opportunity. It's not like the ARP as currently structured provides much incentive to stay in . . .

Big Blue's already been through this drill, and has recategorized as many 11F billets (to 11G, 16G, etc.) as it thought it reasonably could, yet there still aren't enough 11Fs to go around--and BTW, they ain't enough 11S or 11H types either . . . leading to 11Ms filling all manner of billets in ACC, AFSOC, COCOM staffs, etc . . . not to mention MC-12 flying billets, that 11Fs should be filling. Problem is that the "Red Line"--the number of 11Ms Big Blue figures it needs by year group (need lots of Lts & Capts, fewer Majs, even fewer Lt Cols, etc.) doesn't take into account all the added requirements foisted on us. Combine the fact that Big Blue's Wing and below manning models suck (pilots fill Wing/Group/Sq staff jobs that could/should be filled by civilians if funding were provided to do so) with a system that fails to account for the "in lieu of" requirements that 11Ms are filling . . . and 11M units get their nuts crushed while all the charts in the Pentagon show that 11Ms are "overmanned." The refusal to recognize this reality and account for it in Air Force manning models results in all manner of misguided decisions, with this year's ARP just being the latest example. Make the best decisions you can, knowing that the crappy policies will continue until HAF/A1 gets a clue.

GC (can’t bring myself to call you general, given that from your posts I figure you’re at best an O-5) . . . To bring us back from the thread derail (aren’t we supposed to be taking ACP/ARP?), here are numbers questions (you purport to be a numbers guy—take the emotion out of it, blah, blah, blah) that you have thus far failed to answer: - Given the numbers of pilots the Majors are projected to hire over the next several years, the small number of mil pilots available to meet that demand, and the shrinking number of civilian pilots that’ll be willing to shell out the cash needed just to get the required ATP for a regional job . . . how are your predictions of record retention numerically supportable? - How in any way does your discussion of there being a “glut” of 16-18 yrs of service officers (’95-’97 commissioning groups) square with the fact that these same year groups all part of the “pilot bathtub”—read under-production—of pilots in the late 90s? Do you have any numbers to support your claim of a glut? - Specifically, why are there more 11Fs than 11Ms with 18 years commissioned service right now, if there’s such a glut of 11Ms? - How were the 11H and 11S communities—which were manned at 76% or less (10%+ worse off than the 11F community) about 1.5 years ago—able to magically fix themselves so quickly? - If the above two communities have gotten healthy all of a sudden, why is Big Blue not using them as models for rebuilding the 11F force? - Given the glut of rated bodies on AD, what are the projected numbers of pilots that would seek to Palace Chase . . . and as asked before why are they not being encouraged to do so? - Will 40% and below ARP take rates (such as were seen in the late 90s—last big hiring spree) be sustainable when we see them again in the next few years? If you can provide rational, numerically supportable arguments for any of the above, you might have some credibility. Otherwise, I’d recommend that those on this forum dismiss you as a propagandist that is unfortunately feeding at best incomplete info to senior leaders who are thus making misguided personnel decisions that are degrading our force.

Just trying to give some tools to GC here. If it helps, it's forward looking, per his stated purpose of the ARP . . . check out Audries Aircraft Analysis at https://www.audriesaircraftanalysis.com/airline-pilot-demand/airline-pilot-demand-comparison/ , and pan down to the "Total Pilot Demand Among Major Airlines due to FleetGrowth/Pilot Retirements" chart; I think you'll find it illuminating. We can nitpick the numbers, but if the Majors alone are going to need 2k/yr plus (peaking at over 4k a year in the not-too-distant future), would it not seem wise to "lock in" as many pilots as possible into long-term commitments so as to blunt the effect of this rapidly approaching storm? Don't forget that the ARC has half of Big Blue's airlift/tanker capacity, and has its own retirement problem . . . GC: - I'm providing data. You've provided nothing other than "trust me, I know what I'm doing" - Surely, without going into FOUO or above material, you can point to some statistic that in some way at least partially validates your point - In the absence of data to support your assertions, your arguments are as emotional and irrelevant as you purport those of your detractors are - You've clearly missed the point and lost your audience on an emotional level. You've lost the argument on a logical/factual level, since you've done nothing to refute any data/statistics/anecdotal evidence presented Can you explain in a factually/logically defensible way why the 11H and 11S communities are suddenly healthy and can be expected to remain so? After 12 years of post-9/11 airline bankruptcies, followed by increase in airline pilot retirement age from 60 to 65, can you further explain how the "historical" data can possibly have any validity in predicting retention over the next several years? No factual/reasonable support for your assertions? I didn't think so . . .