TnkrToad

Ah, but that's the problem--no facts, just "trust me" coming from what I can only assume is an O-4, maybe O-5--and I suspect a Nav. Considering his "embrace the suck" mantra, I'd guess he's a 12S. Further guess is that he is in fact the buffoon at HAF that's feeding skewed/moronic inputs to the senior leaders making decisions about bonuses, hence the defensiveness. At least you SOF and Helo pilots can be comforted that your high ops tempo is merely a figment of your imagination . . . - I've read no facts on this forum to support this year's ARP, and the facts I have seen make his comments look borderline insane from an institutional perspective - I'm sure all of us on this board would appreciate hearing some sort of factual support for the ARP

Exactly my point--lots of 11Ms filling 11S/11F/16G/etc. staff billets, they're over-represented in AETC flying billets (how many 11Fs in T-6s, at Pueblo, USAFA, etc.?), MC-12s--you guessed it--11Ms are filling those, too . . . and yet the 11M community is supposedly "overmanned". BTW, I didn't see any airlift or tanker units shut down due to sequestration--surely if they were so terribly overmanned, then some number of mobility squadrons should have been stood down, while the under-worked mobility units left open could have picked up the added workload. Based on the evidence, and in the absence of anyone offering a reasonable, factually supported rationale to the contrary, I can only conclude that this year's ARP is nothing short of gross buffoonery. Rant off.

"Sunlight is the best disinfectant" . . . for cynicism and all manner of other ills. Unfortunately the self-described senior leaders on this board seem incapable of or unwilling to describe why this FY's ARP makes institutional sense. Advice as to individual success is great--bloom where you're planted, knock out your PME early (don't even need to crack open a book to pass SOS, ACSC or AWC in correspondence,etc.) is great, but that's not what the ARP is all about. The ARP is all about institutional management, and senior leaders are institutional leaders. If none of those leaders can explain why the ARP makes institutional sense, and if they're incapable of seeing beyond oversimplified Red Line/Blue Line charts that fail to account for all the slack that the 11Ms, for instance, are picking up for other communities, then our institution is screwed.

Not a personnelist, but for smaller flying communities it seems like you'd need proportionally more folks on staff, rather than less. Seems to me every AOC, NAF, MAJCOM, Hq AF, etc., staff needs folks from all the different flying communities, so that those organizations' respective CCs can make wise decisions. Just look at USAFE--one sq of HH-60s, multiple sq's of fighters . . . which community needs to have a higher staff officer to ops flier ratio? Obviously, in order to provide the 603rd AOC, 3rd AF, USAFE & EUCOM staffs with rescue helo expertise, Big Blue needs to retain proportionally more HH-60 peeps than they do the various flavors of 11Fs . . . An F-15E bubba can reasonably talk capes & lims of F-16s & F-15Cs, but only an HH-60 guy (or HC-130 bubba, but none of those stationed in theater) can talk CSAR helo capes & lims. This year's ARP seems to support the exact opposite--relatively limits the number of HH-60 guys who stay in and do staff work by offering a lesser bonus. Doesn't make sense. Again, I'm still waiting for someone to show me a rational basis for this year's ARP. Edited to add a little more specificity.

Trying to keep the faith, but faith without works is dead . . . I still don't see the "glut"--at least among those who've reached bonus eligibility. It would help if you could post the most recent "Red Line/Blue Line" charts for pilots (much as Liquid posted different slides on another discussion topic), then try to explain in a rational way how/why this year's ARP plan makes sense . . . because it sure doesn't to me. (Caveat--my info is a bit over one year old, but in the "closed system" that is Air Force manning, the numbers I've seen can only have gotten worse): - 11Ms: No glut that I can see; '93-'97 year groups undermanned, meaning that '98 & '99 year groups backfill gaps left by those earlier year groups. Throw in the fact that 11Ms are filling all manner of billets that 11S/11F/others should fill, and my back of the napkin math shows that the 2000, maybe '01 11M year group is the oldest FGO year group that is effectively undermanned. The '02ish and later crowd haven't reached bonus eligibility yet. Having been in a UPT then a mobility squadron in the late 90s & watching every pilot that could fog a mirror walk into civilian flying jobs . . . well, I hope Big Blue is happy with having a mobility pilot force populated almost exclusively by Lts through junior Majs -- Is the fact that 11Ms are apparently happy to go the Forks to fly RPAs in order to get out of the AMC grind not proof enough that 11Ms are undermanned? - 11S & 11H: I have zero understanding as to why no special consideration was given here. The '93 all the way back to at least the '05 year groups are significantly undermanned. Why they're not getting more, not less, bonus money than 11Fs offered to them is a complete mystery to me. Only thing I can possibly fathom is that Big Blue assumes that these patriots will stay in, increased bonus or not. Given the criticality of their missions, the fact their manning is worse than that of 11Fs, and the additional fact that they spend more time in the fight than the average 11F, this seems like an awfully big gamble - 11Fs: Ironically, the '93 through approx '03 year groups are actually pretty healthy relative to "red line" requirements. Odd, then, that this community is specially targeted for retention While your words are soothing, without data to back up your assertions I can conclude only one of four things: My data is invalid (considering my source I doubt it), you're ill-informed (you don't appear to be), your're propagandizing (I really hope not), or our leaders are engaging in "tribal warfare" (thin other communities' herds, so that the 11Fs stay on top of the Air Force food chain--cynical, but perhaps the most plausible of the aforementioned scenarios). There might be another possible conclusion, but I can't think of one. What am I missing?

While I get why Big Blue is worried about 11Fs, I still can't past the perception that this program is still all about fighter generals taking care of their own . . . . while my data points are a little dated (approx 1.5 yrs old), the 11S community was only 70% manned last year & 11Hs were at 76%, whereas the 11F community was at a much healthier 87%. Funny that there was no special treatment for these two communities that have "taken it in the shorts" worse than the 11F community has. Is Big Blue assuming that the patriots from these communities will happily stay in the fight without special consideration, while the 11F community gets gets better perks and better manning? Taken together with the fact that the "fat" in the heavy community is almost exclusively in year groups that have yet to reach bonus eligibility, and this looks like a recipe for trouble.

You beat me to it--well said . . . but I submit that the problem is even worse than that. Not only are ops units getting crushed, but if one takes a look around the staffs, there are all kinds of 11Ms filling billets that would normally be filled by CAF bubbas. So you not only lose your experienced/competent aviators from flying units--cue downward spiral--but the situation gets even worse when ops units have to pick up slack when higher headquarters work doesn't get done/or staff outputs suck due to undermanning or crappy quality control (staffs take whoever decides to stay in, not who's best qualified). I shutter to think how bad it can get if Big Blue doesn't realize the scope of the 11M manning prob until September 13, then doesn't do anything to fix it until rollout of the FY14 bonus plan 'til Apr/May/Jun next year. Barring a "happy circumstance" like another 9/11 to screw the airlines/encourage 11Ms to stay in, we're in for a rough ride.

So, why FOUO? Who are they worried will read about it? Seems funny that this year's program theoretically builds on prior years' successes, when according to the FY12 report, the "50% up-front initiative for pilots in 11F and 11U PAFSCs appeared to have little effect on the overall take rate for the fighter community as FY12’s take rate fell below both FY10 and FY11 program numbers." Should be really interesting as Big Blue watches large percentages of heavy pilots get out. (Above quote taken from FY12 Retention Analysis--which has no classification).

Best part is looking at the Mobility Pilot breakdown in that report . . . lost 635 out of 597 eligible (106% loss rate-not sure how that happens) last FY. Mobility losses in FY11 were higher (80% of elibles) than any other community, as well. While there's a lot of justified hand-wringing over CAF manning and retention, Big Blue seems to have its head in the sand over the future of the heavy driver community. Heavy dudes have been filling CAF billets on staffs/in MC-12s/AETC/etc. for some time now--what happens when the heavy driver well dries up? The large early-90s year groups are retiring/getting promoted to O-6/etc., and pretty much the only other "fat" year groups in the heavy community haven't reached the ends of their respective SUPT commitments. BL, the pilot inventory is going to shrink by a lot more than 58 when large percentages of large year groups forego the bonus and walk right into airline & Guard/Reserve jobs--and many of those losses are going to come from the MAF community, which despite budget woes is still flying. All indications are this will be worse than the late 90s.

FYSA: - The numbers quoted were for Line Officers only - The data is from O-5 & O-6 boards starting in '89, meaning that the commissioning year groups we're talking about are from those starting in the mid-70s & early 60s, respectively--when females had fewer opportunities to enter career fields that should make one promotable to higher ranks - Makes sense to me that the oppressed female minorities from the early year groups that didn't have the same career opportunities as those entering today should have brought the average way down, but that didn't happen My conclusions: - If female line officers had higher promotion rates during a time when they were prevented from pursuing combat-oriented roles that they can now, then it reasonably follows that, given their greater career opportunities, we should see even greater disparities in promotion rates between genders going forward - Sure, the evidence is anecdotal . . . I'd love if someone on this forum with better knowledge, rather than counter-speculation, would chime in with better data to prove or disprove my general impression - The whole DUI/UIF thing wouldn't seem to influence the results that much for O-5 & O-6 boards. I might buy what you're selling if we were talking promo to O-2, O-3 or even O-4, but most morons/malcontents from both genders have been weeded out by the time the O-5 boards roll around - In my experience, I've not found females to be qualitatively, on average 20%, better than their male counterparts--at least in and around the communities I've served - Even after making allowance for "known unknowns" and "unknown unknowns", it still seems to me that there's still an AF institutional bias that results in females being promoted at higher rates than males This isn't about my career; I'm just trying to figure out 1) Why (in my perception at least) Big Blue is favoring gender over mission accomplishment in promotion decisions, and if this is in fact intentional, and 2) Why Big Blue won't acknowledge that this is the policy Any true insights from A1 types/more senior folks on this forum would be much appreciated. Further counter-speculation is pointless. Edited for grammar

I'm talking percentages, not raw numbers, so I don't understand why you find the number of females vs. males irrelevant. I'd get your point if I'd just taken a one-year snapshot, but I'm talking the aggregated results of 24 year groups' worth of promo boards. Bottom line, a female O-4 has a 20% greater chance of making O-6 than a male. It's basic math. Seems pretty significant to me. Out

Took about 69 seconds to find the following: From Promo boards from 1989 to 2012 (not exactly ancient history): O-6: Male 44%/Female 50% promoted. O-5: Male 67%/Female 71% promoted. I didn't bother trying to crunch the ethnicity numbers, but whether you buy into the virtues of gender diversity or not, sure looks like Big Blue has been making a concerted effort over many years to promote females at higher rates than their male peers. Take it for what it's worth; all data came from the AFPC Static Reports website.

Better yet, don't even read the books first. Take the test, and if you don't pass, then figure out what areas you need to study, take the cellophane off the books (assuming you even get paper copies these days), then retake & pass the test. Basic math: With three-answer, multiple-choice tests, you need to know less than half the material. The half you know, you'll get right. For the other half, you have a 50% chance of guessing the right answer (one of the three answers will be obviously stupid, giving you a 50/50 chance of guessing the right one from the remaining two. PME by correspondence ain't tough; take the tests, pass, and move on. That simple.

On the contrary, RAND (and hence Big Blue) disagrees with you. They have a Dynamic Retention Model which they think can be used to anticipate what the ACP take rate will be, based on how much $ is offered. $25k/yr, for instance, has been pretty good for achieving about a 65% take rate . . . but that's been over multiple years where hiring's sucked on the outside. When hiring ramps up, but Big Blue is capped at $25k/yr, retention's gonna decrease. Last FY's "half up front" option didn't make a difference: From the last retention report, "This year’s 50% up-front initiative for pilots in 11F and 11U PAFSCs appeared to have little effect on the overall take rate for the fighter community as FY12’s take rate fell below both FY10 and FY11 program numbers." Looks like the only possible option (at least until they can argue for bonuses greater than $25k/yr) is to go back to longer-term contracts. Again, I have to wonder 1) where they're going to get the money for this, and 2) more importantly, how they're going to sell this program in a time of major budget constraints. Funny thing to me is that everybody seems to be wetting their pants about 11Fs, 11Us, etc. It's a big deal, I'll grant you, but it misses the rest of the picture. Whaddya think's gonna happen when large numbers of the 11Ms (those with the most transferrable skill sets and which comprise a large proportion of the bonus-eligible pilots) separate? Who do you think is going to fill all those MC-12/ACC/joint/other billets that 11Ms are filling in lieu of 11Fs/11Ss/etc.? I already know a Capt C-130 pilot who was released to Global Strike Command staff--with barely 96 flying gates met (at a time when we're "fat" on heavy drivers). How much more crap is going to flow downhill to CAF units, when their HQ staffs are filled with bunches of herbivore O-3s/junior O-4s? I'm way past bonus eligibility, but I sure hope Big Blue offers some pretty sweet bonuses across all pilot communities--and even more so, I hope they can sell Congress/the public on bonuses greater than $25/yr--if/when the FY13 program ends up being a bloodbath.

My guess is they're trying to figure out how to sell ACP to Congress and the public--The only viable retention tool the AF has is to offer monetary incentives. Given the other factors you already identified, I don't see much else that's going to work. To incentivize adequate numbers of pilots--especially from certain target communities--to stay past their commitments, they're going to have to offer even more than they have previously. While the rational argument is pretty straightforward (we're going to offer $30/35/40k/yr bonuses to pilots this year, in order to meet our retention targets of XX%, which we need to have a viable pool of pilots going forward . . . which is cheaper/more efficient & effective than other methods), the political/emotional factor makes this a tough sell. How's it going to look when it comes out in multiple news outlets that, in the middle of all our budget constraints, the pilot-dominated Air Force is supporting and protecting pilots through "extravagant" bonus packages? The very worst case would be if the ACP stays the same or increases (causing PR headaches) and they still fail to meet retention targets (loss of experience/capability). Add it the fact that low retention for this year's large group of eligible is going to have a much greater impact than ok retention from small groups in recent years, and it becomes even more important that the AF gets it right. Even a very successful year for ACP could pose problems, as high retention dries up the well from which the Guard & Reserve get many of their folks. It's going to be interesting to see what they come up with--and how they sell it.

This is where I don't get why HAF/A1 doesn't get it: - If regionals aren't hiring/don't exist due to the train wreck which is the 1500 hour rule, then the pipeline for civilians to build enough hours to go on to the Majors is cut off . . . if the US civilian sector can't produce adequate numbers of ATPs, then military becomes the primary (but a very limited) source of qualified US pilots - Even if no US military pilots don't wanna fly for overseas carriers (dubious assumption, especially given the amount of expected growth in the coming years), overseas demand will keep foreign pilots overseas . . . add very limited supply of foreign pilots able/willing to get US ATPs It's a simple supply & demand problem--US mil pilots will comprise the bulk of a very limited supply of competent pilots who have the hours to get US ATPs. Demand will be huge (5k pilots required/yr in North America alone for next 20 yrs). I wasn't an econ major, but low supply/high demand tends to drive prices up. Airlines will be competing for every mil pilot that retires/separates, at the same time the Reserve Component needs bodies as well. What happens when large percentages of large year groups of MAF pilots get out at the end of their commitments--not only to experience in MAF squadrons, but on CAF staffs, in RPAs, MC-12s, etc.?

While I get what they're saying, there are other numbers that point to pending problems in the MAF community . . . and by extension the CAF community, since as discussed above it's the MAF that's backfilling lots of CAF billets. Some numbers to consider: - Per the retention report, 88 MAF pilots got promoted to O-6 in FY12 - If, in FY13 the number of MAF pilots promoted to O-6 is even anywhere close to FY12, things are gonna get interesting: -- The numbers of 11Ms in the 19, 18 & 17 Commissioned Yrs of service--Who will reach retirement eligibility & O-6 board soon thereafter) are extremely small: --- 19 CYOS: 81 O-5 11Ms --- 18 CYOS: 101 O-5 11Ms --- 17 CYOS: 67 O-5 11Ms My assessment: If the 88/yr trend continues for MAF O-6 promotions continues, you could select 100% for promotion to O-6 . . . and still need more. What I forsee over the next few years: - What's left of the large early-90s year groups (20+ CYOS) of MAF pilots is going to retire/be further promoted, leaving little to no excess in the senior ranks - The present-day O-5 (15-19 CYOS) year groups are too small already (remember the pilot training bathtub of the mid-90s?) will for the most part get out at 20 yrs--due to a combination of airline hiring/being sick of getting beaten down over their whole careers - The committed O-4 (12-14 CYOS) types that took the bonus will get beaten down over rest of their careers--No graybeards around to pick up the slack--which encourages them to retire at 20 yrs as well -- Those who haven't yet gotten to take the bonus yet (11 CYOS & below) spend the first 10 years of their careers: 1) Operating under crappy leadership (hard to be selective when there are such slim pickin's), 2) Getting screwed with RPAs/MC-12s/staffs/other backfill "opportunities" since 11Fs & 11Bs can't be spared, yet 3) Not flying enough, because Big Blue produced too many pilots for their airframes -- By the way, the Guard & Reserves are facing significant numbers of retirements in the near future, as well, making it all the easier for non-bonus takers to get out and move right into Guard/Reserve jobs--don't forget how much of our mobility iron is in the Reserve Component In the environment described above: - What 11M in his right mind is going to stay in past the end of his SUPT commitment, much less wanna stay 'til 20 yrs or beyond? - When ACP take rates drop to the 30-40% range due to airline hiring (check out the take rates from '97-'02)--and budgetary constraints make $35k+ per year bonuses untenable, how can the 11M community possibly stay healthy? - What's going to happen to the CAF community when the MAF, due to pilot losses, can't backfill CAF requirements? The thing that bothers me is that all Big Blue can/will do is be reactive; what happens if the reaction doesn't happen until we're already well established in a pilot manning death spiral? //rant off//

Per the Fox News website, it looks like he won't testify on Benghazi now . . . making the situation look all the more fishy. I'm not a conspiracy theorist, but holy crap--it sure looks to me like someone didn't like what he was going to say WRT Benghazi: "The move comes amid the unfolding controversy surrounding the attack on the U.S. Consulate in Libya. Scrutiny has fallen on a range of agencies including the CIA, and the director had been set to testify at hearings next week -- he is no longer expected to do so. But Petraeus, in his resignation message, cited strictly "personal reasons" surrounding the affair." https://www.foxnews.com/politics/2012/11/09/petraeus-resigns-as-cia-director/?intcmp=trending

No idea when the actual End FY 2012 Retention Report will actually come out, but I thought I'd take my best guess how it will/should be written in the pilot section of the report. I'm not a personnelist & have never worked at AFPC, so I have no "inside baseball" on any of this. Nonetheless, I'm going to post my prediction, then when the final report comes out (probably months from now), we'll see how close I came to final product. Here goes: Line officer retention in the active duty Air Force started being an issue in FY12. Pilot inventory losses due to separation or retirement increased when compared to FY11. The increase in separations was to be expected as the number of pilots eligible to separate in FY12 was larger due to 10 year UPT ADSCs expiring. Significant numbers of retirements from the relatively large ’92 year group further exacerbated the problem. While the overall take rate was reasonably healthy at 64%1, this is lowest it has been since FY02, and likely indicates the start of a downward trend. Just as the transition from the 8 to 10 active duty service commitment limited the number of pilots eligible to separate for the past two FYs, the FAA’s decision in December of 2007 to increase the mandatory retirement age for airline pilots from age 60 to age 65 effectively created a five-year hiatus in airline hiring. That hiatus will end in December 2012. Given that retention is typically inversely proportional to airline hiring, retention challenges are likely inevitable. This will be all the more challenging, given that fiscal constraints will make it difficult to increase ACP bonus offerings enough to reach desired take rates. While the overall statistics are cause for concern, the breakdown of take rates among various communities is of greater consequence. The Mobility, Bomber and C2ISR/EW communities had ACP high take rates (67%, 60% and 75% respectively), but those communities are already healthy, with respective manning of 112%, 101% and 91%. The Special Operations and Helicopter communities, however, are undermanned (70% & 76% respectively) to the degree that even reasonably high take rates of 73% & 75% can provide only minor relief to the overall manning picture for these communities. If take rates remain high, though, these communities have a chance to eventually return to “good health”. The situation is much bleaker for the Fighter and RPA communities, despite targeted retention efforts in the FY12 program. Both are already low-manned (87% and [80%?]2), and low take rates (53% and 47%) will only make this situation worse. Low manning, combined with low retention and limited capacity to train new pilots and build experience in these communities will make recapitalizing these communities extremely difficult. It will be all the more so when airline hiring ramps up and as a result drives ACP take rates even lower. In the near term, the only way to at least help alleviate shortages in particular pilot communities will be to recategorize pilots from mobility to special operations and/or further expand the trend of mobility pilots filling other communities staff requirements (e.g., 11Ms filling 11F billets). TnkrToad’s note: Since the most recent info posted on the AFPC website at https://access.afpc.af.mil is only current as of 21 Sep (more could have—and likely did—take the bonus before the end of the FY, but no way to know this without AFPC updating the website), I took my best guess at the final take rate numbers. Overall manning numbers are from an Apr 12 briefing, so some of the above numbers might have changed—but if anything, overall manning likely has gotten worse rather than better. Took a WAG at RPA pilot manning; this wasn’t in the brief I have Feel free to throw spears if you think I'm wrong on any of this, but if you do, please back it up with facts/numbers.

AFPC updated the take rates as of 13 Sep, so I figure they'll be pretty close to the final for the FY; a few observations/questions: - RPAs: Only 45% take rate for initial Pilots (none of the uncommitted Navs, uncommitted Pilots, or even the initial RPA pilot took the bonus) -- If retention is impervious to financial incentives for this group, how is the USAF going to grow/maintain this community going forward? - Fighters: Only 53% take rate for initial Pilots (none of the uncommitted Pilots took the bonus) -- Better than RPAs, but not much--Again, how is this community going to get back to full manning if half get out at the earliest opportunity? - Mobility/SO/C2ISR-EW/Bomber/CSAR: Healthy . . . for this FY; but the airlines haven't starting hiring in significant numbers yet -- Given that there are more heavy pilots in AMC & ACC than all the other pilot communities combined, what's gonna happen in FY13 & beyond when airlines start hiring in earnest--and bonuses get ever-harder to justify in the middle of budget cuts/sequestration? -- Even 70+% retention in the SO community isn't all that great, when they're as low-manned as they currently are; even with a 100% take rate, it'll take 'em forever to get to full manning Makes sense for heavy guys to take the bonus this FY, I guess; live well for another 5 years, while 1) waiting for airline hiring to pick up, knowing that 2) the hiring boom will go on for several years into the future, owing to the size of the retiring Baby Boomer generation of pilots reaching retirement. I figure the USAF will cut back bonuses (voluntarily--or involutarily, due to budget constraints) right at the time when it'll be needed most to keep pilots in. When (not if) heavy drivers start getting out in droves, it won't just be AMC that gets screwed; given that heavy dudes are the ones filling many billets on staffs/in AETC that fighter/SO/RPA pilots should otherwise be filling, then ACC, AETC, AFSOC, etc. will likely soon be screwed as well. Just one man's opinion. Feel free to tell me where I'm wrong, but the numbers (Boomer retirements, fiscal realities being the biggest of them) are hard to argue with.

My concern about heavy pilot retention in particular: - As noted above, 11Ms are filling billets that often should be filled by 11Fs, 11Ss, etc. (Because 11Ms are the only "overmanned" pilot community out there - Problem is the overmanning within the 11M career field is almost exclusively in year groups that haven't had the chance to take the bonus yet - What happens when, starting in FY13-14ish, a large percentage of these large year groups of 11Ms (and likely 11Rs) start getting out due to ramped-up airline hiring? -- Staffs start to really fall apart; not only no 11Fs available due to previous low production (every one needed in the cockpit), but suddenly no 11Ms or 11Rs to backfill, because they're walking out the door and into massive worldwide airline hiring -- Situation gets further exacerbated by the fact that take rates for RPA pilots are even worse than for fighters . . . leading to more nonvols, which further sinks morale, which further hits retention -- AFPC's primary retention tool is increased/targeted bonuses . . . but in an era of major belt-tightening across DoD, it hard to see how they'll get away with 30/35/40k per yr bonus offers to keep pilots in Alternate future is that heavy pilots take over the Air Force, simply by virtue of numbers: - More mobility pilots have taken the bonus this FY than RPA, Fighter, Bomber, SOF & Helo pilots combined -- 11Ms fill all the "good deal", career-enhancing jobs, while those in undermanned communities stay in the cockpit where they're needed. Rinse & repeat for several years, and magically those with the best resumes are the many "bright and shiny" 11Ms that were released to joint billets, crossflow, other career broadening opportunities . . . you get the point -- Add the fact that a significant number of bright and shinies chose not to go fighters to overall strength in numbers, and soon the heavy community is the stronger tribe -- Will it happen? Dunno; depends on how badly 11M retention tanks over the next few years, compared to whether/not pilots from other communities choose to get out in droves, as well Sorry for writing a book, but I think it's a worthwhile discussion.