TnkrToad

My guess is it has something to do with the youth movement in tanker leadership, combined with the lack of tanker experience among those leaders. Case in point: the ARW/CCs at both McConnell and Seymour Johnson are dudes who pinned on O-6 at 18 yrs and are Wg/CCs at 20 yrs into their careers. Both assiduously avoided the air refueling community for at least a decade. The McConnell CC never previously flew the KC-135, and the last time he flew the KC-10 was 2005. The SJ commander is slightly better; he actually started in the KC-135, but was gone from the community for 13 years, from ‘03-‘16. If the Wg leadership’s dearth of tanker experience is any indication of group & squadron CCs’ backgrounds, clueless/clownish leadership should come as no surprise. You want good leaders? Put people who know what they’re doing in those jobs. TT

Just checked the ACP take rates, and thought I'd note a couple things: The overall take rate for initial bonus eligibles is still pretty abysmal--barely over 40%. The initial take rates for 11Fs & 11Rs are especially poor--both less than 40%. A glimmer of hope is that take rates for 11Ss & 11Hs are high (both over 55%). Their take rates have historically always been high, though, so this is hardly cause for celebration. If one factors in the old guy (NC & CE) bonus takers, though, things change a bit. More 11Fs have taken the old guy bonus than have initial eligibles; even though the 11F community is undermanned, at least its old farts are willing to hang around. This provides at least some hope that the 11F community might eventually get healthy. The 11H & 11S communities likewise had healthy old guy bonus take rates. Even though (last I checked) they're chronically undermanned, they will have substantially more stability than they would have otherwise without the old guy bonus. The 11R & 11M communities are screwed. Not only do they have low initial eligible take rates, but their old guy bonus take rates are abysmal, too. If neither the mid-career guys nor the grey beard O-5 types want to stay in, then all that'll be left in the squadrons will be high career-potential CCs & DOs leading a bunch of O-1s to O-3s who're merely biding their time until they reach the ends of their respective SUPT commitments and can get out. Not a recipe for success, in the near or long term. It'll be especially interesting when AMC starts picking its O-6s and above, not based on quality, but rather on simply who is left and can fog a mirror. Based on the stats, I presume the same is or will be true in the 11R community--leadership selection by virtue of one's mirror-fogging ability--but as an 11M, I'll just stay in my lane and hope for the best for the C2ISR types. TT

I don't think it's public. All the data, down to each airframe, is posted on AFPC Secure, though. Go to AFPC Secure, then select RAW. In RAW, select Static Demographics. From the list of all the docs, you'll find one that says FY17 ACP Take Rates (or something like that--I'm not using a CAC-enabled computer right now). They break the data down in about 69 different ways--to include numbers of eligibles and takers (both short and long) for each individual MDS.

The take rate listed on RAW is only for long-term (3+ yr) contracts. The overall long-term take (short term take rate doesn't much matter) is right around 40%. If short term contracts were included, the overall rate would be a little over 50%. Still not good news. It's noteworthy that for Tier 2, the 11Bs & 11Ss are bringing up the average. 11Ms are still below 40%. Tanker and C-17 bubbas (the two largest MDS pilot communities) seem especially inclined to get out--they're at about 35% right now. TT

Dude, seriously? There are (and were) valid operational reasons to open and/or encourage greater degrees of military service to females and non-caucasian males. It provided for a substantially greater pool of folks from whom to draw, when the military always needs talent. The costs don't come close to outweighing the benefits in the case of transgendered troops. We can live without whatever additional talent they might bring to the table.

Obviously devil's advocating, but why not argue for increasing the requirement to 3,000 hrs? - Big Blue will keep its shiny penny HPO types (regardless of airframe), since they'll never get that many hours by the time they reach the ends of their SUPT commitments. They'll stay in, and surely will make the service a better place, due to their superior PME and exec experiences - The AF will keep its fighter pilots, because it's way hard to build that many hours as a fighter bubba - The AF will get rid of those pesky heavy drivers who want to do nothing but fly, because they will have no problem meeting the 3k hr threshold by 10 yrs into their flying careers. The line-flyer heavy drivers will depart in droves, leaving the fighter mafia to run the AF, as it's been for most of the Air Force's (and its antecedents') history - Prior mil folks who already have a-word jobs will love it, because the increased barriers to entry will give them/their unions even more clout. They will, of course, point out how the friendly skies will be even safer than before, due to the more-stringent flying hour requirements - Regionals will collapse, but hey, everybody hates the regionals with their slave wages and such. The legacies will start flying smaller airplanes to fill the gaps left by the regionals' collapse--meaning more flying jobs to be had in the majors - For the more-limited number of folks who break into the big leagues, their pay will increase even further still, due to simple supply/demand economics If making regional pilots get ATPs was good, increasing ATP requirements to 3,000 hours must surely be better. Can't be too safe . . . TT

Any mil pilot worth his salt will have no problem getting hired if the 1,500 hr rule is rescinded. Mil pilots got hired left and right in the late 90s, when folks just needed commercial licenses to get hired by regionals. No reason to believe it would be any different now. TT

Did a bit more research: Jun '18 makes sense for 3 yrs TIG for the IPZs/substantially less for BPZs. The last '04 year group bubba pinned on NLT 31 May 15, so a Jun 2018 IPZ board for them exactly matches min 3 yrs TIG. What this means is that '06 year group folks (the last of whom didn't pin on 'til Dec '16) will meet the 2 BPZ board with as little as 1.5 yrs as O-4s (2 yrs at the outside). The really shiny penny '06 year group bubbas who get picked up two below will thus be selected for O-5 at the 12 yr point in their careers & pin on at barely 13 yrs into their careers . . . with substantial portions of those 13 years almost inevitably spent outside of ops units. The upshot is this: if the AF does grow substantially (thus increasing promotion opportunities/driving boards even earlier) and the AF continues to hemorrhage talent (driving even earlier promo boards, to backfill those who retired/separated), it's conceivable that we'll soon have 16 year pinned-on O-6s (who knows--possibly even younger if this trend continues; 15 yrs to O-6 for some?). Good news for the super-striver types, I guess . . . TT

Just curious--is the 3 yr TIG requirement the issue for the IPZ year group, or the 1- and/or 2-yr BPZ groups? If the 3 yrs TIG is a requirement for promotion consideration, and the O-5 board was delayed accordingly, this can only mean one of two things: Option 1--The IPZ folks don't even have 3 yrs TIG by now: - Either Big Blue is hemorrhaging folks so fast that they have to push promo boards ever-earlier, such that even IPZ folks are meeting their O-5 boards with only 3 yrs TIG/will pin with 4 yrs TIG - Funny thing is, I take this to mean that nobody could meet this board BPZ. If the IPZ group is delayed due to TIG concerns, then the BPZ year groups couldn't possibly meet the board. If so, heads must be exploding all around the Air Force. Option 2--The BPZ folks are the ones with the 3 yrs TIG limfac: - In this case, Big Blue is pushing back promotions solely to protect its shiny penny BPZ types. If such is the case, I'd have a hard time accepting that my promotion was being delayed so that the AF could take care of its blue chip folks. I have no idea which of the two options is driving the promo board timing. Regardless, if the O-5 promo is delayed due to TIG issues, this indicates a real challenge for the Air Force. TT

My guess is the slowdown in promotion increments is due to relatively low number of folks in the '97ish year groups. Promotion increments (in this case for O-5) are based on backfilling O-5s who've retired/been promoted/separated/died. Also, changes in AF endstrength can change things. If AF end strength does increase (as it's theoretically supposed to, under this administration), there will be more total O-5 billets to fill--but as far as I know this hasn't yet begun. Where we are now, If comparatively few even made it to the 20 year inflection point, then there will be few needing backfill as they retire (even if only a small proportion remain on AD). If my hunch is correct, increments will eventually start to increase again as larger year groups reach retirement eligibility and--due to improved economy/a-word hiring/frustration with the AF in general--depart the AF in larger numbers. AF expansion--again, if it happens--will drive increments even higher still. This will pose a further problem for the AF. Right now, folks meet the O-6 board on time around the 20 yr point. This means the super-strivers who make O-5 and O-6 two below can be pinned on at 17 yrs--that's pretty stinkin' young. If folks get out in ever-greater numbers, this means Big Blue will have to either further increase promotion rates (quality control problem) or push boards even earlier in officers' careers (experience problem--smart striver types who have little to no background for the higher-level organizations/staffs they find themselves in). Regardless, not a recipe for long-term success. TT

A little nugget worth considering: While the 1,500 pilot shortage is a big deal, that's only part of the problem. According to my research, the Air Force pilot inventory has dropped from 15,300 to 13,800 since FY11 (1,500 pilots). In that same time, the total number of manned aircraft aviators (pilots, navs, CSOs, ABMs) has dropped by 2,200 (20,900 to 18,700). The only aviator group that is numerically growing right now is RPA pilots. I guess that's why the AF is focusing its bonus program so heavily on them--the RPA community is the only place where Big Blue is getting a return on its ACP investments. Bottom line--the shrinking of the nav & ABM career fields will create even greater demand for pilots on staffs, at a time when the pilot community is already hemorrhaging bodies. Sent from my iPad using Baseops Network Forums

My guess is an O-4 or O-5--probably an personnelist, but it's equally possible he's someone with an ops background who worked in HAF/A1 or other A1 staff. I'm inclined to go with brickhistory's theory--regardless of AFSC, something caused him to go from true believer to disgruntled malcontent. No matter; he's about as credible in his current incarnation as he was in his last. Maybe we'll see a third personality next time he posts, assuming he bothers to re-engage any time in the near future . . .

Not confused. I think the dude's an ass, but that's beside the point. GC did such a good job mimicking some of the rated "managers" I've talked to before that--if he's an operator--he must've spent a helluva lot of time around them. In his new personality, he rants about the need for operators to take control of A1--further suggesting familiarity with AF A1 . . . yet he recoils at the fact he's assumed to be a personnelist. In the end, I'm with nsplayr--he needs to go with quals. It would be neat if he shared value-added data related to AF rated management, but I'm not holding my breath. TT

My best guess is GC's BO.net account was hacked . . . or, alternatively, said individual is schizo. If he was trolling, that was some pretty underhanded trollery. TT

I've harped on this before, but one of the many problems with the current ACP program is that it only--at best--helps keep folks on AD until 20 yrs service (so we can have enough folks for O-4/O-5 command, staff, grey beard line flying, etc.) . . . and it's not even doing this well. The bigger problem, as I see it, is that Big Blue is doing little-to-nothing to keep people on AD past 20 yrs. Given the impact that O-6s and above can have on their commands/the AF, the leadership problem we all like to complain about is likely to get substantially worse. Data points: right now, there are 128 total Command Pilots/163 total pilots (the rest are Senior Pilots--how one gets to 21 yrs of service, without meeting the minimal requirements for Command Pilot rating is beyond me) with 21 yrs of commissioned service in the AF. In other words, these are folks who stayed in past 20 and (aside from passed-over Majors) competed for O-6. At the end of FY13 (just three and a half years ago), there were 374 Command Pilots with 21 commissioned years of service (out of 405 pilots total in that year group). In other words, the number of pilots bothering to stay on AD past 20 and keep the Big Blue ship afloat has dropped by about two thirds in the past 3.5 years. This is across all 11X AFSCs. Certain pilot communities are especially hurting. The '96-ish year group, for instance--the current crop of recent O-6 selects--is healthier on 11Fs than 11Ms. Somehow, this never shows up on the official Air Force website or even Air Force Times, though. Bottom line, whenever you look at stats of how many pilots short a community might be, take a very critical eye. Senior AF leaders are wringing their hands over a 1,500 pilot shortage, with most of that shortage being in the 11F community. Theoretically, this means all the other non-11F communities combined are just a few hundred pilots short. That might be true--it's possible that the total 11B/H/M/S/R population is vaguely close to the raw total required. If the Air Force is comparatively healthy on overall numbers of non-11Fs, the only way I can make the math work is that there are gross overages of pilots in the year groups who haven't yet been offered the bonus. A pilot community where there are overages of Lts, Capts and junior Majs--but almost no senior Majs/Lt Cols/Cols to lead them and/provide staff top cover/fight for new aircraft and/or capabilities/etc.--cannot be healthy. Big Blue must do more to keep adequate numbers of 11Xs in all year groups, leadership levels and 11X communities, if it's going to have a hope of getting healthy. TT

Umm, no. Retiring as an O-7 (get the retired rank so they can feel good about themselves, but not the pay) only applies to O-6 permanent professors. Extremely few of those, and given how long folks stay in those billets, really rare for the opportunity to even come around. Non-perm prof O-6s and below retire like normal. There is no special retirement benefit for simply teaching at USAFA. Regardless, we're digressing from the main point--rated aviators at USAFA, who could be actively flying at USAFA--where there is a demonstrable need for them--are going unutilized because of nothing but misguided Air Force policy (too few coded billets at USAF, in this case). This is just one example of what I'm sure are many around the Air Force where the AF could address manning problems through better personnel policy, rather than crude tools like stop loss. If senior AF leaders want to be taken seriously by Congress, much less airline execs, they should ensure the AF house is in order first. TT Sent from my iPad using Baseops Network Forums

Assuming the AF gets its own house in order and maximizes utilization of the pilots it has (a long shot, I know), then it seems AF leaders would go to the meeting with something other than simply threatening Stop Loss. Assuming we can't get any relief from tasked missions (again, good luck), it seems the primary COA would be partial mobilization of the ARC (for the elements that are truly undermanned), in conjunction with Stop Loss for the AD (again for the same AFSCs that are mobilized). No matter what, it'll be bad news for the AF and airlines. Airlines will be shorted of both the ARC folks they already have on property, as well as supply of folks coming off AD. The AF will have a crap storm on its hands, with disgruntled ARC and AD folks. I don't think the AF should talk Stop Loss without simultaneously discussing further ARC mobilization. Sent from my iPad using Baseops Network Forums

So in other words, it's like I said--USAFA represents a way in which the AF could work to solve its own shortage: - 11F in-res school select: "I wanna go learn how to be a counselor, then be a USAFA AOC!" - AFPC: "Thanks for your interest in national defense; we'll send you to ACSC/CGSC/wherever, then you'll be off to a validated 11F-required billet in Joint/HAF/ACC/whatever staff, where you're really needed." -- In order to ensure USAFA can still inspire cadets to be pilots, it sends 11Ms/11Rs/11Hs/whatever pilot AFSC is at least notionally healthy instead. Likewise with faculty attached flying--as you indicated, it's an internal AF issue (A1K needs to create more P-prefix billets at USAFA) Physician, heal thyself... Sent from my iPad using Baseops Network Forums

Might be my poor reading comprehension, but the focus of the website you linked to is on activating the ARC, rather than stop lossing AD. This brings up a good point, though. Before implementing Stop Loss on AD members, the AF should pursue fuller use of the ARC, CRAF and/or other civ contract air transport (and even air refueling). No need to abridge AD airmen's freedoms, when there are already other valid means to achieve the desired effects. Don't get me wrong; the Air Force is still screwed, due to a combination of personnel decisions over at least the last two decades. If we more heavily utilize the ARC to backfill the AD, the ARC will hemorrhage people even faster than now. If we attempt to limit the pain to AD through Stop Loss, while maintaining the current level of ARC utilization, (1) the ARC won't get the prior-AD bodies it needs to stay healthy, and (2) the AD will suffer all manner of morale issues, which will have impacts for years to come. Just see all the consternation on this forum over a policy that hasn't even been implemented yet. More heavily utilizing civ civilians to do airlift, AR, aggressors, etc., will only drive up external demand for prior-AD talent even more. The only near-term fix that occurs to me, although it might just be a drop in the bucket (I don't have access to valid data), is for the Air Force to look very hard at where it has its rated talent. I'm reasonably familiar with the current situation at USAFA: why do we have 11Fs as AOCs at USAFA? Some of the brightest, shiniest pennies in the 11F community, yet they spend three years out of the cockpit, contributing nothing to the war fighting community. Simultaneously, there are rated USAFA faculty members who are not currently flying, and the airfield needs them to fly IOT train/inspire future aviators, but there are so few attached flying billets that those who are available and want to fly can't. These kinds of situations, multiplied across bases/units around the world, would at least help address our manning crisis. The AF needs to keep looking harder internally before Stop Loss can be considered as a viable option. TT

The Contract Flying Schools had at least three huge things going for them when they were seeking to hire talented pilots/ground instructors/mechanics--especially early on--which don't exist today. First, CFS were exempted from the draft. Not hard to find smart, capable instructors when you offer that carrot during wartime. Draft avoidance ain't much of a motivator today. Second, the US (heck the world) was just barely coming out of the Great Depression; you could hire talent for pennies on the dollar at the time. As already extensively discussed on this forum, the military can't compete financially today. Third, the civil aircraft industry was way ahead of the military in terms of aircraft technology and trained pilots. As late as 1939, the Air Corps still only had 13 B-17s. Meanwhile, despite the Depression, Douglas produced 36 DC-3s in December 1937 alone. In other words, the civil air industry was flying higher-tech equipment than the military, by a long shot, and it had been way ahead for a long time. Even though the T-6/T-38/T-1 ain't the height of current technology, they're well beyond what the vast majority of junior civilian pilots have flown. Whereas before, experienced CPS pilots would have to step down to older/slower technology early in the war in order to train mil pilots, the exact opposite would have to occur today. I could maybe see contracting out T-1 training to civ instructors, but good luck holding onto them once they build up to ATP min hours. I do think there's a strong argument to be made for a US Merchant Aviation Academy. The US subsidizes training for commercial shipping industry through the US Merchant Marine Academy (USMMA). Given the vital importance of aviation to the US economy, why not do the same for aviation? TT

Just be aware that the people who took the bonus and stayed on AD during the late-90s/very early 2000s airline hiring boom are the folks we like to bash on these forums today. Bonus takers between FY97-02, when ACP take rates were really in the crapper, would have been from the '88 to -93 (ish) year groups (who now comprise many of today's AF generals and colonels). - Given the costs associated with training up experienced pilots, the Air Force can't afford not to try to better compete financially with the civilian alternatives. Furthermore, improved monetary incentives might've kept some really great leaders on AD back in the late-90s. Had better incentives been offered, we might have better leadership today Comparatively low-cost options to improve morale have been discussed on this forum extensively already. I won't repeat those, other than to say that--speaking from the heavy driver perspective--it would help if AF senior leaders quit with their public handwringing over fighter pilots, when pilot communities across the Air Force are suffering. That myopia comes across as ignorant and/or condescending. TT

Honest questions: - How many hours did your civ bros have when they got hired? If they got hired before the 1500 hr rule went into effect and they had less than the R-ATP mins, that would be very different from the current circumstance than we're discussing here - How much student debt did your bros typically graduate with? - Especially if they got hired before or after the 1500 rule went into effect, how did they build their hours to get to R-ATP mins, and how much were they paid while building hours toward those mins? - Once hired by a regional, what's their pay been, and how easy has it been for your bros to live while paying off their student loans? Folks getting hired at age 37 today clearly did not have to contend with the 1500 hr rule when they interviewed with the regionals. Just trying to figure out if your peers' experience matches with what folks contemplating going the civ route today would have to deal with. TT

Per the website: "New hires at PSA are projected to flow to American Airlines after only 6 years." (emphasis added) Brilliant plan.

I get it that you're frustrated with AF leadership, and I agree there is still more they can do internally to the organization. Regardless, the facts aren't on your side. - FY97-FY01: Airlines hiring in substantial numbers/US not fighting VEOs--ACP take rate was 28-42% - FY02 (numbers are a little weird, due to transition to GWOT): 47% - FY03-FY13: Airlines not hiring in substantial numbers/US fighting VEOs in a big way--ACP take rate was 65-76% - FY14-present: Airline hiring ramping up/1500 hr rule in effect (but sure, we're still fighting VEOs): -- FY14: 59% -- FY15: 55% -- FY16: Still unknown, since AFPC has yet to publish the final numbers, but somewhere around 50% The trend is clearly heading downward, while airline hiring is increasing. Like it or not, there's a pretty clear negative correlation between airline hiring and AF retention.

I assume the major airlines have been following this magical formula because (1) there were enough prior-mil pilots to fill approx. 30-35% of their needs, and (2) they knew they couldn't hire substantially more regional pilots without screwing over the regional airlines upon which they depend to serve as feeders for mainline. The question is, what happens if/when the majors' demand grows so high that that there are proportionally too few prior-mil pilots to meet their desired mix? The problem we've been discussing is it's impossible to "flood the markets" with RJ pilots, due to the 1500 hr rule. We'll very soon be in a position where the airlines' demand will be so great that either (1) they'll hire away so many mil pilots that the AF will be screwed, (2) they'll hire away so many regional pilots that the hub-and-spoke model upon which the major airlines are built will be screwed, or (3) both. What is your solution to this dilemma, how quickly can it be enacted, and how long will your fix take to be effective?