TnkrToad

What could possibly go wrong . . . - 6 or 8 year commitment would make it substantially more appealing to get out at earliest possible date than the current 10 yr, due to the added seniority/additional pay this would allow for on the outside - Even less experience/corporate knowledge in squadrons due to earlier separations - Less squadron experience still due to higher AETC requirements (more turnover = more pilots needed per year = more AETC IPs needed to train them) - Even less incentive for folks to attend WIC (WIC ADSC overlaps with SUPT ADSC now. Force people to extend their latest ADSC to go to WIC, and watch applications drop like a rock) - Even less money to pay bonuses/fund QoL initiatives/buy new planes, because that cash is being spent on putting more folks through SUPT - Best part, even worse decisions from HHQ staffs, because even fewer pilots with requisite rank/experience to fend off bad ideas Given that all the above would make it even harder to fill COCOM requirements (BTW, the warfighting is the reason the Air Force exists), I don't see how cutting the ADSC commitment--especially down to 6 years--would be a good idea. TT

Not history Friday, but: Hoyt Vandenberg, Nate Twining, Curt LeMay, Tommy White, J.P. McConnell, John Ryan, Lew Allen, Larry Welch, and Buzz Moseley. I'd say it can be done. TT

Or perhaps I was primarily trying to highlight an anomaly and found the explanation that the AMC WOs who didn't get promoted to O-5 were disgusting fatbodies who couldn't pass a PT test to be unsatisfactory. Not panicking; just skeptical of the notion that AMC does a good job of developing/properly utilizing its patches. My insights are based on more than a one-year statistical snapshot. Rather, I worked with & for the initial cadre and graduates from the first KC-135 WIC class and many others afterward. This is from before they could call it a WIC and before they could carry a W-prefix, because AMC and the wider Air Force were so awesome when it came to managing mobility WOs. Clearly, I'm a graybeard, and I'd love to hear that AMC is doing well by its WOs. Looking at the AMC promo briefs for the last 5 O-5 boards (CY11-CY15), though, I tend to see a trend. In every single one of them, AMC WOs were promoted at a lower rate than the overall Air Force. I still can't reconcile Chuck's assertions with (1) the data points I've found--which cover more than just one year, and (2) my personal experience--which exceeds his. To head off a bunch of bickering over statistical significance, I will readily admit you win--a one-year snapshot and small sample size by itself should not be cause for alarm. TT

Not necessarily; I'd hope they'd go there to be better at their jobs. I don't figure they want to endure 6 months of arse pain to retire as O-4s, though.

Perhaps it's a generational thing--since you're still awaiting your O-5 results, you're substantially younger than I, but I have seen little evidence of AMC patches being well-managed. Maybe there's a difference between the C-17 and other MAF communities. The C-17 WIC is younger than the C-130 and KC-135 WICs; perhaps this indicates your community is doing something more right than the others, I don't know. Not knocking on the AMC WO functionals, but rather my impression is that, between local commanders who don't have a clue how to best utilize their skill sets, sending patches to assignments that screw guys' careers and other leadership/managerial malpractice, I've seen multiple instances of WOs' careers getting needlessly frittered away. Your mileage has clearly varied from mine--and, it would seem, that of the MAF WOs who met this last board. I'm really curious to get your insight on the WO O-5 promo rate in AMC. Only 2 out of 6 were promoted--are you telling me that the other 4 couldn't pass a PT test? Likewise, MAF patches fared no better than pilots as a whole. I don't know how to motivate folks to go through that much pain, when stats indicate that doing so won't help one's career one bit. TT

Slides 9 & 10 on the AMC promo brief supports your assertion, particularly for WIC grads: - IPZ O-5 promo rate for WIC grads: -- AMC: 33% (2/6) . . . I can't for the life of me figure out how/why WIC grads fared so poorly -- Overall AF: 72.7% (16/22) . . . The overall AF pilot promo rate was 73.4%; MAF WIC grads actually got promoted at a marginally lower rate that pilots across the entire AF - BPZ O-5 promo rate: -- Exactly Zero WIC, Phoenix Reach & Phoenix Mobility grads were selected BPZ in AMC The funniest part is the banner across the bottom of the slide that touts, "Development Programs are Achieving Desired Outcome." I guess the desired outcome is for everyone but MAF experts to lead AMC/the AF. TT

While I agree it sounds like a good idea, again there are statutory limits of how many officers the AF can have as a proportion of the overall force. Adding substantial numbers of 18Xers--at least as I understand it, I'm no personnelist--necessarily requires cutting officer numbers in other AFSCs. I'm not sure AF leaders are terribly excited about cutting officer slots in other communities to pay the RPA bill, given how the CSAF has said every AFSC is undermanned. I'm not sure what community/communities would be ripe for officer reductions, although someone on this forum suggested there are too many Space officers. TT

Interesting--the latest update to the ACP take rate also includes take rates for the 18Xers' bonus. I'll get to that in a sec, but first a few highlights from the 11X community. From 8 Feb to 15 Mar, here were the following changes: Overall 11x: 16 more takers, for a 37.6% FY16 take rate thus far - Bomber: 1 more taker; 26.9% -- lowest of all communities--surprising, since they've historically had a pretty healthy take rate - C2ISR: 2 more; 48.8% - Fighter: 5 more; 29.7% - Mobility: 4 more; 36.4% - Rescue: 1 more; 71.4% -- highest of all communities (not surprising--they've always had a high take rate) - SOF: 2 more; 38.5% - Unmanned (11U): 1 more; 55.2% 18x take rate: 14.3% (2/14) thus far - Exactly 1 (out of 1) RQ-170 pilot and 1 SOF RPA pilot (out of 6) have taken the droid bonus - None of the seven 18A Pred or Reaper drivers have taken the bonus thus far - Three total RPA bonus takers thus far (between 11U, 18A, 18S); I'm curious to see how GC and company plans to build any degree of long-term experience/continuity in the RPA world Bottom line: the take rate continues to be underwhelming. Over three quarters of this year's eligibles were the true-blue types who signed up for the bonus early last year. The slow trickle of takers this FY further indicates Big Blue has some retention issues (shocker, I know). TT

I know you're enamored with the idea of re-instituting the warrant officer corps in the Air Force--a whole different rank structure that hasn't existed in the Air Force for decades--but it's not clear how doing so would really help. If E's without college degrees can be made RPA pilots, then it would be much smarter to (1) design an enlisted career path that would reasonably ensure E's entering RPA pilot training would successfully complete the program, and (2) incentivize E's--monetarily and otherwise--to want to be RPA pilots . . . and perhaps more importantly, remain on AD as RPA pilots. Keeping them as E's would help protect the field from getting screwed up by the "everybody is a leader so now we can use warrants outside the role of technical/tactical expert" problem Army warrants are currently experiencing. As noted before though, I personally find it tough to envision an Air Force enlisted track that would set E's (with no prior college experience necessary) up for success in RPA pilot training (which would have to include weapons employment, except for Global Hawk drivers). Furthermore, you'd have to throw some pretty huge bonuses their way, or get awfully creative with non-financial incentives, to get them to remain on AD. I really don't see how the Warrant Officer idea is the panacea you make it out to be. TT

I have no special knowledge as to how Big Blue intends to develop its enlisted RPA pilots. All I was trying to do is relate Lawman's tank crew analogy to that of developing an enlisted Reaper crew. In Lawman's tank example--if I read it right--an enlisted tanker progresses from loader, to driver, to gunner, to tank commander. Lots of time and opportunity to train/assess/mentor/eliminate folks along the way. If we want to create enlisted Reaper pilots, it seems an analogous flow would be for folks to progress from sensor operator to pilot. Of course, to make this analogy work, this would be something akin to the Army having tanks crewed by just two people--the tank commander (who is also the driver and gunner) and a loader. Just as I don't see the Army willingly embracing such a concept--I wouldn't be surprised if it were already technologically feasible--I personally have difficulty with the feasibility of an enlisted RPA crew, for the many reasons discussed earlier in this thread. Speaking very conceptually, if the Air Force really wants to go the way of enlisted Reaper pilots, then perhaps a career flow from sensor operator to pilot would be at least logically viable. Much like the Army tank crew analogy, it would allow for the training/assessment/acculturation/etc. From what I read on this forum, though, this idea--while it might read well--is unlikely to work. From what I read, SO's simply have no desire to make the move to the other seat, and even if they did, enlisted pay scales simply would not compete with civilian salaries for doing the exact same job. I'll be interested to see how Big Blue really goes about implementing the enlisted RPA plan. I'm not optimistic, and I certainly don't find the idea "elegant." TT

Problem is there's no analogous, logical progression for the RPA operation. I can only go off what I read on this forum, but the only way your notional plan works for AF RPAs is to train folks up as sensor operators first, then at some point transition them to the pilot's seat. This creates a dual problem of further exacerbating what I read on here is a chronic shortage of sensor operators. Since the problem is throughput in initially training RPA pilots, again I don't see how you solve anything with this approach. What I think is the root issue regarding the officer vs. enlisted RPA driver debate is the combination of COCOMs' insatiable need for the capabilities RPAs provide, together with limits on the number of officers the Air Force can have relative to the overall force: - The Air Force clearly needs to grow the RPA community, in order to meet COCOM requirements - Big Blue feels it's best to use officers to fly RPAs. I would assume due to: (1) O's more likely to make it through training on time, (2) O's more likely to seek out new/novel ways to employ RPAs, & better able to integrate with manned aircraft pilot peers, (3) need to build/maintain a cadre of people who will eventually apply airpower at the operational and strategic levels - The problem is the Air Force is limited by the numbers of officers it can have on the books. I can't quote the magic formula, but based on the overall size of the force, there can only be so many total officers. If the Air Force dramatically grows its RPA officer force--along with the additional Intel, Mx & other officer billets to support them--without substantial increases in the overall Air Force end strength, then this would necessarily mean shrinking the officer numbers in other communities - I personally don't know of any line officer AFSC that's awash with excess officer bodies, so the Air Force is effectively in a damned-if-you-do/damned-if-you-don't scenario - The "elegant" solution (using GC's words) is to train up enlisted RPA pilots, which avoids the necessity of cutting the officer force. Doing so will introduce a host of other problems, and as indicated in other posts won't really help the near-term problem--schoolhouse throughput--but at least it will keep us from gutting other Air Force functions even further. The "elegant" solution of having E's do officer jobs was done in the 1930s, with sergeant pilots. It worked great--two of the three members of Chennault's demo team were sergeant pilots. Of course, that was during the Great Depression (economic factors made staying on active duty very attractive), and both were Reserve Lt's. They had served on AD for two years, until such time their AD orders were up. They chose to revert to enlisted status because prospects were bleak on the outside and Army pay, while not great, was better than starving in the civil sector. I don't see either of these factors being at work today. Well-trained enlisted RPA pilots will punch at the earliest opportunity. I'm not saying the AF enlisted RPA pilot won't work, but I don't see how it could possibly be as elegant a solution as GC and Lawman present it to be. The Air Force will probably figure out a way to make it work as best as possible, in order to avoid further painful cuts to other officer communities. Seems to me that the enlisted RPA plan will come at the cost of (1) higher attrition rates in training and (2) minimal--if any--cost savings, due to the bonuses E's will have to be offered to keep them on AD. TT

Dude, you've got to chill out a bit. I was making a joke (apparently too subtle) about academia. If you didn't get the humor, you clearly don't know many folks who are (or have) slogged through a grad school (grad students/grad school staff and faculty being the academic types to whom I refer). If your "academic type" friends can't regale you with tales of woe when it comes to senseless academic bureaucracy, they can't be attending noteworthy schools, or are just barely getting started in their programs. Getting back on topic, best wishes to Whis and all others trying to gather meaningful data and write useful papers for the benefit of the service. TT

Umm, the name is Air University. As a military academic institution, ACSC ain't Harvard Business School, but it follows standard academic processes. As ThreeHoler indicated, anyone wanting to use survey data in their ACSC coursework will have to jump through the school's hoops. It's no different (and likely worse) in civilian institutions. TT

Clearly you haven't spent much time around academic types.

Copy all on both your points; EGUN crews are plenty busy--perhaps at a rate greater than AMC crews. This would illustrate my point, though: if AMC owned the crews at EGUN as well as those stateside, I'd say it would be more likely the pain--writ large, in terms of TDY/deployment rates and locations--would be equitably distributed. Sounds like EUCOM and AMC are at least attempting to share the load, hence ARC & AD crews augmenting, but the coord isn't working all that great if the workload is still unfair. If you're going to operate a tanker off-station anyway (Istres, perhaps), an AMC crew/jet can do that mission just as easily as an EGUN one. Here's to hoping the two commands can work and play well together, and maximize quality of life for crews stateside and overseas. In an attempt to keep this thread on topic, the high opstempo and crappy deals would do much to explain how/why the ACP take rate is so low thus far. Desert rotations, homeland defense alerts and a-word hiring aren't likely to substantially change in the near future. I don't suspect take rates will substantially change, either. TT

Dude, chill. I took Right Seat Driver at his word when he said, "We had guys in the -135 go to the DO and validate a two week off-station sorties to knock out 'training.'" The way he wrote it indicated there was something less than legitimate about the rationale for those missions and the way they were executed. You apparently didn't bother to read my entire sentence, even though you quoted it. I wrote: "If folks in AMC were taking the keys to the jet and going on boondoggles such as you described, that was a bit shady." You completely missed the whole rest of the paragraph, where I (1) figured there was a more valid purpose for the missions Right Seat Driver described than simply taking the jet for an extended joy ride, and (2) even if they had gotten a good deal, it wasn't necessarily a bad thing, since they likely got good training from it. It's also funny that you mentioned there was a glut (not glutton) of copilots at the time, which might have justified long off-station missions, since I was the one who brought it up. It seems you also missed the part when I highlighted "the lunacy of having USAFE, not AMC, own those tails." I personally think the current command construct for tankers in Europe is ridiculous; AMC should own the tankers in Europe, not USAFE. One of the bennies of this would be that tanker crews stateside would occasionally get to do something other than deploy to the desert, European-based crews might contribute more equitably to CENTCOM operations, and--probably most importantly--the pain would be spread more evenly than it currently is. But that would have required a bit more reading comprehension on your part. If you're gonna critique folks, at least bother to read what they wrote first. Getting back to the topic of the thread, the KC-135 take rate is currently 32.1%--worse than C-130J, C-17, C-5 and mobility test communities. The only heavy communities with lower rates are KC-10 and C-130E/H, which are only marginally worse, at 30% and 31.3%, respectively. Based on these stats, I'd guess tanker crews aren't going on a whole lot of boondoggles these days. If they are, they sure aren't helping retention all that much. TT

I suspect this all comes back to force management, which is the focus of this thread. As I recall, around the '07 timeframe, the tanker community was flooded with pilots. Why? Lotsa pilots were getting produced, but the communities which really needed them (11F & 11S spring to mind--I'm sure others were hurting, too) simply could not absorb them. The KC-135 community--and I assume C-130 & C-17 communities, too--got the overflow, because it's a whole lot easier to get someone through Altus/Little Rock, so they can serve a copilot, than it is to train up a Viper or Talon driver. I distinctly remember we had about 100 pilots for 15 jets, with a 7,000 hr flying hour program at EGUN. Do the math, and that only equates to 140 hrs in the seat, per pilot, per year. Not exactly a formula for success, when one wants to get and keep people competent as aviators. At one point at EGUN, there was a policy that two copilots would fly on each sortie, so that they could build up enough "other" time (even though time in the jumpseat is useless), so they would have the chance to eventually upgrade to AC & later IP. In that timeframe, we also started to deploy crews (but not jets) downrange, so crews could get more flying hours--on AMC tails, which didn't count against EGUN flying hours. EGUN was a sweet deal deployment-wise, because of the lunacy of having USAFE, not AMC, own those tails (and I'm sure the same was true of PACAF-owned tankers). Yes, there were some pretty sweet TDYs in EUCOM, because--shockingly--most places in EUCOM are more fun to visit than bases in CENTCOM. If a tanker's going to go TDY, it's typically going to go to a base with a lot of ramp space and a long runway, which tends to mean it's going to be near a reasonably large city, which typically means plenty to see and do. EGUN was sweet TDY-wise, because--you guessed it--USAFE, not AMC, owned the tails. Again, I'm sure the same held true for PACAF tanker units. If folks in AMC were taking the keys to the jet and going on boondoggles such as you described, that was a bit shady. I imagine there was a legit rationale for those training sorties--not the least of which was getting folks trained on Block 40, which required an overseas sortie--even if the crews took a bit too much license with the opportunities they were given. The tanker squadrons, awash with copilots and young ACs, had to (1) get their crews adequate numbers of hours--which might not have been accomplished if they simply filled user requests, and (2) give their crews some variety of experience--flying in the Pacific (remote/island destinations, tropical weather, dealing with customs, etc.) is way different from theater AR missions flown from the Deid. I'm sure those who went on these boondoggles ended up being much more well-rounded aviators than those who had 2,000+ total hours at the end of their first assignments, but who had done nothing other than fly locals when home and theater AR sorties one-to-a-full stop from desert locations. Thailand and Guam, while one can have great fun at both locations, are also hosts to exercises and real-world operations. Just because one can have a good time at a particular location doesn't mean nothing worthwhile is happening there. I'm sure China and North Korea would be very happy if we avoided "good deal" locations like PGUA, VTUN and elsewhere, in order to avoid the appearance of having a good time. TT

So, the difference is that older officers can read? I'm struggling with your grammar, but if there's an "old officer aristocracy," I ain't part of it. The bottom line is this: you cited an historical example to underscore your point. Your understanding of interwar airmen--who led the Army Air Forces during the war, and the independent Air Force starting in 1947--is historically inaccurate. Is money everything? Of course not--wasn't in the 1930s, and isn't today. That doesn't negate the fact that, then--as now--monetary and other forms of compensation played critical roles in retaining talented individuals. Perhaps we should also return to the days of Hap Arnold, who not only worked himself so hard he gave himself heart attacks, but at a Sunday morning meeting had one of the staffers he was berating literally drop dead in front of him? Not trying to start yet another fight on this thread today, but be careful when citing examples. Sometimes they can prove the opposite of what you're trying to say. TT

Actually, you're pretty close to being exactly wrong. - Pilot pay was 50% of base pay--starting in flying training. Even if pilots' total pay not have seemed spectacular, a couple living on a Captain's salary at Maxwell could live like royalty, with a live-in maid - The workload was much easier. Shockingly, America's interwar isolationism meant airmen's workloads were not terribly onerous. "Equitation"--to include a healthy amount of polo--comprised a substantial part of the ACTS syllabus. Oh yeah--they got paid for their polo ponies - The free housing was pretty sweet, too. What counts as Colonels' housing at Maxwell now was Captains' housing in the interwar years - Pilots had way more social prestige. Back in the day, ridiculously wealthy people often had great respect for airmen, and were happy to hang out with them. It probably helped that a lot of aviators were graduates of Harvard, Yale, Stanford, M.I.T., etc. George C. Marshall and Hap Arnold both came from prominent families. With air travel commoditized, the social respect dynamic has changed substantially - It's noteworthy that interwar pilots led pretty darn good lives, with ridiculous numbers of parties and other social engagements--on one salary Monetary and other social incentives aren't everything, but they're a big deal. If the Air Force wants to retain good people, it's gotta be willing to pay for them. TT

No offense taken, and I'm sorry for your loss. I'll respectfully disagree with your description of how easy it is to fly the tanker--particularly in the landing phase, which is where Altus IPs like Azimuth really make their money, but I won't litigate that any more here. Bringing this back to the purpose of this thread, I hope the Air Force manages to grow and keep experienced MDS experts in the tankers and every other airframe. Fly safe, TT

Ugh. Clearly, communicating on the interwebz is not ideal. Let me spell it out for you, since talking slowly doesn't translate well in text. I did the thumbs up to the post, because I (1) approved of the basic point Azimuth made--executing air refueling missions in the KC-135 well takes substantial skill, training and experience. The absence of these factors can, does have horrible consequences (and it clearly has); and (2) although a forum thumbs up could not possibly convey my intent adequately, I thought it a very small, but nonetheless appropriate way to remember our fallen fellow aviators. Beyond that, I could not care less what your opinion is of me. I personally hope that the level of experience among Altus IPs Azimuth describes does not lead to more Shell 77s.

Whoa. That's frightening, if I understand what you're saying correctly. I assume folks should have no problem getting their 1,500 hrs in their first assignments, given the number of deployments they're doing. Why, then, are they not going to CFIC while still in their first assignments? Are there not enough CFIC slots at KLTS, or are flying units so overtasked that they can't afford to put folks through CFIC and allow them to build a little IP time before going to Altus? Umm, yes. Next time you see a tanker on the flight line, check out the clearance between the motors and the tarmac. Next, understand that the flight controls are 1950s technology, and the airplane is kind of big and unwieldy. Imagine taking a student good enough to graduate UPT, but not necessarily the greatest, and pair him or her with an instructor who spent the bulk of the prior three years deploying to the desert, and flying most every sortie one to a full stop. The instructor hasn't gotten a whole lot of variety or quantity of experience, and the student is flying a jet that's very different from the one they flew before. Not a recipe for success. Let a student land a bit off centerline, combine the crown of the runway with minimal clearance between the motors and the runway, and pod scrapes ensue. TT

There's always been an accordion effect in promotion board timing. In the early 90s, folks met their O-4 boards really late--I want to say at the 10.5 or 11 year point. The AF was in the early stages of the post-Cold War drawdown, so there were more than enough FGOs in the shrinking AF. Boards went ever-later, and promotion rates plummeted. Fast forward a few years--large Cold War-era cohorts retire, airline hiring picks up, fewer get commissioned per year, etc., and magically, folks start meeting boards earlier and promotion rates at those boards increase. When the Air Force shrunk again, in order to pay for recapitalization, promotions slowed down. The Air Force is set to expand again, albeit not hugely so, and the civilian economy (particularly the airline industry) is enticing folks to separate/retire. Seems like a pretty good formula for meeting boards earlier and/or higher promo rates. Where we stand right now, folks meet their O-6 board at 20 yrs, which means some--those who get selected 2 below for O-5 and O-6--can get selected at 16 yrs and be pinned on at 17 yrs. I can only begin to imagine how young our "bright and shiny" types will be, particularly in the manned flying community, as airline hiring takes its toll. TT

And this, folks, is how we get the leaders we do in the Air Force: - Focus on system inputs (ramp up manned pilot/18x/enlisted pilot production--see above) - Ignore losses of experienced individuals, and thus fail adequately retain folks at key career inflection points (e.g., end of SUPT commitment, retirement eligibility at 20 yrs) . . . except for those who fit the right demographics. Ensure they're promoted at higher rates, in order to encourage them to stay in - Promote those who bother to stay in past their min commitments/beyond 20 yr retirement eligibility (retention of adequate numbers of quality individuals be damned) - Further isolate high-potential officers by sending them off to endless strings of schools and staff jobs - Even further isolate senior leaders by giving them staffs comprised of those who--like the senior leaders--were among the few who bothered to stay on AD (and hence have little in common with the masses of folks serving under them, who are mostly waiting to finally reach the ends of their respective ADSC commitments) The Five-Sided Puzzle Palace must be an awesome echo chamber for GC and his buddies. TT

I'm not a personnelist, but it's pretty painfully obvious to me that the overall take rate number is only useful as a very broad indicator of the net effects of airline hiring and/or pilots' frustrations with Air Force/congressional policies. It's useless as an overall gauge of Air Force pilot manning/health, because there is so much variation between pilot communities, and between year groups within those communities. What really matters is various Air Force specialties' manning, and the extent to which retaining pilots reaching bonus eligibility can impact overall AFSC health. The outlook isn't good overall, but it's especially poor for certain communities. I'll use the RPA community as an example, but the principle works the same for all rated AFSCs: The RPA community is hurting for manning already, and the Air Force is seeking to expand it further. It seems plausible that the Air Force really needs 100% of the bonus-eligible RPA drivers to stay in this year, so that the force can be grown while executing global operations. Given the current state of manning and projected growth, I'm guessing the RPA community might need a 100% take rate for several years, if it is to have a hope of getting healthy manning-wise. That ain't gonna happen, though. The only way to grow the community, then, will be through accessions--taking a lot more folks from commissioning sources and making them 18Xs--which involves a huge degree of short-term pain, as folks are taken off the line to train the newbies, and furthermore has the potential of creating an opposite problem down the road (a glut of 2016 year group 18Xers, all competing for very limited school/staff/command opportunities). For the current group of bonus-eligible RPA pilots, the Air Force didn't make enough folks from their commissioning year groups RPA pilots, and the Air Force is highly unlikely to retain enough via the bonus to get/keep the RPA community healthy. I don't know of any other plans to provide further monetary incentives for RPA pilots, to encourage them to become RPA drivers and/or retain those who already are 11Us/18Xers. I know of no plan to promote RPA drivers at higher rates, in order to provide a professional incentive to serve as an RPA pilot. Airline hiring is making it abundantly clear that taking more pilots out of manned cockpits is not going to be a good strategy. It strikes me that, if the Air Force wants to get the RPA community healthy (and I would say this goes for most pilot communities), the Air Force will need to substantially increase - (1) monthly incentive pays--to encourage folks to enter the career field and hence buttress squadron operations, - (2) ACP bonuses--to encourage folks to stay in the career field and hence buttress staff and command, and - (3) consider another bonus offering at the 20-year, retirement-eligibility point--to ensure we eventually have senior leaders and senior O-5/O-6 staffers who are deeply familiar with RPAs. Given how long ago we were able to see this train wreck coming, I can't comprehend why options 1 & 2 weren't pursued long ago. These would seem to be the easiest--it would simply be a matter of updating incentive pays & bonuses to match current market conditions. I think Big Blue should consider Option 3, particularly for manned aircraft pilots, since the combination of airline hiring (airlines pay better) and military retirement (staying past 20 means effectively working for "half pay") will make it awfully hard to keep talent on AD. Of course, it would help if the president/congress provided leadership and funding, Air Force leaders chose not to engage in witch hunts, and officers were selected based on performance, rather than demographic diversity. TT