TnkrToad

I hear what you're saying. While I'm interested to hear GC's response, the purpose of my previous post is as much/more to show folks on this forum how this really works. If GC provides value-added information, we'll all be the better for it. If not, it's still a whole lot better to address him with facts and logic than name-calling. For what it's worth, I don't think folks should be terribly concerned about non flyers screwing with 11-2 series pubs. I'm pretty confident MAJCOM & NAF Stan/Eval & Training billets will be filled by qualified folks. The RAP issue shouldn't be something that's impacted by this dynamic . . . but given that I'm tanker dude, take this bit of my advice for what it's worth; I can't even spell RAP. What does concern me is Joint/HAF/COCOM/Theater SOC staffs being filled by folks who don't know what they're doing. The idea that we might not have a critical mass of operationally-savvy folks influencing policy decisions at the Joint & HAF level scares the crap out me. Bad tactical & operational decisions can lead to ugly consequences, but they're usually recoverable. Bad strategy and messed-up acquisitions, however, are awfully hard to unscrew. At the theater level and below, the Air Force can (and does) make up for staff inexperience/low manning by pushing crap downhill to Wings/Groups/Squadrons. Maybe this will help younger folks on this forum understand how/why some of their taskings come about. If you're an active flyer, better get used to doing HHQ staffs' jobs for them--even more so than you already do.

Curious, then--from which non rated, yet operationally-minded career fields would these staff officers hail? Since you have much better insight, please do tell. Not trying be snarky--I just don't get how you see this working out in reality. Force management programs skinnied down non rated career fields, too. If my Intel friends are to be believed, they have no excess capacity, either. The Space and Cyber communities don't exactly seem flushed with excess bodies. So, when AFRICOM has a Noncombatant Evacuation Operation to execute, can we expect that a Maintenance Officer is going to be the mobility/AFSOF subject matter expert? When EUCOM or PACOM plans its annual live/virtual/constructed theater exercises, is a loggie going to be the fighter SME in the white cell? If so, good luck with that. It seems more likely to me that, every time a EUCOM or AFRICOM contingency comes up, dudes at Mildenhall/Lakenheath/etc. will end up getting tasked with planning ops & exercises that should be done at the MAJCOM or NAF . . . and some poor schmuck from Kadena/Misawa/wherever will split his time between trying to fly the line/remain tactically competent, while doing double duty as the fighter SME for whatever PACOM calls its theater exercise(s). I guess the good news, in that case, is at least the guy in the PACOM example will rack up some good air miles and get to go to Hawaii a lot. Not a great formula, though, for tactical competence or a healthy family life. As noted before, I don't see how, in the scenario you're describing, one avoids having the crap roll downhill in a big way to the Wings. WRT to take rate, I'm still curious to hear how the FY 14 take rate can/will magically change. Even if it does, I assume it will have more to do with creative accounting than meaningfully different data. It seems more important to note that total pilot inventory decreased by 764. Any thoughts on how manning (and more importantly overall health of the force) is going to improve, given that airline hiring is up, take rates are decreasing, and (as far as I can tell) any excess pilot inventory exists in year groups that have yet to reach bonus eligibility?

I'm no math major, but 13 months from board to first pin-on ain't bad. Other year groups have had much longer waits between promotion selection and pin-on. Is your beef really that boards are happening later in folks' careers? If so, talk to dudes who met their O-4 boards back in the early 90s. You'll feel much better about your pin-on times/promotion opportunities.

...but the final bonus take rate is posted: per the FY14 Final Report posted on the AFPC website. 53% doesn't seem like cause for celebration. -- Do you know something we don't? Is the final report not in fact final? The AF has been doing its darnedest since at least the mid-90s to recategorize staff billets from 11X/12X to 16G, etc. Having been an 11M filling a billet that should have been an 11S, I am all to familiar with the notion of "better to have a marginally-qualified dude who is willing to learn than leave the seat vacant" philosophy. I have difficulty, however, seeing how further recategorizations which allow non rated folks to fill rated billets will be a net positive.

That dynamic can certainly hold true--perhaps, because the MAJCOM is too busy to meddle, they'll give the ops wings a bit more control. Having been in an overseas assignment where my unit was the only flying my MDS, I can say it was nice to have more input into MAJCOM Supps & such than would have happened in AMC, because those at the MAJCOM were too busy with other taskers. That said, it also meant that, because the MAJCOM and NAF were undermanned, the Wing got the "opportunity" to give folks in flying squadrons the unique experience of working in the CAOC, being the lead MDS rep for large theater exercises, and individual deployments to . . . well, everywhere. Will you get the chance to do some unique things, while still assigned at the Wing/below level? Sure. Will you be doing MAJCOM/NAF staffers' jobs for them, while your SURF only shows duties at the Squadron/Group level? Yep. Will it also further increase an already-painful ops tempo? Absolutely. - I view it as unlikely that CAOC billets will get shortfalled, so I don't see how Wg/CCs will have any more control over combat mission execution than they did before. Perhaps Wings will be given more control over their training programs. I imagine they'll be given wide latitude in finding creative ways to use Sim's to accomplish training requirements If you want specifics on 12B/12F manning, I suggest you talk to your Sq/CC or AFPC functional. I'm just trying to help folks follow the logical bouncing ball with regard to the second- and third-order effects of enticing/pushing 11 & 12Ms out the door. The last time I saw anything official on 12X manning was a few years ago. At the time--according to AFPC metrics--12Ms were overmanned, 12Bs & 12Rs were just about right, and 12Fs & 12Ss were significantly undermanned. - From what I've read on this forum, it appears that the Air Force has "fixed the glitch" WRT 12Ms - I would assume that CAF functionals would want to backfill 11F staff billets with 11 & 12Bs, 11 & 12Rs before taking 11 & 12Ms . . . which means that you go/have gone from being "right-sized" to being effectively undermanned - The net effect of the Air Force apparently refusing to acknowledge the extent to which 11 & 12Ms have been backfilling other communities' billets is that the CAF community's net effective manning shortfall is/will be even worse For the AFSOC community, again based on old data, both the 11 & 12S communities were hurting badly. Doesn't look like the CAF community is gonna be much help. The mobility side is or soon will be out of Schlitz. I'd love to hear from General Chang, rtgators or anyone else with a clearer picture of current aviator manning. I'll willingly admit that I might be wrong in my outlook. Thus far, the silence from them/other senior leaders on this forum is deafening.

What I mean to say is, in the immortal words of George Clooney, "Damn! We're in a tight spot!" - Due to AFPC and/or AF/A1M buffoonery, we used to just have shortages of 11Fs, 11Hs, 11Ss and 11Us--due to underproduction and/or community growth--but a surplus of 11Ms (which could backfill other communities in AETC, on staffs, etc.) - Now, we have a circumstance wherein--as I perceive it--we don't (or soon won't) have any excess 11Ms to provide those backfills. Don't forget that the 12M community has also taken it in the shorts recently--so all the mobility aviator billets they might otherwise fill will also keep 11Ms in mobility jobs - If the AFSOC situation described in an earlier post is accurate--nobody going to staff/MAJCOM staffers still flying the line--this might indicate how it is going/will go in other MAJCOMs How a bill becomes a law: 1) Not enough 11Fs/11Ss/etc. to fill ops cockpits and staffs, so ops units get filled and staffs get shortfalled 2) 11M functionals refuse to give up bodies to backfill, because various force management initiatives have carrot-and-sticked any excess out of the service. Long-term trends aren’t much cause for optimism 3) ACC/AFSOC functionals are now on the horns of a dilemma: continue to shortfall staffs, which means they have even fewer people to advocate for their relative positions and/or build viable plans, or shortchange ops units and thus make it even harder to meet operational requirements? 4) My guess is that folks in the ops units will see even worse decisions come out of higher headquarters, while experiencing the same or worse ops tempo due to manning shortages. Folks in higher headquarters staffs will be all the more frustrated, because not only will they be overworked by virtue of being undermanned, but they’ll have to deal with even louder griping from the ops units, since they’ll be forced to push work down to wings/groups/squadrons that used to be done by MAJCOM staffs Will opportunities to be released to staff improve? I dunno. I’m not sure you’ll want to go to staff, however, if the above dynamic is truly at work. The “good” news in such a scenario would be that, by process of elimination, your chances of making O-5 should be pretty good. The Air Force appears to have taken a tough problem and made it intractable. Edit: fixed ridiculously large font.

If you're concerned about your QOL, you should be concerned about the health of your MAJCOM (in this case AFSOC) staff. Screwups and work undone at the higher headquarters level have a way of making life suck at the unit level. It can suck enough that seeking promotion becomes a non-issue.

Sounds like a winning long-term strategy for AFSOC. What could possibly go wrong?

Like you, I can't wait to hear how senior leaders will try to spin this. Some other interesting statistics/thoughts: - 12 pilots with 15-19 Commissioned Years of Service took Palace Chase--the most in any FY, from '93-'14 - 30 pilots with 15-19 CYOS took Normal Separation and 4 more 7-day opted--the most since FY '01 (the last full FY of the pre-9/11 hiring boom) -- What do I make of the above two tidbits? While FY 14 wasn't the first year where the AF used Force Management programs to thin the herd, this year substantially exceeded prior efforts. When folks with so much vested in the service get out, this seems a pretty good confirmation that either hiring on the outside is good or dudes are fed up. - 838 mobility pilot losses in FY 14--as mentioned in an earlier post, that equates to 101% of eligibles (versus 69% of eligibles the prior year), due to force management programs. Not only is the grass looking greener on the other side of the fence, but the Air Force seems to be pushing heavy drivers out of the pasture - From another discussion thread, crew ratios for mobility pilots are apparently being reduced. From the Air Force Times, C-17 crews will go from a 3.0 crew ratio to a 2.0 (although someone else was briefed a reduction to 2.5). Such reductions, without reductions in requirements, equates to a 20-50% increase in workload. Not a formula for long-term retention success So . . . Big Blue is doing its best to make life suck for 11Ms, while at the same time incentivizing them to leave, at the outset of a major hiring boom. I don't know how to put a positive spin on this. For those of you who aren't 11Ms, you might wonder why you care. You might want to check who's filling ACC, AFSOC, etc., staff billets in lieu of short-manned 11Fs and 11Ss. edited for grammer and speling

To pile on; here's the basic math, as I understand it: - The current contract is for 179 KC-46s, with the first 18 (optimistically) promised to be on the ramp by August 2017 - With deliveries stretching from 2016-2028, that works out to about 15/year (179 over 12 years) - We have 414 KC-135s in the total force (according the AF fact sheet I found online). Assuming (as Boeing I'm sure hopes) the Air Force simply decides to keep buying more KC-46s to replace the remaining KC-135s, it would take until 2043 or so until all the KC-135s are replaced--assuming the jets are replaced one-for-one basis - Bottom line, the last KC-135s will be about 80 years old when they head to the boneyard; this is something akin to flying the original, 1935-era Boeing Model 299 (the first B-17 prototype) today--not the highly-advanced D-Day era B-17s that flew 9 years later

At UPT bases during that timeframe, the prior-MWS guys spent as much or more time talking about which airlines were hiring as they did teaching folks how to fly Tweets/T-1s. Six from my class took other tracks--T-1s, T-44s and helos--over T-38s (to include our #1 guy out of Tweets, who took a T-1). They used to let folks select their tracks purely based on order of merit. Perhaps the number of guys choosing heavies is what encouraged the AF to go to dream sheets/whatever it is they use these days. At my first flying assignment, I can't recall anyone who was eligible for the bonus actually taking it. Perhaps due to the "mentorship" we got during UPT & our first assignments (and getting beat down because they under-produced heavy pilots from my year group), I'm the only mobility pilot from my UPT class is still on active duty--and we haven't even hit the 20 yr point yet.

Funny; looking at most updated stats: - The three pilot groups with the worst take rates are: Mobility (179/349--51.3%), Fighter (130/281--46.3%) and Unmanned (16/32--50%) -- The Mobility and Fighter pilot groups have the two largest groups of eligibles--low take rates for large groups makes for crummy overall retention -- Two of the three groups were specially targeted by AFPC for retention efforts (Fighter and Unmanned, of course)--specially-targeted bonuses don't seem all that helpful (at least at amounts they're currently offering) Almost all pilot groups are way below last year's take rates: - CSAR: 69.6% (down 24.2% from last year) - C2ISR/EW: 57.5% (down 18.5%) - Fighter: 46.3% (down 16.3%) - Mobility: 51.3% (down 15.7%) - Bomber: 66.7% (down 14.5%) - Unmanned: 50% (down 9.3%) - Particular MDSs seem to really be hurting pretty badly; check out the take rates for the following: -- A-10: 38.5% -- F-15: 24% -- MQ-9: 33.3% -- CV-22: 28.6% - My cursory look at AETC flying training (SUPT and RTU) bases indicates that there'll be plenty of "opportunities" for folks to PCS to SUPT/RTU bases It'll be interesting to read the FY14 ACP Report. Can't wait to see how they try to put a positive spin on this.

Ugh. - Dude, all I know is I followed the logic of what you said (that nobody is swayed by the bonus) and made the conclusion that the 20 YAS is a mistake that should be corrected. Why throw more money at folks who are going to stay anyway? -- Sqwatch--who initially agreed with you--immediately objected to my actually agreeing with him. Given his immediate objection to the suggestion that Chang & company should get rid of the 20 YAS option (as you indicated, it's useless), the bonus seems to be a big deal to him, if nobody else. -- You subsequently argued that we should offer $250k . . . that we should double the bonuses for everybody (more than is currently being offered to 11Fs), which seems to contradict your assertion that short-term monetary incentives are irrelevant to every pilot's decision on whether to stay or go - You can presume whatever you want about my motivations. You've got me--I care about the 11M community, and oddly enough about tanker dudes. I presume you're more familiar with the F-16 community, and that topics related to fighters are especially interesting to you -- As a tanker dude, I've got a fair idea of what kind of range your MDS has. I would hope you'd be interested, too, in retaining some talent in the tanker community (particularly in the CAOC, which is where plenty of those bonus takers are), as you drill holes in the sky over Iraq/Afghanistan/Syria/Upickastan/wherever we end up next. -- You still refuse to engage with what, in my opinion, is the indefensibility of offering a higher bonus to 11Fs, while refusing to do so for 11Ss and 11Hs (particularly HH-60 guys). How does asking a logical question about this issue equate to my looking out solely for the 11M community? At this point, I'm not bitter, just tired. It seems like we're just talking past each other, anyway. Water's wet, sky's blue, and rated management is totally screwed up. Good night. NKAWTG, TT

It's not a joke that some number of people (clearly not you) have found the bonus--and among fighter types the added option of $225k (before taxes)--makes them more likely to stay in and commit to a 20 year career. Your advocacy for $50k/yr for 5 years ($250k before taxes) across the board supports the argument for increasing bonuses order to improve bonus take rates--for all pilot communities, not just fighter guys. - I violently agree with you that our senior leaders need to be realistic with the extent of the problem and tell us what they intend to do about it. Given General Chang and rtgators' silence on this forum, It's not clear to me that they their staff officers are giving them useful data, so they can understand the depth of pilot manning challenges we're facing.

I'm just having a little fun with ViperStud's logic. His assertion that size of the bonus doesn't matter is bogus. That Sqwatch initially supported him is just funny. I get it that retirement benefits are more significant than the bonus, but how much Big Blue puts on the table does matter. My real point is that I can't come up with a way that the ARP actually makes sense: - If larger bonuses are targeted toward undermanned communities, why weren't the 11S and 11H communities offered the same bonuses as 11Fs? In my experience, those two communities are worse-manned and getting worse-crushed than fighter bubbas. Helo and AFSOC guys--feel free to disagree - You gotta be smoking crack if you think the 20 YAS option adds anything in the way of personnel stability. People that stay in until 16 yrs are almost inevitably going to stay until 20. It's all about offering a bigger monetary payout, in the belief that doing so will substantially increase the bonus take rate - With regard to one of my earlier posts, my primary point was merely to question whether or not the increased bonus for 11Fs might is cost effective. I would love to hear someone explain--especially if so few are swayed by the bonus--how it could possibly be that the huge fiscal outlays justify a theoretically minor difference in take rates - I'm well past the bonus, so the bonuses offered to 11Ms has no direct impact on me. What does bother me is total lack of proactivity that the ARP program WRT 11Ms indicates. If personnel stability is really a concern and an airline hiring boom is starting, why in the world would Big Blue not try to do something special to retain those from the community that will find it easiest to walk into the civilian sector? The fact that nobody on this forum has offered a rational justification for how/why the ARP program makes sense indicates to me that our force managers either don't know what they're doing, or are operating from a logic that is totally opaque--at least to me. Given the internal and external challenges the Air Force is facing WRT pilot manning, it scares the crap out of my that our rated force managers seem clueless. My beef is with rated managers, not fighter bubbas. Cheers, TT edited for minor grammar issue & stuff

Copy all--then your clear recommendation is to reset the fighter pilot bonuses to the same options offered to the other pilot communities: - The 20 YAS bonus offers almost no net change in predictability - As you said, and Sqwatch acknowledged, the total monetary benefit offered by the 20 YAS option is irrelevant to people's decision processes -- The 5 yr commitment takes folks to at least 16 yrs commissioned service, and extremely few separate between the 16-20 yr point, so the 20 YAS option offers essentially nothing in terms of added predictability - Unless someone speaks up on this forum and says that the 20 YAS option was a significant factor in their decision to take the bonus, your assertion that the bonus is irrelevant can reasonably be assumed to be correct I hope General Chang & company are listening--you might have just saved the Air Force a bunch of cash in unnecessary bonus payouts to fighter pilots that really don't care about the extra income.

Of course I made up the percentages--I pulled them out of my fundamental orifice to make a point. We can quibble about numbers, but I think the general theme is viable. Bottom line, the bonus is only useful to the extent that it affects fence-sitters. You have to make some kind of assumption in order to assess whether/not the program is effective - The fact is that, for this FY, the USAF has obligated over $28M in bonuses for fighter pilots alone in this FY - Based upon the notional 35% baseline I put forth, that means that--at best--the bonus only truly netted about 35 fighter pilot "fence sitters" . . . which means that the ARP program really cost over $800k for each pilot that might possibly be swayed by the program - If, as you submit, few (or none) were swayed by the bonus, then the per-unit cost of retained fighter pilots increases even further . . . and the economic argument for the bonus becomes even more shaky I personally think the bonus does influence individuals' decision making processes. It seems ridiculous to assert that folks would stay in, in order to get a AD retirement (for its monetary benefits), but the monetary benefits associated with the bonus would be irrelevant. Air Force leaders can do nothing about political leaders (other than try to vote the bums out--good luck with that). The question is what Air Force leaders can actually control. - They have control over what they offer in bonuses--but given the deafening silence from Gen Chang (or anyone else on this forum with insight), it doesn't appear that any serious thought/analysis is actually being applied to this problem - They can control the distribution of pilots within various communities, through multiple means--initial qual training slots, promotion selections, developmental education selections, ARP bonuses and (all too often) force management efforts like VSP and TERA. Again, the admittedly anecdotal (but nonetheless stark) evidence shows that rated managers have poor utilized all the force management options available - I would submit that gross imbalances between different MDSs and/or shortages/overages within particular year groups is a significant cause of discontent--and it is something Big Blue can at least try to address. Being in an undermanned pilot community, in an undermanned year group sucks. So, I imagine, does being in an overmanned pilot community/year group. - Unequal distribution of "good deal" assignments is likewise a major, controllable factor. If Big Blue wants to improve retention, then a more equitable distribution of hard-to-fills between high-potential types and average joes (rather than the rich get richer theme) would likewise help substantially. -- Having known a bunch of dudes who reached the ends of their UPT commitments in the late-90s, I can guarantee that the flesh peddlers can and will take free agency into account when handing out assignments. Free agent types won't get assignments to HAF staff or other career-enhancing assignments, but you'll be amazed at how many of them end of getting OSA and garden-spot MWS assignments Should be interesting to see how this all plays out. TT

I think you're right on with the assignment process being a huge factor. Here’s an interesting thought experiment on the effectiveness of the pilot bonus: - Assumption: The bonus is only effective to the extent that the take rate exceeds 35% o 25% of a year group are bright and shiny, future O-6 types who will stay in anyway because as part of the ubermensch, they figure their futures are golden. No bonus required in order to retain o 10% are slugs or gluttons for punishment—regardless, they don’t have a great future, but still have little incentive to get out. Again, no bonus required for retention Looking at the fighter types, which (thus far) have a 47.3% take rate from 281 eligibles. By my logic: - 70 (25%) are striver types who didn’t need the bonus to stay in - 28 (10%) are slugs/gluttons who, again, didn’t need the bonus to stay in - The striver types will be protected from the bad deals (they almost invariably are) and the slugs shouldn’t be sent to hard-to-fills. Logic: if that hard-to-fill deployment is important enough to take a fighter pilot out of his cockpit to fill, I’d hope it’s important enough to send someone that won’t screw it up - That then means that Big Blue effectively just spent $28,025,000 (the total obligated for fighter pilot bonuses thus far) to convince the 35 notional fence-sitters (folks good enough to have options, but not bought into the leadership track) to stay in, and in doing so, accept that they’ll likely get screwed for the latter half of their respective careers - Works out to over $800k apiece to allow Big Blue to fill those hard-to-fill billets If my logic is correct, Big Blue didn’t get anything out of offering the bonus to the RPA pilots. Only 4/13 took (30.8%) took the bait: - 2 or 3 of those are bright and shiny types - 1 or 2 are slug/glutton/gonna stay in no matter what types - Bad news is it was a waste of money—Big Blue got no more people to fill hard-to-fill billets than they would have without offering the bonus at all - Good news is that they only spent $500k for RPA pilot bonuses this year—less than the cost to keep one fighter pilot fence-sitter! Given how much we’ve paid to retain the fence-sitters, I sure hope the hard-to-fill billets are really worth filling. Seems to me that one huge retention (and cost-effectiveness) factor will be assessing how important many of the hard-to-fill billets really are.

Good question. If you've read my previous posts, you might have already figured some of this out. Mostly I was posing particular questions in the belief that rtgators & General Chang (who at least claim to have insight into the bonus decision making process) would have some worthwhile insights and/or might indicate that Big Blue is enacting changes that might make a difference. In the absence of input from them, here goes: - Offer the enhanced bonus options to all pilots, but at a minimum--to the 11M community. Rationale: 11Ms give you the most bang for your buck. If money is the primary driver then focusing monetary options on the largest community (which by the way is backfilling other communities' billets) would be a good first start -- Even better would be to offer the same options as those offered to 11Fs to all communities. It really wouldn't have a major impact on raw numbers, however. A 10-15% increase in take rate among small communities that typically already have high take rates ain't gonna do much good, but it would ensure that everyone feels like they're part of the same team - Barring the above, senior AF leaders might want to explain how/why it is that 11Ss & 11Hs (which last I checked were at least as overstretched, if not more so than the 11F community) weren't offered the same cool bonuses that the 11Fs were. In the information vacuum, the only rational conclusions are either that Big Blue cares nothing about getting the helo and AFSOF communities healthy . . . or alternatively (and more cynically) they're taking these communities for granted. "They'll stay in anyway, why throw more money at 'em?" - Target promotion rates and/or school slots to enable proper balancing of career fields--at least through Maj, if not Lt Col--by airframe, if necessary -- I couldn't help noting that there are 155 C-17 bubbas eligible for the bonus, but only 77 KC-135 pilot eligibles. This, despite the fact that the USAF has over 400 KC-135s, and a little over 200 C-17s. Granted the AD vs. ARC mix might be a little different, but how is it that a community with roughly half the airplanes has twice the number of eligibles (at least in this year group)? I will submit that gross mis-distribution (prob a better way to say that, but my thoughts fail me right now) such as this leads to really screwed-up lives for everyone involved. Undermanned communities get kicked in the teeth, yet don't get promoted/get good deals because they're too busy doing good to look good, while way overmanned communities likewise have trouble finding useful work - For particular year groups/pilot communities that a clearly undermanned, do what you can to retain their talents -- As an 11M from a mid-90s year group that is in the bottom of the pilot-production "bathtub"--we're undermanned overall, but even worse are grossly undermanned for 11Ms (there are almost twice as many 11Fs in my year group than 11Ms)--I can tell you that there will inevitably be slim pickin's when time comes to pick O-6 and above types. Limited choices generally do not lead to good leadership selections. If we in the heavy community end up with crappy leaders because AFPC/HAF A1/whomever enacted policies that effectively encouraged folks to get out, then the impacts will go well beyond just one or two year groups. See the JQP/toxic leader thread. Would the above ideas solve all our problems? It's unlikely, but they might at least start to make a dent in what seems to be a quickly metastasizing problem, as airline demand is just starting to ramp up. Standing by for spears . . . TT edited for poor grammar/badly worded argument

Copy all--what you wrote has been the subtext of my recent posts. In my view, the ARP program is at best inherently self-contradictory . . . and to compound the problem is way too reactive. I want to be wrong in my criticism, because the consequences of failing to retain quality aviators will be terrible for the service and the nation as a whole. My general theme has been to point out obvious contradictions in the program, while hoping that folks like GC, rtgators, or someone else with insight will provide a rational basis for the program as currently constructed. Since no such rationality has been forthcoming, all I can then hope for is that senior leaders and/or their staffers who follow this discussion will realize how screwed up the program (and more broadly the Air Force) is and actively seek to change it. The first step in correcting a problem is recognizing that you have one. Maybe this year's ARP take rates will spur meaningful change.

Just wanted to note--last day for anyone looking to take the bonus this FY. I sure hope folks are huge procrastinators, since the numbers posted last night aren't promising: - Fighter and RPA pilots (those the Air Force apparently wants most to retain) thus far have the lowest take rates of all communities, at 46.6% and 30.8%, respectively - Mobility pilots (community with the largest number of eligibles) have the third-lowest take rate, at 51.4% - The C2ISR/EW, Bomber and CSAR--which have traditionally had high take rates--are well behind where they were last year: they are 19.2%, 17.6% and 25.7% below last FY's final take rates, respectively - One "bright spot" is that the Spec Ops community's 60.3% take rate is only 6.4% behind last year. Sure glad they're healthy manning-wise (as indicated by them only being offered the standard bonus option) The overall take rate thus far is 52.6%--15.7% below last year's 68.3% final tally. For the health of our service, I hope AFPC's inbox is getting flooded with signed ARP agreements as I write this. Given that the last time anyone even posted on this discussion was 19 days ago, I'm not terribly optimistic. The final ARP report will make for an interesting read.

I get what you're saying, but my target isn't really GC. It would be great to get a meaningful response from him, but I'm not holding my breath. The point is that apparently nobody on this forum has a good rationale for the current ACP program. Given how self-contradictory the program is, we can't even begin to guess how/why the ACP is built the way it is. - The fact that no senior leader or staff weenie has been able to post a viable rationale for rated management policy (in particular as it relates to the ACP program), and none of we peons can see any inherent logic in the policy, should be a concern for all of us

GC, Without “delving too deeply into ‘how [the Air Force mixes] the batter,” your arguments are at best unconvincing. If you more fully explained the underlying rationale for the way the ACP program is designed, you might have a chance of convincing folks on this forum that Big Blue knows what it’s doing. Thus far, your responses have had an opposite, negative effect. Conclusions which you have yet to refute: - The ACP program can’t be about overall manning within various pilot communities o Otherwise the 11S & 11H communities—which last I heard were worse-manned overall than 11Fs—would have been offered the same enhanced options the 11Fs were o Without stating a rationale for the policy, you come across as either clueless (What? The 11S and 11H communities are undermanned?) or cynical (I know improved bonus options for these small communities would entail minimal cost and would at least partially help these communities get healthy, but screw ‘em—they’ll stay in anyway, because they’re gluttons for punishment) - Big Blue is making no attempt to set target take rates, and thus has/will have no clue how relatively successful the ACP program is o All the data is there—Red Line requirements, Blue Line inventory, and number of ACP eligibles by community—but per rtgator’s own admission, no one has bothered to figure out what your targets are/should be o Without stated targets, your claims of success come across as propagandistic - The 11M community is screwed o Hearing nothing but crickets on this one, too—from what I can tell, effective overages in the 11M community exist almost exclusively in the year groups that have yet to reach bonus eligibility o Indicated overages of any post-bonus 11M year groups are mitigated by the fact that 11Ms are disproportionately filling 16G (and other generic rated) billets, as well as 11F/11S/11H billets—in AETC, ACC, AFSOC, COCOM staffs, etc. o Big Blue widened and deepened clear 11M shortages in the mid-to late-90s year groups through various force management initiatives o Despite indications and warnings already from the 11M community (see JQP blog discussion), you still miss the linkage between a limited pool from which to choose future leaders and poor/even toxic leadership (how many of today’s toxic leaders were merely the best of what was left after the massive loss of talent in the late 90s?) Can you rationally refute any of the above conclusions?

The point I'm trying to make, and which neither rtgators nor General Chang has ever answered is how/why the ACP program is in any way rational, and how they gauge success. - I don't know (although I suspect) why the number of eligibles is so skewed . . . but the fact that I don't get it isn't very relevant. The fact that the rated force managers don't get it baffles me - I'm not particularly upset that different communities get different bonus options. What worries me is that the ACP program as built seems to contradict its stated purpose (getting/keeping different pilot communities at approx 100% manning levels) - I look forward to the final October report, but again, from all the other previous ones I've read, the rated management folks have no clue as to what their targets were/should have been, and hence have no idea how relatively successful they really were Here's how I could see the report being written in October, in a way that would make the rated force managers look good, while at the same time showing that they were at least thinking about rated management. Caveat--I don't have access to the actual data. This is merely meant to show that the way take rates currently get assessed seems nonsensical. If the report this October were to be written like the below, it might come across as a bit cynical, but at least it would be honest, reflect rated managers' actual thinking, and would further reflect that they have a clue about their desired end states: - 11M take rate was 10%--Success! The 11M community is overmanned anyway, and there were so few eligibles, that we needed a low take rate for this community to get the overall manning for the community and the manning for this particular year group down to what we need. -- Of course, if this trend continues, the 11M community is screwed . . . - 11S take rate was 100%--Success! The 11S community is way undermanned, and based off of the number of eligibles we needed to keep every one of them to even have a hope of eventually getting healthy. Best part is, we got 'em all cheap--we only offered a 5-year bonus, and they all took it anyway! -- If any of them really suck, we can non-promote/RIF/offer TERA in the future - 11F take rate was 65%--Success! Given that they're somewhere in the middle of the pack--better manned overall than 11S/11H, more likely to stay in past their minimum commitments than 11Ms, this "middle of the road" take rate is probably ok. We getting closer to our overall 100% 11F manning target (especially with the longer commitments that many signed), and the year group(s) that make up this group of eligibles is reasonably healthy overall I'm sure we can all cherry pick the stats above (that I pulled out of my fundamental orifice). The point is that none of the previous FY reports seem to indicate this level of analysis. The silence from rtgators/General Chang/others who claim to have insight into rated management is deafening. I'm begging to hear a valid rationale for how/why the ACP program makes sense for the Air Force. Any takers? TT

I’m less concerned with active-duty vs. airline pilot balance sheets than I am with an ACP program that makes no sense. I have yet to read a rational explanation for how/why ACP program decisions are made. Discussion below: I’d love to be proven wrong, but I’m not optimistic: - It’s not about seeking to gain or maintain 100% manning in different pilot communities . . . which is what I thought is the whole point of the program o The 11S and 11H communities, which at least last I checked, are worse-manned overall than the 11F community, did not get offered the same enhanced options that the 11Fs were. Weird. - HAF A1M has no idea whether/not they’re really being effective o Per rtgators, “I'm not sure I have anything to do with what flavor of rated has expiring UFT ADSCs.” o They know what their “Red Line” requirements are, as well as their “Blue Line” inventory. They could have found out from AFPC how many eligibles there would be—and could have known with pretty darn good certainty what take rate they’d need to meet their requirements . . . but they didn’t bother - The 11M community is likely screwed o All A1M apparently cares about is overall manning o Overall manning for 11Ms will likely always remain close to 100% . . . because of the relative ease of producing 11Ms and 10 year SUPT commitments o If, and more likely when, 11M bonus take rates and retention plummet due to airline hiring, A1M will continue to remain unconcerned (because they’ll have enough folks to fly the line) o Mobility leaders will be selected from small pools of candidates after the retention carnage . . . which increases the odds that there will be some really poor leaders in the heavy community. The ongoing JQP “toxic leadership” discussion might very well be indicative of the same dynamic § I’ve never had anything to do with Rhatigan, but you’ll note he was one of the few mobility pilots in/around his year group left in the Air Force after the late-90s through 2000 airline hiring spree The scary part is, every time I bring up a point on this forum, the response from rtgators and General Chang is never, “great idea--we thought of that, but this is why your idea won’t work . . .” The response is, instead, to cite irrelevant historical statistics (low airline hiring between 09-13 [forgetting to mention Age 60-65 rule change], mil pay going up every year [but disregarding need to retain folks in the middle of a war]). TT