One (kinda) for the space and missile dudes...
THROUGH THE BACK DOOR
In the movie “Space Cowboys,” Clint Eastwood plays a Chuck Yeager-ish test pilot/engineer who leads a group of aging astronauts to rescue a former Soviet nuclear-armed satellite. In a case of art imitating life, during the height of the Cold War and space race, both superpowers contemplated basing nuclear weapons in space. One side, the former USSR, actually had an operational system during much of the 1960s.
At the beginning of the space confrontation between the two countries, begun with the October 4, 1957 launch of Sputnik, just lofting an object into orbit was a major achievement. Within a very short span of time, the ability to carry useful payloads whether man or machine, became a primary focus. The Soviets jumped out to an early lead in the race by the successively bigger payloads of capsules containing dogs and finally the first man in space, Yuri Gagarin on April 4, 1961.
The Soviet premier, Nikita Khrushchev, boasted of the Soviet superiority of his country’s space accomplishments. On August 9, 1961, at a reception for the second Soviet astronaut, Gherman Titov bragged “You do not have 50 or 100 megaton bombs; we have bombs more powerful than 100 megatons. We placed Gagarin and Titov in space and we can replace them with other loads that can be directed to any place on Earth.” (A megaton is the equivalent of one million tons of TNT.)
Detecting ICBMs
Both sides spent considerable time and energy developing methods of monitoring the nuclear capability of the other. For detection of incoming Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), the United States developed both ground and space based systems.
One of the earliest and still effective systems was the BMEWS (Ballistic Missile Early Warning System), a network of high-powered long-range radars placed around the northern periphery of the Western Hemisphere. An approach over the North Pole was considered the most likely for any Soviet missile or bomber strike since it was the point of closest approach between the U.S.’s and USSR’s landmasses.
By utilizing these radars, and eventually, launch detecting infra-red satellites, the U.S. hoped to gain a good 30 minutes of advance warning of a Soviet nuclear strike. With that much warning, the mighty Strategic Air Command fleet of B-47 and B-52 bombers could be flushed from their mid-western bases and sent on a retaliatory mission. Likewise, the U.S. Titan and Minuteman ICBMs could be launched in a massive counterstrike.
Similarly, the Soviets developed missile tracking radars and satellites to counter any U.S. first strike. This standoff between detecting the enemy’s force before he can destroy you and negate your ability to destroy him in turn was known as mutually assured destruction (MAD). Neither side supposedly had an incentive to hit first because the return blow would wipe out the first side’s country.
The Back Door
The Soviets calculated that a missile fired into a low orbital trajectory would greatly lessen the chances of detection since it would appear above the horizon and thus be visible to the searching radar beams of the Americans much later than would a conventional ICBM profile. For example, the first operational Soviet ICBM, the R-7 (NATO code name SS-6), could loft a nearly three thousand pound payload into a ballistic trajectory of between 600-1200 miles altitude for a target 3,000 miles away. The instant the ascending missile cleared the radar horizon radar and other sensors would detect the rocket and sound the alert.
A low orbit weapon using only a 100-200 mile apogee orbit would decrease the warning time to five minutes and that only if the incoming warhead was coming from over the Artic area. If a bomb were to make an approach from the south, the U.S., in the early 1960s, was woefully unguarded. The time from detection to impact would have been only a few minutes.
In March 1962, Khrushchev stated, “We can launch missiles not only over the North Pole, but in the opposite direction, too…Global rockets can fly from the oceans or other directions where warning facilities cannot be installed. Given global missiles, the warning system in general has lost its importance. Global missiles cannot be spotted in time to prepare any measures against them.”
It was a clear statement of Soviet intentions to place nukes in orbit.
By 1967, United Nations Resolution 1884 and the Outer Space Treaty called upon States to refrain from placing in orbit around earth any objects carrying nuclear or other mass-destruction weapons. The USSR promptly dubbed its orbital weapon system a “Fractional Orbital Bombardment System” or FOBS. By simply not inserting the payload into a complete orbit, the Soviets continued with their research into delivering thermonuclear bombs via a low-trajectory, low visibility route.
The Equipment
In Soviets started a three-pronged approach to get a nuclear orbital system in place. The first proposed orbital missile was the Vladimir Chelomey design based on the UR-1 ICBM. The Soviets gave the ok to proceed with work on this system on March 16, 1961. This was a two stage design, known as the UR-200A, used an RD-0202 first stage engine developing 228 tons of thrust and an RD-0205 second stage with 62 tons of thrust.
The second proposal came from the legendary designer Sergey P. Korolev. He had begun preliminary work on the Global Missile No.1 (GR-1) in 1960. The Soviet Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers gave the formal go-ahead on September 24, 1962.
The GR-1 was a part of Korelev’s N1 lunar program booster. The GR-1 and N1 shared many common design features to aid in the development of both systems. For example, the GR-1 used NK-9 and –9V engines, each developing thrust in the 45-ton range. Korolev’s design team used these same engines as the basis for all of the N1’s stages. It was a three-stage beast using several of the NK-9s. The total mass of Korolev’s GR-1 project was 117 tons, carrying a 2.2 megaton warhead. It would have been accurate to within 3 miles.
The third proposal originated with Mikhail K. Yangelis’ R-36-0, approved for development on April 16, 1962. Yangelis based his orbital weapon on the existing design of his R-36 super heavyweight ICBM (NATO called it the SS-9). The –0 variant was a multi-stage missile using storable hypergolic fuels of nitrogen tetroxide and unsymmetrical dimethyl hydrazine. The first stage used a single RD-251 engine actually composed of three twin-chambered RD-250 engines for a total thrust of 241 tons. The second stage used a single RD-250 with 96 tons of ‘oomph.’ The third stage consisted of a guidance section, a retro-rocket and the warhead. The whole contraption was 108 feet long and weighed 180 tons fully fueled.
In 1965, the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces (RSVN) conducted a study to determine the best proposal. Although all three designers had produced hardware, none had yet flown. During the study, Yangelis’ project was chosen as the most promising and work on the other two was stopped. Korolev, however, did continue to work on his GR-1’s third stage, using it as the basis for the upper stage on the N1 and Proton boosters.
Having won the design competition, Yangelis was under the gun to make it work.
One of the keys to making the rocket perform its deadly mission was the third stage. The instrument section contained an autonomous inertial navigation system, but because of the ‘drift’ inherent in gyroscopic instruments, the system was supplemented by a radar altimeter that would aid the trajectory at two points; once at the start of the orbit and the second just prior to de-orbit burn.
The reentry vehicle tipped the scales at 3,000 lbs with an explosive yield in the 2-3 megaton range. Part of the mass of the vehicle included the retro-rocket. That engine used a single chamber RD-854 engine packing 7.7 tons of thrust. It was used to change the plane of the vehicle from an orbital trajectory to a ballistic one. Four nozzles on the sides used bleed thrust from the main chamber yawed the vehicle and four additional corner-mounted thrusters provided pitch control.
Testing and Operations
The R-36-0 was tested from both aboveground launch facilities at the Tyura-Tam missile range and from in-ground launch silos. The in-ground system was to be the basing mode for the missile.
At Tyura-Tam, the 2d Testing Directorate led a series of test launches beginning in December 1965. The table below gives the launch designation, if known, the date, and the CIA assessment of the shot.
Designation Date Comments
1 Dec 16, 1965 inertial nav. system malfunction
2 Feb 5, 1965 retrorocket malfunction
3 Mar 16, 1966 fire on launch pad
4 May 20, 1966 successful, apogee of 136 miles
5 Sep 18, 1966 first silo launch, failed during second stage
6 Nov 2, 1966 same as Sep 18 launch attempt
7 Kosmos-139 Jan 25, 1967 success, reentry vehicle impacted at Kapustin Yar test range
8 Mar 22, 1967 failure
9 Kosmos-160 May 17, 1967 successful
10 Kosmos-169 Jul 17, 1967 successful
11 Kosmos-170 Jul 31, 1967 successful
12 Kosmos-171 Aug 8, 1967 successful
13 Kosmos-178 Sep 19, 1967 successful
14 Kosmos-179 Sep 22, 1967 successful
15 Kosmos-183 Oct 18, 1967 successful
16 Kosmos-187 Oct 28, 1967 missed target by 7 miles
17 Kosmos-218 Apr 25, 1968 successful
18 May 21, 1968 successful
19 May 28, 1968 successful
20 Kosmos-244 Oct 2, 1968 successful, first operational missile test launch
21 Kosmos-298 Sep 15, 1969 successful operational test
22 Kosmos-354 Jul 23, 1970 successful operational test
23 Kosmos-365 Sep 25, 1970 successful operational test
24 Kosmos-433 Aug 8, 1971 successful operational test
According to declassified CIA documents, the FOBS mission profile consisted of three phases: 1) launch, 2) coast, and 3) reentry.
Prior to launch, the system was targeted while in its silo and cannot use external tracking or guidance after launch. During launch, the SS-9 uses its first and second stages to reach orbit discarding each stage as its fuel empties. The orbit was generally along a near polar orbital path with an inclination of 49.6°. Arriving from the Southern Hemisphere, this would put the warhead on track to hit targets in the central US; a little higher inclination would get the warhead to West Coast targets, a little lower would hit the East Coast.
During the coast phase and just prior to reentry, the vehicle initiates a pitch maneuver to reorient itself for reentry. During the reentry phase, the retro-rocket fires for one minute, changing the plane of flight from orbital to ballistic. After the retro-rocket fires, the warhead separates from the vehicle and continues on its trajectory until impact.
The launch schedules matched US expectations of a test period to get the system configured (1965-1966) followed by the robust schedule of preparing crews for operations (Jan-Oct 1967). The six-month gap between most subsequent launches fits the profile of an operational system getting a workout for crew training. Indeed, US ICBM launches followed somewhat the same pattern during the 1960s and 1970s.
Eighteen operational silos were constructed west of Tyur-Tam. The first officially operational unit was RSVN unit 21422 under the command of Lt Col Eng. A. V. Mieyev, activated on August 25, 1969. Two more battalions joined the first and eventually comprised the 98th Missile Brigade.
US Assessment of FOBS
FOBS was never assessed as a precision weapon since the circular error probable (CEP – circle in at least 50% of the bombs are expected hit a fixed point) was more than three miles. It wouldn’t be used to destroy hardened US ICBM silos or other protected sites. Instead, the US strategic planners and policy makers thought the more likely FOBS use would be as a ‘pathfinder’ to take out command and control centers like the numerous sites in Washington, DC – the White House, Pentagon, etc. Much like a World War II fighter sweeping enemy aircraft before the bombers come through, the FOBS would take out the ability to launch the retaliatory strike that was sure to come if ICBMs were detected.
Because of the interest in the US of more accurate, smaller warheads versus the often times ‘bigger is better’ thought of Khrushchev and a greater reliance on the manned bomber, the US never seriously pursued a nuclear orbital weapon system. (See X-20 DynaSoar sidebar) Also, the thought of a nuclear weapon coming down accidentally was politically more dangerous to US leaders than their Soviet counterparts.
By the time of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) II of 1972 and the emergence of the submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) as a safer, stealthier, means of launching nuclear weapons from different areas than over the North Pole, the FOBS weapon was nearing its finale.
Although never ratified by the US, but abided by both superpowers, SALT II specifically mentioned the SS-9 FOB system as one marked for deactivation. Additionally, 12 of the 18 silos had to be destroyed and the others converted to different use. By 1982, the RVSN began dismantling the R-36-0 launch installations and retiring the missiles. By February 1983 the last missile was pulled from its silo and in May 1984, the last silo destroyed.
Aftermath
So unless Hollywood is on to some secret that remains undiscovered, no satellites orbit overhead with the capability to rain mass death and destruction on an unsuspecting populace. Thankfully, both the USSR and the US stepped back from the fallacy of placing nukes in space.
Now if we can only find another good space movie, we’re all set.
SIDEBAR – American Nuclear Weapons in Space
In the 1950s and early 1960s, the U.S Air Force made a strong run to be the space force for America. As part of that attempt, they proposed a reusable spaceplane, the X-20 DynaSoar (Dynamic Soaring) designed for military use. Unlike the concurrent X-15 research program, the X-20 was intended to become an operational system, conducting space missions ranging from reconnaissance, satellite inspection and repair, orbital resupply, and bombardment. The third version of the X-20 would use a Titan IIIC rocket booster and have an orbital capability. This version would contain a bomb bay for delivering nuclear warheads requiring precise targeting and the ability to approach a target from any direction.
Deciding against placing nuclear weapons in space the Department of Defense cancelled the first test version of the X-20 less than a year before testing was to have begun in 1964.
