Hacker

You give airline management -- the ones making these decisions -- far too much credit when it comes to their insights and strategy. Rarely does it extend beyond a simple cost/benefit strategy, and they have entire floors of actuaries and accountants crunching those numbers constantly. Single pilot, remotely piloted, and autonomous piloted aircraft will happen in a flash just as soon as they are cheaper to buy, operate, and maintain than regular ol' humans are (and the regulatory and contractual blocks to them are overcome). It will have very little to do with what passengers want beyond what they will and won't spend money on.

*Every* decision at the airlines is about the money.

I'm certain that "free booze and food" for 100-400 people would add up to well more than whatever the total compensation costs for the two pilots up front would be.

I was just relating that anecdote in response to his question about it. That story happened when I was a 2Lt in 1995 -- I figured the rest of that out relatively well in the intervening 22 years leading to now, mostly thanks to CMSgt Arnao and SMSgt Bussell, who grabbed my young, dumb butterbar self by the collar and taught me how to lead maintainers. Those are the leadership lessons I was referring to in my previous two posts in this thread.

There's zero technical training in the MX officer school, nor is any allowed on the job. Once I was back from AMOC, I actually tried to get a Job Qualification folder started so I could get trained to perform some wrench-turning tasks. That got squashed rather quickly from QA, who could find no AFI authorization for a 21A AFSC to receive such training or qualification.

I started my career as a MX officer before I went to UPT, and quite frankly learned more about leadership during that time I was in charge of 100-ish people than I did in the majority of the rest of my career as a flyer. The unfortunate truth is that leading a 30-aircraft LFE as a Mission or Package Commander is not the same type of leadership skill.

DARPA projects are all really inexpensive, economical solutions, I'm certain.

That wasn't just the "autopilot" that was out to lunch -- that was the flight control computer. Even after the crew tried to go to the lowest level of automation possible, it was still a computer that took a crap between their hands and the flight controls. So, even more dangerous than just an autopilot acting up. But, you have to put this in context. As freaky as that was (and as catastrophic as the outcome could have been if it was unpiloted or remotely piloted), compare it to the number of lives lost due to pilot error (which is still by far the leading cause of accidents and fatalities in aviation).

Toro, I don't know how you still manage to give a fuck about this monkeyshit fighting.

A sample of guys that "did fairly well" among how many peers who followed a similar path and did not do so well?

It will be interesting to see how this one turns out; unfortunately, it will be 2-3 years before we can make the same kinds of assessments of performance that were seen during the '98/'99 crossflow.

The really good ones were Art 15s.

For my last 3 or so years on active duty, I adopted the practice of calling authority figures in my chain of command "management" rather than "leadership". Fortunately, I had Squadron leadership that rocked and were flying top cover for me, otherwise I'm sure I'd have added another LOR or something to my already-impressive record of administrative slaps on the wrist. SQ/CC: "Hacker, have you briefed Group leadership on the ADVON plan?" Me: "Sir, I did brief management, and they did not have any questions." SQ/CC: "Why do you keep using the term 'management'?" Me: "I'll call them "leadership" when they re-earn that title. In the mean time, I'll call them what they actually are in practice." SQ/CC: "I guess I won't be putting you up for Wing Staff anytime soon....you're dismissed."

I did a year at a regional after retiring and before I got hired at my career airline. I highly recommend it for many reasons. Yes, the pay sucks, but it will be to your benefit in the long run if you're not getting calls from the majors.

That's not just on APC...you'll find that out in the real world, too.

I actually enjoyed being a UPT IP, and it was an opportunity to be on the leadership train since I wasn't a shiny enough penny to be a Strike Eagle SQ/CC.

Vampires can't see their own reflection in a mirror.

I was a snacko once as a Lt Col, and I was the best goddamn snacko that squadron ever saw.

My airline's AFPAK Hands program will station you at the Kuala Lumpur Beach Club Café with a tall drink and a companion who will be happy to keep you company, GI.

Amidst all the bleeding pussies, slighted egoes, and hurt feelings around this topic, don't forget that these are decisions based on qualifications that would likely translate to success in the IFF, FTU, and MQT training pipelines. It has nothing to do with ego. It is "gatekeeping", yes, because the AF doesn't have unlimited money to throw at people to see if they will make it -- they have to make educated and calculated decisions. Again, the Colonels and Generals who are kicking this stuff around saw the last iteration of the puppet show and how that turned out -- hell, some of them may have even been participants in it themselves. Since the results previously were marginal/acceptable at best with T-38 trained pilots, what is the logic some of you have behind thinking that opening it up to pilots with no fast jet single-pilot decisionmaking experience would deliver a better result? With a T-38 trained pilot, there is at least some sort of measured, documented performance that shows adaptability to that flying environment and theoretically the potential to succeed. With a T-1 trained pilot, there is no measured documented performance of those tasks...so which is the riskier bet? Again, it isn't about talent, it is about experience. As said, everyone realizes there are probably a number of T-1 trained MAF dudes who would excel when retrained as a pointy-noser using the existent T-38 requal/IFF/FTU/MQT syllabi, but the AF can't build policy based on what are likely statistical outliers.

Based on what you're saying in this thread, it sounds like you haven't learned any of the lessons that are intended to be conveyed during IEP.

I can't wait for you to go back and look at this post maybe 5 or 10 years down the road -- you know, when you have some actual real-world ops experience under your belt -- so you can see how truly ignorant it is, even as sarcasm. At some point you're probably going to have the opportunity to do an IEP either with an IFF squadron or a fighter FTU. I highly recommend you take that opportunity to see what is lurking on the other side of the UPT base fence.

Well, that's certainly going to fix the morale problem. As if there weren't already enough distrust and animosity between line folks and leadership...

Everybody goes back to the bottom at the new job, theoretically. That being said, DOs and CCs in the new units can incorporate FLUGs and IPUGs into "MQT" if it is appropriate. When I went back to the F-15E after having been an IFF IP, my MQT was dovetailed right into a 4-ship FLUG program.