Thanks for the considered post.
I don't agree with the assessment that a 5-10 year capability gap existed between the F-111 and the Tornado.
The Tornado IDS was on par with the F-111E (operating in Northern Iraq out of Incirlik) in terms of capabilities. These 1-11s dropped at night from medium altitude, alone and without ever seeing many of their targets (and they weren't running against Saddam's airfields, either). I am not sure how effective they were, but as one of the guys who there recently told me, "no one really cared about what we were doing".
As for the F-111F with its PGM capability, they still went in low against airfields and other targets in the opening nights. So, they chose the exact same tactics. Sure, they didn't overfly the runways, but I think I have already established was not the cause of the initial Tornado losses. In fact, the F-models were extremely lucky not to eclipse the Tornado force's losses - three of them were badly damaged by AAA on night one.
The F-15E, which had a PGM capability, went in low for the first couple of nights. One was downed by AAA on night one. At the time, it was the newest MDS in the Air Force inventory and was, in the same way as you characterise the IDS, optimised for a European conflict. But the capability gap didn't stop the same tactics being chosen...
The F-16 had no PGM capability (some squadrons with LANTIRN did, but they were in the monitory), and they went in at medium altitude and dropped dumb bombs without any idea whether they were going to hit the target.
So, no, not convinced that capabilities explain the disparity between sortie numbers and loss rates.