Clark Griswold

Not really a high / low mix per se but a change to a more strategic delivery preference for effects. It is about capabilities ultimately but at some point that has to translate down into what kind of iron in what proportions of the total fleet so invariably it will be made out to be more bombers at the expense of what? That's is the 69 billion dollar question but it's not the best way to articulate the question. Hi / Low could still be made part of a newly balanced air fleet though. Not every new platform would have to be LO. Concur with your point on Hi / Low to get the right amount of capacity and capability, less expensive delivery platforms get unfairly tarnished IMHO when the platform may have less capability to afford greater numbers but to close the effects gap we add the capability into the weapons, sensors, equipment it carries for it's mission. I hear ya but I think keeping that coalition together would be difficult as China would focus on peeling them off one by one and most nations now are easily intimidated / bought off by them, no judgement against them as we have / still do the same but we are a far more benign hegemon but it's what great powers do. Other issue is our business community would likely use their vast influence to undercut that threat as they would either have property destroyed or confiscated by the CCP during / after the conflict never to be made whole likely. Destroying their actively attacking forces with limited Chinese homeland strikes (mil only) is probably the only COA the USG would / does really have to deter aggression. I think Taiwan does rise to that level for our interests for several reasons but primarily for what it represents. Like it or not, we have inherited this policy position and walking away from it would be interpreted as capitulation to China; defeat if conflict arises proves their supremacy in the SCS and would likely lead to a far more Chinese oriented world if not outright primary global leadership assumption by them. For better or worse, unless China becomes something other than totally dominated by the CCP, we must ensure Taiwan is free and independent to maintain out world standing against the rival power. Same with Russia in the Baltics and Ukraine, it just has to be otherwise we are diminished. Your right they have a BIG home field advantage but as Taiwan is a well fortified and dug in, China is likely to give pause. The best way we can assist in giving them assistance in deterring them from attacking is raising the probability that no matter how much they bring to the fight (ships, aircraft, uavs, etc...) it will be completely mauled on the way to Taiwan and when the surviving force arrives there, it will be hit again. How to do that best in the Pacific theater ruled by the Tyranny of Distance is the question. *********** Our two big foes have capable air forces and surface to surface fires along with other capabilities (anti-satellite, cyber, etc...) but their ability to project power is limited. Close to their territory they are a force to be reckoned with, far from home their power diminishes significantly. By increasing our capability to strike from longer ranges (distant bases) and from greater stand off ranges, we (the AF particularly) accentuate this weakness as our weapons will be launched before their platforms can intercept and our bases will have the maximum warning times if they choose to use very long range strike capabilities, if they can reach that far (AK, HI, Australian bases, etc...). Longer ranged platforms can also draw the enemy to spread thin his forces by using some portion to draw him with feints and probes to distant quarters allowing for more likely successful attacks on now less well defended main areas. AR can enable shorter ranged (not short range) platforms but that's a potential vulnerability and that vulnerability only increases with multiple AR events required per sortie or per ATO to accomplish the CFACC'S intent. Not saying that we should throw out AR and shorter ranged platforms from the team but we need to acknowledge these risks and mitigate with different approaches to delivering effects in a theater(s) where we want our land based aircraft basing further from enemies home turf and needing fewer operational resources to execute a mission when launched . Rebalancing the fleet to grow deep strike seems the best way to fight capable opponents. The ugly part is who will be the bill payers if this is not funded via additions to the appropriation. If the role of the Army diminishes as is likely with the "Pacific Pivot" does the Air Force require as large an Air Mobility capability then? If more longer ranged platforms are purchased to operate in the vast Indo-Pacific theater, does this reduce the demand for Air Refueling? If we (the AF) determine that using longer ranged platforms is the better COA, what is the right number of tactical / fighter platforms? Not spears thrown but questions asked assuming resources are fixed and potentially less in future FYs.

As to our current force structure, are we built to win the next fight(s) against China / Russia? I've been thinking a bit on this lately and a few articles I've read are making me believe we need a change. Peer competitors will not allow us to build up and then operate with impunity from MOBs near their territory or newly captured territory or areas they now assert control over in conflicts or high tension periods. One of the articles I read (WHY THE PENTAGON SHOULD FOCUS ON TAIWAN) and for the purposes of this thread's debate I will say we accept it. One of the arguments from article is that if we use this scenario to primarily prepare for, it will also prepare us for other contingencies (Russian territorial aggression in the Baltic, Iranian actions to close the Staits of Hormuz, etc...), that's probably true. My two cents: They have seen that movie and know the ending therefore the Joint Team but specifically for this thread, the Air Force needs capabilities that are less vulnerable to attack at base, less reliant on a vulnerable enabling support capability (AR), capable of penetrating some level of the A2/AD system to deliver effects and with enough mass to absorb losses at least initially.and a more combat oriented and equipped Air Force. Not a swipe but a respectful critique of the force we currently have but I don't think it can answer all of those requirements when facing the peer threats we say we need to pivot and prepare for. In fairness, I doubt any platform or system of platforms can fully answer all of those requirements but we probably can build a better portfolio of platforms if we decide that our mission requirements and focus is to be a primarily longer ranged combat focused air force. All that said as I think we would have to do this inside of the current and realistic future budgets, like how the USMC is restructuring itself that there will be bill payers inside of the service vice Congress just appropriating more money for the new systems while maintaining legacy systems that while valuable, now fall lower on the priority list. This is where the long knives come out and potentially nothing gets done. So all that said, we need an Air Force that has greater range, greater numbers and is more focused on delivering desired effects directly in operations vice enabling other services with support. Agree, disagree or Shitter's full Clark?

Yup https://warontherocks.com/2020/10/every-brief-ever/ Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

Not enough of a reason to stay there or in Syria. Leave the ME, empower allies and partners to keep Iran in check with the price for support being accepting the existence of Israel. Look the other way when they do things we find in poor taste (to a degree). There's just so much Schliz in the cooler, we can't waste it in areas we don't have a vital interest necessitating a direct military presence. Damn genius Gump.

Aircrew didn’t survive unfortunately but thankfully no one on the ground hurt https://www.google.com/amp/s/fox2now.com/news/national/2-dead-in-alabama-naval-aircraft-crash/amp/ Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

Fair enough

But I don't think our presence in Afghanistan influences them in anyway and building it up to a potential that could would be difficult to say the least. Iran to the West, Pakistan to the South and Russia to the North and last but not least China to the East, all while inside of Afghanistan where the Taliban and other VEOs will be forces either to be reckoned with or the government of Afghanistan. Pakistan is getting closer and closer to China and could be pursued to close air routes into country as China has the means to immediately fill the void that estrangement with the US would leave them. All places in the world we have made a stand and kept a long term mission to deter aggression and keep watch on the other side were defensible and connected to allies via land or sea routes with air access available. Guantanamo Bay and West Berlin being obvious enclave exceptions to that but you get my drift. No disagreement giving China a problem on it's Western border would be beneficial to us, I just don't think Afghanistan is the place to do it. Reasonably courting a better relationship with India and the nations of SE Asia who have legitimate concerns of intimidation by China is a better place IMHO along with getting the Islamic nations to finally push back on their genocidal treatment of the Uighurs.

Understand your point but in this case the juice is not worth the squeeze No enduring / residual presence in the amounts being suggested could either generate offensive combat power to keep China out or intimidate them. It would just be a liability to us that gives our enemies a tempting target to harass, embarrass and distract us if they choose to. I’m more familiar with Chess than Go so does one pawn moved well forward with no pieces behind it and in an exposed portion of the board really do anything other than provide a convent point of attack for your opponent? Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

No Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

True POTUS could choose more conventional means of major policy announcements but so be it No matter which way it goes Nov 3 just end it POTUS Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

No I think they know it is wishful thinking at best but no one wants to be there and then get the blame and scorn of history put on them, unfairly I might add but those are the breaks. I also think there is a reluctance on the CJCS as he is an Army GO and the withdrawal from the Stan will lead to a loss of funding for the Army and to some degree operational prestige as the large scale ground operations in the ME are wrapped up. Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/12/world/asia/trump-milley-afghanistan.html I get that no one wants to be in the seat when the fall of Kabul happens and seeing the last helicopter get the hell out with the last group as the inevitable happens but the CJCS has got to realize this is going to happen, America is no longer interested in continuing this operation and that we are leaving come hell or high water. He doesn't have to like it but don't drag your feet.

Yeah but the time is now to take "them" on, the MIC-Swamp-Deep State-Globalists-Illuminati-yada yada yada who want the US everywhere and never pulling out sts while telling us its our solemn duty to fight everywhere for nebulous reasons of late. I think we are underestimating the damage to the Republic by endless, pointless wars. Preaching to the choir likely but if we don't stop "them" we are nothing more than slaves of a sort. What the hell can our working and middle classes think when the leadership and chattering classes of this country think nothing of keeping a 50-70 billion dollar gravy train going to fight half-way around the world for people who hate us, their neighbors, have no intention of changing their ways and their is no definable end state or one that is realistically feasible when those said working and middle classes are losing ground. You'll spend money into oblivion in Afghanistan but f you little people if you want to secure the borders, remove violent illegal aliens and fix infrastructure. Rant finished. Concur on reducing the European footprint, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are the only ones who truly need a deployed US force to deter Russia. Keeping some air/naval basing in the Med for access is fine but only sparingly IMHO.

Hell yes https://warontherocks.com/2020/10/defund-centcom/

Yeah, ultimately this is a class war being disguised as a reaction to racism. The use of race as a canard to to distract these useful idiots as the corporates/globalists/etc... obliterate the working and middle classes with open borders and abusive work visa schemes while simultaneously allowing unlimited amounts of cheap goods into our country made by slave labor in China is one of our main ailments. If we had throughout our government people who realized internet monopolies, bad trade deals and massive conglomerates using media arms, lobbying firms and disinformation factories were actually the ones killing our country and crafted economic policies to combat those negative trends, those disaffected idiots would have two nickels to rub together, a decent job and a material reason to keep their shit straight, but they don't and we don't have many leaders who actually like the country they purport to represent and here we are.

Because these people living their lives quietly really are the problem... /s https://www.theblaze.com/news/blm-riots-wauwatosa-wisconsin-alvin-cole

Noted comrade 😉 Just a modern concept of what I think could be if the mind of the DoD switched to having some portion of the manned air platform force being good enough rather than gold plated. Good enough to buy in numbers with confidence you will be able to afford the entire projected buy to avoid the only 195 Raptors built/bought problem. Not to derail the thread (too much) but a resurrection of the delta winged interceptor inspired by the 102/106 could fit the bill, if it is to be paid at all. Delta wing for fuel capacity, high speed high altitude performance - this platform would spend (IMO) most of its vul time in the mid 40s looking from the high ground to shoot from a favorable position when cued by an LO asset or finding its own target. Signature management vs LO for cost and developmental risk mitigation, range and speed valued over maneuverability, reliability valued over exquisite technical capabilities. All of those trades are to a point, it would need to be relevant, useful and not a liability to the team in combat. Interceptor, arsenal, sensor, jammer, etc... at an affordable cost and with a unique difference from the other team members, exceptional range, to minimally tap AR resources those platforms will require more of. Conceptually, this platform is behind the LO on ingress, can provide info via link, fire the first volleys or decoy launches then retrograde to DCA for the HVAAs. Less costly to develop than the unmanned loyal wingman and to compliment that platform.

An American MiG? Thought some more about this (mass) returning to the AF and the same idea is being discussed for the Russian AF to get cheaper fighters by going back to single engine light(er) fighters so continuing that idea, even with our higher design/production costs, propose building: Low Cost, Modest Capability and Coverage should be what this platform would be designed for. Cost to buy in numbers, capability to assist the 5th gens and defend themselves in the high end fight and coverage to bring weapons/sensors to meet long distances/large areas and large enemy numbers. - Single engine jet, cheaper to buy and maintain. - Fuel fraction of at least 45%, range is paramount for this platform. - Preferred internally carried weapons (min of six AIM-260s) but semi-recessed conformally carried could work, range again. Simplify and lighten when possible with no growth in weight / cost in initial design allowed like the A-4 was when being built. Modest radar/avionics but capable. An approximation of what I think could be designed, built and operated in high numbers (500+) relatively inexpensively:

Because we need an updated F-106...

Capisce? Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

Alrighty then.... ****** MSG ENDS ****** Not to drop into the weeds on this idea but I'll just drop into the weeds... could the US / DoD build a family of systems (just thinking Air but applicable to Naval assets as well) to provide mass at a large discount compared to the frontline systems now and coming online? A US built long range fighter / interceptor for $30-40 million per tail and FH cost under 7k? An arsenal platform under $75 mil per tail and not overly complicated and years behind schedule, etc... as examples. Mass to engage the enemy mass, mass to complicate the enemy's targeting problem and mass to stretch thin the defense of the enemy. That is just my off the cuff concept of why we would look to this, which leads in my mind to an inexpensive (relatively) long range manned and unmanned platform team primarily for the China / Taiwan type fight but applicable elsewhere.

Disagree. Threatening to use special weapons in defense of the territorial sovereignty of allies or other non-existential interest is not a realistic threat / deterrent. Our foes who also possess special weapons with the capability to strike with them intercontinentally know this, that we will not use them against them unless they already have or we truly believe they will use them on us our own homeland. We will have to use conventional means to deter or defeat them in potential conflicts against allies, control of global commons or other vital national interests, hence the percolating idea that we need a force that can take hits and come back on Night 2, 3, etc... I've heard smart folks say resources don't drive requirements, ok maybe but they do shape the answers to those requirements or even if that requirement can be met. So in answer to the requirement (assuming it's valid for this discussion) we might need to first start with a dollar amount or X percentage of the AF appropriation and work backwards from there on what it is we want and for what purpose.

Possibly. Mass could be more of X-tens bigger platforms or capabilities with range versus X-hundreds of smaller platforms without long range capability. I think we conceptualize mass as being always the small, cheap and limited capability when it could be a bit more than that. Seems contradictory I know but it's a trade-off with a sweet spot somewhere. Could even be different for different threats (Russia, China, Iran, NK, etc...) - China is deterred with a big wing arsenal platforms for stand off weapons barrage with range for the Pacific theatre, Russia by an expanded Cyber capability ref @nunya and Iran / NK kept in check with a drone / manned platform capability. That is all in addition to what we have or already planning on acquiring. I asked at the beginning if we had XX billions extra, with future budgets likely being flat or slightly higher what would we be willing to trade to bulk up?

From WOR: BENDING THE PRINCIPLE OF MASS: WHY THAT APPROACH NO LONGER WORKS FOR AIRPOWER Worth a read IMO; if you accept the article's premise that facing potential foes, China namely, that will soon likely combine mass with peer / near peer capabilities that will inevitably attrite and confound asymmetric capabilities used in lieu of actual mass, we will have to add mass to offset this. We have the quality per platform / person covered now we have to have more. Groking a bit on this, does this mean mass in platforms, weapons, weapons/sensors delivered/carried per platform, etc...? Probably some combination not in equal proportions and likely a platform/system(s) different than we have been gearing towards. The exquisite and the few to the adequate and many. That can give some cushion but then what mission(s) do we wish to add mass for? Air Superiority or Attack? ISR or Mobility? Everything costs money to design, build, operate, maintain and train with but could we or should we look for a new family of systems and the people to operate, fix and protect them that are: Inexpensive enough in total ownership cost to buy in mass, Tasked with missions/roles that keep training costs reasonable, Distributed across multiple mission sets to augment with mass the entire AF effort in Joint Operations and Relevant to peer / near peer contingencies. If we were given another XX billions in appropriation to buy more iron, people, improve existing iron or infrastructure, what to choose?