Jump to content

Clark Griswold

Supreme User
  • Posts

    3,162
  • Joined

  • Last visited

  • Days Won

    39

Everything posted by Clark Griswold

  1. The MAF leaders and managers obsess over it because the queep grows usually with rare periods where it is cut. Just by the sheer size, visibility of the reports generated by the execution of queep and use of the measure of execution of queep, that is where or where a lot of the non-mission, myopic focus comes from. Much easier to put on a PPT slide 98% compliance with X beans vs. the X number of vingettes of the MAF crews doing a good job on the mission but missing X not worth a damn beans. One is an easily transmitted slogan, the other a nuanced story requiring time to ingest. Other things at play also, the execution of primarily support mission to combat forces necessitates a certain level of rigidity in execution to be predictable and reliable to our customers of said support missions. That rigidity can sometimes be chaffing as at the tactile level, the crew might see a better way to do something but at the macro level that efficiency could be disruptive to the macro goal of stable, reliable, predictable service... that could just be the nature of the beast in the MAF but it can also imbue in managers/leaders a lot of shut up and color answers to legitimate questions/critiques from the line, this again could feed into the mindset. I also think that this is a product of 20+ years of continuous operations serving the same or similar missions in the same or similar locations/theaters. AMC got into a rut, where the DOs and ADOs were just constantly and are still trying to fill the rotations leading to a widget production mentality at their level and a time to make the donuts mentality at the line level. This monotony or cadence wore down a lot of the positive aspects I think over time of AMC. I offer no solution but only that lament as it may have been/probably is just necessary as that is where the mission just is/was.
  2. Good stuff and agree on the idea of a constant cross flow program, variable to the needs of the AF. As to the synch idea, airframe only. Said airframe would need to be fairly adaptable to be able to cover all those missions to a minimally satisfactorily level, particularly ADAIR and Chase Ship as I imagine the customers for those services want something more than a fat kid to fight against or keep up with them. I like Scorpion but it probably would need a hot rod version of the baseline jet to meet those missions in a useful way. L-159/39NG would likely be the next best choice for an already existing platform considering total cost and capabilities required. Shared fleet idea is not bad if the investment is/was there. Copy on ADAIR not being able to be stopping point, I think borrowing for ADAIR might be more palatable to Big Blue but they have already written a check for contract ADAIR, but one can advocate on BO... The tyranny of aircraft fleet economics makes this a difficult idea to sell to the Bobs, I'm guessing if you could torture the numbers and get the costs down per tail/hour, you could argue for a 150-175 tail fleet for CTP, ADAIR, Light Attack, Chase Ship, Flight Based Training Platform, Test Platform, etc... figure you buy 160 L-159/39NGs at average $20 mil with all the goodies (radars, pods, sensors, etc) , program 500 hours per at $3,000 comes to some reasonable numbers for a multi-use, multi-mission platform. I would say two problems, short term needs to the 11F/11A communities and long term needs to change the culture of the AF. If we want leaders and managers to not myopically focus on queep and realize the point of all of this is to generate airpower to perform X mission then we need more dudes to a experience a culture/execute a mission that probably focuses less on bullshit and more on delivering the mission / winning the fight. I say probably as I have never been in a fighter/attack unit but having interacted with different fighter dudes at different times in different places, they did as a group display a less queepy mindset and I think that experience of single seat flying or at least often single seat flying in a dynamic mission or training environment causes some mindset shift. Particularly when you execute a mission where significant threat from the enemy exists and the pressure/expectation to perform is high as you are employing weapons against enemies often close or inter-twinned with friendlies, don't screw it up. Not infatuated or a fighter groupie, I'm happily married to my heavy aircraft in a monogamous hetero-crew relationship but I think if there were a mechanism to let some reasonable number of dudes who tracked Heavy, FAIP, RPA, Bomber but wanted a fighter/attack jet to work hard, prove their mettle, meet a legit requirement and then serve in a tactically minded flying community (training or operational), I believe it would pay dividends in morale, retention and cultural renewal in some parts of the Air Force. Don't doubt your point about retention of dudes who tracked fighters right out of the gate from SUPT but I see this idea as the one of many simultaneous efforts to return the AF to course. Airplane porn just because...
  3. Not operational enough? What the hell do they want? A mash up of Iwo Jima, Gettysburg and the Tet Offensive to make it tough enough? Copy that. Thinking about a better cross-flow program (x to fighters), I'd probably have the program mainly look at applicants that came from other specialized communities that could give some transferable skills and experience to make the accepted applicants more likely to succeed. B-2, U-2, Light Attack, etc... and alluding to the mil adversary program @HuggyU2 mentioned earlier, that might be a first stop for an accepted applicant, ADAIR first then based on that performance as an wingman, moving on to a B course in a pointy nose. If possible, I'd try to synch the CTP programs, Light Attack, Chase Plane and mil ADAIR. Might end up with a jack of all trades, master of none but that might be ok in the big picture. Scorpion would be my choice as I think it could probably fulfill the majority of requirements for all and more than all for some (particularly light attack). This could avoid the original sin of specialized programs, small fleet size and expensive/risky logistics with support over the life of the airplane.
  4. I remember that. Everything that doesn't fit some mold I have yet to perfectly visualize that the Bobs in charge think is right is always under the gun regardless if it is chump change in terms of money, personnel and trouble while adding value that is either not readily quantifiable like induced crew retention for military only opportunities, morale or military flight, tactics and leadership development. Bean counting a-holes with low experience in operations, intensive military training (participation in mil exercises, mission qual tng, etc..) or formal qual training don't realize that quantity of experience has a quality all its own. Just the shear number of sorties a mil pilot flies is going to put him/her/it (for the wokesters) into unforseen circumstances, hopefully rise to the occassion, learn something and debrief it to their peers so they all get stronger. Repetitions build experience, proficiency and confidence. That confidence is the basis of a good pilot so they can use more their nugget when things are not as planned, excrement hits the fan or they need to help a member of the team who is trouble/not as strong. Rant complete. Buy cool iron AF and get your mojo back.
  5. Damn it that would have been fun... Well kept T-33 in aggressor colors for a what could be if the AF still gave a shit about flying... #bitterandcrusty Add pods, radars, sensors, etc... with a new build airframe, engines, avionics, links, etc... you have a platform to segue to different missions: aggressor, light attack, support and utility platform, flight based training, etc... Amen. They took the CTP from the Global Hawk right as I got there. The CTP budget to rent Aero Club aircraft and fly all the GH pilots at the time (early 2000s) cost less than the copier toner budget for the FY at the 12th RS about 90k at the time, it was cheap and effective therefore it had to be killed.
  6. Copy that, it is probably the only data set to study if the AF were inclined to take up Maj Byrnes ideas, or this particular one. Agree on that base of experience, acquired at an early stage in one's military flying career is crucial and likely what led to a higher rate of difficulty, sub-par performance you observed in cross-flows. I would still support a Heavy/RPA/Recce/FAIP cross flow program but with lead in experience building to promote a better cross flow fighter pilot / wingman. What that lead in experience would be for these already rated dudes coming from a non-fighter assignment would be is the $64,000 question, unfortunately we don't have a platform like the A-37 in the inventory that took pilots from all platforms that met a requirement and built tactical experience in aircrew from other backgrounds. Cross Flow (X to fighters) is not / would not solve all the AF's cultural problems but I think it would be beneficial. Costs to be sure but in the rated community I think it would have a sizable positive impact, particularly with aviators in the beginning of the career looking for that second shot and likely to stay for a career with a background that could make a well rounded leader. Benefits to the AF and the fighter community I believe also if executed properly. Good article on the A-37: https://www.airspacemag.com/military-aviation/legends-of-vietnam-super-tweet-8974282/
  7. Agree that the referenced GO is looking for the silver bullet when it is one of several cultural problems but if it is describable and can be reduced to one word or phrase, I would say it is the loss of prestige. That sounds bad as prestige I think has an undeserved negative connotation but the loss of prestige of the rated community in the AF is fundamentally “it” as to What Is Wrong With The AF. That idea has other stuff in orbit around it (loss of trust as adults and officers, emasculating treatment by shoe clerks for meaningless reasons, etc...) but I think that is what mainly ails the rated community Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk
  8. I remember a little about those programs but they were just before my time (99 yr group dude) so I'm low SA on that topic. Nothing readily popped up from a Google search, what was the result of that initiative? Copy, I agree with his overall sentiments but see that it is not a perfect fix for immediate problems, it (his proposals/observations) are really critiques of the legacy culture in the rated communities of the AF and they're impact in a changing operational environment.
  9. Interesting article on AF culture and resistance to changing it, focusing on the rated force. SYNCHRONIZING CHANGE AND AIR FORCE CULTURE: MODERNIZATION AND THE DIRTY SECRET OF AIRCREW SHORTAGE Worth the 10 mins to read IMO.
  10. That may or may not be a good thing for that Wing (if RUMINT turns into reality) I remember the debacle of the C-27, seemed like the AF supported the program after resisting it only to pull the rug out after acquiring when it could. Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk
  11. He gets partial credit but only that. From the article: "The competitor should be a drone fighter plane that's remote-controlled by a human, but with its maneuvers augmented by autonomy. The F-35 would have no chance against it," He’s envisioning (I think) something like the drone in Deal of the Century doing 69 g turns/rolls out muscling a manned fighter in a WVR dog fight, not exactly where air combat is in reality now or likely to be in the future. Not saying BFM in WVR is not important but the totality of delivering air dominance now is a lot of other stuff (LO, links, weps, sensors, cueing, sens fusion) on top of tactically relevant speed/maneuverability. He’s partially right that it (warfare and air warfare in particular here) will be conducted by drone (a significant part but likely not all) but to truly take advantage of the tactical benefits, a UCAS will need to be untethered and autonomous most of the time during its actual combat ops for signature reduction, operational liability with reliance on a vulnerable link and to shorten the find-fix-finish loop. Also as previously mentioned the bandwidth issue will likely become a limfac as more platforms/weps get on the net/links That’s a tall order for the risk averse CYA modern US military but one that IMO will have to be accepted if you actually want the full capability of a UCAS. Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk
  12. Not an A-37 but thought it relevant: https://www.barnstormers.com/listing.php?catid=17479 Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk
  13. This may just be a way to less expensively field a UCAV with the additional benefit of being optionally manned. Our friends are pushing ahead in development of UCAVs (Hunter in Russia, Sharp Sword in China), this should be one of several COAs pursued IMHO. Many big bombers methinks would be a bridge too far but an arsenal / C2 platform to accompany at standoff distances the LO package and control / update the UCAVs might be affordable, if you forgo LO and keep the platform focused on supporting the LO fighters/bombers/attack platforms rather than trying to make it one of them. Missile/Sensor/Comm platform for on and off-board cueing, high endurance to provide gap coverage during yo-yo ops, secure node in the network for additional coverage and enough capability/performance to self-defend / egress if a leaker gets thru. Not perfect, but using the F6D Missilier as an example: Not a fighter but an archer and a lookout with endurance to support as the package moves forward / threats detected and suppressed.
  14. Saab Viggen STOL capabilities
  15. I hear ya but I think SOCOM is looking for a platform with a lighter footprint logistically and financially. Light Attack vs Heavy Attack. More RPAs could be a solution but honestly it sounds like overkill when you consider the full footprint to bring that capability to bear. Physical and telecommunications infrastructure, PED, contingency planning, integration/deconfliction with manned aircraft (civ & mil), etc... Not hating on RPAs but sometimes it's just easier to send a manned platform for a specific mission to support a specific team/unit for a specific time vs everything needed to have a platform to deliver persistent ISR/Strike. Just my two cents, RPAs bring a capability more suited for a campaign or long-term operation, then the costs justify the capes brought to that long(er) term fight. Likely, this could be solved with a split buy of manned and more unmanned but then economics of a small specialized fleet(s) rears it's ugly head. Then if you want a tailored solution for specific requirements or additional capability, you have to develop or modify an existing design and you bump into more money, time and risk to develop. Again, what are they looking for? How much capability and up to what cost?
  16. Good question @tac airlifter and anyone else who can speak to this (OPSEC and NDAs considered), are the SOCOM requirements the same as the LAAR program's from 2009? From wiki (reference link bent): Rough field operations. The RFI requires that the aircraft be capable of operating from semi-prepared runways such as grass or dirt surfaces. Defensive package. The aircraft will have to include several defensive measures, including a Missile Approach Warning System (MAWS), a Radar warning receiver (RWR), and chaff and flare dispensers. Armored cockpit and engine. Long loiter time. The aircraft must be able to fly 5 hour sorties (with 30 minute fuel reserves). Range. The aircraft must have a 900 nautical mile (1600 km) ferry range. Data link capability. The aircraft is required to have a line-of-sight data link (with beyond line-of-sight desired) capability of transmitting and receiving still and video images. Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. The aircraft will have to laser track and designate targets, as well as track targets using electro-optical and infrared video/still images. Weaponry. The LAAR aircraft will need at least 4 weapons stores capable of carrying a variety of weapons, including 500 lb bombs, 2.75-inch rockets, rail-launched missiles, and illumination flares. The aircraft will also be capable of aerial gunnery, either with an integrated or pylon mounted gun. Desired traits (but not requirements) included: Infrared signature suppression for the engine(s). 30,000 ft (9000 m) operational ceiling. 6,000 ft (1800 m) takeoff and landing distance. Aerobatic capabilities capable of maneuvers such as the Immelmann turn, Cuban eight, and Split S. I agree with @Danger41 that the fight has moved on (Grey Zone, Hybrid op environments) and a platform for purely permissive at relatively short ranges is not viable for the on-going and likely future COIN / LIC theaters.
  17. Agree, both turbos (AT-6 and A-29) have guns / gun pod capability but methinks this platform (if acquired for reals) will primarily employ APKWS, Hellfire, JAGM, SDB or like PGMs when called to go kinetic
  18. Yeah, if they’re not going to buy new iron Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk
  19. Which platforms recap’d or modified? Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk
  20. Is SOCOM only considering the turbos evaluated under LAE or are they considering Scorpion also?
  21. Roger that... reminds me of an Antonov AWACS design for their -72: Keeping on a Douglas theme, Douglas model 265 concept fighter, vectored thrust with a frontal rudder: https://www.simpleplanes.com/a/Qf6Zz2/McDonnell-Douglas-Model-265
  22. Like it, optionally manned. Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk
  23. How’s SOCOM going to man this? Split among the force providers or a joint unit? Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk
  24. They may want it but like the AF they want it only if getting it was in addition to having what they already have, same as the AF. If Congress authorized X billions in addition to the total obligation for light attack planes, people and stuff this would have happened already, it’s just that’s not the case. They want the services to trade inside of their program to fund this. I can only armchair General this from an AF perspective but divesting 5-10% of the oldest/brokest 4th gen fleet seems the only viable COA if the AF ever gets serious about acquisition. Not sure what the Army would be willing to trade in capability to get this new capability. Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk
×
×
  • Create New...