Clark Griswold

Light Attack getting support: https://www.militarytimes.com/opinion/commentary/2019/10/29/the-case-for-light-attack-aircraft/ Another article on the Brazilian Mosquito: https://www.janes.com/article/87662/laad-2019-akaer-presents-conceptual-mosquito-multi-role-aircraft

Something is better than nothing

I'm not saying I think we should do those things unless we are honest with the public as to what these 40+ year missions will take and if we decide that this is something that we should do.

Not advocating for this but if I were at the Puzzle Palace / Congressional Liaison and asked to make a slide(s) on how to do this (a national policy / mission to intervene in multiple long term humanitarian security/stabilization missions simultaneously): 1. Reinstate the draft but not implemented thru random selection and not necessarily skewed to only very young adults (18-21). If this is to be an enduring national mission then it is an enduring national responsibility for all socio-economic, cultural, racial, regional groups. Would recommend 1/5 of main ground combat forces be conscript members to balance mission objectives with human cost calculations by political & military leaders. 2. Establish military objectives and strategies that will be honored/adhered to over any changes in administration. No legal mechanism to do this so it would have to be informal and understood by all relevant parties. 3.. Levy dedicated taxes as required to pay for these operations. Funding vehicle authorized over multiple FYs to lessen administrative/political risk to sustained operations with likely political/administration changes. 4. Expand the size of the US military to accommodate high operational utilization. 30-50% expansion sounds about right/expensive. 4a. Reorganize the US military to execute these protracted / permanent missions. Delete / Curtail some conventional military capabilities to allow for further expansion of COIN-LIC-Stabilization forces (infantry, light armor, ISR, etc...). 5. Reduce deterrence presence in militarily / economically capable allied nations. Europe except for Poland, Batic countries and GB would have no significant US forces, only logistical ports/airfields. SK & Japan would also have a reduction in garrisoned forces. 6. Expand agencies for rebuilding, establishing civil societies & economies. Local populations engaged in productive labor with subsidized industries likely. 7. Temper expectations, tolerate some cultural practices that would be unacceptable in our country. 8. Begin education, cultural exchange and information programs to promote values that would increase the probability of an end state after several generations that is acceptable. 9. Massive expansion of refugee resettlement. Some situations would be impossible to stabilize, large scale resettlement would be required in some cases into the US homeland. Laundry list of things, some military some not but what I would say is required and again to my earlier posts, for leaders to be honest about what is it that we are trying to do in this conflicts, what it will likely cost and how long it will take. I am not advocating for this necessarily but IMHO what would be required if the US decided that as country it was a national priority to intervene when it deemed necessary into conflicts for primarily humanitarian and not national interests. I did not even list attempting to cajole allies into this endeavor, no other country in the modern world as it is would even think about doing this.

2 Not privy to any of the concept planning for Gen 1 loyal wingmen or UCAS but methinks the best first mission is an on-call semi stand off weapons cache for cueing a BVR AAM from its inventory via secure datalink vs having to fire your own weapons. High altitude, long endurance UAV on station (above 50k, on station 6+ hours) with 4 AIM-260s waiting to be cued from a fighter or AWACS, could also be adapted to provide an unmanned sentry DCA CAP for HVAAs. Mission expansion to follow as experience and technology is developed. Just my two uneducated cents but I doubt anyone is going to a merge when fighters are truly cut loose to achieve Air Dominance against a capable opponent and allowed to use all their tricks and toys. Shots will be taken well before anyone gets WVR.

Yeah, that is a statement without the necessary context or specifics to make it more meaningful. Total offload capability, offload capability at X range, etc... As to defensive systems and the current capabilities of the KC-46, I have no knowledge of them other than it has them but I would imagine that they are there to defeat while in retrograde / enable survival from a pop-up threat not to linger in the WEZ of a threat while performing an AR mission. Defending and Running like hell so I can live to pass gas another day. Unless it is a purpose built "tactical tanker" with low/greatly reduced signatures, significant defensive capabilities and for a large platform has a good turn rate, acceleration and speed... keep tankers in their safe spaces, they're very sensitive and get upset by AAMs and SAMs. Returning to the point of Strategic AR capability and the argument against divestment (platform aside), it's a needed capability as we will have to respond to the fight from our side of the court if a major contingency dusts up. Having a capability to launch a receiver capable tanker with both boom & drogue AR and 350k+ at launch is not something we can shit can unless our rich uncle is going to surprise us with a 777 tanker at Christmas.

On the subject of tankers: https://warontherocks.com/2019/10/the-case-for-a-three-tanker-air-force/

I can't say that I do either but I won't dismiss it completely. IMO, It's a concept meant for the collective action of nations that can act and who feel compelled by their values to act. Not the responsibility of just one nation no matter how powerful/wealthy compared to others and not without the consent of the governed who will be required to serve and sacrifice for others with no definite end in sight and no assurance of success. All of those caveats have not been met by those advocating for humanitarian intervention. No honesty as to the cost, the time and risks. Powers and those who push for western nations, especially America, to act on the concept of the Responsibility to Protect along with those who push for what I would call Indefinite Engagement aren't honest about what it required to execute missions that act on these ideas and that dishonesty erodes trust in leadership, exhausts a military structured to mainly deter and win conventional conflicts and breeds a cynicism in the public that infects every other way we view our government. Joe Kent wrote a good article on this at Breitbart: https://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2019/10/07/kent-why-president-trump-should-follow-his-gut-on-foreign-policy/ From the article: If the American people do want to go to war for human rights, then we need to reinstate the draft and double the size of the military. There are plenty of places in Africa, the Middle East, and central Asia that we would need to fight decades-long conflicts in to right the world’s wrongs. That is probably a pretty good overview for what would be needed along with financially capable Allies being required to do the same and participating in these missions with no ROE restrictions, not holding breath for that. Likely, whole conventional mission sets would need to be dropped to shift resources to grow other mission sets to handle this much demand for Occupation/Stabilization forces. I'm not for America alone to go out and fix the world but if the Western world just can't tolerate the mass tragedies then we have to be honest as to the cost, risks and requirements while explaining clearly to the people who will bear this cost as to why and what are they sacrificing for.

Nothing but trouble unless you believe the US and other countries with the capabilities and means should honor and act on the concept of the responsibility to protect political theory then it is a duty we (and ideally others) will/should take up. Not advocating just commenting. I am not sure we do or anyone does individually but collectively I think there is a stronger cause to say we (collectively) should, not saying we (collectively as a sovereign nations) will but that the theory merits greater consideration then. I read this article this past weekend: https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/10/book-review-the-education-of-an-idealist-samantha-power/ and it seems relevant to this latest development. Interventionist and Realists again. But at what cost and if it is worth it why can't they (interventionists) be honest about the costs if the cause be worthy? Unless we and others who are capable and publicly call for a world order where certain national behaviors are not tolerated are willing to pay the cost, sacrifice and remain engaged for causes that do not directly defend our nations and interests then we should abstain from seeming to offer false hope..

Not sure if this was brought up earlier in this thread but what about Contractor / Dept of AF Civilian flight instructors? I believe the AF is using them for the CAA A-29 program (contractor I think) so why not a limited program (3 years) to get out of the hole without burning out another cohort of the rated force? If not enough military IPs then civillian IPs? Thinking recently retired or separated but not ruling out CFIIs necessarily. Sidebar question: Can the total amount of resources available to train SUPT studs handle all this? Aircraft, Sims, MOAs, MX, etc... or is it all tapped out? Never put it past the Bobs to try to put 10 lbs of excrement into a 5 lbs bucket... that would lead to opening another SUPT base but if the need is there then it is there.

Yup. Mike Pietrucha proposed an anti-dote to this a couple of years ago: RECLAIMING THE AIR ATTACK MISSION: A RADICAL RETURN TO A PROVEN SUCCESS Good article and worth a read IMHO. Light Attack Armed Reconnaissance (manned) is still a requirement but the environment has moved on from the COIN/LIC mission of the early 2000's and while it may seem counter intuitive (or not depending on cynical you are about the AF) if the requirement(s) were updated to the current/projected operational environment and the solution to said requirement(s) were likely a bit more expensive but more capable, the AF might give it a second look. When rebels or insurgents have modest conventional military capabilities as is becoming common in Grey Zone conflicts, the requirements are going up and if though it is bitter and frustrating, militarily participating in these conflicts to some capacity is often better/cheaper in the long run. In practical terms, a platform with: Medum Strike, Multiple Sensors, Good Endurance, Good Speed, Good Survivability, Growth capacity and low to modest cost for high utilization over long conflicts. Nothing great but a lot of things done pretty good. This would never be a silver bullet but a platform that will be relevant to a range of conflicts in capabilities delivered, threats it can defeat, reliability it can deliver with care and attention to cost.

Maybe but maybe not... never underestimate the AF to finally do the right thing after 15+ years of doing the wrong thing. The light attack requirement is there and we should have years ago gotten into the lead on this, the Brazilians want to build one: https://www.airway1.com/brazilian-company-wants-to-launch-light-attack-aircraft/ https://www.janes.com/article/87662/laad-2019-akaer-presents-conceptual-mosquito-multi-role-aircraft Just a bit like the OV-10 but imitation is the most sincere form of flattery. Light Attack should have segued into Light Fighter ala an F-5 or F-20 that would have been part of a family of compatible systems to deliver modern, relevant airpower effects at a reasonable cost to sell to our Allies and keep in our own portfolio.

Ad Astra.... Daddy issues in space is the most succinct description of the plot. Fair overall with good special effects and action sequences (questionable physics in some scenes) but overall story too drawn out to rate higher. Wait till it is on Netflix streaming if you are thinking of going to see this.

Yeah but keep charging that windmill, you'll win someday, maybe... - Break Break - Has the USMC released any requirements for a light attack? There have been mentions of a partnership with the Marines (and others) if the AF finally got to acquiring Light Attack... https://www.defensenews.com/smr/federal-budget/2019/03/13/air-force-to-buy-handful-of-light-attack-planes-but-will-a-bigger-program-follow/ https://www.businessinsider.com/senate-gives-marine-corps-100-million-for-cheap-light-attack-aircraft-2018-6 Doubt they would have requirements that different than the AF's but you never know. I would argue the original LAAR requirements are dated and new ones push to a more capable system (shamelless Scorpion plug) but anything official on what the Marines and other potential partners (Aussies) might want/need in LA?

https://dsca.mil/major-arms-sales/poland-f-35-joint-strike-fighter-aircraft Another member of the club.

That would be a helluva pimp slap to the AF from Congress but would probably get the message across Just buy it AF and get it over with Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

https://www.defenseone.com/politics/2019/09/tired-air-force-slow-rolling-one-lawmaker-threatens-give-next-attack-plane-army/159814/?oref=d-topstory Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

Cool, interested to hear. On a sidebar issue and idea: So they wanna shorten the time in SUPT to produce pilots faster then why not begin training pilots sooner once selected for pilot and deemed medically qualified? That is at the Academy or ROTC, once selected for Pilot and passed an initial medical screening, start flight training sooner (prior to commissioning) to get training started so that either IFS is now skipped or is just a quick quality check prior to reporting to SUPT? IIRC, we were selected for Pilot/Nav at the end of Junior year and depending on your school's academic calendar, initial flight training could start the summer following Jr year, intensive 2.5 months to get PPL + some hours then Sr. year, you would work towards instrument certification. IFS is a quality check and off you go to SUPT with around 100 hours. This would involve the AF having to risk some money as some cadets would not either complete initial flight training, medically disqualifie or choose not to continue but I think they would be a manageable number. SUPT graduates arrive more prepared, more likely to succeed in an abbreviated SUPT syllabus (would argue for replacement of those flight hours but that is another fight) and the cost/risk is very affordable. For OTS cadets, a separate program for the approximately 100 hours unless they already have flight time.

On the original topic of this thread, has the Navy started to experiment with shortening their pilot training syllabus and/or introduce technology to compensate for less flight training time? I saw that two Navy guys went thru PTN but as far as changing their program, is the Navy looking to this also?

Copy that If Air Tractor could modify the AT802U for a liaison / light cargo version without breaking the bank, there's a contender if the USAF wanted to get back in that business. AT's website says the AT802U can launch with an 8k payload, use some of that payload capability for a rugged cargo pod and 4-6 pax seating with a stretched model. AF would need to get comfortable with single pilot utility ops, not sure they could get on board but the times are changing (sort of). On the subject of Light Airlift / Liaison Aircraft, I'm not sure if this is the right one for this proposed mission but I just know the AF needs it:

This maybe related to that idea: https://www.defensenews.com/smr/defense-news-conference/2019/09/04/controversial-changes-coming-soon-in-air-forces-next-budget-its-top-civilian-says/ Probably more aimed at older systems vice one in procurement but it's possible.

All true but here we are and there is no turning back from acquiring the F-35 nor should there be any attempt to abruptly stop procurement but I think there is a reasonable amount of room for a serious debate on whether or not to buy the full lot.

Copy. Agreed un-fornicating that which exists now is preferable (cost/risk/timing/possible) but... if restarting the Raptor line is a NO GO, then while the 35 line is open, exploring what is possible (perhaps not practical) would be wise IMHO. A reverse of the process that developed the A-7 from the F-8.

Article on deficiencies: https://www.defensenews.com/air/2019/06/12/the-pentagon-is-battling-the-clock-to-fix-serious-unreported-f-35-problems/ Like Brabus, I think getting the F-35 right is the best outcome but LM getting a correction vector in the form of a truncated buy might be necessary. As to the F-35 replacing the Eagle, maybe if they could optimize the outline for lower drag. Longer fuselage, lower cross-section with a slightly taller airframe, additional third weapons/mission bay forward of the existing two, finback conformal fuel tank, etc... if this variant were ever designed/built I would base off the A model to attempt to maximize commonality between the two to mitigate one of the major problems of variant incompatibility with parts/sub-systems. Lower drag, two more missiles, a bit more gas. Japan might be interested in this as they have expressed interest in a 22/35 hybrid, this would not be exactly that but an air dominance focused variant, close enough.

Possibly, as to light fighters in greater numbers but we are where we are now but if we did acquire a smaller, nimble fighter like Gripen just as an example, a light airlifter force that meets the fighter at a dispersal or roadbase for a quick turnaround then launch again for all involved could be a viable concept to sustain launches while the threat of long range fires still exists. Ex: Two ship of light fighters recover to a road base approximately 200 NM from the FEBA and meet a light ground party who handle initial recovery and approximately 5 minutes later a two ship of light airlifters land at same roadbase with 2k of ordinance, 4k of fuel. Ground party turns the jets in 20 minutes and they immediately launch on next combat mission, turboprops launch immediately after them for RTB for next re-supply mission and ground party departs road base for next rendezvous. Small airport, roadbase or grass strip used for 30 minutes max to keep from attracting long range fires or enemy RPA attacks. That scenario is a pretty tough triple flip off the high board coordination trick for ops, mx and logistics but a likely example of what will be required if we go bare knuckles with Russia/China.