Clark Griswold

Worth a listen: F-35: Pierre Sprey vs Lt Col David 'Chip' Berke debate

Any value in the US developing a like platform?

Restart on thread. RT so caveat emptor but an interesting idea of a super interceptor and taking aerial warfare to sub-orbital: https://alert5.com/2017/08/25/mig-41-mach-4-optionally-piloted-operate-in-space/ and another article on a "MiG 41" https://russiafeed.com/russia-working-ultra-high-speed-mig-fighter-aircraft-capable-spaceflight/

By "high" end conflict suitable for a high end LAAR I mean a medium intensity COIN / IW scenario - fighting irregular forces with sporadic conventional military capabilities that threaten fixed wing assets operating low. This would also be an asset also for a Grey Zone conflict where other ambivalent to cooly hostile military forces are also operating necessitating a platform that could self-defend and egress quickly if needed. Syria being a good example of this but Iraq and Afghanistan also have a need for a what a high end LAAR can bring: jet speeds (400+ KTAS) and mission altitudes (20K+ AGL) for solid on-station times (4+ hours) with sensors & weapons in one asset at sustainable costs.

Valid point but just my two cents, for long term overt assist or pacify missions, we'll probably operate from MOBs (could be smaller than we're accustomed to in Iraq/Afghanistan). We can have both, the OA-8 was sold to Kenya for about 15 mil a copy and that was not a large buy (around 12 aircraft I think) so if the USAF came along and wanted a split buy of LAARs, getting enough OA-8s to get some benefit of the economies of scale and get a higher end LAAR, I think we could do it without breaking the bank. The argument then would be for an AT-6 or A-29 for engine commonality but really what we need are high and low mix. A strategy to prosecute a "high" end LAAR fight and a "low" end LAAR fight. Speed, range and growth capability for the high end LAAR. Ruggedness, endurance and value for the low end LAAR.

That spaceplane yes... https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Starflight:_The_Plane_That_Couldn't_Land But the next generation of spaceplanes is ready to go, IMO. No incredible leaps in technology required, just the logistical costs to come down, highly likely as demand would increase supply and the economics of scale kick in. The promise of cheap access to LEO was probably a bridge too far for the technology / materials of the 60s / 70s but within reach for the technology we have now. A space access strategy: Privatize and encourage mainly commercial access to LEO, focus national space efforts on HEO and Deep Space access / presence. Continuously launch every year to build logistical supplies and space based infrastructure. Spaceplanes, reusable medium / heavy lift rockets and we need to go all out and make a BDB (big dumb booster) even bigger than the upcoming SLS (Space Launch System) - that BDB should be the Sea Dragon IMO. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sea_Dragon_(rocket) Lift in one mission all the gear or re-supply for an interplanetary mission.

I sure as hell hope so. I realize that no one is going to shoot my ass into space for NASA so I want space plane based tourism to succeed and bring the cost down to somewhere in the middle class mid-life crisis range (10k to 20k) range so for 5 minutes I can float and see the pale blue dot from up high. More spaceplanes: Chinese proposal: https://www.popsci.com/china-plans-space-plane-for-tourists And a really interesting NASA concept from the 70's (like a XB-70 Valkyrie on steroids) that would be a good National / Strategic project for reinvigoration of Space Exploration / Settlement: https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/ezvj4j/the-747-to-space-that-never-was https://www.alternatewars.com/SpaceRace/Star_Raker/Star_Raker.htm

Will not question or quibble with your assessment of the choices but ultimately it is about getting them (and us) an aircraft appropriate for COIN / LIC. Even if it is not the best system we think out of the possible choices, it is first about just getting one on the ramp / dirt strip and supporting door kickers. If the A-29 is what they have their heart set on no matter what and they can afford it, maintain it and use it effectively, so be it. Now if we are paying for their aircraft thru a partnership program, totally different story but if it is their dime, give them your sound professional opinion but let them go their route and get into the business of effectively / efficiently delivering air power for COIN / LIC. As to your valid if just a bit gruff point of whether it is stupidity affecting the assessment of LAE, I will say it is a bit apples to oranges. Most if not all of the operations / missions a USAF LAAR would execute would not be from an austere FOB / FARP. Likely it would be from a MOB with support and tied by VDL to an ITC / C2 element, rightly or wrongly, as I think that is just mainly the way the AF rolls. A LAAR for an ally of lesser means / different ROE may not be the right LAAR for the USAF just given the way it operates (fairly risk averse). Valid points but I would contend we (the USAF and CAA community) need to bisect the LAAR concept into two programs, their LAAR and ours. We can have both with our purchase of their LAAR likely to be only for an FTU and our LAAR in greater numbers, say a schoolhouse at Duke with 15 OA-8s and 100 Scorpions / AT-6s / A-29s over 6 Wings in the ARC. Not sneering at the OA-8 but the GOs can only think so far out of the container, for the USAF LAAR, it will have to be something closer to what they are used to or have now.

You're probably right but one can hope. My take on going all KC-46 is that it puts a fire under the ass of the USAF / Congress / Boeing to fix its problems and get it right. We're not going to have the same tanker force that was built to enable air delivered part of the Strategic Mission, get the fighters across the pond if the bear came over the hill and still have some to spare. But if we want a tanker force to get us to the fight and keep us in the fight if the dragon comes out in the Pacific and have some to spare for contingency X, the current buy won't cut it and a KC-46 only fleet won't do it. We need a big tanker to go with the medium tanker. If development is a problem, go with a KC-30 / KC-45 since EADS has done that work in lieu of developing a KC-777 but negotiate a reciprocal buy of US systems to grease the political skids. We buy 50 KC-30s at 180 mil a pop they (Europeans) buy 9 billion in US systems produced systems. Germany needs to be on the build up and France has a backlog of defense spending, let's make a deal and get new iron on both sides of the pond.

Understood but sometimes a tanker has to do what a tanker has to do... But I think you get my point about what is it exactly the tanker is supposed to do as that will drive design, cost, etc... Just my two cents but the 46 like the 35 for all of its flaws is a major part of the future AF and V1 on this project was 30 knots ago... let's mitigate the problems / limitations due to adapting an airliner to a military mission and press forward by acknowledging problems with the KC-46 total concept: - We need to buy more keep lowering costs and while not planned, going ahead with a KC-46 buy of 325 aircraft to replace 425 KC-135s . This will also give the medium size tanker force fleet commonality and lower logistical costs while putting new iron on the ramp. - Acknowledge the KC-46 is not a suitable replacement for the KC-10 or Heavy / Strategic tanker mission, even when employed in numbers that can deliver the same capability for an assigned mission. The AF and the Joint Team need a lower density high capacity heavy tanker / cargo aircraft for quick response and movement of initial forces into theater or for operating at extreme AR ranges (1000+ nm). While this might be rewarding sub-par performance, a KC-777 with the same but improved AR systems from the KC-46 is a logical compliment and round out to the the USAF's AR force. - Study and determine if a Tactical Tanker is worth the effort, if the CAF determines it is, let them define the requirements and fund that project. A future AR / Mobility strategy: Robust modern Medium AR capability, Focused Heavy AR / Mobility capability and limited Tactical AR capability to expressly compliment some assets . Medium AR covered by the KC-46. Heavy AR / Mobility covered by a KC-777. Tactical AR covered by two systems - a KC-X LO system to compliment night 1 strikers with AR pre / post ingress AR and EW while on mission and a SOF focused AR / ISR unmanned system to compliment and support the MC-130s.

Related to the discussion of KC-X/Y/Z Articles on stealth tanker / cargo aircraft... https://www.nridigital.com/global-defence-technology/july-2017.html?wv=s%2FGlobal%20Defence%20Technology%2F3adead8f-dcd8-5ed1-849a-2e4cab33b0ce%2FGDT1707%2Ftankers.html https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/7012/the-air-force-desperately-needs-a-stealth-tanker This discussion and these articles on a more "tactical" tanker raise the philosophical point of what is it exactly or mainly we want our air refueling aircraft to do? To support CAPs near the fight thru LO or some self-protection in an A2AD environment? To get aircraft to the theater with all their associated equipment and manpower in one quick movement? To do conventional AR, strategic alert, cargo movement, aeromedical evacuation, etc... to an acceptable level in one platform with the lowest possible support cost and the right logistical footprint? All of these questions will drive different requirements, designs and costs and I think that they have not been really considered, we just take AR for granted and want it to do what it has been doing for 60+ years but cheaper, more with less and maybe with some new cool stuff. We're stumbling in this next attempt at acquisition / update of a current capability because we haven't really decided what that capability should be in the 21st century.

Just my two cents but I felt a dual buy of KC-30s and KC-46s was actually the right option. Former POTUS and SECDEF didn't think so but it had some merit, IMO... https://blog.al.com/live/2009/08/why_two_tankers_may_be_better.html The conventional arguments against it (fleet commonality, economy of scale, etc..) are great but when you have in reality only one supplier for a type of system, things get FUBAR. Giving Boeing actual competition in the heavy military aircraft market for USAF contracts would probably incentive their behavior / performance in the right direction, they have the US heavy military market cornered and they know it, they need a true competitor to keep them on point.

All the way to the bank I imagine.

707 Tanker Transport from back in the day: https://www.flightglobal.com/FlightPDFArchive/1983/1983 - 1054.PDF https://1000aircraftphotos.com/Contributions/Visschedijk/7288.htm

Airbus spaceplane concept: https://room.eu.com/news/Airbus_Spaceplane_May_Be_the_Future_of_Space_Tourism

Ditto. Thinking a bit on this, SK and POTUS should be as insistent as the Young General and demand removal of all or most of the artillery concentration just north of the DMZ. The DPRK demands the cessation of large scale military activities between the ROK and US forces, ok fine, then you remove every last artillery piece from within 50 nm of the DMZ. Fat chance but it if they want something we get something in return. We focus on the WMD and that's logical but the conventional situation deserves some time on the front burner. - No artillery within 50 nm of the DMZ. - Declaration and decommission of all clandestine tunnels under and thru the DMZ - No formations of troops or vehicles greater than 2,000 and associated vehicles / equipment (brigade size) within 50 nm of the DMZ. No more than 3 at any one time within 50 nm. Just some ideas off the cuff but the point would be to move forces further back so that if the DPRK did or was planning aggression, then the telegraphing actions prior to attack would be more detectable and would lower tension overall. Focusing on WMDs is fine just don't forget about what they have actually used (recently in fact) to attack the ROK and US forces.

Article on effectiveness of a DPRK attack on the ROK. Artillery attack Seoul metropolitan area, logistics required, attrition rates (combat and operational attrition) examined. Long but worth a skim for the big points. https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/mind-the-gap-between-rhetoric-and-reality/ Some highlights: Table 1: Summary of Effects IMPORTANT CAVEATS: 1) No indications there are plans for these events; 2) Assumes most people are at home or in an office i.e. more protection than standing outside in an open field. Scenario Possible Casualties Weapons Surprise Volley (Primarily counter-force i.e. barracks, military bases) ~2,881 initial volley; mainly soldiers 240 MM MRL170 MM KOKSAN Surprise Volley (Countervalue and a-strategic i.e. firing directly into population centers) ~29,661 Civilian; likely~790 Foreign nationals~605 Chinese 240 MM MRL170 MM KOKSAN Counterbattery and counterforcemissions.Very few 240 MM or 170 MM KOKSAN would exist after 1 week. Expect DPRK to lose these weapons at 1%/hour based on historical rates. 467 ROK aircraft; Possibly 1,200 U.S. aircraft 2,660 Main Battle tanks 1,538 Multiple Rocket Launchers Note: These forces already exist on Korea, or come from Guam and from Carrier Strike Groups in international waters. No need to ask third country permission. KPA would likely run out of fuel/ammunition within two weeks. NOTE: another study projects KPA can last up to two months. The point is, once started there is very finite amount of fuel and therefore time left. DPRK needs to drive approximately 2,500 soft-skinned vehicles per day to supply a southward invasion in order to sustain themselves – or spare ROK fuel stores and scavenge from ROK Conventional Artillery Attack of Seoul Here is the summarized table of results and what follows below the table is a more detailed description of deriving these numbers. Table B-1: Conventional Artillery Attack Scenario Possible Casualties Artillery KPA primarily counter-force ~ 2,811 fatalities initial volley.~ 64,000 first day (majority in first three hours)~ 80,000 one week. Very few KOKSAN and 240 MM MRL last more than one week 2/3 of batteries firing max rate for 5 minutes from likely positions between 5 and 10 km north of DMZ and then sustained rate for ½ of batteries for 24 hours. Batteries destroyed by direct, indirect and counter-battery fire at about 1%/hour. Unrealistic assumption of unlimited ammunition and 100% maintenance rate. KPA counter-valueLikely indicates KPA desperation ~29,661 fatalities initial volley.Within the range of a previous study by Bennet, Bruce [20] 2/3 of batteries firing indiscriminately intoSeoulfrom DMZ trace. Most residents at home or office. Lots of data and looks reasonable, well cited. And a Time article on evacuation of non-combatants: https://nation.time.com/2013/04/05/fleeing-imminent-incoming-north-korean-rockets/ There are different accounts of how long the DPRK war machine could operate (fuel, ammunition, attrition absorbance, supplies, etc...) but methinks they could probably operate for a month without resupply from China/Russia. That probably gives the DPRK a few days of advantage (if it generated all of its forces and poured its entire national resources into the attack) before the first waves of the Coalition begin to augment KFOR and begin the push back. Destroy the ports, airfields and basically all telecommunications as you invade SK and you might be able to stymie a data-dependent force with a high logistical footprint.

Ouch. That is why I am not becoming dove on NK but no longer exactly a hawk either. The window for a military solution (pre-emptive first strike followed by regime change and military occupation) is either closed or rapidly closing. The cost is too high in casualties, the military mission risky of expansion involving the PRC and the best outcome is a long term occupation, trillion+ nation building process fraught with known and unknown problems. The conclusion of (occupation/rebuilding) is uncertain and the US is unlikely to ever be thanked for. My humble conclusion is that in starting a new war with NK, there is nothing to be won so why start one. Not respond and win if attacked first but there is nothing to win in first strike. I have no wish to see the NK people further enslaved and used cruelly by a despot and his evil cohorts but ultimately, given our values, the cost and the military facts of the situation, deposing him and company thru an offensive military solution is not a realistic option. But tolerating the current and legacy situation is not an option either, just how to change that is the question hence my belief that it will take something completely different than what we have currently been thinking of for the past decades. Credible conventional military deterrence in theater & Strategic Capability and Retaliation assured against aggression - couple that sword and shield to a new diplomatic effort that proposes partial unification, a formal peace treaty and a trade engagement plan. Everything has built up to a crescendo, the resolution needs to be something other than the first shot fired.

Article from The Atlantic on NK: https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/07/the-worst-problem-on-earth/528717/ BLUF: Four ways to deal with NK (quoted from article) 1. Prevention: A crushing U.S. military strike to eliminate Pyongyang’s arsenals of mass destruction, take out its leadership, and destroy its military. It would end North Korea’s standoff with the United States and South Korea, as well as the Kim dynasty, once and for all. 2. Turning the screws: A limited conventional military attack—or more likely a continuing series of such attacks—using aerial and naval assets, and possibly including narrowly targeted Special Forces operations. These would have to be punishing enough to significantly damage North Korea’s capability—but small enough to avoid being perceived as the beginning of a preventive strike. The goal would be to leave Kim Jong Un in power, but force him to abandon his pursuit of nuclear ICBMs. 3. Decapitation: Removing Kim and his inner circle, most likely by assassination, and replacing the leadership with a more moderate regime willing to open North Korea to the rest of the world. 4. Acceptance: The hardest pill to swallow—acquiescing to Kim’s developing the weapons he wants, while continuing efforts to contain his ambition. Call me naive and crazy but if a military solution is not possible, if a standard diplomatic proposal(s) of sanctions / relief from sanctions are not really breaking the ice then something needs to come from left field and let's face it, the current POTUS is likely the only politician willing / capable of throwing something like that into the ring. What is needed (IMO) is a new option / proposal that: Changes the situation on the ground, gives the NK regime something, the SK government something and the people of Korea something and moves slowly and steadily away from the current situation of cessation of hostilities by armistice rather than treaty, with borders that encourage military tension and lack of robust engagement (economic and cultural). The NK regime has no interest in opening up their nation to the world but we need to have the world believe that the democracies led by the SK & US want to end the Korean situation not just this latest flare up in tensions, peacefully & productively. Therefore, propose not full unification but partial unification, a jointly governed Korean province to replace the DMZ at the 38th parallel with a 25 km area north and south, to be codified in a Korean War peace treaty to replace the 1953 armistice agreement. The new province would have: - No military forces from either North or South stationed in its territory, no heavy military forces within 10 km in the respective sovereign nations of North / South Korea bordering it. Only police with up to light arms from either side are allowed. - UN sponsored stabilization force for 30 years assisting North & South governments, composition to be equally matched by requests from North and South. - No military air traffic allowed over the unified province, civilian traffic allowed only thru dedicated corridors. - Any Korean is allowed to visit and live in the province but no Korean may emigrate to the other Korean nation thru the unified province, integration is the objective. - All international trade and investment in the unified province is tax free of North / South Korean duties for the first 30 years of founding. - North and South Korean leaders would be required once a year to meet physically in the unified province for a summit to plan, negotiate and coordinate. Pie in the sky but something has to change, articles on unification: https://www.newsmax.com/International/north-korea-donald-trump-trump-missile/2017/01/22/id/769850/ https://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2016/05/korea-opportunities

True - this could require rapprochement between SK and Japan prior to development but if nothing changes in the overall strategic situation then nothing will ever change. +1 for your idea of no American boots north of the 38th in the event of things going loud/kinetic but it might need to be caveated for no permanent or occupation forces, not sure if the ROK could generate their reserves fast enough to do the job(s) without direct American / Coalition forces, just my guess so worth what you paid for it. Copy and it might be, good stuff on how the Share a Nuke program works with the NATO partners. If really want to send a signal that we are serious, start sending dependents home to the CONUS. Coordinate some evacuation of towns nearest the DMZ, bolster defenses in Seoul (air raid shelters, ROK Army checkpoints, etc...) and deploy more BMD. Then offer a cooling off period followed by no pre-conditioned negotiations with all parties present, they will never agree to certain pre-conditions and neither will we so why keep demanding something we or them will never get.

Another good article from WOR: https://warontherocks.com/2017/08/deterring-north-korea-the-next-nuclear-tailoring-agenda/ Just my two cents but in this one particular security threat to the world, our nation and allies we should carve out an exception to our/their policies and treaty obligations (NPT) and allow for a small scale development and deployment of a limited, regionally aligned and declared tactical nuclear military deterrent. This would be for SK and Japan to organically deter NK. - Delivery systems only built to limited range, in this case about 225 NM to not threaten China. SK would be land based, Japan would build a sea based deterrence system. - Limited deployment, at most, 30 missiles per SK and Japan. - Very limited warhead yield, 5 kiloton maximum yield. Target intention is for deployed formations of conventional forces or static military / industrial installations. - Develop and share Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator technology for deeply bunkered targets. - Targeting policy of no civilian population centers, only military / political installations. Reduces deterrence capability and could be stymied by human shielding but philosophically it is to be considered a necessary evil with every intention of only holding military targets at risk. - No first strike policy. Reduces deterrence again but a philosophical statement of defensive and deterrent capability only. The Army is already developing Long Range Precision Fires (LRPF) to replace the MGM-140 ATACMS which SK already has, develop a nuclear capable variant with a new small yield warhead and keep the DPRK at bay. If nothing, this will light a fire under China to change the behavior of NK as this would take sometime to develop, train and deploy and the only way for them to stop SK and Japan from attaining a nuclear deterrence capability is to eliminate the reason for their attaining it.

Very true, as Mark Twain said "history doesn't repeat itself but it rhymes"... As in Vietnam, we prosecuted that war for about the first 5 years as we wished it were to be fought rather than how it should be fought, similarly we are doing the same thing, wishing that cutting off the head of the Hydra didn't grow back with two more in its place, but it does... and in reality it is not the head that is the worst problem but the body. The body of foreign fighters and local jihadis comprising the VEOs, the support (tacit or robust) from sympathetic populations in these semi-governed places and while not politically correct but true the tribal and fundamentalistic Islamic denominations (Salafist, Wahbabist, etc...) that provide the cultural and spiritual motivation and justification for jihad as aggressive war and an oppressive state. The Long War is on three fronts: Cultural, Military and Economic. A war of ideas, a war against fascist theocrats and a war to provide something other than jihad as a means to a dignified life in the countries that spawn these cancers.

Strategy is being very, very generous. The obsession / fixation with the tactic of persistent ISR followed by a precision strike against one target(s) exquisitely developed is distracting "leadership" from overall strategy and overall progress (or lack thereof)... if those damn trees were not in the way we could see the forest.

This meme seems appropriate: The big suppliers want big expensive systems and the big support costs associated with it hence encouraging their talking heads to attack.

No doubt but considering the desired objectives/requirements of the LAE I think it is an outside chance at best. It's a good concept and has successful operational use but for a potential USAF LAAR, IMO this how the current line up stacks up: 1 - Scorpion 2 - AT-6B 3 - A-29B 4 - AT-802L