Clark Griswold

On the subject of who's in charge... I can understand (somewhat) the hesitation to not let go of control of the mission if the target has been surveilled and developed prior to arrival of the asset on station and that asset is continuing the persistent stare with VDL back to a GCC or other ISR element but when a target is developed in the mission either by the air asset or by cue from another ground or air asset, the authority should / needs to remain with the mission crew. For a LAAR, this should be it's primary modus operandi (IMO) and lends itself more to the proposed Observation mission than ISR as doctrine defines that mission now. Observation mission as proposed by a previous reference in this thread article from a War on the Rocks: https://warontherocks.com/2016/08/oa-x-more-than-just-light-attack/ How to get leadership on board with this? Not sure, but the arguments I see supporting it are: - Shortened kill chain, fewer levels of approval. Possible risk in that understood. - Lower footprint due to lower amount of FMV requiring PED from ground element in rear echelon, PED is to be usually organically supplied by supported element or mission crew if customer is not VDL capable. - Can be allocated to customers / targets that are lower priority for high persistence assets thereby allowing greater focus of high persistence, ISR focused assets against higher value targets. Allows longer surveillance of targets that should be under constant stare. - Concept of Employment and primary mission of Observation / Light Strike in direct support / coordination with GFC or JTAC not aligned with longer decision cycle involving rear echelon ground elements.

2 With perfect hindsight, the introduction of 5th Gen had and has an apparent flaw that with the technology, materials and designs we have now they don't work with the Hi - Lo concept that was successful with the 15 & 16, that is you really can't make a "cheap" 5th Gen fighter. The barn is wide open and it doesn't matter but if we had committed to a full run of 22's (in the 500+ range) to replace the 15Cs and Es, developing an FB-22 and kept our requirements in check for the 16 and 18 replacement (forgoing the VSTOL altogether) to not be go full 5th Gen but 4++ with unique capabilities or design to be relevant but not in the first wave on night 1, things might have worked out better. The lesson learned for the 35 acquisition and development is strive for good improvement not unrealistic improvement over the previous jet. The price soars, the schedule goes late, you reduce your goals to keep it alive and undermine your service reputation, important because you'll want to get another toy in the future and politicians trust you less or not at all anymore.

Textron gets a demo event this summer for the USAF... https://www.defensenews.com/articles/textron-sets-its-sights-on-air-forces-light-aircraft-experiment

You got right some of what I was thinking after I read the article, my posts were / are skeptical of the concept, I was just imagining and putting up a visual of what I thought this modern LWF F-45 if brought to life would be or likely to be.. I can describe in words what a hot girl looks like but if I put up a picture, that's about 69% more effective...

Nice.

Copy that. There's something that happens to people when they stare at video feeds, BFT maps, etc... at an AOC, the illusion of control is slow, subtle and inevitable maybe. History doesn't repeat but it rhymes, trite but true. This micro control is reminiscent of LBJ, McNamara, et al in the Vietnam War directing what targets, when, what weapons from the White House... guess they didn't cover that at Maxwell...

Copy that Circling back to the article and proposing another jet that will likely never get funded, unless there is a champion or group of insurgents in the AF to fight for another LWF then I would suggest taking a design the article's author referenced positively and that IMO is unappreciated, the JAS-39 NG, and seeing if an "F-45" could be had from it. Just vaporware from the Internet but a good approximation of what could be a modern LWF from an existing design that is true to what the author and Boyd would likely advocate for. The KF-X concept I referenced above is years from flying, the Japanese Stealth Fighter is a twin engine design and likely way higher in intended capabilities than a hypothetical F-45, taking a good multi-role light fighter that focuses on reliability, interoperability, limited support and affordability seems a viable COA.

Sacrifices must be made. Given the habits formed from the last 15+ years of ops in permissive environments and the generous growth in links back to C2 and ITCs (not all bad, having access to ground based resources is nice), it might do some good to wargame VDL degraded / denied scenarios to flesh out TTPs for LAARs in Observation / ISR / Strike. Ask any of the perspective vendors, they would fall all over themselves to make this happen FOC. Not sure if it would be exactly FAC-A but seems pretty close to it.

2 I like his general concept but the limitations or firm targets he sets on the dimensions of the aircraft seem a bit optimistic. I don't see Big Blue going to Congress for another fighter but in lieu of that I think asking Congress for a companion trainer/aggressor for Fighter Wings is in the realm of possibility, on the edges of it but possible... to prevent the problem you are unfortunately dealing with, too few flight hours. Rolling the T-38s that have enough life in them to Fighter Wings as the T-X comes online would give them some less expensive iron to fly for their own Red Air / Companion aircraft program. His idea is not without merit, it is just not in the cards (probably) given the MASSIVE investment into the F-35, for better or worse, probably more the better I think though. One thing about his concept for a passive detection focused LWF that I don't see him address is how he will handle opponents practicing their own EMCON discipline and/or being distracted by decoys (ground or air launched). Cross cueing might solve that but without your own robust radar, seems kinda limited.

Legit points but the LAAR is not a direct competitor or substitute for an RPA, but I believe a system to be used in combination with one, like an LOS Tier I RPA or maybe a Tier II. The LAAR does bring a lower cost operation and lower risk in some ways when operating in conjunction with other manned players but it's strongest point is its autonomous operational capability. No LOS, satellite footprint, no comms with the IMC, no problem - brief the crew and cut 'em loose. Start point, call sign and frequency - get the details at check-in. I'm not for just winging it but sometimes we need a capability to just operate on little planning or support, a LAAR seems to be able to meet that need.

Thread bump. Article from National Review for a modern LWF ala Boyd and the Fighter Mafia vice the F-35: https://www.nationalreview.com/article/445708/f-35-replacement-f-45-mustang-ii-fighter-simple-lightweight Interesting article, very similar to a concept advocated by Robert Dorr a few years ago. Not sure about all of his ideas / principles for this modern successor to the F-16 / LWF but his requirement of demonstrated high reliability (multiple operational sorties per day) is prescient for what might be an Achilles' heel in peer / near peer fight. Reading it reminded me of one concept model for the KF-X project: This would probably fit the bill for this next generation LWF. Semi stealth F-16 kinda.

True - it is an institutional character flaw in the AF. Pride, stubbornness and a lack imagination have infected it at the deepest levels. Agree that they were disruptive both short term and long term, the TAMI-21 sh*t sandwich though I think was way more damaging. There was a requirement, the AF stepped up to meet it but to reference Gates again "with the fine motor skills of a dinosaur" it manned it in a 1950's style that treats highly skilled valuable difficult to produce aircrew as interchangeable cogs to be used until failure then replaced with another. Unfortunately for the AF as a bureaucracy, it has not gotten the message that people have options, the ones your want to keep are hard to recruit, train and retain so it continues to stumble... if it were Gen Clark Griswold designing these programs, they would have heavily recruited from the ARC, not tried to nickel & dime the orders so that I could get a high degree of participation, looked for volunteers in the RegAF with the carrot of special programs following successful completion of their MC-12 / UAV tour rather than some pixel pusher who will need disability for repetitive knees stress (in residence PME if desired, base of choice, etc...) We have resources, we can retain key airmen, we just need to stop acting like an AF or military for that matter from a different era. What drives us into the dirt is that the world has changed, the wars / operations we are in are different than we are institutionally structured to meet yet we really don't change. The AF should be running head long into getting a LAAR not just as a cheaper way to deliver Airpower but as a strategic retention tool. I can only speak for myself but I worked my ass off to get a Pilot Slot to be a... Military Pilot. If you got 100 to 150 of these aircraft located at a few different, varied bases to give options for personal/family choices and QOL... instead of Capt X quitting after his second assignment UAV tour, he might stay for a career because he had a follow on in an aircraft, doing the mission and rebluing an officer in the process. Same thing for CSO. This will pay for itself for being about 95% cheaper when operationally employed and also when it retains hundreds of qualified aviators in the AF over the course of its operational life:

Depressing but likely a reason that could get them to the party (around 14 years late depending on your opinion of when we should have realized we were running a marathon and not a sprint). It's going to take a public brow beating ala the SECDEF Gates chiding the services and specifically the AF that spurred Project Liberty and got an FMV surge. Not judging the efficacy of that project but I cite it as an example of an event that shocked the AF into action. If a SECDEF, Senator or other serious politician publicly humiliated the AF or threatened to send the mission to the Army, that might spur action. Just buy one AF... if we can not figure out how to buy a light turboprop or jet, crew it appropriately and not crash the AF then we might as well hang it up and head to the house.

Do you really think commissioned officers of the AF, who are rated aircrew entrusted with millions of dollars of equipment on a daily basis, have legal authority over probably hundreds of enlisted personnel at Vance AFB, who could be put on a plane at a moment's notice to fight in a war.... do you really think those people could be entrusted with this on government property or at government sponsored social functions?

Yup, that came to mind when I read that article too. We like buying big high end systems and only buy the smaller lower end systems when reality calls us on the carpet. We have to reframe this argument, it is about buying the right capability, Global Precision Attack, at the right levels: Low threat and low effect - LAAR Moderate threat and medium effect - A-X High threat and up to strategic effect - B-21 This is not about this plane or that plane, we get fixated on the toys and it gets into debate with guys vicariously imagining which plane they would want to fly and we end up solving nothing. But I still want us to buy the Scorpion...

Good article. One most insightful line: An A-29 will simply not arrive on station as quickly as an F-15, survive contested airspace like an F-22, or have the situational awareness of an F-35; nor does it need to. This simple obvious fact that not every aircraft has to be supersonic, LO and the pinnacle of capabilities can't be grasped or publicly acknowledged by leadership hell bent on enabling the MIC to sell us what they want to (big ticket high profit on sale and service) vice what we actually need. Some want to sell us the systems we need and for their own interest; that's fine but methinks LM or others don't want a low cost, operationally successful LAAR to cause serious debate on the acquisition of 5th gen multi-role strike aircraft (or at least question how many we should buy, seeing the LAAR as competition for some of the resources necessary to acquire big ticket projects - money, time, political will, logistics, force structure, etc...) A LAAR doesn't get rid of the requirement for 5th gen strike but I think some with lots of political capitol are fearful it would hence the impossible to rationalize stubbornness of the USAF and other services to acquire that which is obviously needed.

Maybe but there could be other reasons to go back to a single advanced trainer even it is more expensive. I lean towards a single track but SUPT does make a helluva lot of sense still. To mitigate the cost of a more expensive advanced trainer (assuming a single T-X track) - could the instrument phase in T-6's be expanded and the instrument phase in T-X be shortened? Just use T-X to teach military specific items (form, mission, etc.)? 60% T-6 & 40% T-X or some other ratio... The T-X program seems to be emphasizing capability vs. cost (to a point).... https://aviationweek.com/defense/high-performance-t-x-could-edge-out-low-cost-bid If there is to be a T-XXX as a Tone replacement, maybe Big Blue would be willing to get a new jet with the luxury options? A jet that has range, modern avionics with full automation to manage (capable of full auto flight & HUD), NVG compatible cockpit, short field capability (landing on 5K' wet asphalt at ISA), a UARSSI just like the T-X will have even if only for dry plugs, etc... Swing for the fences for T-1 replacement...

Valid critique. Going back to a single advanced trainer is fine by me with the breakout of Fighter Rec'd and not later in the syllabus. However, if SUPT survives and not GUPT and they want to replace the Tone, then another modern suggestion would be the Syberjet SJ30, fast light jet, about the same size/weight as a Tone but a fuel miser with long legs.

T-1 back in the crosshairs (sorta)... Full article behind the paywall but the idea that the T-1 (as it is now) is past its prime is back. https://aviationweek.com/defense/opinion-us-air-force-overspending-t-1a-its-forgotten-trainer If the T-1 is too much to upgrade/sustain, get a Cessna Mustang.

Thread bump on a related topic, RAAF looking to automate the boom. https://www.janes.com/article/68425/avalon-2017-raaf-and-airbus-to-develop-automated-refuelling-boom-for-kc-30a https://en.c4defence.com/Archive/airbus-to-develop-automated-refuelling-for-raaf-kc30a/3886/1

Ouch. The proposal was supposed to only need a 25% modification to the A model, I imagine it was whole new pressurized section and the rocket motors in lieu of the jets. That seems a little too good to be true but whatevs, it was an awesome idea from a different time...

Possibly.

2 On the related subject of Building Partnership Capacity, a briefing from NGAUS & Textron making the argument to buy something you can afford and is what you really need. https://www.ngaus.org/sites/default/files/TEXTRON.pdf In the case of the PI, when the US gives you 120 mil+ in 2016 in military aid, we do have an opinion that counts on what you should buy. https://fronteranews.com/news/asia/much-foreign-aid-manila-lose-washington/

Agreed - from the articles/videos, the super flankers stand a chance if enough can survive either the first volley and/or get close enough for the surviving formation to overlap sensors to get SA (still BVR but close enough to find a Lighting) Break, break... Possible Polish F-35s in a few years: https://www.defence24.com/251668,new-fighter-for-the-polish-air-force-f-35-complementing-the-f-16

Sub-orbitial T-38 concept. Talons in Space: Northrop's N-205 Proposal