Clark Griswold

Well that makes 2. 1) Agreed. I also should have listed current members, recently retired would be a better descriptor of who out of the retiree community we would be looking for. Not recently retired would still be definitely welcome but the recent experience and outlook on the modern AF is being sought specifically. 3) Agreed. Reaching out to Kane of "Bleeding Talent" I think should be seriously considered. I have never attended a course at AU but are there any instructors there who would join or help a serious public argument for reform? 3) The could work. I think there would be several stand out examples that we could frame the distilled ideas around. Like, Capt X was an outstanding officer / aircrew member / etc... but left as his career and personal goals could not be aligned because of this <idea> and identified by our detailed survey of officers & NCOs... The sale would be in providing evidence that agreeing to updating policy x to something else will improve retention, save money, increase morale, increase operational effectiveness, etc... and then how to do it. Basically, the reformers have to do all the work, present a plan(s), argue incessantly to the machine for change. I am thinking AF specific but this might need to be an all branches movement as some of the updates would be statutorily enacted (elimination of up or out for example). Would that be an unmanageable movement or strength in numbers?

Concur. For this to take hold and move forward, I don't know if the retirees pre mid-90's would believe how it has gotten or maybe they would, just don't know as I don't have a lot of contact with retirees from that time. What I am thinking of is a core group of retired officers and senior enlisted members coming together (virtually or IRL) and contributing what they think the "problem" is and then distilling that into a coherent message. When we start to discuss this as current and former members, our experiences and perspectives tend to get us to focus on the specific problems in our operational / support communities. For my two cents, we have to find the motifs running thru all those vignettes and opinions to come up with the overall updates required for the AF in this era. I say updates rather than fixes as I believe the AF is not absolutely fundamentally broken, just needs a major update to work effectively in the modern operational world, the current economy and culture and to fully realize the changes the latest revolutions in tech and evolutions in warfare have brought. Approaching the powers that be with the idea of updates I think extends a more palatable idea for change as we're really talking about convincing politicians, senior civilian officials and AF officers that what they have spent their careers in service to is not fundamentally bad but needs major update. My hope is that if we assemble a large enough chorus for reform, it will be loud enough that it can not be ignored.

Meh - no worries. _________________________ On the idea of a war forcing the institution back to mission focus / operations centric, I think that would apply if a modern, conventional war against a peer foe or a modestly capable foe was going to last for a few years harkening back to WWII / Korea. Just my two cents but in a Taiwan Strait, NK, Baltic Sea / Eastern Ukraine, etc... conflict, hostilities would be over before the evolutionary pressures of a real war with a capable opponent have time to burn thru the institutional processes that create, promote and sustain toxic leaders. Given, that any realistically conceivable major fight would be fought and decided in a matter of weeks, it is even more imperative to have effective capable operationally focused and forged leaders in the Air Force to supply the UCCs with the forces necessary to win the fight and to be ready at anytime. Choir preaching but you see the idea: there will not be enough time to get the guy who should not be there out of the way and bring up the real heavy hitter, against a foe like Russia or China, it will be a done deal by the time the reality demand signal is recognized and reacted to.

Maybe but waiting for that is not an option IMO. Again, I'm not sure the AFA or a sub-organization under it is the right vehicle but if we (those who believe the AF needs a major course correction) do not organize under a banner, communicate clearly and prove to the public and decision makers the problem(s) with viable, feasible, executable reforms offered and defended, then nothing will change. I have no delusions of grandeur nor am I naive to think this would be a sprint to a quick victory, it would be a marathon uphill in a snowstorm but it has to start somewhere. There's more than a few people on this forum I suspect that have access or contact with decision makers (HAF, Congress, Executive Administration, Media, Academia, etc...) and with a strategy, they could fight a good fight in the war for reform. Make a case in the public arena, publish articles, speak to interested media and win converts to the cause. This already being done but it seems to be going nowhere, with the only change of note being the belated and reluctant retirement system reform, nothing is prodding the Air Staff to evolve, something besides JQP and this forum has got to put the status quo on the defensive.

Agreed. The current plight of the AF reminds me of the Upton Sinclair quote: "It is difficult to get a man to understand something, when his salary depends upon his not understanding it." I am convinced that trying moral persuasion on the bureaucracy is impossible as individuals become dependent on it financially and in some ways spiritually (best word I can think of to describe the personal investment of one's prime working years and efforts) to change it as they have spent their working lives building it, maintaining it and defending it on that 20+ year career. I am no different as I just passed year 18 and at peer levels advocated for change, when given the chance by fate honestly spoken my opinion to superiors but not fallen on my sword and just left dropping the mic for effect. The AF is so ossified it will take an outside reformer with enough previous knowledge of its faults and enough authority to enact change but will have to reenter the institution leap frogging all the traps that preclude change. I think AFA is too joined to the AF establishment to be an honest advocate for a reformer, what other organization could AF members, vets, etc... rally under that could seriously garner attention and advocate for a modern Billy Mitchell?

2 I am not sure where the dam breaks but it must. I suspect that a win in the assignment process (pushed to a market driven system where volunteers select and are hired by commanders) is the necessary first step. That could be the first domino to end or massively reduce AFPC, distribute A1 functions to the and under the command of Wings & OGs, etc... the other necessary changes could come afterwards...

Watched a presentation Kane did on his book "Bleeding Talent" at the Hudson Institute on ideas for reform. Disband AFPC, eliminate A1 as a separate directorate, get rid of Up or Out, decentralize the assignment systems and distribute HR functions mostly to Wings/Groups/Squadrons, reform the retirement system (presentation is 2013), tie promotions to some assignments / billets, etc... Not a bad list, keep fighting the good fight

If you opened a new UPT base and co-located it with an ARC RPA unit you probably could get some takers. Fly the UPT line for a few weeks, pick up some orders and direct the droid. Rinse lather repeat. Decent location, civilian flying job and ARC duty in one location and ZERO AF BS when not flying, this could turn out to be a decent deal if done right.

It was this guy

About 6.9 years too late If the RPA & LAAR debacles are prologue then it will take two leadership cycles before any meaningful action is taken and even then it is half hearted and begrudgingly done It is not a exactly a matter of saving the AF as much as it is evolving the AF - it is not built administratively or culturally for the world it finds itself in. You can only fix / change a legacy company that is stumbling by changing out the Board of Directors, without a nearly wholesale change of GOs and their acolytes expect more symptom treatment vs disease treatment

I hear ya but I do follow their logic in preservation of an industrial capability (to build their own) versus being dependent wholly or partially on the US. Just the execution of that theory needs work apparently.

Germany may not join the F-35 team after all: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-defence/germany-favors-eurofighter-as-it-seeks-to-replace-tornado-idUSKBN1E52EK

Ha But yes ultimately it is that.

Good words. The decline didn't happen overnight and not due to action / inaction of one but of many and over many years. There's always that problem, do I stand and fight probably to die (metaphorically) or withdraw and live to fight another day? Quit and make a statement with my feet or try to fix from the inside? Principle or Rationalization? No one answer is always right except "it depends" and is only is dependent on the individual having the moral character to ask themselves that question.

Related question to the CSAF sidebar and overall topic of the thread - is Moseley just a stand in for the generic Fighter General and that’s the problem? Schwartz was not an 11F and only pushed the throttles up on the way to point insanity so I believe that less but others have mentioned that idea before (fighter guy always in charge) - is it a problem of “the same guy” is always in charge ?

Ditto on Moseley also. I remember the 45k Airman cut to buy the Raptor, the beginning of PT uniforms / testing and basically the descent into madness also. He was not the worst but the point at which it really started to go off the rails. At some point around 2004, it should have been realized we were in new territory and the AF needed a fundamental change as we didn't have the resources to keep doing things as they always had been done and handle the new missions, pace of ops, etc... and shift with the times. Easy to say with 10+ years of hindsight but that's why we pay them the big bucks, to have a forward looking vision...

Informal survey: Who is the most responsible out of the last 5 CSAF's for this rapid increase in decline? The CSAF is only one man and the AF is a huge fat bureaucracy that has plenty of bosses telling it how it has the wrong cover sheet for its TPS reports but ultimately if there is one person responsible for the overall strategic direction of the institution, it would be him. I don't lay everything on the CSAF but where did we really start to go off course? Where did we miss the signal to change the institution that is structurally designed to be in garrison to one that is operational / expeditionary in nature (in terms of leadership selection, resource prioritization, long term strategy, short term nimbleness, etc...)

Discussion on Airliners.net about 46 vs. 767 differences: https://www.airliners.net/forum/viewtopic.php?t=1025901 BLUF: KC-46 can carry about 45K more fuel and is slightly bigger / heavier (max gw) aircraft. KC-767s can have booms or not based on customer choice, Columbian AFs don't have one.

This is probably either not necessary (or been done) but as a lot of these aircraft are two seaters, is it possible to fly the aircraft with one pilot (on an independent O2 system) and have a sample(s) drawn from the other seat's OBOGS station to directly sample under the operational conditions when these symptoms have been reported, what exactly this system is producing? O2 with particulate contaminants, O2 with oil fumes or laced with carbon monoxide, directly capture what would have been inhaled by the crew and analyzed... Not just testing the masks, filters and system itself pre/post flight but the product supplied directly to the aircrew?

When it is more profitable to advocate buying / building for the future versus selling us the best technology to win yesterday's war. We keep looking back and getting ready for round 2, equipping / training for previous wars so we can fight them even better. Good idea except our adversaries watch and learn from our fights and will not fight us that way as they see what happens when you do that. https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/2163.pdf My hope is that a generation used to technology shifting constantly and needing replacement / update every 3-5 years will shift away from huge, once in a generation procurements and organizational restructuring will be way less verboten when they come to leadership.

Wise words. I would expand on Hi / Lo mix to a Hi / Medium / Lo mix with 5th Gen / 4+ Gen / LAAR. The idea of a modular but semi-common fleet for 4+ Gen platforms IMO is more feasible going forward based on the financial / technical realities of 5th Gens. Trying to get the usual suspects and some new ones to buy into a EF 2020 or Silent Eagle with advanced capabilities and survivability may be a viable COA if the F-35 family doesn't grow (Germany, Canada, Aussies, SK, etc...)

Yup that checks with what the AF taught me... Changing the channel... Referencing @Lawman's comment above, "lasers" may be on fighters relatively (2021 or so for testing) soon: https://www.wired.com/story/lockheed-martin-fighter-jets-lasers/ My druthers and with billions of TP dollars... Give the Eagle an encore career with a role as a super duper 4+ gen fighter armed to the teeth (bajillion missiles, laser turret, etc...) An operational version of this tactical laser Adapted into an advanced Eagle Easier I suspect than trying to integrate it into the 35 and can work out the kinks prior to integration into new 5th / 6th gen

No argument that they need to up their game on domestically sourced hardware, that vaporware fighter could be a chance to break that paradigm (looks good but in reality...) Your comments are not the first time I have heard that the EF is lacking in the Air to Ground game and it puzzles me why the EF operators would let ostensibly their premier fighter lack in the mission that is done operationally 99% of the time by a fighter. Losing the French in the consortium hurt the Typhoon program but aside from just giving up on building their own jets, if the EU + UK nations don't band together, they just can't / won't put enough of their own money on their own solo projects to actually get them done but just my opinion, collaborative aircraft projects can work, you just have to agree to the minimum amount of collaboration required to get the costs down to what everyone can afford and agree to then with a modular design let each country add whatever capabilities they feel they need.

I think that was his best point. Seems like common sense but mil / civ leadership believe it can all be done with flat budgets, just honestly admiring we will not do certain missions any longer could in theory allow us to focus resources but then that would be admitting things like we are not actually going to send 4,000+ tanks into the Fulda Gap

Valid critique but... they have improved and evolved the Gripen (ref Gripen NG and E) and the EF is finally getting an AESA. They get some stuff right, Meteor and PIRATE EO/IR sensor but I see your point. Just a WAG but at best this new jet could be ready to test in 5 years (if you started today and worked like crazy) so a collaboration would be a moot point as the F-35 will be x hundreds of airframes delivered by then