Clark Griswold

Good article on what a theoretical A-X could / should be: https://warontherocks.com/2016/05/its-not-about-the-airplane-envisioning-the-a-x2/ It didn't get far in development but the MD 226 concept would be a good place to start from

Probably the later 80's I saw him at a mid-sized airshow in the SE USA.

Time to leave Incirlik? https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2016/10/get-ready-walk-away-incirlik/132585/ My suggestion for a new location...

Wondering if we will see more of this with the rise of "Grey Zone" warfare: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/23/world/americas/colombia-airline-flights-venezuela.html?_r=0 There was no specific mention of a loss of separation but it was enough to get a "sharp diversion". China seems to be practicing this also: https://www.lawfareblog.com/chinas-harassment-civilian-ships-and-aircraft-south-china-sea-reminds-us-why-we-need-more-us-freedom This article and referenced speech imply they make no distinction or even attempt at distinguishing between civil and military traffic for interception or harassment. Could ICAO as a governing body respond? Suspension or some or all certifications or reciprocity of certifications?

Godspeed Mr. Hoover. Saw his Commander sans functioning engines show many years ago and as a know nothing kid I could tell that was a truly great pilot.

PI is looking for another friend... https://www.yahoo.com/news/south-china-sea-looms-over-duterte-visit-beijing-071920789.html PI is good geography but can we operate / pivot without it?

Only qualified candidate Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

No worries.

How so?

On that idea, a good article from National Review: https://www.nationalreview.com/article/419278/why-america-has-lost-the-will-to-win-wars And his response to comments on the article is worth a read also: https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/411333/responding-atlantic-yes-military-has-problems-it-really-losing-wars-david-french Not to steal the author's thunder (Iraq vet with deployment in 2007) - he hits home some major points that are some of the reasons we can't seem to get these conflicts done, but his most important point (IMO) is we set the bar too high. From the second linked article / response: Since Vietnam (perhaps even since Korea), the Left has done a very good job of delegitimizing military efforts (or even diplomatic efforts) that don’t end in a state of quasi-utopia. It wasn’t enough to oppose the Soviet Union. We also had to make sure that our allies were sufficiently virtuous. It wasn’t enough to resist North Vietnamese aggression. South Vietnam had to be a model democracy. It’s not enough to depose Saddam Hussein. His replacement had to usher in the Middle East’s first (non-Israeli) enlightened democracy. While — ideally — we certainly don’t want to replace evil with a separate evil, the objective of the United States military is not to increase earthly virtue but to defend the Constitution by deterring and, if necessary, defeating the enemies of the United States. That last bolded statement is perfect, we have mistakenly taken on too much (the military) into our mission set. Post conflict, it is not or should not be our mission to set up a government / society that we find to be an improvement or morally superior to the one we just defeated, we are not there to "fix" the defeated so that they are better and one day thank us for changing them. Keep it simple: Defeat the enemy. Secure the objective(s). Establish a sustainable, tolerable authority that is allied to our interests. GTFO. These articles count Korea as a draw, I would put it in the win column and I would further use it as a template for how to do things: Kick the shit out of the enemy. - Done. More could have been done but things could have gotten out of hand (nukes, full on war with China, Russia, etc.), they got a bloody nose, commander's intention met. Don't get too ambitious, win what territory, concessions, etc. you need to call it good and secure those. - Korea south of the 38th parallel free and secure? Good enough. Keep your expectations of behavior realistic and minimal when you stand-up your proxy in the newly secured objective. - SK gov. was a not so nice authoritarian gov. for a number of decades, let it be. As time went on, we slowly and smoothly got them to a better place. GTFO - Still working on that, but it is sustainable at least and the SK's do foot some of the bill.

As this is a thread on what is wrong with the AF, I offer a movie on that theme, basically about a GO trying to cover up his crime, using his power and influence and the culture of officers that sometimes fight it and others that enable it. Sole Survivor from 1970. Found on Youtube - worth 1+30 of your time if sitting SOF, faking work, etc...

And it is a valid reason, skills preservation is a valid part of an acquisition strategy.

Possibly. Discussing this it is easy to get focused on systems (yours truly guilty of that) but this could be more of a doctrine question.

Valid point. Smart kids are working on it: https://www.economist.com/node/21563702 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NAVAIR_Spike The cost aspect of using PGMs to strike a couple of dudes in a Hilux gives a light gunship, maybe incorporated into a LAAR platform, legitimacy. Maybe not enough to justify acquisition but a valid reason none the less.

Truth Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

Fair enough, disagreement is healthy. When all the talk is only in one direction, we never step back and evolve if appropriate. I think I understand what he is trying to get across with his article on articulating the concept of "Observation" and I echo your point on military academia publishing for fear of perishing, those papers are not always worth it... It should be a one stop shop for ISR, PED, Comm, Light kinetic, etc... and the key is for it to be in one right sized platform that doesn't need AR, doesn't need to be cued from another sensor platform necessarily, has some legs but doesn't try to match an RPA in persistence and can deliver a right sized kinetic effect without putting itself into the WEZ of likely to encountered threats... all this without breaking the bank in operational cost, development risk and acquisition. Commuter turboprop in the 19-30 passenger range or repurposed small MPA would be my suggestion. Keeps cost in the 2k or less per flight hour, acquisition likely in the 25 mil or less range and enough capacity for all the gear without having to finagle it and some room for growth in weight, power required, etc. The distinction has to be made in who is controlling the mission and how big the information loop is, does the ITC need to be in it? Rhetorically asked but I think that is one of the questions inferred by the OP article. Build a family of systems to fight this war Big Blue rather than showing up with hardware too expensive to operate in these persistent, long marathons to keep the barbarians from over running the tenuous at best governments we support, rightly or wrongly. CSAF believes we are in for another 15 years of this, plan accordingly. AT-6B, A-29 or Scorpion for LAAR. OA-X for LASO (Light Attack, Surveillance & Observation). MQ-9 ERs for extreme persistence ISR / surgical strike. Everything can do ISR / Observation, everything can strike, everything is relatively cheap to operate.

Observation not exactly ISR at least not as we have become accustomed to it usually being performed True mult sensor ISR is already deployed but not as an organic part of the ground maneuver element - I think that is what the article in the OP is advocating for and I think should be explored Just because the VDL can link a TOC ISR cell to a mission doesn't mean they should - you become voice directed RPA. Maybe that is a point for the GFC's to fight but if the AF wants this potential mission the argument has to be made and incorporated as doctrine It is not without merit as we face more capable adversaries in non state actors they may challenge our EM capabilities and require us to operate differently Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

Yup - don't see that check from Uncle Sugar Daddy anytime soon after whatever foot-in-the mouth moment Duterte has done this week... On the idea of Observation as new or re-discovered skill or art for an OA-X platform... as most great military aircraft are built around the actual weapon or mission system, what would you build a great Observation / Light Strike aircraft around? Ideally, a new EO/IR sensor with a very wide field of view, as that may be a bridge too far since OA-X would have to stay on a tight, modest budget as it is not an F-35... adapt technology currently available but organically operated together on one platform for Observation, ISR and PED seamless between customer and provider... so you need a platform to do carry all that to the high ground, stay there as the company, team, unit, etc... operates and you support... While it is not in production now, for a contract Beech would probably figure out a way to make new ones or used ones like new again, I would suggest a Beech 1900 (C or D model), Algerian AF is already operating them, it has what Boeing is pitching for JSTARS replacement, SWaP-C, size, weight power and cooling. the 1900 would be just the right size, sts. OA-X: Multiple EO/IR sensors with an additional sensor capability for self cross cue. 1 all WX sensor. 2 hard points, MIL STD 1760 bus capability. Hellfire / SDB primary weapons. Lots of radios but keep it real, probably 6 is enough; voice, data and link with BFT. Exploitation capability on board, crew position and dedicated station for keeping score, watching the re-play for advising GFC, if tasked. Built, trained and employed for 6 hour missions, after that replace on station or call in the droids. Algerian AF 1900, this could be a starting point for OA-X: https://defence-blog.com/aviation/photo-of-raytheon-beech-1900d-multi-mission-surveillance-aircraft-by-algerian-air-force.html https://www.jetmods.com/photos_beech1900.html

That blatant? Not in FMS so I have no inside baseball to draw on, 14 mil a copy seemed reasonable but it is not the real number then... On OA-X... found a summary article written on the main offerings, gives some additional details and seems fairly propaganda free, still caveat emptor... https://warisboring.com/the-pentagon-has-two-choices-for-light-attack-planes-2e4306197b1e#.ojts6rihw

Philippines may pick the Super T as a light CAS platform: https://www.janes.com/article/64358/philippines-set-to-re-launch-bid-to-acquire-close-air-support-aircraft The requirements the PI set out favor the Super T, how the hell is it a $140+ billion AF can find 1.2% of its budget to fund a low risk LAAR / OA-29? 100 A-29s at $14 million per tail, conservatively planning $1,000 per flight hour (double the advertised cost) and programming 3,000 hours per tail per year (way more than you would actually fly) would easily cover the acquisition, program stand up, operational utilization, bed down, etc... A 5th gen will cost about $105k+ per flight hour for an OIR type mission. We have to stop taking crazy pills and thinking this is the way to fight these kinds of conflicts.

I have kids but not old enough that this is an issue, if I was giving advice to nieces, nephews, etc... I would still recommend it but I would have to pull no punches on the bullshit and have them decide after hearing my nuanced encouragement. For every emasculating moment of insanity I can usually balance it with a recollection of the thrill of flying military aircraft in actual operations or in some interesting way, along with other actual military activities or duties that gave me pride in service or were just cool. It's math, this graph is how I think about my AD career, at some point I hit the top and no matter how much effort I put in the benefit (personal/professional satisfaction, respect for BB, etc...) just started to taper off... I've been AD and am now Guard, I would tell them do what you can to get a Guard/Reserve slot, then look at AD AF, if you want to be an AF pilot.

This is the AF:

Checking the site they are unfortunately not taking ISTs currently. https://www.noaacorps.noaa.gov/recruiting/interservice.html Basics: O-4 and below with 12 or less years of service, able to complete 20 years of service prior to age 62.

Maybe but for my opinion that approach (restrictive ROE, maybe overly preoccupied with preventing 2/3rd order effects) is not getting us any closer to victory, an acceptable end state, a point where we can call it good, whatever... the problem is that it destroys a drip at a time the enemy's forces not the enemy himself, leaving him to regenerate his attrited forces to fight another day. This approach however is also keeping the shit to shoe level so it is not without some merit, it just doesn't finish the task. Tactical patience seems like dithering. We have to pick a side, arm the F out of them, look the other way when they do unseemly things and just blast through. 2 We're at 60 CAPs and the plan is to go to 90, great. You perform a mission with tactics as part of a strategy to win a war, prosecute a conflict, affect your enemy's behavior, or shape the battlespace; not to do them because that is what we do because that is what we do. The FMV feed has given the illusion of positive action towards victory / an acceptable outcome along with a false sense of control / insight to whatever element is receiving it. We could grow to 1000 CAPs and it would not matter, without the strategy to win or at least get to an acceptable end state, it is holes in the sky followed by whack a mole sometimes. After some X hundreds of good hits, is this really getting us closer to victory? Maybe, but is it fast enough given that militaries are funded by politicians that get swapped out, loose interest, become impatient, don't understand the military situation and might prematurely pull the plug? You bet. Democracies don't fight long frustrating wars / conflicts well usually. They get tired, bored, frustrated and sustaining the political will becomes problematic. We have to be on the march, moving the ball down the field in an easily perceptible manner. Or we have to be mature enough as a country to accept that we are in for probably 20 years of suppressing an insurgency while simultaneously rebuilding a nation that is likely populated by people who DGAF about what we are doing there at best and likely don't actually want us there, not holding breath...

Unfortunately that is likely but one can and must argue for us to remember our roots Centralized planning Decentralized execution The tether that modern links provide has become a chain dragging down our aggressiveness and offensive capability as an AF Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk