Clark Griswold

More of an off ramp... Nah, that's the place Jabba runs across the DMZ...

Su-25 documentary and article on their deployment to Syria. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/russias-has-its-own-10-warthog-syria-enter-the-su-25-13988

Sarlac Pit

CAS vs. BAI in the news, this story is making the rounds. Doesn't say anything other than they were "US jets" but raises the issue of priorities. No judgment on my part for the re-tasking as apparently a juicy ISIS target came up and assets were dynamically reallocated but our allies lost some dudes, that will have an effect on they way they perceive our value of them. https://www.cnn.com/2016/07/07/politics/syria-iraq-isis/index.html https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/07/06/u-s-jets-abandoned-syrian-rebels-in-the-desert-then-they-lost-a-battle-to-isis/ From the second article: “Hanging out our supposed allies to dry doesn’t achieve much and undermines our legitimacy and credibility,” Maxwell said. “It’s hard to establish and maintain rapport with these organizations if we say one thing and do another.” Break - Break Reading material on another interesting CAS case study: CAS at Khe Sanh https://books.google.com/books?id=Qw02ILaqfHQC&pg=PA23&lpg=PA23&dq=CAS+in+Vietnam+high+threat&source=bl&ots=1v6f6xAcTk&sig=vh9wjmu1MWlXCWr2bgNrLGwu3Tg&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjDqZnuwOHNAhXHSyYKHSTaAGMQ6AEIKDAC#v=onepage&q=CAS in Vietnam high threat&f=false

Tragic losses yes, but epic effects...

Back to basics might be the new black with a resurgent Russia, China on the build up, etc... Army https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/05/20/heres-a-reason-for-army-to-get-back-to-basics-it-isnt-good-at-remembering-them/ Air Force https://www.afgsc.af.mil/News/ArticleDisplay/tabid/2612/Article/715384/ellsworth-launches-for-large-force-exercise-in-prtc.aspx Getting back to Large Force Exercises with an enemy that has more than VBIEDs and AKs is long overdue. On the idea of CAS within a threat envelope, I always wondered if the Concept Bird of Prey aircraft could have been developed into a light LO CAS / RECCE platform at relatively low cost. No big gun but if you could have an LO platform to deliver X SDBs or JDAMs against the SA-22s & 6s, that moves the needle significantly. With all the development successes and programs coming in on time and on budget, I am sure this could happen... CAS can be done in a High Threat Environment, ref Battle of Hoth...

Power, unlimited power!

Further thought on this idea, feasibility of CAS in a High Threat Environment, and while I am not aware of any specific work analyzing this I have considered a historical precedent, the Yom Kippur War, where Israel had command of the air (not exactly Air Superiority) andt a significant and effective threat from the ground in AAA, SA-2 & 3's that extended a threat envelope well over the FEBA, resulting in the loss of over 100 aircraft. Has anyone in the CAS community studied this or has it been discussed (assuming it can be discussed openly here) Israeli CAS tactics where only a "fast pass" in support of TICs might be possible due to a not yet suppressed threat? I imagine this could be a possibility in an AOR where an advancing enemy ground force is operating a long range threat (S-300 or above) from a no-go political boundary and if their offensive is not blunted quickly the facts on the ground will be such that the conflict is over. Baltics, Eastern Ukraine, Iraq or Afghanistan bordering Iran, etc... Could CAS still be effective and be morphed into a "fast pass" with a quick re-attack but the asset escapes after delivering a PGM but before it is engaged? As always OPSEC trumps everything, probably not much discussion can be had here but an idea.

Not a bad article and I can't find a fault with his argument that some missions are effectively impossible but reading it I believe he was imagining a high threat environment where CAS is being performed but without support from ISR, EA, SEAD/DEAD, Decoys, Cyber & Space, etc... If there was a scenario where a ground element requires CAS and where CAS assets could receive SAFIREs from high end threats, they would likely have Growler, CJ, Compass, Rivet, etc... support. A CAS asset is not going in alone in that environment as it is going to be a brawl with everyone shooting trons to shut down sensors & links and likely UAVs to serve as lookouts for pop up threats and to hopefully soak up said surprise SAMbush while the manned asset either attacks or escapes the threat A-X performs the CAS, Growlers jam in the immediate vicinity, Rivet supports from standoff, MQ-9Cs operate where threats are suspected to be and sounds the alarm if detected / take one for the team if the threat starts to emit-target I could see this coming up (CAS in a contested to possibly contested environment) in Syria if we had to recover downed aircrew or support SOF in Russian backed government controlled areas of Syria, possible but not likely.

Another article from War on the Rocks contributor Mike Pietrucha on CAS in a high threat environment. BLUF: We aren't / can't really do it (sts) https://warontherocks.com/2016/06/the-myth-of-high-threat-close-air-support/ Right, wrong, not relevant? Discuss..

Touche I honestly believe Gen Welsh cared and tried but if a CSAF really wanted to improve morale it would not just be new policies and strategies but a purge of leadership at all levels that I doubt legally he could ever actually do, I have hope that the shoe clerks will be purged so for some brief period of time before they regenerate I could see an AF truly mission and not queep focused but over a number of years it has "corprotized" and the ability of an inspirational leader who espouses change is probably aspirational in reality, not that I am cynical or anything...

Yup - my thoughts also, the AF likes turboprops but loves jets. If it is a pick, the Super T would be my choice for the capability afforded for the cost and ease of acquisition (relatively). It has a strong track record with the Columbian AF and I believe only one has been shot down in over 20k operational hours and that is not acknowledged by the Columbians, only claimed by the FARC. Suitable as you said is the key word, we (USAF) sometimes shoot ourselves in the foot by by striving for the perfect plane when pretty good is the right answer.

No argument on the logistics and expense of reinventing the wheel vice buying an airplane already in production, in this case the Super T or alternatively the AT-6B. I left out the Scorpion Jet as I don't think they have finalized the production configuration yet until they get a launch customer. I am biased for the Scorpion Jet as I got to see it at WEPTAC a couple of years ago and I think that it could be an easier sell to the AF even though it is a pricier jet to buy and operate compared to the Super T or AT-6B, but still way cheaper than a 4th gen fighter or attack for COIN / Light CAS. My suggestion would be to re-mission probably 25 Wings, 8 Active & 17 ARC, for these missions: Scorpion Jets for LAAR, C-27Js for Light Air Mobility, Firebirds & MQ-9s for persistent ISR / Precision Strike with the PED, JTACs, TACPs and ALOs to keep the customer up to speed on how and what Air Support can do. I added the Firebird even though it is just a development effort but having an Optionally Manned Vehicle with persistence you need and the ability to go unmanned when warranted (really most missions). All it takes is moving a mountain of institutional inertia and billions of dollars, that's all..

2 If you aren't paying for it you won't appreciate it. On the LAAR, it amazed me how hidebound the leadership of the AF is but perhaps this is reading too much into the background of senior leadership, but as far as I can tell none of them were ever in any low intensity conflicts or COIN actions, their experience and paradigm was Desert Storm, Allied Force, etc... they just couldn't imagine doing things any other way, UAVs slowly took root but even they have a large footprint, considering the reachback and MCE structure. It just wasn't big enough, sts... Always a favorite concept when there was some semi-serious discussion on acquiring a LAAR was the OV-10X

I don't want to ride one in either but I don't think you or any other pilot of a LAAR aircraft would be facing a significantly higher probability of that in a semi-permissive AOR, like Eastern Syria - Western Iraq or Afghanistan. Manned ISR has been operating in AORs like this for years with only one loss I know of, Iraqi Cessna Caravan shot down by 57mm AAA in open source, and that was / is an unpressurized aircraft not capable of operating out of the WEZ of a 57mm or above AAA. A Super T, AT-6B, Scorpion Jet, etc... would still offer more than enough performance to operate quietly, safely and reliably well above 15k and X miles away to avoid most threats / detection while being surveilled prior to going kinetic and if CAS is required for a TIC, it is built for that also. Is it the same an A-10? Nope but for the fight we are in and the modernization efforts we say we want to do, we have to consider costs. Ultimately it is the TOA of the AF and all the different pots of money that add up to that, that determine whether we can get new toys by not spending all our money in current ops. Bar napkin math for hypothetical B-1 deployment to the Died I came up with for a year with 6 jets, crews, support, and tankers was about 1.1 billion and for a Super T deployment replacing the B-1s with 20 Super Ts and flying 3 sorties for each B-1 sortie was 52 million. You could double my estimate for the Super T deployment and cut my estimate for deploying the B-1's in half and sill save in the neighborhood of 500 million per year, serious money. This aircraft/mission/capability would be a good fit for a Guard/Reserve unit with specialized group like the CAS integration group being stood up at Nellis being the lead unit or FTU for it, Call on it as needed and put it back on the shelf if the world somehow becomes more peaceful, not holding breath... Just my two cents again but the AF has a terrible delusion that it believes it is really only going to fight big Desert Storm or Allied Force style campaigns and that these missions in the Arc of Instability are not going to be the norm or at a minimum a large portion of our likely operations. For the past 15 years they have been the norm and a guess but 15 years from now we will still be doing lots of ISR, kinetic action on dynamic HVTs and targets with a high CDE concern and low destructive effect desired. I don't think we should be completely focused on CAS / Low Intensity conflicts but keeping something like 10 - 20 % of our air assets geared towards that seems a balanced approach to having a capability to eliminate 3 terrorists in a Hilux for about 10k per mission vice having a capability that costs probably 600k to 700k per mission to deliver the same effect at not really any greater risk.

They may have gotten out (or at least had the vote to get the people's opinion on the record) before thing really get all New World Order... https://www.breitbart.com/london/2016/04/24/european-ministers-lay-out-explicit-plan-to-create-united-states-of-europe/ Could be a tin-foil hat generated rumor but I don't think the machine that is/was the EU would just be satisfied with putting the tip in... sts... Methinks that European Regional Blocks of sovereign nations (political, economic, defense, etc...) coordinating and supporting each other at that level and then the Regional Blocks coordinating and working with each other on the few really big transnational issues that affect them all (defense, terrorism, intelligence sharing, etc...) is more feasible... a North Sea Block of British Isles and Scandinavian countries working with a Polish and Baltic Block on fishing rights; a Central European Block working with a Caucasus Block on refugees and illegal migration, etc... just a two cent opinion from an American looking in..

Good points. Knowledge increased and thanks for your take. But just because as a "bag of meat" you don't like the fact I chat with hot Russians just looking to send me $20 million from a Nigerian prince while simultaneously needing to verify my credit card information on a website with .ru at the end of the URL all on my gov computer, don't think I will fall for some phishing scam...

Sidebar: Question for a Cyber guy, has it been thought about or discussed in the Cyber community to develop proprietary software (OS) and/or hardware for the AF, military or government agencies that is custom built to be the most secure it could possibly be? We build our own aircraft, why not for all or some requirements (Secret, TS, etc..) have a proprietary system only possessed by US government institutions to limit vulnerability by keeping it's details as tightly kept as can be? Just a random question but our computer systems are pretty much constantly under attack by hackers from governments and non-government actors, then why not invest X billions for a system as secure as it can technically be rather than just a computer(s) / OS we get out of a GSA catalog?

So a little extra money in the short term (estimated to cost the average Brit around 3000 pound sterling) is worth your right to control your borders, laws, economic policies i.e. the most basic elements of your national sovereignty? Good thing nobody fought like hell and sometimes gave their life for something like that... The EU like all Globalist dreams is fundamentally flawed as it ignores the damage done to the working & middle classes of the developed world while simultaneously depriving the developing world of its best and brightest that could turn their countries around.

True, that and it is out there on its own naked, vulnerable, and distracting. Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

Yup - I have heard that anecdote before and it never ceases to disgust or amaze me, how can that GO say that and not dishonor the memory of WWII pilots flying headlong into fields of FLAK, Sabre pilots flying to MiG Alley in Korea or Thud drivers taking the mighty 105 over Hanoi or Stealth Drivers going into Iraq first, etc, etc. etc, too many examples of courage to list... this is easy for me to say sitting here at 0 knots and 0 feet with 0 threats on me right now but there is inherent risk to what we do, I have seen a tad, not nearly as much as others, but a tad of risk, it is an accepted part of the life we chose, it is their job to lead us responsibly not keep us in a bubble where nothing bad could ever happen...

Freedom, courage and self-determination won... chalk up a win for the good guys, not surprised the British people rose up to the occasion...

Article related to the idea of getting rid of the AF, this guy (retired AF Lt Col William Astore), argues Air Power ain't all that... https://warisboring.com/dominating-the-skies-and-losing-the-wars-713819dcc441#.xph2o2xg5 His bio from the article and his blog (https://bracingviews.com/) says he taught at the Zoo (History) - was he a professor for anyone here on the forum? When you read these type of articles and they are just from random academics, bloggers, writers, raving lunatics, etc... you get what drives them or the illusion / appearance that drives their argument(s), that the AF doesn't give a shit about supporting the Ground Forces. I disagree with that on a basic level but given some of the less than perfect procurement decisions we have or have not done in the past few years: Ditching the JCA when we got control of the program, never procuring a LAAR for on demand tactical ISR (Overwatch, Route Scan, etc...) & CAS, getting chewed out by the then SECDEF and only then surging ISR with MC-12s and now we are stepping on our dick to get rid of the A-10, etc... One can see how it is possible for the poorly informed to think we are not interested in supporting Ground Forces, so for the good of the AF, why not dedicate a portion, an appreciable portion to this highly sensitive and visible mission to defeat the perception that you don't care? I'm sorry but if we can't afford to fly these relatively inexpensive airframes in again relatively small numbers (maybe 75-100 tails) with a $140 Billion dollar budget then we need to get a cranium-rectum extraction

2 I have been an attached flyer and I came back to fly as often as I could (about once a quarter) all broke and non-current, it was usually NBD to get a quick bounce and go but it was still a problem to be solved. I do think letting dudes at the Building fly the RPA maybe in a dedicated status for short periods of time, thinking 2 weeks parole to man the shelter would be good as that recency of experience might by proximity educate the HAF on problems, challenges and the reality of 24-7-365 CAPs even if done in garrison. There's plenty of space at KADW for an ops building, shelter(s) and downlink station...

Dual qual should be no big deal for the Guard / Reserve as a lot of dudes are de facto dual qual'd with an airline/ charter / corporate job. Distributing more of the RPA enterprise into the Guard / Reserve is a good move to keep the bum force gainfully employed / interested in high participation via good prospects for employment. Pushing niche capabilities together at Wings could serve this purpose too, e.g. LAAR & RPA, JCA & RPA, etc...