Clark Griswold

AFSOC would be my choice of MAJCOM for a LAAR but I'm referring to the entirety of COIN operations and efforts. We need a new or repurposed USG agency to serve as the lead agency when the USG commits resources, not just military, to a COIN-Recovery-Stabilization-Rebuilding Whole of Government mission. Not quibbling with you but looking at the doctrinal definition of Special Operation: Special operations are operations requiring unique modes of employment, tactical techniques, equipment and training often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments and characterized by one or more of the following: time sensitive, clandestine, low visibility, conducted with and/or through indigenous forces, requiring regional expertise, and/or a high degree of risk. https://doctrine.af.mil/download.jsp?filename=3-05-D02-SOF-Spec-Ops-Defined.pdf LAAR or SCAR may not exactly fit the "special" of Special Ops, it is just that they (the MAJCOM) is just as a community open minded and not threatened by a LAAR to their traditional missions/platforms.

Very good deflection.

Did they have a cover story or just walk away?

Maybe I remember the 70s... well, as a little kid but 40 is in the rearview mirror... His mathematical analysis is fine and he acknowledges his assumptions/blind spots for the sake of writing a consumable in one sitting article. Thought the comparison of precision vs. direct fire systems was not flawed but likely required further nuance, probably a further separation based on what type of kinetic effect was usually called and number of effects called for in one engagement. Hopefully the take aways is in the data analysis for the economic exchange expressed in cost per DPI, total flight hour cost and the highlighting of the historical rate of kinetic action being about 7 percent per OEF sortie will make the powers that be realize this is a marathon, not a sprint and should be prosecuted with equipment designed as such. You may be right. This could just be smoke and mirrors to look like they are really considering a LAAR when in reality the fix is in but one can hope. As he said, the capability to be acquired is additive in nature, not displacing. A LAAR has a role separate from conventional / existing Strike aircraft. The last point (AF not willing to commit resources to acquiring a LAAR) has made me think if so then who should have this mission? Taking that idea and extending it; is COIN, LIC, etc... something a conventional military force should be assigned? Is this the time to form an American Foreign Legion or similar organization as a separate branch / autonomous corps to have this and potentially other red headed step children?

NK in Syria: https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2017/04/syrias-war-has-been-goldmine-north-koreaand-dont-expect-change-anytime-soon/137194/?oref=d-river

This. Both really but especially the cancerous growth of civilian & contractors in areas of the directorates where by their duties they are making decisions that should only be made by military members. Paying for them from MILPERS I believe would be the appetite suppressant needed to cure that.

Long article but worth the time: https://warontherocks.com/2017/04/playing-moneyball-the-scouting-report-on-light-attack-aircraft/ Major Bier did the math. As discussed, the math is only part of the argument for a LAAR but a big part (sts) with others: force development/sustainment, BPC, etc... but a well thought article on the subject of LAAR acquisition.

Back in the air. https://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=99931

Valid point - if the AD takes a hair cut then as a Total Force, the ARC will get a little off the top also. Keeping up with the same idea of what this hypothetical round of BRAC should be (limited, politically realistic and focused on capability consolidation to shed excess infrastructure) - pick 5 ANG/AFRC bases or Wings to consolidate to another ARC facility or AD base. Some headaches likely but when we are estimated to have 20% excess infrastructure, somethings gotta give.

This +169,000. The growth in queep is directly tied to there being no feedback mechanism to the good idea fairy from on high being able to task out a fool's errand that consumes time, resources and any remaining faith in the Air Force as a mission focused organization. No cost to the tasker, just TMT that good idea and let the minions handle it. MAJCOMs and NAFs are supposed to function as shit screens but of late a lot of FOD has been getting thru or they're in cahoots and the cycle of data gathering to gather data to analyze the data we gathered but need to gather again for no clear reason continues... 3 execs + 1 WIC grad? Who the hell is this guy, Xerxes? On technical tracks... same problem, different century... ACSC paper from back in the day, 1988, why the AF continues to navel gaze and not take action when this needed change has been identified and discussed for decades is incredible. Worth a scan/read: CAREER PILOTS - ONE FIX FOR THE PILOT RETENTION PROBLEM https://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a192791.pdf Base consolidation has been mentioned several times and deserves a look by the powers that be: Pick 5, look for states with multiple bases ripe for consolidation or loss of only one and focus on the worst real estate.

Copy that. After I posted that I googled to see if the RN had considered the Superhornet or Advanced Superhornet, I knew that Nigel "Sharky" Ward was advocating for the Superhornet as a substitution or a mixed fleet with the F-35. Some arguments for it but they are now OBE (probably) but from his personal website (https://www.sharkeysworld.com): Figure 1. Assumption: Using Unit Procurement Cost of F-35 for fiscal 2014 Defense budget An R.N. establishment of 48 aircraft. Costs in US$ millions Aircraft number of aircraft unit Fly Away cost subtotal in life cost ** Total F-35 48 $290 $13,906 $27,811 $41,717 F-18A Super Hornet 40 $60 $2,400 $3,600.0 $7,800.0 E/A-18 Growler 8 $90 $720 $1,080.0 Saving by going the F-18 Super Hornet route (US$ millions) $33,916.80 34 billion is real money, even in fighter procurement, and the immediacy of procurement to ensure the Fleet Air Arm doesn't get the ax by not having iron for a few years, another plus. A mixed fleet of F/A-18 Adv. Hornets with F-35C would be a good combo, IMO, seems less risky. Just another model but a looker in RN colors:

Article on AFPAK hands by Lieutenant Colonel Steven Heffington (USAF) who wrote this on his second AFPAK tour. A Security Forces officer by trade, or was as the article is 3 years old, not sure if he is still in or not. https://warontherocks.com/2014/01/afpak-to-apac-hands-lessons-learned/

Raimius beat me to the punch but this a pretty good summary of the ideas posted so far, will add add two more to the running tally Continuity / Homestead opportunities More of AA units. Taking some of the comments, suggestion, COAs, etc... and trying to distill them to more general ideas... At 50,000' - the view is that the AF needs a more mission focused culture with a infusion of professionalism and active elimination of the "corprotization" that breeds queep, box-checking careerism and a DGAF attitude from some of the support elements/organizations. I am not sure how to do this, hence the reason for this thread but, how do you imbue an esprit de corps in a military organization where most members are not in operations and many will not go outside the wire / cross the fence during their careers? Also, quell the "gotcha" aspect of PC culture, witch hunts - guilty until proven innocent - emasculating or embarassing training / policies / events to be eliminated. At 30,000' - the view is that the AF (thinking Total Force but mainly focusing on AD) needs to address Career Development: It is fool hardy to pretend every officer will become O-6 or above so there needs to be new vectors, specifically codified that will allow individuals to remain in or compete for assignments or career tracks that allow them to pursue excellence in technical or operational skills without being marked as inferior as these tracks will likely not rise above Company Grade or O-4. Promotion: Separate promotion boards for Line and Support Officers. Locations: Eliminate several AD bases that are retention poison. Pay: Change the bonus and incentive pay structure to increase with higher tenure vice being flat static payments per year. TDYs: Loose the AEF construct, get tougher with the COCOMs to eliminate worthless requirements, honor deploy to dwell with greater integrity - call on more ARC support to as little as possible violate deploy to dwell for AD for QoL. PME: Update material for relevancy and value, shorten to reasonable lengths, de-emphasize the effect on career, encourage but don't make mandatory all but in name. If I missed something, put it on top of the woodpile. At 10,000' - at the Wing and unit level: SNCOs: Respect the experience and wisdom but encourage standards enforcement in professionally appropriate ways. JOs: Empower and expect higher performance, maturity. Just an Lt is not an excuse any longer, nor should it ever have been. Civillians (contractors or DAF GS series): Neutralize the growing cancer that they are stymying military personnel for laziness, incompetence or just obfuscation for empire building. Reemphasize the relationship that they work for the unit, not vice versa. If I missed something, put it on top of the woodpile.

The forum has been particularly active lately with several of the threads talking about the same, similar or tangents of the same topic: the current version of the Air Force is broken and getting worse. Symptoms of this are being discussed: pilot retention being abysmal, anecdotes of oblivious attitudes to operational support from different nonner shops, the somewhat desperate move(s) to change conditions outside of the AF or close off opportunities outside the AF to "encourage" retention, the threat of Stop Loss being publicly (if mistakenly) discussed and the indifference expressed by previous leadership, not really rebuked by current leadership, etc... If the AF is broken now, what would fix the current structure / concept or what would a new successful design / concept be? I'm not talking about what aircraft or systems but the structure itself, its philosophy, personnel organization, etc... We all know of or see the problem(s) with the Air Force as it is now but what should it be? Trying to return to a previous version won't work because the times and conditions that AF thrived in no longer exist, the form it is in now doesn't work evidenced by its recent problems of the last 15-20 years reaching a fevered pitch recently. so what should it change to? All the problems we have as officers and aviators with the shoe clerk AF are part of a larger organizational cultural problem, how do you fix that? Who the hell could do it? Someone in the AF or from outside? We can discuss the fact that it sucks the AF is in a deep stall below 500' AGL or we can discuss WTF can be done to recover the jet in the hope that someone on this forum might be in a position to do something about it... congressman and possibly others... or try to influence those that could. I'm not naive, this will take years if it even happens and it will not be just because of this one thread start in the august chambers of BO.net but you have to start somewhere...

Bingo. Every detail, task, function, duty, requirement, mission, etc. has to be looked at top to bottom and if it can not be readily related to an operational mission, requirement, duty, function or task in a few credible steps then it needs to get the boot. In a broader sense though the USAF is in decline, IMO, because of a total misunderstanding of what leadership is based on. Leadership is based on Professional Competence foremost, Adherence to Core Values second, Common Sense thrid. If you are incompetent in your job/field it does not matter if you have integrity, you can not follow someone who can not perform the mission nor hold the standards or is not intellectually capable of multi-dimensional decision making or strategic thought. Victory or success must come first for without it there can be nothing or little at most. If you do not have integrity you can not be trusted. You can not be lead by those you don't trust. Trust is not lost in making decisions where some are disappointed if only that their preference(s) were not chosen for legitimate reasons. It is lost when decisions are made for opaque reasons, not clearly explained and no strategic, operational, institutional or widely enjoyed personal benefit is observed. We need a reason to fight, serve, obey or preserve, we can not do so blindly. If you do not have common sense or context recognition of when to apply procedure/rules/policy firmly and when to bend or not follow them if time & conditions necessitate that for appropriate reasons (mission success, safety, futility, cost, etc.) you will not be able to function in a dynamic, uncontrollable environment like the real operational world. Unforeseen events and factors will challenge your knowledge, training and plans in ways that there is no ready made decision tree to take you easily to a right answer., a leader at any level must be able to adapt. We used to first evaluate professional skill and then test leadership potential of those demonstrating superior skill while simultaneously looking for character defects when those selected would have to make decisions affecting others for the success of the mission and their ability to adapt, innovate and interpret in an unpredictable environment(s). Deviation from this classic model to what I would call a specious model (assuming pedigree equals leader) has led us nearly to ruin.

That's the problem, the shoe clerks that run the place I believe could not resist the temptation to poach from the career pilot pool and build empires and fiefdoms of action officers, execs, assistant to the assistant manager of pencil sharpening, etc... The career pilot (aircrew, technical specialties, etc..) track is desperately needed in addition to reforms on the scale of Goldwater - Nichols 2.0. Officers, 3 career tracks: Technical/Operational, Staff, Leadership. Technical/Operational would be just that, technical/operational skill & experience focus. Not merely operating equipment but leading at the tactical level Staff would be treated no differently than a qualification to ensure competency & only accept volunteers with a special pay for those willing to serve and bring their competency and work ethic to avoid mouth breathers just interested in cruising. Leadership you would require nomination by your peers to be done on two year intervals with selection following and individuals allowed to accept or decline. Just a rough sketch but we have to acknowledge the current model no longer works, people are voting with their feet, we have more bullshit than mission relevant duty on a day to day basis and things can be better.

Was going to PM Steve Davies this but remembered this thread so a question for Steve Davies and anyone else who knows about this question... Because I'm an aviation nerd... was wondering if you knew if the RAF / RN were ever interested in acquiring the Rafale for a single fast jet type for both services? Water under the bridge as the UK is an F-35 buyer but I saw this model, Rafale in RN livery and it peaked my curiosity,... Google didn't turn up anything but was wondering if there might have been an backstory.

For your friend, fare well heading west...

In the WTF thread for... lots of reasons. If you thought the movie was awful, watch the theme song video... Iron Eagle never say die by King Cobra.

I know a few but they are usually not Line officers, of the Line O-6s I know I guess around 60%+ are single or on wife 2 or 3 in some rare cases. That raises the interesting question why the Line has become expected or accustomed to selling our souls when other communities don't but they seem to have as much rank, prestige and leadership in the AF. Is it because we are all type A's and a consequence of just the competitiveness amongst that set or are we held to unrealistic career / QOL standards?

Use relief from sanctions and other carrots they want not related to Syria to change their opinions on the matter Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

More BDA info on the strike and performance of the Tomahawks used: https://warisboring.com/u-s-cruise-missiles-struck-syrian-base-with-impressive-precision/ TLDR version: 7 Syrian KIA, 18 Syrian WIA, airfield heavily damaged, 4 Syrian Su-22s destroyed and no Russian helos or personnel hit. On the policy executed by POTUS, good commentary on it from Bolton: https://www.theblaze.com/news/2017/04/07/last-night-the-obama-era-in-american-foreign-policy-ended-says-john-bolton/ He mentions around the 6:30 mark in the video embedded in the article what I believe is inevitable and should be encouraged, the partition of Syria/Iraq. FP article on the idea: https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/09/its-time-to-seriously-consider-partitioning-syria/ I'm not for imposing on others without a lot of thought and caution but is this inevitable and really what the situation is now and likely to remain so without a major intervention? I include West Iraq in the question as the Sunni population there would and is drawn to union or alliance with the Sunni population of Syria vice being ruled or in a nation dominated now by Shia.

Russian RPA post-strike footage of the Al Shayrat airfield:

Can't argue with the likelihood that we would take blame for things going wrong before, during and after the fact that no military could legitimately be held responsible for and that physically and mentally capable military age males running to Europe for asylum does not help the cause of major sustained intervention as LBJ said... but... in life there very few absolutes and every instance is different, probably similar to past events but still different. It is right to be wary given the history and result of the OIF and OEF missions but I see 3 reasons for intervention: - that allowing the Syrian Civil War to continue provides an opportunity for hegemony for Iran and Russia in an area of vital national interest, the stability of oil exports and increased threat to Israel will in the future only increase the probability and cost of a required US led intervention, nip it in the bud. A riff on the Domino Theory but analogous to challenging Axis powers in the 30s versus waiting and having a devastating war in the 40s. Not every aggression will lead to WW 3 I know but in this case, allowing a Persian Crescent to form with the Russians assisting is not in our interests. - continuous war is setting up the nation of Syria or what will become new nations possibly for long term failure by the loss of youth, educated populations and a physically/psychologically/culturally damaged populace. on the doorstep to Europe a West Afghanistan could be forming. not in our interest, Europe's or the ME's to allow. and - the west or IC needs a win in order to keep the team together. this may seem shallow but allowing our military, economic and security alliances and organizations to wither and then further question the basic value of a world where democracies for the most part stick together, promote basic decency and for the most part don't let the authoritarian regimes run riot over their neighbors has a value we take for granted. this is a theatre where if the team comes together, a whole government(s) and organizations (govs, intl, and ngos) effort first led by a military mission then followed by a humanitarian mission then followed by a diplomatic mission then finally followed by a long term economic mission can work. from a military perspective a Syrian theater has several advantages over what is probably dissuading us, the false analogy that is the recent experience in Iraq / Afghanistan: - the area to be secured (primarily) is smaller. Syria is 1/3 the size of Afghanistan and 1/2 the size of Iraq. we can concentrate forces, patrol and monitor more frequently and react faster. - there is an existing infrastructure (for now) we can use. civilian roads, airports, seaports, military bases, etc. with direct and secure road access from two potential allies, Turkey and Jordan. - the potential AOR is much closer to existing logistical support bases / major commercial ports. compared to Afghanistan, resupply will be easier. - we have an enormous amount of equipment designed for this operation (occupation and likely some level of COIN / LIC following the initial deployment. MRAPs, RPAs and the large amount of recent operational experience will likely mean this operation would be run better. optimistic but I don't think naïve. just my ranting and opinion worth what you paid for it but I think we could pull this off if we decide it is in our collective interest, will allocate the resources and then some if required, act decisively and call the bluff of malevolent actors in the situation and if we chose to act, be patient and not expect this to last less than 10 years.