jazzdude

There's more demand for doctors across the board, and they take longer to make than a pilot... The air force trains a pilot and gets a 10 year ROI via the ADSC. And there's no shortage of young Americans that want to fly jets. The AF gets a 1:1 return for the doctors who take the scholarship money to pay for their medical school, so at best a 4 year ROI. Then again, the AF only pays about $400k to get a doctor, while the cheapest pilot (C-17) is $800k in direct training plus roughly $200k in pay/allowances, so the payback is about the same ($100k per year old ADSC) It takes roughly 2 years to have a basic pilot trained, and roughly 2-4 years to become an AC/IP/4FL, so 4-6 years to get a "fully qualified" pilot. It takes 4 years med school plus 1-6 years in residency, so 5-10 years to get a certified doctor who can practice. Not all doctors get rock star pay either. https://www.dfas.mil/militarymembers/payentitlements/Pay-Tables/HPO4/ If they don't sign a retention bonus, many get paid about the same after they complete their residency as a pilot on the bonus after their initial commitment ($43k for most medical specialties, compared to the $12k+35k=$47k for a pilot, though the pilot has a multi year ADSC the doctor does not have). The big money goes to certain specialties, and those spots to get into those specialties are competitive nationwide (mil and civ). One thing the doctors on scholarship give up is their selection of specialty: no matter how good they match to residencies, they are still needs of the AF. So even if they scored well enough to go to say anesthesiology to make the big bucks ($300k+ a year on the outside in a major city), if the AF needs flight docs that year, well, they are going to go be flight docs/general practice. Even if there's an anesthesiologist residency position in the military, all med school graduates can compete for that spot, not just the ones on military medical scholarships. This also essentially locks them into that specialty for the rest of their career, and switching specialties means recompeting for a residency match (which again are limited, and competing against the new med school grads), and then completing the new residency at resident pay (1-6 years at $25k-50k/year working 60-80 hours a week. That last part is why my brother decided not to take an offer for a military medical scholarship-there's a loss of control over your career at a critical point, the initial residency match, which has a significant impact on your career earnings potential.

Yeah, good catch.

Civilian employers aren't required by law to ensure you have certain transition training and medical assessments done prior to separation/quitting. Most of those laws are in place to make sure that 22-26 year old enlisted troop transitions well into civilian life following their enlistment. Also, 2 weeks is generally just a courtesy, could be 0 (right to work goes both ways), could be more based on the employment contract.

But do they make as much as an airline pilot? A continued captain who takes the bonus makes as much as a major (though at the cost of an ADSC). I'm not sure if those flight LTs have a contract (similar to an enlistment contact), as that changes some of the calculus. Would their command structure work if scaled up to our AF's size? Would we culturally accept a flight LT that only has a high school education? Not saying it couldn't work, but it'd be a huge shift in how we structure ourselves.

They're both related, but I'll stay on the latter point. The question is where to draw the line on the public good. Should I have to bear the cost of hospitalization of someone who catches COVID and needs ICU care, but had believed COVID was fake news, ignored CDC recommendations, and believes the vaccines contain microchips? Even with private insurance, if the insurer is paying out more for medical services, you can count on premiums going to go up the next year so your still going to take it out of hide to pay for someone else's stupidity. After all, the insurer is in the business of making money, and generally has a fiduciary responsibility to their shareholders to deny care whenever allowed by contract/coverage terms. And most people do not have the money to pay medical costs directly themselves, so that means pooling resources with others to mitigate financial risks. That can be with government, or with private organizations, both of which can screw you as the individual in many different ways. We benefit from decent healthcare in the military, and for retirees I'd say great healthcare for the price that you couldn't get in the private sector. Oddly enough, you never hear that come up as a factor when taking about compensation packages (pilot pro pay vs bonuses, etc), it's just taken for granted because that's just the way it's been. So it makes it easy to justify why we get government healthcare and others don't-because that's how it always has been.

How do you feel about DoD reducing it's healthcare services, with the plan of kicking dependents off base to the private providers/Tricare? In theory that's fine, in practice there are many locations where it's difficult to get added as a new patient off base, which would effectively deny routine healthcare access to dependents. Should retiree Tricare be eliminated? Any service related issues could be handled by the VA. Need coverage transitioning to your second career? There's always COBRA. Shouldn't the pension be enough of a thank you for a full career of service, similar to what the private sector offers in retirement plans? Can't afford your care of for that of your family? Well, there's plenty of charities... Even if you don't go to those extremes, should the premiums for Tricare coverage for dependents be raised to be on par with private sector HMO rates?

It's not unsolvable, but the solution may not be one the line pilot wants. TLDR- The bean counters probably figured out the formula, and that's why we see the compensation that we do, to include the reduced bonuses this past FY. Also, not sure if pro pay would stop a significant number of pilots from going to the airlines anyways. With doctors it's a 1:1 comparison between military and civilian, and my bet is they use national averages for each specialty to set their pro pay. If the military offers competitive pay, they can hire a doctor off the street, send them through OTS and have an O-3/4/5/6 doctor as fast as they can get them into the service. So the doctor pro pay isn't a retention tool, it's a *recruitment* tool. Closest parallel for military pilots are ACMI carriers and airlift, at least looking at mission sets. 121 scheduled service would be an easy argument to make though to include with pay comparisons. Unlike the doctors, the AF can't (won't?) hire an airline captain and make them an airlift AC right away, and definitely can't just make them a 4FL in a fighter. That lateral transfer only goes one way and it's not in the AF's favor. The AF doesn't have a pilot recruitment problem, it has a pilot manpower problem, which can either be solved through retention or production. Pretty much no matter how you cut it, the AF is on the hook to train pilots to be AF pilots. So it becomes a balancing act between pay and bonuses, training costs, and Congressional perceptions on what is "fair" pay. Congress thinks we're worth an extra $35k/year. That's not going to budge until the defense committees get new members. The AF thinks we're worth less unless you commit for a long time, which works in the AF's favor. The hard truth is the AF seems to have accepted that it will grow it's way out of the shortage, lean heavier on (AD) CGOs to fly the line, and bet experienced pilots wanting off AD will go guard/reserve which keeps the experience in house for the potential high end fight. We've gotten by without pilots on staff for so long that those positions might not come back and be eliminated (making the shortage smaller). And the AF likely has a business case showing that the rate of bleeding is acceptable, so there's no need to offer more money. Enough people are staying with the compensation being offered, so why pay pilots more? Also remember the AF budget is essentially a zero sum game-that extra pay means something else the AF can't buy. Hypothetically, if there was a fly only track and those pilots were paid a pro pay to put them on par with major airlines pay, how does the AF manage the number of pilots? Do you keep a 21 year major over a 9 year captain if you have to force shape? How do you determine which pilot is "better?" A seniority system might work for the airlines, but it can create significant drawbacks in a military environment since our mission is more complex. While the 21 year major may be more experienced and "better" in many ways, they can also quit at anytime. So how does the AF make that call? A1 doesn't know enough to weigh in, but if you put it all on commanders, they can play favorites (well, Maj X flies okay, but they planned the holiday party and tackle queep without complaining, while Maj Y flies better but doesn't do anything else to help the sq run...) Even if the money was the same as legacy pay, I'd bet you'd still have plenty of people punch from the AF anyways for QOL goals (sure, AF might pay me $300k a year to be a military pilot, but I could go to the airlines and make that much and not have to deploy while working significantly less than AD, so why should I stay past my initial commitment?) The AF loses in that scenario, because the extra money it spent wouldn't have the desired effect. People make the same argument for the bonus-many of those people would've stayed anyways, so that's just wasted money. Though having a longer bonus commitment (like 5 years) makes that investment worth while over a pro pay to the AF since the pilot loses the option to say no to assignments for a period of time, which the AF wouldn't get with pro pay.

One difference could be that doctors take the financial risk up front while military pilots don't, do that puts them in a better negotiating position. Doctors can essentially lateral over into the military, and then back over to civilian practice. A pilot can't really do that (though it'll be interesting to see what becomes of the UPT pipeline for heavies bringing in commercial pilots on reduced training timelines). Just for reference, a doctor takes on around $400k in debt to graduate medical school, after which there are multiple points over the 3-6 years after graduation they can wash out and be stuck with the debt. Meanwhile, a military pilot, particularly a fighter pilot, receives a significant investment from the employer (AF) for training, for which the price paid is time. My bet is the AF knows that most pilots in the "rage quit AD to go to the airlines" will also try to go guard or reserve to temper the variability of the airline business, so the AF doesn't really lose the talent, just keeps it for much cheaper (both from a bonus standpoint and from straight pay/benefits) Also, what would pro pay be based on? Pay at the big 5? All major airlines? 121 airlines? All that being said, dropping the "normal" bonus from $35k back down to $25k unless you take a stupid long commitment (or just not offering a bonus like to 11R) is a slap to the face. The other issue is highlighted in the promotion thread, the AF only knows how to manage by year groups, and there's no technical career track (ie fly only track). Pro pay makes a lot of sense if fly only guys capped out at captain, and got paid extra to retain their experience, which is essentially what we do for doctors.

Copy, that makes sense.

Does anyone that just wants to fly the line really care about the rank, or just the extra pay that comes with the (Lt Col) rank? Better flight pay or bonus options could make up the pay difference, and that's where the focus should be, particularly since the number of O-5s the AF can have is limited. Though I guess the problem is that the AF isn't going to increase pilot pay (through flight pay or a pro pay), and the bonus has gotten worse and probably will continue on that path. Especially since 11M are now "100% manned" and 11Rs are "overmanned"...

Had a boss show me where I could find the generic memorandum of instruction for promotions (it's on mypers in the promotion section). Good read on what the boards are told to value when scoring. His take was to try and have your OPR touch on all of the points in the MOI if possible. They also added (in the last year) career fields expectations as well that outlines what each career field values at different points in your career. Also found on mypers in the promotion section. That being said, "job performance" can be nebulous like you mentioned.

However the CC wants to do the notifications

I mean, they added a loadmaster check in the C-17 before landing checklist that is literally there to ensure the pilots put the gear down, so he's also busy making sure we don't land with the gear up. Again...

So kinda like a JPADS bundle that can fly further and go boom? And some stuff is similar to conventional airdrop, where we plan CDE (oh wait, we have to call it ADE) with a stupid large CEP because winds (which you may not be able to get a good forecast or observation in execution) significantly affect parachutes and where the stuff lands. Not saying it's a 1:1 comparison, but a lot of the concepts in airdrop seem similar to weapons employment concepts used by the CAF. Not saying I can do what you do (because I lack the appropriate training), but we do more than just "gear up, feet up, collect per diem." Like Brabus was saying, this definitely won't be the go-to option, but if it works out it can help free up fighters/bombers to handle the more challenging targets, potentially increasing surge capacity without having to buy more platforms.

Maybe Lockheed is just better at burying those costs and indirectly passing it on to the government.

This problem isn't just a MAF problem, or a TACC problem. Put in more general terms: Attacking an AOC or a COCOM headquarters severely impacts our ability to execute C2 of our forces. This is also a problem for the CAF, and the joint force at large. That's nothing new-headquarters/C2 have been a critical node that affects fighting capability throughout history. What's changed is that it used to be harder to attack headquarters/C2 because those functions tended to be further to the rear of a battlefield and harder to reach, limited only by their ability to communicate with the front lines. Airpower made it easier to reach out and attack a headquarters, but advancements in IADS make it easier to deter air attacks. And now, cyber attacks remove most of the safety that physical distance from the front line brought. It's easy to say scrap the system and get the combat minded people in the seat to make decisions. But for MAF, you still have to prioritize movements because airlift is limited, and losing the AOC removes efficiencies and effectively decreases available airlift capacity. A fighting force can only move as fast as it's logistical tail. How does a line squadron decide what needs to be moved and when (unless it gets chopped to support a specific commander)? What takes priority, a M1 Abrams tank, food and water, a MICAP engine for a fighter, or evacuation of a patient in critical condition?

I mean, at one point in history someone asked "what if we put a bunch of miniguns on a cargo plane?"

And then the fighter guys turnaround and complain about not being supported in things like ACE, or that mobility lacks a tactical mindset. Yeah, some dudes they carried away, we're probably not going to be on the day 1 push. But someone has to seize/set up that forward base for fighters to operate out of. Or for the army to stage out of. I'd rather have my community leaning forward to try and get better tactically (even if some of the ideas or reasonable are laughable at best), rather than take the mentality that our job is just to haul trash, collect per diem, and only expect to fly in a permissive environment. If we're flying the miles long train dropping paratroopers, we're not a liability, we're the mission...inserting the army to go do their thing. We're generally not doing it just because we can (except for that one time we did exactly that, which was a boondoggle). We're just asking for tools so we don't have to suck SA from C2 or escorts because we are blundering blindly into threats. Also don't forget that RWR was a capability the C-17 lost during the transition from C-141 (partial fleet had RWR previously).

Fixed it for you :) In all seriousness, those investments are being made because AMC has to fund it to continue it's core mission, whether it's to comply with airspace requirements, or to address diminishing sources for replacement parts, in order to keep the jets flying. You'll also get other minor (cheap/easy) improvements that piggy back on a bigger effort like replacing the HUD. While RWR gear or being on the link would be great, that costs money, and AMC/big AF is spending that money elsewhere. The budget is essentially a zero sum game: if there's no money for an effort, well, unfortunately that tells you what the priority is (or isn't). ETA: For the copilots, just remind them regardless what the AF's or AMC's priorities are, it's still their butt out on the line. And that the WOs will probably be in the planning cells, and not flying in the threat environment, so learn what you can from them to maximize your (and your crew's) survival if you have to fly in a threat environment

It buys options for strike planning if this capacity pans out. But I'd bet the capability likely will sit on a shelf and crews spun up as required. That being said, cargo aircraft generally enjoy easier access/basing/overflight than bombers or fighters, and could help ease political concerns from other countries, again buying flexibility for planners. But COCOMs do this all the time (trade requirements and prioritization of missions). If something is important enough to move, it'll get a tail, particularly if it truly is a COCOM/CC priority. Look at Aeromedical Evacuation-often times priority cargo/pax movements will get bumped to support an AE mission when necessary. That bumped cargo gets reshuffled onto other missions, or missions replanned to add stops to move the cargo/pax. It's a huge house of cards. Coincidentally, that house of cards is what makes things like ACE challenging. And why sometimes you get stuck at the pax terminal for days trying to fly in theater, or a large MICAP part gets delayed.

There aren't enough tankers to meet everyone's needs, so yeah, stuff gets prioritized by big blue/TRANSCOM/COCOMs and requirements go unfilled, and operational missions generally get the priority over training or exercises. So yeah, if you don't meet the priority, go find someone else if you still want a tanker (your unit can always try for a business effort). Throwing spears at line tanker pilots does nothing to fix your problem; talk to your current ops or to your MAJCOM to fight better for your requirements. I've been in C-17 squadrons that wanted to do DACT with fighters to actually practice how to self defend (particularly the high workloads and CRM required to keep an attacker in sight), but almost always it falls apart in early planning due to fighter availability (and even if the training executes, that gives one crew maybe a couple attempts at the task, so not likely to get to a proficient level). Why don't fighter units support heavy squadrons getting better tactically so they are ready for the near peer fight?

I'll admit there's a mindset problem in MAF, with a good amount of people just not caring. There's plenty of airline mentality in strat lift. There's no real excuse for that. We in MAF don't really get the deploy, reconstitute, train, exercise, deploy cycles. So there's no dedicated time to train for different fights built into our ops schedules, which is essentially continuous. AFSOC seems to do better than AMC despite a similar ops tempo, but they already have that culture ingrained into their ethos, and the ability to offload their slackers elsewhere. The hard part is that even if you do care, it's hard to get training for the high end fight in when you've got to get your currency beans because you're needed to go on the road later that week. Especially when you may only get one training sortie a month, and be on the road for a majority of the month. Even after deployments in the C-17, we'd get our 2 weeks of downtime, 2 weeks to get recurrent, and then we're back out on the road passing through Germany on the way back to the sandbox. None of that TDY time counts against deployment dwell time either. And it doesn't help that crew ratios were lowered to fix the manning problem on paper.

So what do you propose to fix the problem? Not like crews can say no to deploying so they can go to a flag exercise instead. If we reduce the tanker demand in CENTCOM, that might free up time to train for the near peer fight. But that's on big AF to sell to the COCOMs; reducing sorry for operations now to prepare for the high end fight in the future. The challenge with tankers and strat lift is that the mission never ends, there's always someone somewhere in the world who needs gas operationally (to include coronets), or cargo moved. The demand is there, and it's insatiable. Plus, the simple fact of life in a heavy is that our choices are wait for the fighters to clear a path and continue to protect us as we push toward our objective in a contested environment, or run away/avoid (all while being much slower than adversaries). That being said, I've always encouraged my crew to do some tactics study while at cruise (even if it's only on a couple legs during a 2 week trip), it's a great time to study and learn, and talk through scenarios, especially when you've got tactically minded people on the crew who do want to get better for that future fight. Not like there's much else to do during that ocean crossing.

It depends on what your goals are. If you want to fly for the military: - Specifically for JROTC, you'll want to compete for a Flight Academy scholarship. https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Holm-Center/AFJROTC/Flight-Academy/ - Civil Air Patrol is the official civilian Air Force Auxiliary, and has cadet programs focused on aviation (as well as scholarships available). - Work and pay your own way through flight training. The summer hire program is more geared towards developing people for civilian (government service) jobs within the Air Force. If that's a path you're considering, it can be a great entrance into that world. Not saying you shouldn't apply, but if flying is your goal, that time could be used to round out your application to the Air Force Academy or competing for an AFROTC scholarship with athletics or community service (or other organizations/groups where you can develop leadership traits).

VSP for 11X in general doesn't make sense. Any year groups in particular airframes overmanned? Seems like 11Rs in the 2010ish year groups or older might get offered VSP based on not being offered a pilot bonus this year. Unless not being offered the bonus fixes the glitch on it's own.