If all the issues the MA experienced before the actual causal issue are 'normal', thank god I never ended up on that aircraft.
During takeoff from Yokota AB, the MA experienced the first EP of the mishap sortie (MS), "MISSION CMPTR 1 FLT" (Tab DD-47). This occurs, due to a software glitch, when the backup computer automatically takes over while the primary computer restarts, referred to as a ''warm-start" (Tab DD-47). This EP was displayed visually on the CDU and audibly with a master caution tone and necessitated the MC to complete a 29-stcp checklist while flying to MCAS lwakuni, which was completed without issue
At lwakuni, after exiting the runway at taxiway F, the MA experienced a second mission computer warm-start (Tab 11-11). The MC verbally acknowledged the warm-start alert and continued via taxiway F2 to the hot pits, an area for re-fueling without shutting down (Tab II-11 to 11-12). When the aircraft stopped in the hot pits, the MSMA TS exited the MA to prepare for refueling operations while the MSMAFE ran the refuel checklist (Tab II-13). The MP monitored fuel flow while discussing departure sequencing and timing with the KC-130Js for air-refueling (Tab 11-18 to 11-20). The MCP and the MSMAFE ran the checklist for the second wann-start (Tab II-13 to 11-15). While refueling, the MA experienced a third warm-start, which caused the Intelligence Broadcast Receiver (IBR) connection to drop, a system required for the MC to receive intelligence information (Tabs DD-47, and II-15).
During the time on the ground at MCAS Iwakuni and while the MP was coordinating mission events with other exercise participants, the MA experienced multiple system advisories, mostly associated with the wann-start, to include: a blade fold control unit periodic built-in-test failure, a Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver failure, an exhaust deflector fail, a radio-frequency jammer failure, and an infrared jammer failure (Tab II-14 to II-17). The MC also nearly overfilled a feed tank due to a ground refuel-defuel panel fail (Tab 11-17). While some of these additional failures were associated with the mission computer fault, they require additional crew attention (Tabs DD-47 and 11-14 to 11-17).