tac airlifter

It was me who recommended it, and I'm very glad you enjoyed the read. There are quite a few books about the fighter aspect of the AF, but very few about us prop folks. I thought his end story about the "divert field" was about the best I've read from any aviator.

THE UNTOLD TRUE STORY OF MAD DOG SHRIVER: Mad Dog led dozens of covert missions into Laos & Cambodia until his luck ran out. By Maj. John L. Plaster, USAR (Ret.) <https://www.ultimatesniper.com/images/macVsog-patch.GIF> There undoubtedly was not a single recon man in SOG more accomplished or renowned than Mad Dog Shriver. Mad Dog! In the late 1960s, no Special Forces trooper at Ft. Bragg even breathed those top secret letters, "S-O-G," but everyone had heard of the legendary Studies and Observations Group Green Beret recon team leader, Sergeant First Class Jerry Shriver, dubbed a "mad dog" by Radio Hanoi. It was Jerry Shriver who'd spoken the most famous rejoinder in SOG history, radioing his superiors not to worry that NVA forces had encircled his tiny team. "No, no," he explained, "I've got 'em right where I want 'em -- surrounded from the inside." Fully decked out, Mad Dog was a walking arsenal with an imposing array of sawed-off shotgun or suppressed submachine gun, pistols, knives and grenades. "He looked like Rambo," First Sergeant Billy Greenwood thought. Blond, tall and thin, Shriver's face bore chiseled features around piercing blue eyes. "There was no soul in the eyes, no emotion," thought SOG Captain Bill O'Rourke. "They were just eyes." By early 1969, Shriver was well into his third continuous year in SOG, leading top secret intelligence gathering teams deep into the enemy's clandestine Cambodian sanctuaries where he'd teased death scores of times. Unknown to him, however, forces beyond his control at the highest levels of government in Hanoi and Washington were steering his fate. The Strategic Picture Every few weeks of early 1969, the docks at Cambodia's seaport of Sihanoukville bustled with East European ships offloading to long lines of Hak Ly Trucking Company lorries. Though ostensibly owned by a Chinese businessman, the Hak Ly Company's true operator was North Vietnam's Trinh Sat intelligence service. The trucks' clandestine cargo of rockets, smallarms ammunition and mortar rounds rolled overnight to the heavily jungled frontier of Kampong Cham Province just three miles from the border with South Vietnam, a place the Americans had nicknamed the Fishhook, where vast stockpiles sustained three full enemy divisions, plus communist units across the border inside South Vietnam -- some 200,000 foes. Cambodian Prince Sihanouk was well aware of these neutrality violations; indeed, his fifth wife, Monique, her mother and half-brother were secretly peddling land rights and political protection to the NVA; other middlemen were selling rice to the NVA by the thousands of tons. Hoping to woo Sihanouk away from the communists, the Johnson Administration had watched passively while thousands of GIs were killed by communist forces operating from Cambodia, and not only did nothing about it, but said nothing, even denied it was happening. And now, each week of February and March 1969, more Americans were dying than lost in the Persian Gulf War, killed by NVA forces that struck quickly then fled back to "neutral" Cambodia. Combined with other data, SOG's Cambodian intelligence appeared on a top secret map which National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger studied aboard Air Force One at Brussels airport the morning of 24 February 1969. Sitting with Kissinger was Colonel Alexander Haig, his military assistant, while representing the president was White House Chief of Staff H.R. "Bob" Haldeman. During the new administration's transition, President Nixon had asked Kissinger to determine how to deal with the Cambodian buildup and counter Hanoi's "fight and talk" strategy. While President Nixon addressed NATO's North Atlantic Council, those aboard Air Force One worked out details for a clandestine U.S. response: The secret bombing of Cambodia's most remote sanctuaries, which would go unacknowledged unless Prince Sihanouk protested. When Air Force One departed Brussels, Kissinger briefed President Nixon, who approved the plan but postponed implementing it. Over the coming three weeks, Nixon twice warned Hanoi, "we will not tolerate attacks which result in heavier casualties to our men at a time that we are honestly trying to seek peace at the conference table in Paris." The day after Nixon's second warning, the NVA bombarded Saigon with 122mm rockets obviously smuggled through Cambodia. Three days later, Nixon turned loose the B-52s on the Fishhook, the first secret Cambodian raid, which set off 73 secondary explosions. A Special SOG Mission Not one peep eminated from Phnom Penh or Hanoi and here was a fitting irony: For four years the North Vietnamese had denied their presence in Cambodia, and now, with U.S. bombs falling upon them, they could say nothing. Nixon suspended further B-52 strikes in hopes Hanoi's negotiators might begin productive discussions in Paris, but the talks droned on pointlessly. To demonstrate that America, too, could "talk and fight," President Nixon approved a second secret B-52 strike, this time against a target proposed by General Creighton Abrams with Ambassador Bunker's endorsement: COSVN, the Central Office for South Vietnam, the almost mythical Viet Cong headquarters which claimed to run the whole war. An NVA deserter had pinpointed the COSVN complex 14 miles southeast of Memot, Cambodia, in the Fishhook, just a mile beyond the South Vietnamese border. The COSVN raid was laid on for 24 April. Apprised of the upcoming B-52 strike, Brigadier General Philip Davidson, the MACV J-2, thought that instead of just bombing COSVN, a top secret SOG raiding force should hit the enemy headquarters as soon as the bombs stopped falling. He phoned Colonel Steve Cavanaugh, Chief SOG, who agreed and ordered the Ban Me Thuot-based Command and Control South, CCS, to prepare a Green Beret-led company of Montagnard mercenaries for the special mission. At CCS, the historic COSVN raid fell upon its most accomplished man, that living recon legend, Mad Dog Shriver, and Captain Bill O'Rourke. Though O'Rourke would command the company-size raiding force, Shriver equally would influence the operation, continuing an eight-month collaboration they'd begun when they ran recon together. "Ready to insert deep into Cambodia on a covert operation, "Mad Dog" carries his trusty suppressed Grease Gun, Gerber fighting knife and plenty of grenades." (Photo by Medal of Honor winner, Jim Fleming) Mad Dog -- the Man and the Myth There was no one at CCS quite like Mad Dog Shriver. Medal of Honor recipient Jim Fleming, who flew USAF Hueys for SOG, found Shriver, "the quintessential warrior-loner, anti-social, possessed by what he was doing, the best team, always training, constantly training." Shriver rarely spoke and walked around camp for days wearing the same clothes. In his sleep he cradled a loaded rifle, and in the club he'd buy a case of beer, open every can, then go alone to a corner and drink them all. Though he'd been awarded a Silver Star, five Bronze Stars and the Soldiers Medal, the 28-year-old Green Beret didn't care about decorations. But he did care about the Montagnard hill tribesmen, and spent all his money on them, even collected food, clothes, whatever people would give, to distribute in Yard villages. He was the only American at CCS who lived in the Montagnard barracks. "He was almost revered by the Montagnards," O'Rourke says. Shriver's closest companion was a German shepherd he'd brought back from Taiwan which he named Klaus. One night Klaus got sick on beer some recon men fed him and crapped on the NCO club floor; they rubbed his nose in it and threw him out. Shriver arrived, drank a beer, removed his blue velvet smoking jacket and derby hat, put a .38 revolver on a table, then dropped his pants and defecated on the floor. "If you want to rub my nose in this," he dared, "come on over." Everyone pretended not to hear him; one man who'd fed Klaus beer urged the Recon Company commander to intervene. The captain laughed in his face. "He had this way of looking at you with his eyes half-open," recon man Frank Burkhart remembers. "If he looked at me like that, I'd just about freeze." Shriver always had been different. In the early 1960s, when Rich Ryan served with him in the 7th Army's Long Range Patrol Company in Germany, Shriver's buddies called him "Digger" since they thought he looked like an undertaker. As a joke his LRRP comrades concocted their own religion, The Mahoganites," which worshipped a mahogany statue. "So we would carry Shriver around on an empty bunk with a sheet over him and candles on the corners," recalled Ryan, "and chant, 'Maaa-haa-ga-ney, Maaa-haa-ga-ney.' Scared the hell out of new guys." Medal of Honor recipient Fleming says Shriver "convinced me that for the rest of my life I would not go into a bar and cross someone I didn't know." But no recon man was better in the woods. "He was like having a dog you could talk to," O'Rourke explained. "He could hear and sense things; he was more alive in the woods than any other human being I've ever met." During a company operation on the Cambodian border Shriver and an old Yard compatriot were sitting against a tree, O'Rourke recalled. "Suddenly he sat bolt upright, they looked at each other, shook their heads and leaned back against the tree. I'm watching this and wondering, what the hell's going on? And all of a sudden these birds flew by, then a nano-second later, way off in the distance, 'Boom-boom!' -- shotguns. They'd heard that, ascertained what it was and relaxed before I even knew the birds were flying." Shriver once went up to SOG's Command and Control North for a mission into the DMZ where Captain Jim Storter encountered him just before insert. "He had pistols stuck everywhere on him, I mean, he had five or six .38 caliber revolvers." Storter asked him, "Sergeant Shriver, would you like a CAR-15 or M-16 or something? You know the DMZ is not a real mellow area to go into." But Mad Dog replied, "No, them long guns'll get you in trouble and besides, if I need more than these I got troubles anyhow." Rather than stand down after an operation, Shriver would go out with another team. "He lived for the game; that's all he lived for," Dale Libby, a fellow CCS man said. Shriver once promised everyone he was going on R&R but instead sneaked up to Plei Djerang Special Forces camp to go to the field with Rich Ryan's A Team. During a short leave stateside in 1968, fellow Green Beret Larry White hung out with Shriver, whose only real interest was finding a lever action .444 Marlin rifle. Purchasing one of the powerful Marlins, Shriver shipped it back to SOG so he could carry it into Cambodia, "to bust bunkers," probably the only levergun used in the war. And the Real Jerry Shriver Unless you were one of Mad Dog's close friends, the image was perfect prowess -- but the truth was, Shriver confided to fellow SOG Green Beret Sammy Hernadez, he feared death and didn't think he'd live much longer. He'd beat bad odds too many times, and could feel a terrible payback looming. "He wanted to quit," Medal of Honor winner Fred Zabitosky could see. "He really wanted to quit, Jerry did. I said, 'Why don't you just tell them I want off, I don't want to run any more?' He said he would but he never did; just kept running." The 5th Special Forces Group executive officer, Lieutenant Colonel Charlie Norton, had been watching SOG recon casualties skyrocket and grew concerned about men like Mad Dog whose lives had become a continuous flirtation with death. Norton went to the 5th Group commander and urged, "Don't approve the goddamn extensions these guys are asking for. You approve it again, your chances of killing that guy are very, very good." But the group commander explained SOG needed experienced men for its high priority missions. "Bullshit," Norton snapped, "you're signing that guy's death warrant." Eventually 5th Group turned down a few extensions but only a very few; the most experienced recon men never had extensions denied. Never. "Mad Dog was wanting to get out of recon and didn't know how," said recon team leader Sonny Franks, though the half-measure came when Shriver left recon to join his teammate O'Rourke's raider company. And now the COSVN raid would make a fitting final operation; Shriver could face his fear head-on, charge right into COSVN's mysterious mouth and afterward at last call it quits. Into COSVN's Mouth The morning of 24 April 1969, while high-flying B-52s winged their way from distant Guam, the SOG raider company lined up beside the airfield at Quan Loi, South Vietnam, only 20 miles southeast of COSVN's secret lair. But just five Hueys were flyable that morning, enough to lift only two platoons; the big bombers could not be delayed, which meant Lieutenant Bob Killebrew's 3rd Platoon would have to stand by at Quan Loi while the 1st Platoon under First Lieutenant Walter Marcantel, and 2nd Platoon under First Lieutenant Greg Harrigan, raided COSVN. Capt. O'Rourke and Mad Dog didn't like it, but they could do nothing.* Nor could they do anything about their minimal fire support. Although whole waves of B-52s were about to dump thousands of bombs into COSVN, the highly classified Cambodian Rules of Engagement forbad tactical air strikes; it was better to lose an American-led SOG team, the State Department rules suggested, then leave documentable evidence that U.S. F4 Phantoms had bombed this "neutral" territory. It was a curious logic so concerned about telltale napalm streaks or cluster bomb fins, but unconcerned about B-52 bomb craters from horizon to horizon. Chief SOG Cavanaugh found the contradiction "ridiculous," but he could not change the rules. The B-52 contrails were not yet visible when the raiding force Hueys began cranking and the raiders boarded; Capt. O'Rourke would be aboard the first bird and Shriver on the last so they'd be at each end of the landing Hueys. As they lifted off for the ten-minute flight, the B-52s were making final alignments for the run-in. Minutes later the lead chopper had to turn back because of mechanical problems; O'Rourke could only wish the others Godspeed. Command passed to an operations officer in the second bird who'd come along for the raid, Captain Paul Cahill. Momentarily the raiders could see dirt geysers bounding skyward amid collapsing trees. Then as the dust settled a violin-shaped clearing took form and the Hueys descended in-trail, hovered for men to leap off, then climbed away. Then fire exploded from all directions, horrible fire that skimmed the ground and mowed down anyone who didn't dive into a bomb crater or roll behind a fallen treetrunk. From the back of the LZ, Mad Dog radioed that a machinegun bunker to his left-front had his *(Greg Harrigan and I had been boyhood friends in northeast Minneapolis.) men pinned and asked if anyone could fire at it to relieve the pressure. Holed up in a bomb crater beneath murderous fire, Capt. Cahill, 1st Lt. Marcantel and a medic, Sergeant Ernest Jamison, radioed that they were pinned, too. Then Jamison dashed out to retrieve a wounded man; heavy fire cut him down, killing him on the spot. No one else could engage the machinegun that trapped Shriver's men -- it was up to Mad Dog. Skittish Yards looked to Shriver and his half-grin restored a sense of confidence. Then they were on their feet, charging -- Shriver was his old self, running to the sound of guns, a True Believer Yard on either side, all of them dashing through the flying bullets, into the treeline, into the very guts of Mad Dog's great nemesis, COSVN. And Mad Dog Shriver was never seen again. The Fight Continues At the other end of the LZ, Jamison's body lay just a few yards from the crater where Capt. Cahill heard bullets cracking and RPGs rocking the ground. When Cahill lifted his head, an AK round hit him in the mouth, deflected up and destroyed an eye. Badly wounded, he collapsed. In a nearby crater, young Lt. Greg Harrigan directed helicopter gunships whose rockets and mini-guns were the only thing holding off the aggressive NVA. Already, Harrigan reported, more than half his platoon were killed or wounded. For 45 minutes the Green Beret lieutenant kept the enemy at bay, then Harrigan, too, was hit. He died minutes later. Bill O'Rourke tried to land on another helicopter but his bird couldn't penetrate the NVA veil of lead. Lieutenant Colonel Earl Trabue, their CCS Commander, arrived and flew overhead with O'Rourke but they could do little. Hours dragged by. Wounded men laid untreated, exposed in the sun. Several times the Hueys attempted to retrieve them and each time heavy fire drove them off. One door gunner was badly wounded. Finally a passing Australian twin-jet Canberra bomber from No. 2 Squadron at Phan Rang heard their predicament on the emergency radio frequency, ignored the fact it was Cambodia, and dropped a bombload which, O'Rourke reports, "broke the stranglehold those guys were in, and it allowed us to go in." Only 1st Lt. Marcantel was still directing air, and finally he had to bring ordnance so close it wounded himself and his surviving nine Montagnards. One medic ran to Harrigan's hole and attempted to lift his body out but couldn't. "They were pretty well drained physically and emotionally," O'Rourke said. Finally, three Hueys raced in and picked up 15 wounded men. Lieutenant Dan Hall carried out a radio operator, then managed to drag Lt. Harrigan's body to an aircraft. Thus ended the COSVN raid. A Time for Reflection Afterward Chief SOG Cavanaugh talked to survivors and learned, "The fire was so heavy and so intense that even the guys trying to [evade] and move out of the area were being cut down." It seemed almost an ambush. "That really shook them up at MACV, to realize anybody survived that [b-52] strike," Col. Cavanaugh said. The heavy losses especially affected Brig. Gen. Davidson, the MACV J-2, who blamed himself for the catastrophe. "General," Chief SOG Cavanaugh assured him, "if I'd have felt we were going to lose people like that, I wouldn't have put them in there." It's that ambush-like reception despite a B-52 strike that opens the disturbing possibility of treachery and, it turns out, it was more than a mere possibility. One year after the COSVN raid, the NSA twice intercepted enemy messages warning of imminent SOG operations which could only have come from a mole or moles in SOG headquarters. It would only be long after the war that it became clear Hanoi's Trinh Sat had penetrated SOG, inserting at least one high ranking South Vietnamese officer in SOG whose treachery killed untold Americans, including, most likely, the COSVN raiders. Of those raiders, Lt. Walter Marcantel survived his wounds only to die six months later in a parachuting accident at Ft. Devens, Mass., while Capt. Paul Cahill was medically retired. Eventually, Green Beret medic Ernest Jamison's body was recovered. But those lost in the COSVN raid have not been forgotten. Under a beautiful spring sky on Memorial Day, 1993, with American flags waving and an Army Reserve Huey strewing flower petals as it passed low-level, members of Special Forces Association Chapter XX assembled at Lt. Greg Harrigan's grave in Minneapolis, Minn. Before the young lieutenant's family, a Special Forces honor guard placed a green beret at his grave, at last conferring some recognition to the fallen SOG man, a gesture the COSVN raid's high classification had made impossible a quarter-century earlier. Until now, neither Harrigan's family nor the families of the other lost men knew the full story of the top secret COSVN raid. But the story remains incomplete. As in the case of SOG's other MIAs, Hanoi continues to deny any knowledge of Jerry Shriver. Capt. O'Rourke concluded Mad Dog died that day. "I felt very privileged to have been his friend," O'Rourke says, "and when he died I grieved as much as for my younger brother when he was killed. Twenty some-odd years later, it still sticks in my craw that I wasn't there. I wish I had been there." There remains a popular myth among SOG veterans, that any day now Mad Dog Shriver will emerge from the Cambodian jungle as if only ten minutes have gone by, look right and left and holler, "Hey! Where'd everybody go?" Indeed, to those who knew him and fought beside him, Mad Dog will live forever. (This article is derived from Maj. Plaster's book, SOG: The Secret Wars of America's Commandos in Vietnam, published by Simon & Schuster.)

Yes. I also had the pleasure of being at Balad while she was there (although she thankfully never tried to fly with me deployed), then coming home and having to baby sit her as she flew pattern work. Hands down the worst pilot I've ever flown with; low SA, bad hands and a lack of self-confidence coupled with an inability to distinguish between things that matter and things that don't. I won't say she is the worst leader I've experienced, but she is certainly the worst of the leaders at her rank I personally have dealt with. She is destined to be a GO and knows it. She made life miserable at Balad and now is even more empowered at the Died for a year. My sympathies.

Hey Died folks, how do you like your new Ops Group/CC? She made quite an impression here in LR and I've already heard stories of her outlawing hookas and things of that nature. Have fun with that!

I didn't know you were FCF qual'd, didn't you just recently upgrade to IF? You're a fast burner bro. Anyway, good luck with the FCF thing, the last three they tried didn't even make it off the ground. Yikes!

Good call bro, I forgot all about this thread. Well, the course is great, I can't say enough good about the course or the staff. The flying in Arizona is some of the best I have done in my career and definitely the best I have done outside a combat zone. The instructors are great and very knowledgable. Col Westfall was an awesome guy, and they have another dude who is an ex coastie that is also one of their best (name escapes me at the moment). The only part I didnt find particularly useful was their NVG assualt trainer. I think it is a new concept to some of the guard guys in the course (no offense, just my impression from the guys there) and so there is a very basic approach to it. My 2 instructors were WIC guys, and I am not bashing the WIC but they made it much more mathmatical than it needed to be. The LLAT and red air sorties were the best training, you get a good feeling for how aggressive you can be and still be in complete control. I'm talking mainly from a pilots perspective, the hand training was excellent. But it was also great training for the other crew positions. Loads were probably the least challenged in their job as loadmasters (since we really didnt rig anything special) but they called the entire fight with the fighter and the only reason we survived the gun engagement was because my guys really brought their A game. Nav training was also excellent since there are no 10 mile slowdowns. you are dropping on unfamiliar DZs low level at night into rising terrain with minimal route study and only slowing 4 miles prior (and flying the routes faster than you do normally). Again, this course gives you a huge amount of confidence that you can actually aquire the DZ, and if you meet all your parameters and fly well you'll get the drop off in what would seem on paper to be impossible conditions. You need to bring the best in every crew position to the class, one weak engineer slow on TOLD or a load who can't open the ramp and door at 60 knots on the dirt LZ are going to fail your crew. There is much I am leaving out since part of the training is how you handle the suprises they throw at you. The graduation sortie lives up to the hype. Like anything, much is what you make of it. I went with the right attitude and they gave me all I asked for. Some guys there (C-17 crew who was non airdrop and CONUS only) brought the wrong attitude and probably didn't learn much. But the opportunity is there and the instructors genuinly want to make you a better combat aircrew. I have noting but praise.

Well, I know just about everyone will disagree with me but I honestly didn't think the instrument training in corpus was all that great compared to T-1s. I never flew the T-1 so I cannot say for sure, but from my experiences with T-1 grads they seemed to fly a wider variety of instrument approaches and were exposed to more unique approach types. For example, I never flew a high approach in corpus. Corpus focuses more on partial panel instrument operations, meaning they fail your compass card on your ADI but the needle itself still moves; and then you fly the approach using mental orientation and partial instrument input as opposed to having all raw data available (just one example). Here's the catch-- according to the NATOPS it's pretty much impossible for an electrical failure to occur that would actually place you in these types of situations. So the purpose here is not so much realistic training as it is a mental exercise in deriving your location based on non-standard instrumentation. When all is said and done, I think it would have been more valuable for me to have spent time in T-1s flying numerous appraoches at numerous airfields (Corpus keeps you mostly at the same 6-8 airfields) than to have learned an ability to handle a malefunction that doesn't actually happen. Maybe I am wrong, maybe Corpus taught me things I didn't realize I knew about situational awareness and general pilotage skills. But I don't think so, I think in the end the training is less valuable than that recieved by my peers in T-1s. There is also something to be said for switching to the FAR/AIM instead of staying engaged with the 11-217v1 as your primary reference as a student. The navy obviously doesn't use the 11-217 but it is all you will read in the AF (until later in your career when you are comfortable enough with the basics to start independantly expanding your professional reading material). Yes I know the 11-217 is derived from the FARs to an extent, but new students are more confused than they should be about the differences between the two and it's the fault of the system in my opinion. I think the AF would be much better served by having its own squadron at Corpus with only AF instructors using an AF sylabus with 217 and a -1 and AF type pubs. Thats my opinion. I will say Navy EP training is far and away better than the AF.. they actually shut down engines in flight and actually do all EPs and boldface in flight. That gave me personally a much higher degree of confidence in my abilities than any standup in T-37s. On the whole I think there are some advantages to doing joint training this early in your career, but they are not apparent until later. Remember that initail 130 qual has very little instrument training in the course; the net result is guys coming into their ops squadron who have not seriously read the 217 since phase 2. That is a disservice to our comminuty.

My flight had a contest for outrageous dollar ride gifts, and I gave my IP a life size cardboard photocopy of myself wearing nothing but my helmet and boots with a giant novelty dollar bill taped to my dick. It was a horrible idea and even though everyone told me to do it (including my flight/CC when I had cold feet) no one actually laughed when i did. I officially stopped giving in to peer pressure after that embarassment, so I suppose I learned a valuable life lesson. Anyway, my advice is don't try to give the fuinniest or coolest gift. Just give him a dollar and a bottle of booze like everyone else in the history of the AF and don't be the one jackass who tries to be funny and fails (like me). Did I mention my IP was an 0-5?

I have met several 0-6 nav types, one is the current 463AG/CC but he is a terrific guy and we all have a great deal of respect for him. This particular individual at Pope is disliked not because of his rating but because of what a douche he is. Oh, and he only had 1700 hours in the aircraft when he was at Salem... I don't know anyone with more than one assignment who has that few; which tells me he has spent his career doing indoor activities to get promoted and not flying.

Wow, I remember him. That guy made all the aircrew wake up early to pick up trash around the base one day. But that wasen't enough, he made us all wear our flight suits so the rest of the base would know that he made aircrew pick up trash, not just some shoeclerk types. I think most of the trash I picked up was from the first gulf war.

was in the USO at HOU yesterday and was unimpressed. Don't get me wrong, the poeple were great and took good care of their facilities; but for an airport the size of HOU I was suprised at how small the USO was. Basically the size of a one bedroom apartment, although it did have a nice selection of kids books for my 3 year old.

I'm not sure I understand what your post has to do with what I sad. After a long sentence in the dungeon of the sqadron training shop I am well aquainted with the shenanigins of the MPD program. What you may not fully appreciate is that at the Ops squadrons, these guys are not being allowed to fly L seat at all without an IP, even though they are fully qualed to do so. The FPH vs FPQ thing really is not relevant; right now the burden of upgrades falls on us, not the schoolhouse. Most of us are still totally befuddled by the program. But the bottom line is that we aren't saving money, we are just flying less. So what's the point?

I think the term "savings" is a little deceptive for how this program actually works. The "savings" according to AMC is that we no longer need a schoolhouse dedicated to upgrading these guys, right? But instead we take away our local training lines at the Ops level to have dedicated 'AC upgrade lines.' The net effect is less training going on at the unit, because the unit is shouldering the burden of upgrading these guys in addition to our regular training duties. So where is the savings? We still fly the same number of lines since AMC is not providing more tails, and instead of having a schoolhouse where these guys go we have a local line dedicated to them... at the expense of a local line that would have gone to our proficeincy training. I understand that money is saved, but it is saved by not flying our regular flights. So to paraphrase, AMC is saving money by flying less. There is nothing magic about the training program that inherently makes upgrades cheaper, AMC is just throwing this onto the Ops squadrons and telling us that we'll get even less regular training since we now have to give up local sorties for these guys. This whole program is "do more with less" and it's that simple. I was an old school copilot and there are things about the MPD program I like. They do three engine stuff and no-flap and we weren't allowed to. That is an improvement. But the truth is there is no reason at all why they should be in the left seat until it's time to be an AC. At my squadron, these guys can barely keep their L seat landing currency because we don't let them fly L seat without an IP anyway.. so whats the point?

Just thought I would provide an update. I went into Leadville with a herc yesterday and it was pretty badass. I highly reccommend anyone who is off station and looking for a challenging approach to stop in.

thanks for the replies. I'll let you guys know how it went.

Thread revival. I'm attending the day/night course with an H3 in early March and am looking for feedback from crews who have been. I've already been to their website and this is the only thread that came up in the search function (and I assume that when this was written no one had yet attended the exact course I am going to since there is nothing substantial here about it). So, does anyone have any feedback on the new day/night course or any good stories or any clue of what I can expect? Anything in particular I should look over before attending? The schedule says to expect a 3-3 test our first day. One last thing. None of the information I have seen on the website lists a weather backup in Ft. Hauchucha, but weather.com tells me that the ceilings there can drop during these months. So, has anyone had weather problems there? Do they fly any SKE in that case or just cancel the day? Thanks in advance.

Where is my bad logic? The original question was "Two aircraft, one heavier than the other, descending at the same airspeed. Which aircraft will have the greater VVI and why?" The answer to the OP's question is the lighter aircraft will have the higher VVI. Although I could guess, the truth is I don't know why.

In your hypothetical situation, the lighter aircraft will have the higher VVI. Look at penetration decent tab data, you'll find that a 105K C-130 takes less distance to lose the same amount of altitude as a 150K C-130 if they both maintain the same airspeed (250KIAS). The only way to lose equal amounts of altitude at the same speed in different distances is if one aircraft is losing more altitude per unit of time.

Thanks, that was just the kind of information I was looking for. We're taking a slick herc, and it turns out one of the FE's from my squadron has been there before as well, so I think all my questions will be answered.

Leadville, Colorado has the highest field elevation in the United States and the third highest in the world. It sits at 9927' MSL. I am thinking of taking an OST (off station trainer) there in mid march. I am curious if anyone here has been to the airfeild. I tried a search but turned up nothing. The webiste for the airport has some interesting info, but I'm looking for firsthand military experience. Thanks!

I guess I'm to ######ing lazy and stupid then, since about 25% of my travel vouchers on DTS are screwed up for some reason.

DTS is a mess. Has anyone ever had any training on it at your squadron or do you all just figure it out along the way like I do? Right now I am sitting on a 2 month overdue bill for my GTC because the DTS guys won't pay me for a TDY. We spent 24 hours in a hotel in Reno, and they should have charged us for 2 nights. But. being the friendly folk they were at the El Dorado, they decided to only charge us for one night. Now the airmen who approves my DTS TDY won't pay me; why you ask? Well, I only have a reciept for one night in Reno, but my voucher indicates I spent 2 nights there. I tell the guy we were only charged for one night, thus I only have one reciept (although reciept does show i stayed 2 nights). The airmen tells me he cannot process any of my voucher unless I am charged for that night and have a reciept. So now we're in a stalemate, I can't get a reciept for something I wasn't charged for and he can't process my voucher unless I paid for something I didnt pay for. To top it off, he only works 2 hours twice a week for my squadron, so I have to be available in that tiny window of time; which is incidentally when all the staff meetings are scheduled for.

he asked and i think he supports me (but he is new and doesn't really know any of us). he said i should ask again and i probably will since it is what i really want. but i don't know if i will be beating my head against a wall and never allowed to leave. i see guys leave and do other things, so i just don't understand what "not releasable" means. i am asking if that is a blanket statement and if i really try they'll let me go, or if those are magic words that lock me in place. i don't understand the system or the process.

what exactly does AFPC mean when they say I cannot be released? do they mean I can never leave my current airframe, or that right now I can't leave the airframe and i should ask again later? I have another unit that i want to go to and they want me, and despite having 3.5 years time on station, AFPC won't let me go. so i don't know if i should try again, or if this is a permanent thing; anyone else face a similar situation?

wow, that is one of the most absurd things i have ever heard. fake military pictures for folks at the deid? as bad as some of the other spots are in the AOR, i do believe you'd get you ass kicked for doing that around the army.