xcraftllc

The Golden Penguin (Because it looks and flies like a big expensive penguin.) by xcraftllc (Yes I titled my post. I've been writing a lot of essays for school recently. Big whoop, wanna fight about it?) Well, I'm probably earning I reputation for long posts, so I'll try to keep this one (relatively) short. I have no personal fighter experience (I fly Apaches at the moment), but have been following this program ever since I saw Battle of the X-Planes as a kid. I also watched the Comanche program fail miserably. I'm a military aviation enthusiast and am fascinated with fighters. Don't worry though, I'm not going to try to throw in a bunch of fighter jargon and such in a vein effort to sound like I know more than I actually do. So here's my take on it: Original mission of the JSF Program: To solve the problem of fewer fighters and less training due to increased costs from inefficient production methods and complex logistical support, by producing a fighter that uses economy of scale through parts commonality and a simple base design that can be made into different variants to suit the various user's needs. It would also have Supercruise as a standard feature and be operational by 2010. Basically, the JSF Program, as it was originally laid out, is a failure. Producing fewer numbers which will be flown less due to increased costs caused by lack of economy of scale and significant differences between models. It will also not have Supercruise and will likely not be operational until 2016 at the absolute earliest. HOWEVER... This is all we got. And frankly all our allies have if they want to get new planes. I know the Superhornet is a great design, and Europe and Russia have good stuff too, but we are already committed. The western world's R&D/Acquisitions programs are so backward that there is basically no way that we're going to come out with a realistic replacement any time soon. Not to mention the economic impact of cancelling it now would literally be more of a threat to our respective nations' security than anything else. The lasting problem with the F-35 won't be the program failure, many programs have rose out of their own ashes to end up being relatively successful. The problem is that the F-35 absolutely depends on it's technology. It isn't ever intended to have a backup plan if its technology doesn't win the fight. It can't dogfight, and it can't run. Although it's yet to be seen, I doubt it can take much damage and return to the fight quickly either. I don't think we should cancel it, but it certainly won't be getting us all the way through WWIII. We'll need a modern "Mustang" to get us through a war like that. Something relatively simple, reliable, mass-producible, adaptable, and versatile. Until then we need to stick together and learn to love this Golden Penguin. Understand its weaknesses and strengths for what they are and don't lose absolute faith just yet, or we won't be flying anything but drones (don't even get me started on the vulnerability of depending on UAVs). Trust me, if the Army could take the overweight-under-powered Delta model Apache and use it effectively in the mountains of Afghanistan, then the Air Force can find a way to make the F-35 useful. After all, it is kinda stealthy and does come with some really cool gadgets. Hey, the Air Force was even smart enough to put a gun in it this time, unlike the original F-4!

Absolutely. Some very good points there. The AH-56 was a terrible attempt from Lockheed to get into the new and lucrative helicopter business and it failed miserably. It was the first and last helicopter they ever tried to develop and its failure has nothing to do with the A-10. I had heard of that but didn't make mention of it on this thread. I'm not harping on you for posting it, it's good to talk about these events and learn from them (not in great detail on a public thread for OpSec purposes of course). No one can be sure what the circumstances were and any such event is beyond tragic. I'm sure the pilots were mature professionals. Also, stats on which airframe killed what number of friendlies are a rather complex measure to gauge an airframes worth. Especially when the number of airframes, number of missions, and types of CAS missions are considered. That is to say, if less aircraft are used less often in less severe conditions, the number will inherently be less. Just as a C-17 has never been shot down in a dogfight but that's not because it's more survivable than an F-16 in air to air combat, and no F-22s have ever shot down an enemy but that's not because they are less capable than an F-16. Let me stop myself before I go any further because I think we should probably just give this case a few weeks before we start any serious debates on how the airframe factored in.

I hear ya man, I went back through and edit my posts a bit. I doubt that any of it was info that someone couldn't get off of liveleak or wikipedia though. Still a good idea to keep that in mind.

This is going to be a long post but I really need to do some venting after reading that beautifully written and well-articulated piece of some of the finest ignorance I've ever come across in my entire career. I normally keep my personal and emotional opinions out of this forum since its a relatively professional place and is highly public, which can actually turn around and affect ones career, but this guy is way out of line. He is a perfect example of why the Air Force had to split from the Army in 1947. I'm really glad busdriver posted this since it helps to express what its like to be in Army Aviation and be commanded by people like him. Army aviation assets are assigned to the ground force commander and used at his disposal. The only way Army Aviation is a successful organization at all is that it was made into its own branch in 1983, and we can slightly ignore a lot of the specifics giving us enough flex to actually accomplish the mission. There's nothing more frustrating than hearing a ground force commander talking about how well he planned the aviation piece in an operation when in reality, the aviation assets had to basically reinvent it to make it work. In infantry speak, Its like an LT taking credit for a successful plan when his platoon sergeant had to polish the turd that it was in order to make it work. Let me clarify, these men are not idiots nor are new LTs. They are intelligent professionals who do their job well and lead the greatest infantry in the world, but they don't understand aviation any more than they understand the satellites that their GPS devices use. Im not even referring to his end point. If you have the opinion that there are better ways to use the money then fine, but don't be ignorant like that in an official public news article, making all-encompassing statements about various airframes that could not possibly be derived from your perspective. I absolutely agree with HOSS in that I cant believe the Air Force Times published this, at least they stated at the bottom that these are his opinions alone. I guess the Air Force wants to get rid of the A-10 so bad that they don't care where the opinions come from. The AC-130 is a hell of a machine and I'm sure the AF would be wise to convert some C-130s like the Marine Corps did, but suggesting that the AC-130 is the king of CAS is quite a bit of an exaggeration, are you basing this opinion on Call of Duty? You might prefer the Kiowa, but that is literally the first time I've ever heard an infantryman say that. Maybe the people Ive talked to were just trying to be nice to me since I fly Apaches, but there's a reason why that airframe is going away, and if you want loiter time and precision weapons with a lot of ammo and firepower, why are you even defending the Kiowa or any similar program at all? Given that hes also the first infantryman I've heard of who wants to get rid of the A-10, Id say his opinions are rather unique in the infantry in general. As far as bombers are concerned, its great that they can cover down on CAS gaps with JDAMs. I've seen some Bones do some good work but saying that capability justifies cutting the A-10 is very misguided. His statements toward the end about how the Air Force should divest JTACs and how he would take artillery over CAS any day if there was an enemy artillery threat present pretty much ended what was left of my consideration for any of his opinions. Having said all of that I really hope no one gets the idea that I'm some sort of rebellious, insubordinate, disrespectful dickhead who has no respect for leadership or infantry. This guy just doesn't know what hes talking about and makes the Army look bad. For example, while this forum isn't as official as a news article, I still didn't title it something all-encompassing like "The Air Force Needs To Get Rid of the B-1" because despite my experience I can't alone know something like that for sure.

Ok so now I guess nobody knows what's going on: https://www.stripes.com/news/us/a-10-supporters-rebuffed-in-defense-spending-legislation-1.286650

Whoops, sorry man, I meant to give you a positive feedback on that one but I was on a bouncy bus and hit the negative button, anyway to change it that you know of?

It's interesting that you mention the ARH, yet another example of how broken the R&D/Acquisition system is. Almost as ugly as the Comanche program. It seems to be a problem that has spanned all services too.

So I hear the 2014 almanac is out. I don't see it on the website but apparently it's on the newsstand. Posted from the NEW Baseops.net App!

A long read but an interesting one. I can't believe how I overlooked the desire and therefore political influence that Lockheed has on the elimination of the A-10. Oddly enough that also most likely means that Vipers are safe. Lockheed would only like to see the Hawg go since they have no investment in it, whereas they now run the Viper program. The "Snowball" or "Spiral" effect of economies of scale is the scariest part of the F-35 program and is why I say we just have to suck it up and learn to love that thing. The program is reaching the lower end of its critical mass in that if we can't commit to the 2443 we said we would buy, then other buyers won't be able to afford it and so on and next thing we know we have even less of an Air Force than we already do. You know I appreciate the input from all the people who commented on this thread. There were definitely some very valid points made about how valuable the Bone is. I think we can all agree that the real problem and question isn't which airframe should we cut, but rather that the political and bureaucratic forces at work can only offer that as a solution. Having said that if it comes down to it, I still believe the B-1 would be a better cut, especially if the next gen bomber program can be kept alive. Then there would be a true replacement for the B-1 that would be easier to justify with the Bone already gone, along with the other factors I mentioned earlier.

Yep, as well as a host of other problems that arise from having aircraft assigned to a ground commander who really doesn't understand them, similar to the issues that caused the creation of the Air Force in the first place.

Lol, and that pic is of Israeli Apaches. U.S. Apaches also support the use of aux tanks although they haven't been used in a while, I just came across that pic first. It's not a very practical system when used like that. The old ones are also not ballistic, the new ones are but they hold less fuel. Single Aux tanks were used in desert storm before the internal "Robby" tank was created. They were dangerous though and had to be jettisoned at the first sign of enemy. I think everyone would agree that it's better to use A-10s for long range stuff if available.

Or if you're really an unlucky Army Aviator, they'll get some external aux tanks for your Apaches and fat cow a bunch of chinooks with internal aux tanks in to a remote field site to set up tents and pull your own security.... Bottom line is there are ways to do it but having long range and relatively quick FW assets to help cover down is a much better way to go. https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/94/Flickr_-_Israel_Defense_Forces_-_Apache_Helicopters_Overlooking_Greece.jpg https://rdl.train.army.mil/catalog/view/100.ATSC/BE9C0DC8-3EB5-4582-9729-8AFD1876340C-1331137175881/image017.jpg

It's funny reading some of these posts that mention the Army's "requests" as far as CAS is concerned. Most people know that the Army actually tried to acquire the A-10 the last two times the Air Force seriously considered getting rid of it. The only reason it's not now is that it already lost that fight twice and there's no way the Army can afford it in the sequester. It is already having to get rid of the entire Kiowa fleet. If you wanna know what the Army is thinking about regarding loss of the A-10, let's just say there's a reason why dispite the sequester, the entire fleet of 690 Apaches is being moved to active duty and upgraded to the E model standard. Well, there are actually many reasons but among them is the realization that without a good replacement for the A-10 in the immediate future, the Army is currently in the process of ensuring that it will not to have to depend on the Air Force for CAS. With that said I do believe, like some people are saying on this thread, that despite its shortcomings, we are better off learning to love the F-35 than we are fighting. That's it man, it's all we got. The only thing I disagree with is having to remove airframes to get it. It's going to arrive either way. If the AF is going to retain it's fighting ability in the mean time, it's is going to be by doing what porkchop said with airframe life extension and upgrades.

https://theaviationist.com/2014/05/01/a-10-mud-lake-pix/

Lawman has some seriously valid points here. This is why in my earlier post I said that although I believe the original mission of the JSF program has been a failure, cutting it is a completely different argument. It is seriously all we have now, and the economic fallout of cutting it would be devastating. The R&D process in this country is so broken that it will literally be until WWIII until it's fixed, and we are already facing an airframe lifespan and technology gap in the near future. It would be nice to think that we could develop and release another alternative in time but we can't, so the F-35 is going to be something we're going to have to learn to love for the time being. The F-4 was kindofva crappy jet too really, but the pilots and commanders learned to live with it and it ended up being a successful program (in a relative sense). Also like lawman was saying, if you're trying to think about things from the ground force commander's perspective, you need to understand that those guys know absolutely nothing about aviation. Just be glad you're in the Air Force and don't have to be commanded by them!

I know man, I was just throwing out names I heard from stories about the Fighter Mafia, I'm not saying anyone alone has the right ideas to solve everything. At the same time, a camel is a horse drawn by committee, and when you have as many hands on the drawing board as we do for the F-35, many of them politicians and each with their own objectives in mind, you are almost destined for failure. I guess the 10, 15, 16, and 18 turned out so well that one can't help but wonder what the hell happened to the R&D process. I mean hell even on the Army side, most of our workhorses were designed around the same time.

Geez I really opened up a can of worms with this one! Well I suppose my original question has been answered in the form of: "it's complicated". I suppose this thread was doomed to end up taking the same path as the massive sequester thread which could be compiled into a book at this point! I wanted to leave stuff like the F-35 and ObamaCare out of the argument but I guess it's all a giant pool of inter-related issues. The good old days of the Fighter Mafia are long gone. It seems that we are destined to learn our lesson the hard way again until a new generation of John Boyds and Pierre Spreys rise out of the mess to try to save it. I suppose the problem isn't whether to cut the A-10 or B-1 but rather that we are having to choose to cut one at all. Since the thread has already departed its original course, I suppose I can throw in a quick 2 cents on the F-35. To say it's a failure or should be cancelled is an entirely separate argument, but I do believe that Lockheed and our leadership failed the original JSF mission: To solve the problem of fewer fighters, fewer training hours, and rising costs by making an affordable and efficient aircraft that is made more cost effective through parts commonality and mass production. As we know it now, the F-35 will be more expensive, consist of fewer aircraft, and fewer training hours due to it's higher operating costs, significant parts differences, and lower production rates (~3000 compared to the F-16s ~4500+). We need to get our $*** together.

I suppose the only real solution here is to get our economic S*** together as a nation. Pawnman, I think you said it best on the sequester thread: It just sucks that indiscriminate slashing across the board seems to be the only option the politicians put on the table. Nevertheless, you see things like this going on (to save fellow users the time, basically the Army told congress they can save a ton of money by not funding the tank programs that they don't need, but Congress said too bad you're buying them so cut funds from other departments!): https://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/10/09/army-to-congress-thanks-but-no-tanks/

Alright, I know I'm about to offend some very respectable people here, and I'm sure there's much more to it than someone in my position could possibly know, but this has been bugging me for a while. As seen in articles like this one: https://www.airforcem...-the-Table.aspx, the AF considered divesting either the B-1 or the A-10. My question to all the Strategic-Level gurus is: If they could save just as much money by cutting the fleet of B-1s, then why would they ever consider cutting the A-10? Here's the reasoning from my perspective, (an Apache pilot who has worked with F-15Es, Vipers, A-10s, and B-1s on real missions in Afghanistan): The B-1 is an awesome aircraft, it really is, capable of long flights, long station time, and a huge payload. However, it is very expensive and extremely mission-limited. Fitting the bill for a "Single-Role Aircraft" as the AF bean-counters like to say (although I know that term is basically meaningless). It is a long-range strategic bomber designed to put bombs deep in the heart of Soviet Russia, and although it technically can perform some semblance of "CAS", helping to fill gaps in coverage, it is certainly no true CAS aircraft by any measure. In fact, even in it's primary role as long-range bomber, nearly any other bomber, fighter, or attack jet in the fleet can perform that role, granted not quite as fast and maybe with a couple more tanker-hits. On the other hand, the A-10 is literally the only attack jet in the entire AF, although Strike Eagles and F-16s can cover down on CAS as needed, they are not true dedicated CAS platforms (for the sake of expediency I will not be mentioning anything about the F-35). This mission is the bread and butter of the AF once Air Supremacy has been established, which is typically in the early portion of a war. The A-10 has proven invaluable in this regard time and time again. Together with true multi-role fighters like the highly cost-effective and general-purpose F-16, the AF becomes a very valuable branch to everyone. One final argument, the A-10 has a huge community consisting of many highly cost-effective guard units, and around 1000 pilots (I assume based on a fleet of around 400 A-10s). The B-1 is a very expensive aircraft to operate, and has a community of only around 400 pilots (I'm assuming based on a 2 man crew and 66 aircraft). Wouldn't it be far easier to ask 400 bomber pilots if they want to fly fighters than it would to displace 1000 happy A-10 pilots and a host of very proud and patriotic guard units? Again, I am just asking, I don't think I know everything. It just seems odd. My advice to the community of A-10 supporters would be to suggest divesting the B-1 fleet entirely and stick to that strategy as it may be the only good one that the AF would execute. Maybe put a handful in "type 1000" storage or some other form of preservation in case Russia becomes the primary focus and we actually have the budget and need for them. Also, keep in mind that one of the other ideas that the AF had was cutting 350 F-16s! Literally, (and I don't think anyone would argue otherwise) the absolute worst idea I have ever heard of throughout the entire sequestration, from a financial and strategic perspective: https://www.airforcetimes.com/article/20140318/NEWS/303180067/B-1B-F-16s-could-next-Congress-blocks-Air-Force-plan-retire-10, a decision that would literally be the exact opposite of the reasoning the AF has used to cut the A-10. I think cutting the B-1 would be the lowest collateral-damage decision the AF could make at this time. Anyway, please don't send me hate-mail, I'm not actively trying to get rid of the B-1 in my spare time. Just wondering, that's all.

Just stay away from the downtown and 4th Street bars lol. If you want to get a casino feel and not have to go all the way downtown, just go to the Atlantis and check out the sushi bar in the over-street bridge section (the Sky Terrace). Hell just take the free shuttle that goes from the airport and back too, then you can just walk over to the ANG https://www.atlantiscasino.com/resort/atlantis-airport-shuttle. They might even be able to hook you up with a decent room for cheap if you ask if they have any deals at the time, try mentioning that you're applying for the ANG, who knows, the receptionist might be sympathetic. Better yet, just ask the guys in the unit if they have any ideas. Reno's relatively small.

Thanks for looking into that and confirming it.

In short, my advice is to inquire about the regulation they are using and look into the regs yourself. Also ask around like you're doing now, don't be discouraged. I have also spoken with both ANG and Reserve recruiters and have so far not heard of anything like a one-year DQ. That might be some weird local SOP of the recruiting unit you spoke with, or a misinterpretation of something else. (or I hate to say it but like Saint said, also possibly totally false) The first recruiter I spoke with told me that I had to be within one year of my ASDO (I'm currently in the Army) to even begin working with them or get a DD 368 (conditional release) signed by them. He even referenced Title 10. I emailed some of my Army personnel managers that work in separations and transfers, and I got a pretty clear email back stating a process that I could use and didn't mention anything about having to be one year out. I also checked the regs and there was nothing of the sort. When I spoke with another recruiter, they were immediately helpful and supplied me with a signed DD Form 368 which is now prepared and awaiting a good time to be submitted to the approval authority. I asked around and was told that the first recruiter was probably going by their local policy, guidance, or simply didn't know how it worked.

ROFL, yeah it was an ancient photobucket account so it has a couple jokes in there from Rucker flight school or something. Weird how it showed other photos, that's the last time I trust the "Direct Link" feature, especially for a more professionally oriented forum such as this! When I tested the link from the post after I logged out of photobucket, it went direct to only that one screen capture on a blank webpage. Whatever, does anyone know why the image tool doesn't allow you to use photobucket URL inserts? Yeah, I edited the original post without the link now. I suppose I'll keep it simple next time. Let us know if you hear back from Robert.

I think if anyone did, it would show a high number since few are ever sent up unless the unit basically knows it's a situation that would be approved. If you look at the regulation, it's pretty clear. I'd imagine that most Guard commanders know when they have a workable situation. The keys being "exceptionally qualified" and "minor deviation" that meets the Air Forces needs etc. I suppose the long and short of it is, it never hurts to ask about it, and generally, if the unit is willing to push for it, they will probably get. AFI 36-2205: A2.3. If a member exceeds the age and/or TFCSD limits and does not meet the above criteria to be considered for a waiver, he or she may request an exception to policy (ETP) through their MAJCOM or ANG chain of command as directed in A2.3. Age and TFCSD limits exist to protect the interests of the total rated force and should not be taken lightly. Exceptions to policy will normally be granted only in rare circumstances when a commander can document sustained, exceptional performance and the deviation from policy is minor. Further, commanders must specifically and explicitly justify why supporting an ETP for an individual, considering a large pool of fully qualified applicants, is in the best interests of the Air Force, Air National Guard, or Air Force Reserve. Each ETP imposes potential increased risk to operational safety and effectiveness. Only the rare, truly exceptional individual should be endorsed and forwarded through the chain of command for ETP consideration. A2.3.1. ETP requests judged by the Wing/CC (or equivalent) or TAG for Air National Guard, to have insufficient support or merit should be denied and returned to the applicant. Basically, if you have really high scores and very applicable experience, the deviation is "minor," and the unit really wants you, then you'll be fine.

It was from one of the recruiters on the 155th website: TSgt Amanda Flanagan amanda.flanagan@ ang.af.mil (608) 245-4657