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Cite one source that Rove ever attended an NSC meeting. My understanding is that he was never permitted to attend. Access = power. This is court politics signaling that Bannon has more power than someone like Coats as DNI or Dunford as CJCS, which many people find very troubling. A permanent seat at the PC table is way different than occasional attendance to broader NSC meetings when the President seems it appropriate. Also Rahm was the Chief of Staff, like Reince, and has a far different role than the political strategists. Let's talk apples to apples here.

Dudes, there's a huge difference between a reporter getting something wrong and some guy just making shit up to get clicks. The paper posts a correction and updates the article plus admits mistakes. Fair enough. Should have got it right the first time and verified sources better. Romanian guy writes that Trump is eating little children's hearts for breakfast at the White House. Unrepentant and will even tell you directly that he just made everything up to get ad dollars from clicks. One of those is fake news and the other is the normal ups and downs of journalism. Or it's all the same, morally equivalent. https://www.google.com/amp/insider.foxnews.com/amp/article/54120 Kind of like Putin is a killer...there are a lot of killers or there. Are we so innocent? Y'all know you would have completely lost your GD minds if Obama had said that, regardless if there's a kernel of truth to it.

This story highlights exactly why you don't want high level political figures (like Bannon) involved in national security decisions. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/josh-rogin/wp/2017/02/04/the-white-house-cabinet-battle-over-trumps-immigration-ban/?postshare=7731486222921115&tid=ss_tw&utm_term=.b20f15d565f1 Good on Sec. Kelly for refusing Bannon's "orders" and using the chain of command (i.e. POTUS). Kelly, Mattis, Tillerson, CJCS, are in the chain of command for their various agencies and departments and all report to the President - Bannon or anyone like him is distinctly not in that chain. Re: Rhodes...call him unqualified if you want, but his portfolio was NATSEC issues based on his role as Deputy National Security Advisor. President Trunp has several of those in his admin and they are all appropriate attendees to NSC meetings and that decision-making process. Not as principals (that would be Flynn), but I'm sure they're in the room and they should be. Unless the President wants to dual-hat Bannon as the National Security Advisor, he has no place on the PC. Unless he's also a deputy NSA or NSC staffer of some kind on top of his role as chief strategist, he shouldn't even be in the room, let alone trying to tell the DHS Secretary what to do. In my opinion, W did this right based on accounts of the process he ran. He had his political folks and his NATSEC folks and they had a bright, clear line between those two portfolios. He, as the President, sat in the middle and over everything and alone or with the VP made the appropriate decisions on if and when politics played a role in national security decision making and vice versa. Now, I think Bush made lots of foreign policy mistakes, but FFS they at least ran the interagency process in a logical, deliberate manner and respected and upheld the institutions that exist solely to help the President succeed.

Ben Rhodes was the Deputy National Security Advisor.

On a serious note, if you don't understand why experts in national security would be loudly sounding the alarms about something that on the surface doesn't seem like a big deal, maybe you should read up on it. Agree or disagree afterwards, but if you want to understand the info is out there. The source I linked to (lawfare) and the article I copied in full is an excellent summary of the criticism.

It's a big, beautiful wall, it's true, believe me. I wanna keep all the bad hombres out of the NSC. And you know who's gonna pay for that wall of text? Mexico!

As a follow-up to the discussion on Bannon and the NSC reorganization, this is a worthwhile read. Author bio: Michael J. Gottlieb is a partner in the Washington, D.C. office of Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP, and a Term Member on the Council for Foreign Relations. He served as Associate White House Counsel for President Obama from 2009-2010, and 2011-2013, and the Deputy Director of Combined Joint Interagency Task Force 435 in Kabul, Afghanistan, from 2010-2011. Earlier in his career, he served as a federal prosecutor, a Senate Judiciary Committee staffer, and as a law clerk for Justice John Paul Stevens on the U.S. Supreme Court. "In 2012, I witnessed a scene that has been on my mind this week: then-Deputy National Security Advisor Denis McDonough reprimanded a less experienced staffer for merely referencing the ongoing reelection campaign during a mid-level NSC policy meeting. Why? Because, he said, “politics have no place in the Situation Room.” We face a different question today: should the President’s chief political strategist play not merely a glancing role but an active and sustained role in the national security policy-making processes overseen by the National Security Council (“NSC”)? Until earlier this week, no administration of either political party had answered that question in the affirmative, largely because the NSC is regularly called upon to address life or death issues that transcend momentary news cycles or opinion polls. President Trump’s January 28, 2017 reorganization of the NSC, via National Security Presidential Memorandum 2, casts aside that norm by elevating Chief White House “Strategist” Steven Bannon to a permanent role as an attendee at all NSC meetings, and as a regular attendee at all Principals Committee (“PC”) meetings. Separate from the concerns that some have expressed regarding Bannon’s ideology or his qualifications to serve in his new role, the decision to install the White House’s chief political strategist as a key decision maker within the NSC policy process is an ill-conceived decision that threatens to politicize the NSC policy-making process from top to bottom. The President has broad discretion to select his advisors and structure his staff in the manner best suited to his management style. The NSC, however, is unlike other parts of the Executive Office of the President; it is a creature of statute, with statutorily-prescribed membership requirements, and has a specific mission that is enshrined in federal law. Congress established the NSC via the National Security Act of 1947, which provides that the purpose of the Council is “to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving national security.” Administrations from Truman to Obama have structured their NSC staffs and policy-making processes differently, but one constant aspect of the NSC throughout its history has been the existence of a process structured to provide the President with the best military, intelligence, and foreign policy advice on matters of national security. To provide the President with the best advice of the federal government on complex issues of national security, which often involve the interests and expertise of more than one agency, the NSC manages a multi-tiered policy process that is designed to narrow the issues necessary for decision by the President, consider the views of all federal agencies with interests in a given issue, and, where possible, achieve interagency consensus. The Principals Committee, in particular, was designed to serve as the “senior interagency forum for consideration of policy issues affecting national security.” Its function is to assemble all of the views of the interagency, and to distill what are often divergent positions into coherent recommendations on which the President may choose to act. At times, these policy discussions are dense and plodding; at other times, they involve life-or-death decisions regarding foreign military operations. But regardless of the issue at hand, the goal of the process is to provide the President with the best advice of his available options from his military, intelligence, and foreign policy professionals. The professional advice that results from the NSC policy process has never been, and can never be, perfectly insulated from politics, but it is designed to be as free from political influence as possible. President George W. Bush reportedly instructed Karl Rove not to attend any NSC meetings, for fear that his presence would suggest that life or death decisions were being made based upon politics. The argument that President Obama took similar action to Trump’s order by allowing his chief political advisor, David Axelrod, to observe a limited number of NSC meetings is frivolous; there is a difference in both degree and kind between observing, by invitation, a limited number of NSC meetings from the back bench, on the one hand, and being a decision-maker in all PC meetings, on the other. The law does not require the NSC to follow a strictly non-political process, but that approach is unquestionably desirable as a matter of policy for at least three reasons: First, better advice yields better decisions, and political considerations will erode the quality of advice the President receives from his national security professionals. The President deserves to know whether an emerging issue constitutes a genuine threat, and how that threat (if it exists) can or cannot be adequately addressed or mitigated. Whether a terrorist organization intends to launch an attack against the United States is a factual assessment with political implications—and while the President is entitled to consider those political implications, his understanding of the likelihood of an attack should not be polluted by the political fallout that such an assessment may cause. To take another example, consider the President’s view, which he frequently stated on the campaign trail, that the United States should have seized Iraq’s oil after toppling Saddam Hussein’s regime. Were he to consider such an action now, his decision would undoubtedly be better informed were he first to receive the military’s best advice regarding the efficacy and consequences of such action separate from the political considerations associated with adhering to his campaign rhetoric. In sum, the President will have better information from which to assess threats and fashion responses if he receives unfiltered national security advice. Second, an independent national security policy process protects the President. A process in which agency “equities” are debated and weighed is one that is more likely to produce consensus and reduce internal dissent than one in which the merits are subordinated to political calculations from the start. National security professionals do not expect that their views will always carry the day with political leadership, but they do expect at least to have their views considered. If that does not happen, destructive infighting and leaks will be more likely, and the President will become more vulnerable to charges that he risked (or lost) American lives for political gain. Third, separating politics from national security policy protects the NSC staff, which is comprised largely of career military, intelligence, and diplomatic professionals who are on loan from the interagency. Those professionals have dedicated their lives to serving their country, and they deserve to know that their expertise is valued, that their advice is considered on the merits, and that their expertise is not being used to promote a political agenda. Injecting politics into the NSC process will inevitably reduce staff morale, lead to unnecessary turnover, and produce a less capable and effective workforce. All this brings us back to National Security Presidential Memorandum 2, which risks all of the dangers described above by simultaneously inserting the White House’s chief political strategist into a central role in the NSC process and demoting the roles of the Director of National Intelligence (“DNI”) and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Specifically, the Memorandum enshrines Bannon with a permanent decision-making role at every PC meeting, and invites Bannon to be present at every NSC meeting; meanwhile, the DNI and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs have been demoted from their roles as “regular members” of the PC and instead will attend only “where issues pertaining to their responsibilities and expertise are to be discussed.” In light of the fact that the PC is the “senior interagency forum for consideration of policy issues affecting national security,” the Memorandum sends an ominous message. Namely, by granting his chief political strategist a permanent seat at the table, but making the DNI and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs invitation-only participants, President Trump has declared that his political strategist has more important “responsibilities and expertise” over the “policy issues affecting national security” than the DNI or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. That prioritization is absurd – nearly all PC meetings do raise issues that intersect, in one way or another, with the responsibilities and expertise of the DNI, who speaks for the intelligence community, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, who speaks for the uniformed military. The same cannot be said for the President’s chief political strategist, whose only arguable institutional interests (the President and the White House) are already represented within both the PC and NSC processes. Some have criticized the Memorandum on the basis of Bannon’s qualifications to serve in his newfound role. But whether Bannon’s service in the Navy somehow qualifies him to make complex foreign policy decisions is something of a distraction—the more salient point is that the hat Bannon wears in this White House should make his participation in the NSC process inappropriate. The President has already raised more than $7 million for his 2020 reelection bid, and has filed an official statement of his 2020 candidacy with the Federal Election Commission. Bannon will likely be the point person for that reelection bid, and reportedly has already begun to focus on the 2018 midterms. It is inconceivable that Bannon can participate in the NSC policy-making process without inserting his political and communications views into assessments of emerging threats, diplomatic disputes, or military options. If Bannon’s political views change the outcomes of PC meetings even modestly, the President and the country will less safe, and public faith in our national security professionals will be further undermined. The President is, of course, entitled to have his political strategist advise him regarding any action he is asked to consider. The problem with the structure President Trump has adopted is not that his chief strategist plays an important role in his decision-making process – rather, the problem is where Bannon has been placed in that process. Bannon’s permanent seat on the PC will make it difficult for the interagency to offer its best military, intelligence, and foreign policy advice to the President, while simultaneously undermining the role of the National Security and Homeland Security Advisors. The theoretical risks described above are magnified by Bannon’s hard-edged political and ideological predispositions, his penchant for crediting and promoting conspiracy theories, and the joy he appears to derive from advancing provocative anti-establishment arguments and rhetoric. All of this is fundamentally incompatible with the order and stability the NSC process is designed to promote. The breakdown of that process will, sadly, leave us all less safe."

The reason this is news is because it's a pretty significant break from all past administrations. As I said before, access = power in DC, and proximity to the President is key no matter what your title on paper says. Removing the permanent invites of the CJCS and DNI indicates that their status and access is below that of those NSC members who retain (or gain) permanent invites. It may seem like a lot of inside baseball "court politics," but it's relevant to how decisions get made. Bannon, as chief strategist to the President, already has a TON of access, including a West Wing office. Now giving him even more status in and access to the NATSEC decision-making process is in essence further increasing his already significant power and influence. My strong misgivings about Bannon as an individual aside, the President should have a chief political person close to him. W had Rove, Obama had Axelrod, etc. Trump can have Bannon if that's who he wants. But very directly mixing politics with national security at the NSC Principals level is something I would have thought most military folks would be uncomfortable with. When Presidents have even tangentially involved their more politically-oriented staff in NATSEC decisions in the past, there was strong push-back from the standing NSC principals. So maybe this is NBD and Bannon will provide insightful and sage advice as a member of the NSC PC. The President apparently wants him sitting there day-in and day-out so let's all hope so. Needless to say I'm not holding my breath...

What business exactly would the NSC undertake that does not involve the DNI or military? I would challenge anyone to devise a reason to convene the NSC yet does not involve the collection or analyzing of intelligence not involve military action/presence/resources/expertise. To me, the DNI and CJCS along with the SECDEF, National Security Advisor and Secretary of State are so obviously the key players that I'm surprised anyone would even make an argument otherwise. Tweaking the format or frequency or whatever of a meeting, NBD. Removing the permanent invitation from two key players (and access = power in DC) while giving that very invite to a political operative with extremely questionable NATSEC expertise is very troubling. Also, what's your source for Valerie Jarrett sitting in on NSC meetings, let alone receiving a standing invite? I searched the interwebs briefly and could not even find that on a single politically-motivated "news" site, let alone from legitimate fact-based source. Gates apparently blew his lid when Obama had his press secretary Gibbs sit in on a couple specific NSC meetings. I did not find any evidence that Jarrett ever attended. Karl Rove did not ever to my knowledge attend NSC meetings under W. Bush.

Well my in-laws are making ends meet because of social security, so that's directly benefiting them as well as me. Were it not for that check, based on my father in law's 30+ year career at a steel mill that went bankrupt and severely reduced his pension, they'd probably be living with us. So thank you to FDR and Uncle Sam for that. Re: TSP advice, you receive no match as a mil member unless you opt in to the new retirement plan. If that is the case, then absolutely save, at MINIMUM, the amount that will afford you the max employer match. Like the card says, 20% (or higher) of total pre-tax pay is an even better goal, and one I live by. Re: safety net - yep, I strongly support smartly run government programs that provide a safety net for citizens who fall on hard times. This is a widely popular position to have. Saying it's every man for himself sounds pretty noble until life kicks you or someone you love square in the dick.

The field of behavioral economics was kind of born out of the observation that a lot of decisions were being made in the real world that don't match up with the rational-actor model that "standard" or rational economics theory would predict. The goal is to find out some of the psychological and other factors that cause people to essentially act irrationally. Lots of cross-over applications in public policy, politics, marketing, etc., any field that deals with humans making choices essentially. I've found it really interesting and applaud programs by companies or governments that try to leverage the lessons learned from behavioral economics to help nudge people into making better decisions.

IMHO this covers about 69% of what most people would ever need to know: I also enjoyed Predictably Irrational by Professor Dan Ariely. I'm a big fan of behavioral economics vs rational economics...the former seems to explain the real world much better.

Valid.

Exactly. Debt is not bad so long as your downside is covered and the expected upside is higher than the known costs, factoring in your risk tolerance.

FWIW I play a small role in the U-28 pipeline and they have new pilots and CSOs going through initial qual training every single month and have for years (i.e. this is steady-state ops). What the community actually requires to sustain or improve manning levels, I'm not really read-in to that anymore, but every new ass in the seat means potentially one senior captain or major on the other end gets released to school/staff/cross-training/broadening. BL: I see new copilots going through initial qual every month, so they should be dropping one or two from the UPT bases on a regular basis...if not every drop than every other drop I would imagine.

Why do you say this? Given that I could invest in the 99.9% safe TSP G-fund and come out ahead, it seems like this particular deal makes a lot of sense. On top of that, $4K isn't really a life-threatening chunk of change to risk even if I thought there was much risk. Also businesses regularly borrow to invest. Landlords borrow to purchase rental properties, hell, regular homeowners borrow in part to live and for many people in part to also invest in real estate. BL: Can you expand your thinking beyond the platitude level? Genuinely curious.

Yep, good point to make. I already have life insurance with them so not a factor for me personally, but definitely something to keep in mind if you don't. Adding in that insurance premium to your payment makes the effective interest rate 8.3% on the loan, although obviously the insurance is worth more than nothing if that's something you need more of. Their term 1 is cheaper than SGLI FWIW and can also be had in addition to SGLI.

On-topic, has anyone taken out a CAP loan from AAFMAA? $4K, 1.5% interest, no other fees. Seems like that's a ripe opportunity to take the loan, invest the $4K, and reap the benefits since all of my current investments are doing much better than 1.5%. Hell, even the TSP G-fund (i.e. almost completely safe) has returned higher than 1.5% recently. Only available to O-3 and below on the O-side, NCOs only on the E-side. Any downside I'm not seeing?

Good on them for trying to own it. Hope the gains continue and administration ownership of the economy continues regardless of the outcome. FYI the DJIA under Obama: +148.2% That's an average of a 0.35625% gain per week over the course of 416 weeks in Obama's 8 years in the seat. President Trump is above that average so far closing in on Week 1 in office (+0.78% and counting), and honestly, good luck to him. I would like to see those overall economic gains delivered to mainstreet as well as wall street (i.e. job growth, wage growth, etc.). https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-dows-biggest-surge-came-under-this-president-2017-01-23 Not that any President really has much control over the stock market, but if you're gonna bear the blame might as well take the credit too right?

Checks with what I recently went through in the Guard. Apparently the Guard (maybe all of the ARC?) recently adopted the same blanket age waiver that AD uses. 35 for RPA pilots approved across the board, at least that's my understanding.

Brookings is always a good source: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/01/23/seven-trump-foreign-policy-assumptions/

Is it a 365 or something? As stated above, terminal is not a right but an allowance that your commander doesn't necessarily have to approve, especially over 60 days. I can only speak to my experience, where I deployed and upon returning home, outprocessed and started terminal leave 7 business days later. Somewhat different situation in that I wasn't looking to get out of the deployment, but it also didn't appear optional even if I had been trying to do so. No min time to outprocess was discussed or considered - the deployment was a go and on the back end I was determined to get out of dodge ASAP. I did end up losing a handful of days of leave, and even lost an appeal on the grounds that "special leave accrual only applies if your deployment crosses fiscal years." That to me was a head scratcher based on a literal/logical reading of what the regs say, but what do I know, I'm just some random captain flying the line... Water under the bridge...I got out and moved somewhere awesome and actually now have the job I would have stayed on AD to do, but in a great unit in the Guard. Good luck to you sir, may the odds ever be in your favor!

New basong announcements for several airframes here, but notably there will be an active duty MCE at Shaw AFB, SC startig in FY18. Fingers explains explicitly that the decision was made to improve QOL and increase leadership and rotation opportunities. Never been to Shaw myself but seems like an upgrade from the two options available now! https://www.airforcetimes.com/articles/more-bases-named-to-host-f-35-k-46-and-mq-9-operations?utm_content=buffer942fd&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook.com&utm_campaign=buffer

He's retired from AD, now a fed civilian I believe. Thus, griping about benefit cuts to fed civilians who are veterans but still glad to have tricare from his AD days. That check @Prosuper?