jice

Except for lend lease (‘41), tax incentives for companies producing war goods (‘39,) a peacetime draft (‘40), a government reorganization to facilitate a war footing (‘39), civilian pilot training program (‘39), embargoes against Japan (‘40), freezing Japanese assets (‘41), training Brit pilots in Texas (‘41)… the list goes on and on.

Similar experience recently. Recommended steps after that experience: 1) Submit claim with the TSP. They are required to pay full replacement value for a “like item.” Their definition of “like item” will be ridiculous most of the time (Nice mitre saw is “like” Fisher Price’s baby’s first mitre saw). 2) Refuse initial low-ball offer, attempt to demonstrate the difference in like items and remind them of FRV obligation. Submit counter-offer. 2b) If you’ve got a lawyer friend willing to write a letter explaining the above, that might help them understand. 3) They’ll likely double down on stupidity. Submit claim through base legal. You’ll immediately be paid a depreciated value of the item. Then! The government will attempt to recoup the DV AND the difference in DV vs FRV. If they do, you’ll get a check for the difference. 4) Once the TSP gets a letter from a lawyer from the federal government telling them they’re about to be sued, they’ll likely cough up the FRV. “Go away” money is way less expensive than defending a stupid position.

Mods, any chance of moving the “money isn’t real” discussion to its own thread? I’d like to ask Random Guy what happens if a bank creates money out of thin air to buy a bird (obviously not real) that flies towards the edge of the flat earth… I think it might derail the Ukraine discussion, though.

I mean the people telling you that haven’t read a plan and need to retire. Go talk to an any-service human in a Joint 5, and you’ll walk away with plenty of problems for AFSOC to solve.

The “maintain relevance” words should make the hair on the back of necks stand up when folks hear it in their organizations. Seen it in at least two communities as they entered a death spiral. If your advantages are not self-evident to people within the org, you’ve lost the ball years ago and failed to recognize it. At that point, it’s time to reset entirely; square one mission analysis to determine whether comparative advantages still exist and finding greener pastures for most of the leaders representing the majority ‘generational’ demographic.

You’re not asking the right people outside of AFSOC.

Sadly, we all know the answer to this one: The Democratic and Republican Party!.. but better. No, really; they’re totally gonna turn it around this time. It’s time to get serious about ranked choice voting and open primaries.

🥃

This. For two reasons. 1) Somebody who has never been in the fast jet business doesn’t natively understand the risks in fast jet administrative or tactical flying. 2) At some point as a theoretically ideal (but resource constrained) readiness posture approaches imminent conflict, the administrative and tactical curves cross. Ex: If war is going to happen tomorrow and I’m expecting double digit attrition by the enemy in each pulse, the smart put is on tactical tasks rather than administrative tasks. If I can save 10% of my force through weight of effort on tactical training while sacrificing 2% to administrative risks, I come out ahead… that varies across fleets, roles, locations, etc. etc. etc. Unfortunately, we’ve not actually had that level of thought about risk in our pilot training or operational training enterprise. We tend to live on the “your mission is my motherhood” (who touched you in the motherhood, @hindsight2020? [good natured ribbing intended]) or “admin is assumed, the tactics will save you” camps, per command/commander. Edit to add: we may have had that level of thought… but I’ve never seen it. If somebody has, please point me to it.

We’re talking about different things, man. Correct tool for evaluating the performance of an aviator, sure (when task at hand). Correct tool for ensuring compliance across the formation (3V’s reason for being): not that guy’s form 8, until it becomes the task at hand. The first formal work shouldn’t be an individual Q-2/Q-3 if there’s a known problem. 1) Clearly different cultures in different commands. I think the CAF does it right, and I suspect if COMACC has a different opinion, he’ll formally ask for a change. (I hope he doesn’t). The CAF is a small place; people know your rep. 2) Bingo. See discussion of the formal SII process and what an effective 3V does to reinforce that process a page or two back. 3) That sucks, and so do those commanders. Glad I don’t work there. 4) Making it formal allows you to PROVE this, making the ding/Q-2/Q-3 even more appropriate and bulletproof. Thanks for indulging the derail. We’re down to differences in command culture; funny how we all end up places that match our personalities.

Nobody’s arguing for violating the rules. Copy the normalization of deviance discussion. It’s a good one and I agree with you. I’m saying there’s a better way to ensure compliance when commanders deem something important than making a random example of some schmuck (and yeah, that schmuck should have done better.) I think we agree: that evaluator remains right. The examinee remains wrong. My point is that evaluator ALSO remains a human choosing the wrong tools for the right job and can do better, in order to further the mission of his organization. Negative. The reason the MAJCOM, its staff organs (including 3V), and subordinate units exist is to OT&E forces to fight wars (and sometimes fight wars, COMREL depending.) The airline flying your FAA evaluator exists to make money. The FAA is there (in part) to protect the interests of the traveling public and ensure safe and smooth operations within the entire NAS (not of that airline.) The squadron and the 3V have different functions within the same mission. The FAA and airline have different missions and meet at the point of function. The day to day might feel the same for a line guy, but the FAA doesn’t HAVE to care about doing its job in a way that maximizes the performance of the airline. The MAJCOM absolutely SHOULD, which is why pulling the most efficient and effective levers is important.

Yeah… dude. Play the game. Protect yourself. But if an evaluator is leaning on that game or focusing on queepy, non-mission-related things: that evaluator is a non-mission-enhancing waste of time and the org and/or process is broke. The organization should weed those humans out and fix those processes, not punish folks for failing to waste their life on behalf of a MAJCOM 3V staffer’s ego. Yeah, still protect yourself when you go to the airline. Common sense. But the FAA doesn’t work for your airline; that douchey FAA jump-seater isn’t paid to care whether your airline is effective at its job. That should be the MAJCOM’s only concern if they’re sitting in my cockpit.

You’re absolutely within your rights to do this. You’re flat out right… but (IMO) informal isn’t the best answer when the result is a formal process that takes things away from subordinate commanders. (Humans, time, resources for retraining.) There’s a formal process already, and that formal process exists so that commanders at all levels (the ones buying risk for their formations) are informed and have input/recourse. The formal answer is an SII plus HHQ N/N and/or SPOTs (usually ICW a planned inspection/visit.) A good HHQ Stan-eval program will also send informal coord that might sound something like “Bros, we have a problem. This is a command priority. Expect spot objectivity checks with an emphasis on SIIs. Don’t make your dudes force a choice between your Q3 or theirs.” The folks running those HHQ 3Vs are just schmucks (div/branch chief) working for a dork (director) working for the commander, who actually buys risk. They’re not the MAJCOM speaking unless they’re explicitly and formally speaking for the MAJCOM. (Doesn’t need to be queepy; “I trust you, do what you think is right” is just as good as a 100-page eSSS.) It’s all about risk. Abort criteria & instrument proficiency? Guarantee a 3V staffer and commander are of the same mind for corrective actions that are going to take somebody out of the fight for retraining. Send it. Rings and boots? Dude, depending on how maintenance is doing, it might be faster to medically return to fly after an unplanned 4th finger amputation than a Q-3 (tongue in cheek… except for the B-1.) I wouldn’t want to table drop the 3/4-star his new “no rings” SII, but would bust the door down with actions I took on his behalf if folks are nearly morting as a trend. Everything has a cost, even following the rules, but following them harder. Commanders are the ones who decide how to pay the bill; that’s why the formal process exists.

Understand your main point fully. Re: inference of context: I’m not inferring any, but if you have some additional data I might understand better. If homeslice was being openly hostile to the rules and pressing to test: he deserves to walk away with a Q2. If your prior efforts never broke squelch at the unit and it’s normal to wear rings (like not wearing gloves is accepted in some communities)… his FEF isn’t a useful tool, and an evaluator giving the patch a Q2 for a ring under those circumstances is teaching the wrong lesson at the wrong level. I don’t know what the examinee’s intent and context was, so I don’t know if the evaluator in your story was being a turbodouche. If turbodouchey: I hope ops sups are checking his safe to fly boots and not-tumble-dried flight suits at step on every flight. I don’t understand the gen Z speak. Tension? I think I understand. I would say A3V fulfills a role within the MAJCOM’s OT&E responsibility: quality control. For many, the only MAJCOM staffer they’ll see in daily life is a HHQ FE. When those dudes show up worried/mark up FEFs at the unit for things that don’t break squelch at the lower echelons, the ability of the MAJCOM (not it’s 3V) to support the unit is degraded due to a lack of mutual trust.

Ok… regarding rings in the cockpit and a particular evaluator, sure. I suspect Joe average also learned something about a forest, trees, and to not trust the humans on staffs that supposedly support the mission. Wasn’t there; context of the examinee’s intent matters. I’m sure you did the right thing. This just strikes me as perpetuating the “you’re incapable of understanding the divine calculus that resulted in an AFI” attitude that’s resulted in a generation of officers who choose compliance over problem solving and reading assignments over leadership.