HiFlyer

For you who follow such things, here's a little blurb from the web (Av Week site, David Fulghum) about the F-35: "There were troubling words from the Air Force about the F-35A. The inability to demonstrate the Joint Strike Fighters ability to conduct offensive counter air and suppression as well as the destruction of enemy air defense in heavily defended environments is going to delay the strike fighters operational debut by another two years. Last summer, the Air Force estimated that F-35's IOC would be declared in 2016. But when an analysis is complete later this year, we currently expect up to a two-year delay that will push establishment of the first operational unit into 2018, Shackleford says." The name "Shackleford" refers to Lt. Gen. Mark Shackleford, military deputy to the assistant secretary of the Air Force for acquisitions.

Could be worse. We had a reserve student in my flight at Laughlin back in the 70s who was really, really bad. We tried like hell to get him washed out but couldn't. Then we tried like hell to get him into a big airplane where he could "season" in the right seat, but couldn't do that either. It turned out his father was the wing commander of the reserve wing that flew A-37s in the mid-west someplace and he wanted his son to fly "fighters" like he did. His father got to watch him stall an A-37 in the final turn and buy the farm off the end of the runway. Really sad.

Lots.

C-21's drop to students out of SUPT fairly often (not meaning lots of slots, but a slot in many class drops over the course of the year at the various bases. By the way, C-21s are not considered VIP aircraft (those are mostly 89th Wing aircraft from Andrews and don't drop to UPT grads); they are called either "Intra-Theater Airlift" or DV airlift (C-21 and C-12). I think the 89th is mostly manned by experienced pilots who have had at least one operational tour in some transport aircraft.

I've never flown the T-6 but I have flown a fair amount of TP time. One good way to kill the engine on an air start is to get the fuel flowing before you get the ignition on, or flowing at too great a rate before you light it. It can burn or even melt the turbine blades, combustion cans, or other sensitive components. I saw a guy totally melt the back end of an OV-10's engine that way. I have no idea what happened in this case, but I'm sure its possible if you get the air/gas/fire combination out of sequence or out of balance.

The US govt charters the aircraft, you reimburse the govt. Last time I was cognizant of something like this it wasn't too bad...something like $300 a seat, but it depends on what the govt pays and how far they take you. Don't expect 38" pitch seats!

This is very colorful bar talk, but, of course, is completely backwards, and misses some critical realities. In fact, the Air Force doesn't want to keep all its pilots (nor all of any other career field). The entire system is built around the concept of "up or out" because there are far fewer jobs in any career field as the rank structure increases (something like 60% of pilot slots are for Captain's and below; if they all stayed, there'd be no place to put them). If you really delve into the details, you'll see that the AF starts at the bottom and trains you to "perform duties of a rated pilot". What some people neglect to realize (or choose to ignore) is that the "duties of a rated pilot" include far more than just flying. For the system to sustain itself, it needs pilots to fly operations, train other people, perform non-flying duties at local and headquarters levels to organize, fund, and develop operational capabilities, supervise and command non-flying but aviation-related units, etc. Those jobs aren't as much fun as basic aircrew duties, but have to be done anyway. So, while your buddy's time line is generally correct, those career points aren't designed to suck you into staying, they're actually designed to see if you wish to leave or transition on to the next phase of a career (probably not designed for it exactly, but serve as transition points in the "up or out" philosophy). If you accept that process, you will continually cycle between non-flying staff jobs and flying supervisory jobs for the rest of your career. If you don't want to do that, then get out, go Reserve or Guard, whatever. Its your life and you should go the direction you wish to go. In my case, I chose to stay, and after the first staff job had a back end supervisor job (not a pilot slot, but almost as much fun deploying around the world with the crews), three additional flying commander jobs (two det CC jobs and one Sqn CC job), as well as a flying (but not as a pilot) job where I occasionally got to travel all over the world. In all, I spent 26 of my 30 years in airplanes collecting flight pay. I guess the difference between my view and your buddy's view is all a matter of perspective. He isn't necessarily wrong (and I'm not necessarily right), but how you understand the system affects how you respond to it. You have to know the system to use it to your advantage. Keep that in mind.

??? Nobody was trying to talk him out of anything, merely mentioning the very real consequences of one decision. I was one of those commanders Danny was talking about and he's exactly right. The AF is real tight on flying hours and flying jobs and I had to make decisions about who I would recommend to go to jobs that would reasonably lead to better AD flying jobs, and those that were less likely to lead to the next flying level (for instance, going to Stan/Eval as a Flight Examiner or the Ops Sqdn as a training office scheduler. If I had a guy that was doing well and talking career, and a guy who was also good, but constantly talking about ways to get out, or just fly forever and not share the non-flying load (somebody has to do the staff work or there will be no more flying!), I'd give the better job to the guy who wanted to stay around. That's an wise investment from my perspective as a commander, and I tried to spend my flying hours and jobs on poeple I could count on in the future. The point being made is that nothing has changed in regard to that situation and if you decide PC might be for you, don't advertise it around until you have made a decision and have a plan or you may find yourself getting screwed. If you constantly harp on getting out, people will assume that's your goal and act upon that assumption even if you later change your mind. By the way, that's no different in Big Blue than any civilian company. If you decide getting out is for you, then fine...I applaud your decision. Have a plan, execute it, and get out. Just don't burn your bridges before you go.

Actually, based on recent conversations about this subject with current SUPT people I believe there can be a little horse trading for aircraft assignments between the units and with AFPC. The two critical questions for the student are: 1) does your IP/Flt CC know that you really, really want one, and 2) has your performance for the last year been such that they're willing to spend the extra time and effort to make sure there's one (or enough) in your drop so that you can get one. No guarantees, by any stretch of the imagination, but there appears to be willingness on the part of some of the people who work these things to occasionally call their buddies at another base and perhaps swap a slot or two if its mutually beneficial.

Good to see this. Things haven't changed one iota since I was a T-38 IP 38 years ago! I always told my studs that if they weren't having fun in UPT they were in the wrong business. Stressful, yes, but fun, too!

So you're saying that wasn't a threshold requirement for IOC ? No, it wasn't. The requirement was to track small vehicle sized objects, although seeing (vice tracking a single guy in a crowd) dismounts were a nice to have capability if it could be done, and we may well get there yet. The "Increment 1 capability is just the "A-model" and improvements will be made as it is tested and fielded. Were the phase 2 pod requirements in the original contract or are we paying prison sex for a pack of smokes style? I'm not sure of the actual contract provisions, but the "Increment 2" development was intended to incorporate lessons learned from the first set, to the extent that technology can be applied and the cost is within reasonable boundries. I hope it is that simple, but i doubt it. There is something to see here if the pod isn't meeting threshold requirements AND/OR if we wrote an open ended contract that drives up the end costs far beyond the programmed budget meaning we ultimately get less than we need because we run out of money. Keep in mind that this isn't some extensive, long development effort via the standard DoD 5000 series procurement process. The AF asked the COCOM what they needed help with, they said they needed long duration area observation similar to the initial and widely applauded Army "Constant Hawk" program but with better comms and wider usability at the platoon level and needed it ASAP, and the AF Lab guys came up with something in about two years. It isn't perfect, its not without flaws, but if they can get it to function properly it will be an 80% solution that will help the COCOMs (BTW, it has a faster frame rate than the Army program, has real time comms to the grounds which the Army system doesn't have, it has IR which the Army doesn't have, and it has much more loiter than the Army system). There are dozens of similar programs like this developed on the spur of the moment that are already in use (called a QRC -Quick Reaction Capability). Some work well, some barely work, some don't work and are sent home and trashed. Most aren't even "Programs of Record" in the POM, and don't have formal requirement paperwork with "Threshold" and "Objective" requirement sets. That would add 5-10 years to the process and the need would probably disappear before it was fielded. These are QRCs intended to fix a COCOM CCs immediate priority need. The CENTCOM commander sends a letter to the Chairman, the staff work is done via a JUON (Joint Urgent Operational Need), and a solution is proposed to the Joint Staff, COCOM and Service; if the leadership agrees that it is a viable solution and the money is found (most of it through supplemental or reprogrammed funding), they try to implement it. Other similar programs include the MC-12 Project Liberty program, several IED detection and suppression devises, a number of unique sensor systems which help with specific target sets, etc. That's what's wrong with the basic tenor of the article. The writer clearly doesn't understand what is going on. The original "whistleblower" is a member of a small "watchdog group" which tries (apparently) to expose waste in the military budget, and somehow latched onto the draft report of the first OT&E review and is trying to make it into a big scandle report. In fact, the OT&E is doing exactly what its supposed to do...find problems and fix them before fielding the system (or provide rationale to the SECDEF to cancel the development). Money has always mattered but it really matters when the SecDef is looking for places to slash the budget. Yep, and his staff has his eye on this one, too. But to develop stuff like this, you have to take some risks. This one may be worth it. Actually, the biggest problem may occur if it works too well; it will put out huge amounts of imagery data every day. The Vice Chairman recently spoke about the issue of looking at all that stuff. Too much for humans (it would take thousands of additional analysts for each CAP) and not good enough automated expoitation available. Of course, most of the initial use will be to send many small segments pumped to a Rover terminal in a small tactical unit's hands rather than long term intelligence analysis...tactical SA rather than intel analysis. Personally, I think that's fine...they're the ones on the ground who need to see behind the walls and around the bend! The advantage of this concept is that instead of dedicating one Predator to each unit, one or two such CAPs may be able to cover dozens of small units as long as they cary a ROVER unit with them...much more efficient that allocating a Predator CAP to ever patrol in a small area (Kabul, or the Bagram area, for instance).

The fundamental mistake in your assumption is the idea that you are competing against your classmates. You are not. You may be "ranked" against them, but you are competing against the syllabus. Its a little like golf...you play against the course, not the other players. The ranking only describes how you did against the course relative to others. In flight training, it's you and your ability to absorb knowledge of the airplane, the systems, the procedures, etc. The more you can all work together to help each other, the better you and your classmates will do.

No offense intended, guys, but this is mostly media BS from someone trying to make his name with the next big military boondoggle. The facts are a little different, as I know them. For instance, "To carry the Gorgon Stare pod plus the required processing pod, Reapers have to be stripped of other sensors and weapons..." Yeah...well, to carry its weapons, the AC-130 can't carry the C-130 cargo load either. Oh, wait...that's not its mission, is it? Well, the few GS Reaper sets that they're building have a different missiion than the strike Reapers. And by the way, their normal FMV sensor ball is still there, still being used; it hasn't been removed. Only some weapons on the wings are missing because the pods are installed instead. The fact is that this is a new system in its first OT&E, and they're finding a few problems, which they will probably fix fairly quickly. When was the last time we had a new capability go thru OT&E without some problems popping up? That's why we do OT&Es! "This is bad. Real bad." Oh, come on now. It's one little set of pods, not the linchpin of American combat capability. No one likes to have a failed program (which this isn't likely to be in the end), but this dramatic hand-wringing is a little over the top. The same basic concept has proved very successful for the Army, with a similar set of capabilities called "Constant Hawk". GS combines that capability with expanded coverage, faster processing, and multiple near real-time comms. Perhaps there are a few problems to be worked out, but the ops concept is proven and sound. Can't track dismounts? Well, it wasn't intended for that purpose as its primary mission. As they improve the sensor over time, I'm sure it will get better...all the other sensors I know of improved over time. Its called "spiral development!" The Phase 2 pods (yet to come) will be better because of what we learn with the first set. This is yet another case of an overzelous author with little practical knowledge of a subject taking a report (and a draft report, at that) out of context. Nothing here to see. Move along...

I was listening to a discussion by some of the NRO engineering guys about this a while back. According to them, the excess hydrogen issue was a known problem, and the engineering solutions to prevent it were pretty expensive. It turned out that it was a lot cheaper to just coat the exterior a little more heavily with fire resistant insulation and let the hydrogen burn on lift-off. Not real elegant, but very effective. Sometimes simple is better!

The problem with the original article is that the writer seems to equate a fighter-sized RPV with an air-to-air vehicle...a "fighter". At this point, they are not intended for that mission, nor were they ever for the X-45/47 vehicles. All the UCAV prototypes discussed are actually "attack" vehicles intended to focus almost exclusively on putting ordnance on the surface. Perhaps the "fighter" mission will evolve sometime in the future, but not with these aircraft. Being able to mount an air-to-air system for a publicity picture does not make it an air-to-air system. Ask any fighter pilot how he'd do in air combat if his sight picture of the bad guy and resulting reactions were delayed 2-4 seconds because of transmission delays through an extensive comm structure relaying data from the aircraft to Creech AFB then back to the aircraft! Until that issue is resolved, or the "autonomous vehicle" is made trustworthy, I think the air-to-air "dogfighting" mission for UCAVs will be minimal.

I'm almost positive this is incorrect. The SECDEF did institute a policy of reducing CONTRACTOR manning by 10%/year, particularly in the area of Studies and Analysis bodies supporting all those highly important study efforts the Services do to determine what the best way of procuring toothbrushes in the 2020-timeframe will be. There was no announcement I know of from his office here in the beltway of cutting one single military body. The remaining announcements (like eliminating JFCOM) would cut structure (organizations) but the manpower positions would be transferred, not eliminated.

Its been a while, but when I was flying out of Cannon in the old days our Wing King insisted on having his aircraft (I'm talking F-100Ds) towed out to the hammerhead and preflighted by a Stan/Eval FE so he could just jump in the jet and go without wasting his time taxing the whole mile to the end of the runway. He was the prototype douchbag, by the way!

There is an overseas sales progran through AAFES. Its been a while, but over my career I bought five cars (three Corvettes, a Thunderbird, and a Mercury. The deals vary, but were generally about 8% below dealer cost. For example, I paid $10,200 for my 1980 Corvette, which had a MSRP sticker price of $14,800. What the "deals" are now I don't know, but the program still exists. The catch...you have to be overseas on orders to use the service. No quick trips to Europe on vacation or a quick TDY on a C-17 and stop by the BX. In those days the BX offer was only on American cars (although, as mentioned, some of the foreign types had a different deal). The BX deals were buy overseas, pick up at a dealer when you got back to the U.S. The foreign deals were generally buy a U.S. spec car there, then have it shipped back when you returned to CONUS. Edit: By "stationed overseas" the definition in those days was PCS or an extended TDY that provided you with a USAFE or PACAF BX privilege card, whatever the rules allowed then in terms of length of TDY. A 60-day TDY was sufficient in our case, but I'm not sure what the minimum was. I know the C-141 crews passing thru did not qualify, because they did not have an intheater mailing address. The degree to which the car company sales people (not BX employees) would "work with you" to get a sale, I'm not sure.

You're safe for about another five years. I think the current plan for the U-2s now goes thru 2015-2016. That date is one of many proposed retirement dates, none of which has been met because of issues with the GH. There are several major reviews of the GH underway by a very disgruntled DoD senior leadership. In essence, from an overall performance standpoint its a great little aircraft, but they need a great medium-sized aircraft, and the cost has escalated way beyond expectations for a lot of reasons...mostly because the original ACTD development concept had no operational requirements (the only requirement was a unit cost goal and a desire to operate in "high threat environments"). As the govt began to add real world requirements, the costs went up and up and the design had to be modified beyond what the original concept envisioned. You now have a very expensive platform (with no apparent end to cost escalation) which has serious sensor and mission capability issues for a good part of the mission area. As to what will the U-2 guys do when it does end, I don't think theres an answer to that. Given that most U-2 guys are fairly senior (due to the entry requirements), as they end their flying tours most of them migrate to staff tours and other AF assignments. System retirement will also be stretched over several years, so I doubt if there will be a wholesale transfer to the GH program.

I stand corrected. My knowledge is outdated in this case. Thanks for the correction.

AAFES is not a NAF activity, nor is the Commissary system. They are still "appropriated entities", which Congress frequently complains about. Their money (profit) mostly goes to finance improvements in the AAFES system (I know, I know..."What improvements??"), I believe, and to some Service level master funds.

There are two problems that have doomed the club system over the last few decades. First, as mentioned above, is the change in the social habits of the piopulation combined with the PC/risk-intolerent behavior of the senior leadership. The other major issue is related, once again, to our friends in Congress. In the late 80s they decided that it was "unfair" for the taxpayers to help sustain the quality of life of the military, and removed all appropriated funding from the entire NAF system. While before they "provided" a building and utilities, the new law required the facilities to be "self-sustaining". That meant they had to reduce services and raise prices to pay for all theese new costs, resulting in a typical death spiral for the system on most bases (exceptions usually were bases with huge retiree populations and HQ bases that could augment some facilities with "protocol" money. When combined with risk-adverse leadership which cut popular but politically risky activities (like aero clubs) and used the "alcohol card" as a punishment, the decline was almost guaranteed. Example: the Patrick AFB aero club made so much profit that it almost single-handedly supported the base NAF system. The base leadership closed it under a bunch of BS excuses and the facilities and service dive-bombed. Only the retiree population saved any of it!

Word is it was a formation flight, but the other aircraft wasn't involved. Both guys are back on base at the hospital for checkout but apparently no serious injuries.

Well, radials were only "romantic" if you didn't have to deal with them...smelly, oily, vibrating, not-very-reliable POS engined compared to turbines. Khakies (1505s, I presume you mean), maybe...good in dry climates but sweat-soaked mess in high humidity...first thick and wet, then white salt stains when they dry. I prefer the current light blue shirt, personally. Stag bars and beer call, absolutely! And don't forget about the "several-mistakes" Air Force, as opposed to the current "one perceived mistake" (even if it really wasn't one) Air Force.

Yep, truly a great weekend...I am also still in the recovery mode. For those not in the know (most of you), the "1955" refers to the hard core guys who started with the U-2 in 1955. There were five of them at the 55th anniversary reunion this weekend. The part that really struck me, though, was that at the banquet opening they had a great video honoring all the drivers that didn't survive and the year of their death, and went down the list starting with the first loss. As the program went on, name after name was shown, with 1955 as the year they died. I lost count and need to go get some old documents to check, but there must have been a dozen or more of them listed in 1955, with several more in 1956. Keep in mind that the first flight of the U-2 wasn't until Aug 1st, so all those guys crashed and died in the first five months of the program's existance, and the "test" program was being run at the same time the first crews were in training; they were the testing. I do know that they lost two on one day. Can you imagine the balls of those guys who went out every day to fly an aircraft that crashed and killed its pilot at an average rate of between two and three guys a month...out of one squadron!!! Frankly, I also find it amazing that the Skunk Works could keep building them fast enough to keep airplanes around for the remaining guys to fly!! Of the five who survived to make it to the reunion I know at least one, and I think two, had to bail out of disintegrating airplanes during their first year, too, so that is all the fatal losses plus one or two more non-fatal aircraft losses in that first few months. Balls. BIG balls!!!