HiFlyer

Here's my input to the "great debate"... I admit that if I had a choice, an A-10 (or A-10-like) capability for a CAS mission would usually be my first choice in a survivable environment. However, that doesn't mean that it's an absolute requirement. I know I'm a bit dated, but out of my 250+ FAC missions in the OV-10 (Vietnam), 125 or more of them did CAS support at some point during the 3-4 hour sortie. I don't recall a single one of them resulting in the good guys being overrun due to poor CAS capability. Only one resulted in a friendly fire casualty and that was because the idiot stood up to get a picture of a Mk82 hitting the bad guys about 75 meters away (the ground CC's immediate comment was something like "Never mind, it'll save me the time it would take to beat his stupid ass to death"). The point of this is that we did great CAS work nearly every day with no A-10s. I worked F-100s, F-4s, A-4s, A-7s, A-1s, A-6s , VNAF A-37s, and F-5s, AC-119s, AC-130s, and even some AH-1Gs and UH-1Cs (gunship variants), plus my own pitiful ordnance, of course. Most of the work was in the 100-300 meter range, but some as close as 30 meters. In some cases, the sheer power of the 30mm may have been a detriment...the 7.62 was actually safer to use and plenty good enough in terms of killing power with less collateral damage potential. Each platform had its good and bad points, and had to be used carefully to maximize impact on the bad guys and minimize threats to the friendlies. For instance, a light platform with small ordnance (like an A-37 with 7.62 and 250lb slicks) I generally started working close with guns and backed up about 10m a pass until it was safe to use the 250s. When I had a couple of A-6s (usually VMA 225 out of Danang...really good at CAS!) I'd put one or two mk82s as close as possible to slow the action, then start dropping sticks of five or six (remember, they has 28 bombs each) behind the bad guys about 300m then march the sticks forward about 25m a stick. It didn't take long for the bad guys to figure out they were soon to be caught between a wall of bombs and fire from the friendlies, and they backed out fast. It might have helped that the first sticks tended to take out upper management, watching from the rear, early in the game! In general, F-100s were not too bad, since CAS and other close support was a large part of their mission, and the Marine A-4s and F-4s were very good at CAS since that was almost all they did (especially the A-4s from Chu Lai). They averaged between 20-40 CAS sorties a month and were very good because of their sortie rate. On the other hand, the AF F-4s from Danang (Gunfighters) were usually terrible, but that's because most of them only flew a real CAS sortie once or twice a month. I hated to use them closer than 200m. The VNAF guys were pretty good, too, but most of them had been flying for a decade, with the leads frequently having 1000-2000 combat sorties (mostly CAS) over a decade or more. Navy (mostly A-7s) was my last choice, mostly because they rarely did actual CAS, and I saw them infrequently which lowered my confidence in their abilities. As a matter of fact, my feeling is that good CAS may be less about the airframe than the pilot experience in the cockpit (and maybe about the guy directing the situation (air or ground FAC, or whatever the current nomenclature is). The Marine F-4/AF F-4 comparison is a good example. Just a thought...

No, No, Yes, No.

Old and digitally challenged, but here are some thumbnails of my two prints.

Yes, those are some of the images. When looking at the original imagery on a light table the clarity was amazing, although you lose a lot when they're copied and printed on paper. Clarifying my earlier comment, I did not actually fly the sorties; I had been the U-2 Det Commander at Patrick a bit earlier, and was at Beale when the first flight was flight was actually flown and at the Recce Center at HQ SAC for the second. I did a lot of the staff work with the NASA and 45th Space Wing people at KSC and the Cape to set up the track and procedures. I don't have the records to determine which of the pilots flew the missions, but I do recall the debriefings. The pilots had a great time on a very difficult mission The H-camera only moved side to side, so manually adjusting the camera azimuth from the cockpit while banking/yawing the aircraft at high altitude to try to keep the shuttle in the field of view was a real delicate maneuver and not without some risk of stalling at altitude.

I'll work on it...

Hmmm. Might be tough to do. The one print I have is about 18x30 and mounted on a foam board. It was a PR shot used in a NASA briefing at Patrick. I guess I could take a picture of it with my Nikon and try to upload it. The rest are probably buried in some film archive at NASA or the National Archives. Also, its black and white...not near as pretty as the color one the F-15 guys took!

Close, but not exactly. After the Challenger disaster NASA was looking for shuttle launch pictures from another view aspect. When they started flying again, we loaded up a U-2 with a camera (the old "H" cam) and flew over the Cape at about 70K when they launched. The objective was to get high res pictures of the shuttle/booster interaction from above. I still have a blowup of one of the shots in my basement. Fun sortie!

Current plan is for all C-130Hs to go to Guard (maybe Reserve?) units, and the H model does carry a CSO (Nav), so that might be another option.

Oops, yep, UH-1s. Sorry

It's worth noting that there are two separate C-12 operations overseas. As noted earlier, the DATT C-12's are flown by embassy-assigned Air/Asst Air Attache types as an "additional duty" of sorts. The pilots tend to be senior Capt through Field Grade. There are also C-12's assigned as DV airlift. The 459th AS at Yokota AB is one such unit, flying both the C-12 and UH-60 in support of 5th AF units. Those aircraft are mostly flown by young pilots, many right out of UPT. I don't know if there are any other locations like the 459th in other theaters.

Yes, as far as I know he was well respected within the flyers. Many in the community thought he was treated pretty poorly...sort of a Vietnam returnee-like treatment from the people who sent him, because the incident-fallout embarrassed them. No matter that the risk was on the table and they sent him anyway, then didn't want to deal with the problem they themselves caused. At least that's my view.

I'm old, but not that old!! No, I was a generation later. I did meet him several times in the early 70s when he attended pilot reunions at D-M. Very nice guy; quiet, but easy to talk to, except if you asked about his visit to the Soviet Union, then he was just quiet! When I got there in 1973, some of our supervision knew him, and some even flew with him in F-84s before they joined the U-2 program.

Damn, those things sucked. Luckily, I didn't have to fly them much before going to the R-model and wearing the Cadillac suit!

My experience tells me that part of the problem isn't stall recovery, it's "approach to the stall" recognition. In UPT(at least when I was an IP) the stall series was taught as a flight maneuver. I can't remember how many times I'd see a student later drive himself right up to the edge of a stall while getting ready for something else and not recognise what was happening. They were so focused on doing something else they simply didn't recognise the situation early enough. I recall the day in 1987 or '88 that a Castle tanker did a horrible approach to a touch and go at Beale, stalled in the flare and banged the #1 nacelle on the runway, then did a go-around and a tight left three engine closed at low airspeed and stalled again, planting the airplane in the field across from the tower (seven fatalities as I recall). In both cases the student and IP didn't recognise what was happening while being preoccupied with instructional and EP issues, I suspect, Late stall recoveries didn't solve their problems! Recognition is the key, not recovery!

Initial solo in the T-41 at "Casa Grande International" (yeah, way back then...Jan, 1968; Willie's T-41 aux field). Took off, made 9 solo T&G patterns...things of beauty. Turning base for the full stop reached for the flap handle and suddenly recalled I hadn't done that on any of my other patterns. I flew 9 no-flap patterns without noticing and without getting a call from the RSU. IP patted me on the back and said "good job". Nobody had a clue. Needless to say, I sorta forgot to mention it while debriefing.

Actually, I personally have three former AF aircrew acquaintences who now lack a left ring finger. In each case, they caught the ring (while wearing their gloves) in some kind of a rapid, slightly off balance move either inside the aircraft or exiting the cockpit. That period does cover several decades (70s and 80s), but it can happen. I decided not to wear my ring while flying, simply because it was a simple, effective, and painless way to avoid a potential hazard. While not a frequent and widespread issue, Its not just urban legend either..

No, this is probably an accurate statement. Hagel is a political appointee and former Senator; he's good in the political arena and not an idiot, But, Ash Carter has been working in the defense acquisition business from every possible aspect for something like 30 years. He probably is one of the most knowledgeble people in the country about how the acquisition system really works at the nuts and bolts level. He's a really nice guy and willing to innovate. He'll be tough to replace.

In addition to the above comments, which I agree with, you also need to understand the much of the flying at any base is unique to that base, so applying basic instrument techniqes to the Laughlin airspace and its departures and approaches is not the same as the procedures at Vance or Columbus. Beyond understanding the basic functions of the various instruements, there's really not much to learn at this point.

Yeah, but I'm getting too old to remember what I ought to know.

Cabin pressure is the correct term. My documents say the program name for this particular mod was "Cockpit..." not "Cabin...", but frankly it doesn't really matter. I'm sorry I even mentioned it.

I'm just the messenger here, but let me clarify what was stated. Most of the callbacks are likely to go towards manning lines associated with the old Continental side, not pre-existing United routes. It has nothing to do with seniority lists, its about where they will wind up flying. Take it for what its worth, I don't have a dog in this fight.

I ran across this in the OTS BOT Handbook...maybe it will help. "1.1.3. Commissioned officers from sister services, reserves, and guard interested in Active Duty as an Air Force Line Officer should visit the Air Force Contact Center Website for the latest in inter-service transfer information (website: AFPC Top Page). If needed, they may contact Recall/Inter-service Transfers at AFPC (210) 565-2068/2288 or DSN 665-2068/2288 or email afpc.recall.ops@randolph.af.mil."

Technically, you are correct, but the old Continental side and the old United side are still (administratively) not fully integrated at the aircrew level, so that's the way he refers to them; he's from the old Continental roots. Also, you are correct there is no United Express, There is a set of operators who are contracted by United to fly their "commuter" routes under that name, which he does. Never the less, his statements stand as reported.

i have a family member who flys for United Express. He says virtually all these recalls are going to the old Continental side, where they are woefully short of crews. He says maybe 50% take, but 25% could be the case.

Well, for the Duece, there is no cabin, only the cockpit. Also, I believe the acronym is from the official Air Force/Lockheed project name for improving the U-2'scockpit environment, not a more widely used generic term applying to other aircraft.