ViperMan

"Fake news" is the modern incarnation of propaganda. The reason for the new term is because of the modern proliferation of "news" sites along with the historical association of the term "propaganda" being so closely linked with what Communist governments do in their own countries. Those two factors necessitated the creation of a new term, though it's really nothing new. Basically, it's everywhere. People are either outright lying, lying by omission, or selectively hearing statements and reading into them what they want to hear, you name it - it's literally everywhere I look. People do that with or without the internet - that has been true since the dawn of time. Question: Is 4D chess distinguishable from "fake news" or anything else? At what dimension of chess do we finally arrive back at checkers? I say the proof is in the pudding - it's really the only way to tell.

That's what I see, too. Hill to Holloman? No fvcking way. You HAVE to close bases. Yeah, that. Your choices are your only currency.

Valid. Which is why any such system should be implemented on a "continuous" vs "discrete" basis. A day at a time would likely solve the issue: 3 days in Holloman, 4 days-of-service (*DOS) - new acronym, first coined right here. Then, at worst, dudes get screwed out of one days' time. At its core, this is the exact same issue, and root cause (IMO), that led to the design of the 179.

I agree that incentive pay would fix the issue for some folks (like with those whose personal desires align with the assignment, such as having rug rats). Using myself as a data point, however, I can tell you that right now I make right around a $100K/yr, and there are contractors that the AF pays ~$180K/yr - to do a similar job at Holloman. If that extra $80K (~10x the bonus amount you suggest) was offered to me as "Holloman incentive", it still would not be enough for me to move there. So I get that I'm a data point of one, but I'm telling you that the AF could double the money, and it wouldn't affect my calculus. IMO, to a great, MANY people, it's all about location, location, location, and with the way BAH, and COLA is designed, no one at any base should be hurting financially, so it's not like someone would really need that extra money. Just my 2 cents. I think the AF does have to get creative when it comes to solving their problems, re: your X% of 365s suggestion. On that note, specifically, however, I think 179s/365s need to be drastically reduced, and beyond that, the AF needs to keep a long-term (i.e. career-long, 20+ year) list of those who have done such tours - and ensure everyone who hasn't done one, stays closer to the top than ANYONE who hasn't - including HPOs. A lack of transparency and fairness when it comes to 179s/365s is a major factor I think leads people to bail. On the career benefits side, I think there could be stuff done in that regard. Something like every 3 years you spend at Holloman (sorry to keep piling on), nets you 4 years of service (YOS) - meaning you get pay raises earlier, get more time subtracted off your commitments/ADSCs, AND get to retire early. Costly? You bet - but such places already are costly in terms of attrition. Soooooooo, costly is a given at this point. Two tours at Holloman? Cool, you get sanctuary at 16 YOS, and get to retire at 18 - with a 20 year retirement. Yeah, I like it. Maybe give certain assignments/bases "point values." Lock up a Can-Kun tour, get 100 points; rock a non-vol AFPAK hands, clear 500; soak up Spang/Aviano, pay -200. Next assignment drop, whoever has the most points, gets first dibs. This flies directly in the face of how the AF stacks the deck, but it would solve LOTS of problems - I can almost guarantee it. Every point you get to the end of your career with, the AF pays out 1000-to-1.

Pile on: I fully agree with the author, and the main factor he discusses - incurred service commitment for a PCS - was at least 60% of my decision to separate. No shit. I'm also on board with those who say slowing the PCS beast would save the government (DOD) a lot of money that is wasted literally shuffling one Captain/Major with the next. That said, what is the solution to the "clog" that would occur in places like Hill, Hawaii, Phoenix, Spang, Aviano, when you have other "less desirables" that are in the mix such as Holloman, Cannon, Creech, et al? Of course one man's trash is another's treasure, but there would certainly be an ever-growing population at the garden spots, and dwindling pops at the shitholes. What's the fix to keep manning "balanced"?

In lieu of making that previous post even longer, I decided to not go into the 'how' of our fight in Afghanistan. In short, I think we've eff'd it up wholesale by going in as heavily-handed as we did. Putting 100,000+ troops on the ground was not the answer - I think history and the present proves that. 15 years ago, it was Army leadership's job to tell their bosses that going into a 3rd world shit-hole like that was not a winning gameplan. Going in with SOF/surgical airpower/Jason Bourne/etc was the right answer. But, of course, we were reeling from 9/11, and IMO, we acted emotionally instead of rationally. Now, we designed a fight without realistic conditions for victory, and we're left with a quagmire that I literally think no one has any realistic idea on how to get out of victoriously. I'm sure there's lots of pretty slides and strategy papers on the who, what, where, when, and how, but I just don't buy it at this point - in fairness, I didn't buy it 15 years ago either - call me cynical. I too, am happy when our bros on the ground make it back, but the sad fact is that many of them have been killed without our nation having achieved its strategic objectives. So, with that as context, and arguably the only legitimate reason to be able to justify asking soldiers to give their lives, what is the solution? Burn up our Air Force and Navy? The two arms of the DOD that give us truly global power and asymmetric advantage? Right now Navy and Marine Hornets have <50% MC rates in some cases. That is what fighting a ground/guerilla war with air power gets you: not much. To your second paragraph, that's basically my point. We never should have invaded in '03, and we never should have fought Afghanistan with the tactics and strategy we chose. I chalk it up to our national leaders having access to the 'easy button', i.e. air power - low political cost, high-impact, immediate effect. Pretty much.

I'll add my two cents (and some more). Soooooo not everyone on this board agrees with Tony Carr's perspective on the USAF - see his editorial on the Thunderbird mishap from last June and (if you know ANYTHING), you'll know that that piece was designed to elicit an emotional response, did nothing to satisfy public curiosity about the event, shed no new light on the event, and was literally the journalistic equivalent of throwing $hit at a wall - in the name of smearing the AF (cause he thinks it's fun, IMO). After that post I was honestly not sure whether or not to take him seriously any more - and I don't. He was a previous safety guy who "had F-16 experience" but yet he wrote it as someone would who lacked a military flying background. His response to my analysis (https://disq.us/p/1ejpsoe) of his editorial was dismissive, and when presented with facts, he avoided the issue. I don't consider him value-added at this point - as I do this message board. I think he's a semi-talented, own-press-reading, bitter, (ret) Lt Col who has nothing better to do with his time than sport bitch on the internet. I think lots of people agree with that sentiment, and while he can sometimes come close the mark, I don't think (in general) he is that interesting any more. On that note, and to your question, I don't think the root cause of the USAF's current crisis has much to do with leadership in a traditional sense, but then again, I was never one who drank the AF koolaid that would have all its officers believe that leadership is the panacea to every and all problems. No, sometimes, people make poor decisions and it's not because they are poor leaders. And sometimes, it doesn't matter who's at the seat, there can be (and are) systemic issues in an organization which have far greater effects. Pinning it all on "toxic leadership" is what someone who is still pissed at a lot of previous superiors does when he is no longer subject to their rule. That said, if you choose to orient yourself in such a way, then I suppose that everything can be boiled down to poor leadership (not toxic), but I think there are more systemic issues as to why the USAF is in its current state, and when viewed in that light, will lead to more fruitful changes. 1. 179s: Look a troop in the eye, and tell them that the reason they're going down range for 179 days (vs 180 or more) has nothing to do with the USAF's policy of granting short-tour credit for deployments of longer length (sts). https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/112915/air-force-normalizes-short-tour-credit-policy/. IMO, there is only one reason such a policy could exist, and it is to screw airmen out of a medal, deployment credit, make it easier for the personnel machine to send them downrange again sooner, or whatever. Justifications along the lines of "well, we will need to be able to deploy them again" do not hold water. All airmen who were getting short-tour credit for 180+ day deployments were playing by the same rules, and were all on the same "list". What shifting a policy did while we were in the middle of a war, was create two groups of people - those who had deployed for >181 and <365 who got credit, and those who did not - that is a ripple in the system, and though it may not have an immediately visible consequence, it certainly has an effect and was unfair to lots of people. So, that's one example of something wrong, which has nothing to do with anyone wearing < 4 stars on their shoulders. But toxic leadership? Maybe, but by only one person - not a culture of it. 2. RIFs/Force-shaping: During my time in the USAF, I "survived" two RRFs (I think, maybe, I can't remember at this point). One occurred shortly after I finished the B-Course. The U-S-A-F sent me, a fighter pilot, paperwork that suggested I may not be retained, literally immediately after I finished soaking up the better part of $5M in training costs/taxpayer money and with nearly 10 years of commitment remaining. IMO, this was done in the name of "social justice" - an example of a policy enacted to make everyone feel like they're on the same page and are all of equal value. Was I actually concerned I was going to be force-shaped? Nope. But this is an example of something that is wrong with the AF at a cultural level. Fixing this would go a long way toward re-orienting the AF in the correct direction, but (I get it) it would cause A LOT of teeth-gnashing with the REMFs, and that is a merge I highly doubt the AF wants to buy - because we MUST be socially just, we absolutely must be (sarcasm). 2a. In 2011, the USAF got rid of 157 Majors who should have been allowed to retire: https://dailycaller.com/2011/11/25/military-advocates-decry-illegal-early-terminations-of-157-air-force-majors/ https://nation.time.com/2012/01/03/air-force-firing-for-effect/ This occurred, and then (almost immediately), the USAF sought to be granted TERA (and was given it) in order to "slim down": https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/467816/eligible-officers-enlisted-members-offered-early-retirement/ https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/483997/af-opens-additional-tera-vsp-windows/ https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/467713/af-announces-additional-force-management-programs-to-reduce-force-size/ https://federalnewsradio.com/retirement/2016/01/greg-rinckey-air-force-officers-demand-reinstatement/ Does that not cause one to scratch their head (who said head)? Look a troop in the eye and tell them this is not the apex of hypocrisy and short-sighted decision making. If you ask me, this is an instance of breaking faith with people. And before we cry uncle and say "well we're subject to civilian leadership decisions", I don't remember any stars falling on their swords over that one. GOs should have been resigning up and down the chain over that one. Again, like it or not, when people witness decisions like this, it affects their "matrix" and they then re-evaluate their criteria for staying in the AF for the long haul. What this sequence of decisions made clear was that a member's continued service was arbitrary, and subject to the flavor of the month. That is not going to be good enough for most people who are investing the most valuable years of their working lives towards a successful career, and I think this has had a direct and lasting affect on morale and retention. Again, this is an example of a policy decision that created two classes of people: those who served > 15 years and were not given a retirement, and those who were. 3. Shortly on the pilot bonus: the fact that it hasn't change in what, 20+ years, communicates a lot - if not directly, then indirectly. All the hand-wringing about increased amounts being just around the corner is a little pathetic, and is obviously being done from a reactionary perspective. This should have been addressed YEARS ago, because the Airline hiring wave is NOT a surprise. 4. Focus: This, to me, boils down to what the USAF should be focused on. IMO, it is high-time that "space" and "cyber" became their own separate service (or perhaps services). Much like the USAF growth out of the Army benefited both branches, I think another, modern version of that evolution needs to take place with those two realms so they can get the focus they need, and we can get ours. No, space is NOT a continuation of the "air domain", and neither is cyber. There, I said it. Sure, they abut, but so does the surface of the sea/Earth, with the sky, yet we have different branches dedicated to those domains. IMO the AF is in love with the idea of being a one-sized fits all solution to all problems (or maybe they're addicted to the money, IDK). That last point will lead me to #5. 4a. It was suggested on other message boards that more 11X presence is needed throughout the AF - from staffs, to the FSS. I fully agree with this sentiment, and would happily displace an FSS Maj or Lt Col (while remaining on flying status) and run that shop/unit. Would I be there everyday? Nope, but I wouldn't need to be. See, it's all about policy and setting an expectation. The USAF for far too long has been ceding ever more control to those who don't have to cross a wire. Why is this? Do we really need a finance-trained, specialized Maj/Lt Col to run the finance shop? Really? Does that person even know how to operate DTS or whatever else? And even if they do know how, do they? I highly suspect they fill more of figure-head roll; a leader of those units could easily come from an 11X background and provide actual, bonafied leadership. I would go so far as to say that in order to command anything, you should have to be a rated officer. Yes, this caps non-rated officers - tough shit. Go get wings. 5. This is likely an unpopular opinion on this board, but the biggest mistakes we have recently made (as a nation) have been the strategic errors of invading Iraq in 2003, the "how" of invading Afghanistan in 2001, and then the subsequent withdrawal from Iraq in whenever we actually did it. Bottom line on this one, is that the USAF leadership (at the time) should have thrown down a firm "no" when the Army demanded we play in the conflict for as long as we have, as should have the Navy. Drones and snake eaters? You bet. Multi-million dollar fighter jets, the full capes of the world's greatest AF burning holes in the sky, US Navy billion-dollar aircraft carriers? No way. We have WAY over-extended ourselves in these conflicts and have NOTHING to show for it. Well, except a military full of equipment that is falling apart at a time when we least need it. I fully grasp that we were sent to war by our civilian leadership, but not calling a goat by its name isn't solving the problem. No, AFPAK Hands will not succeed. Not because of lack of awesome people and their concerted and earnest efforts, but because the strategic context of its goal is illogical and nonsensical. No amount of Air University PHD-research-papering will make it so. The point of the military is to kill people and break their shit; not to nation-build before a war is won. Advising people who don't want what we want isn't the answer - if there's one thing I learned from my experiences, combined with the 'cross cultural competency' assigned by ACSC, it's that. The sooner our "leadership" - of whatever flavor and level - wake up and recognize this, the better. We have poured (and continue to pour) far too much in time, resources, blood, and money into an unwinnable situation. We need to get back to defining realistic, measurable goals, by which we can actually measure a 1 or 0, we can start counting those. I would much prefer to hear from our leadership that the new, stated goal in Afghanistan is to never allow a Taliban, or al Qaeda sponsored/sympathetic government to take root - and leave it at that. We're not interested in standing up a government there; we're not interested in building girls' schools there; we're not interested in teaching air advisers how to read the JP 3.09-3. We are interested in shooting Hellfires off of drones at anyone associated with the Taliban or al Qaeda for the next 1000 years - that's it. This section has run on way too long, but to sum up: our current strategy only exists because we misunderstand who and what type of people we are fighting. 6. HPO lists, etc. This category is all about creating "classes" of people. The military has always been a good 'ol boys club, and it always will be. Formalizing it in Excel spread sheets, and choosing people while they are Captains is what has created and perpetuated a perception that it literally doesn't matter what you do if you're not on that list. It is nothing more than playing favorites, and creates an environment that leads people to separate - now there's some "leadership". I ultimately believe that more transparency in the assignment and promotion system will go a long way to correcting a lot of the AF's current problems as well. I could, and might, write more, but until next time, if you haven't read this article, the author hits on some extremely relevant points: https://philipgmorrison.wordpress.com/2017/01/15/its-your-move-the-dilemma-of-incurred-commitment-in-the-modern-job-market/. - ViperMan

I agree with this. It just doesn't make good financial sense to take one guy and give him two trainings. You're literally robbing Peter to pay Paul. We're going to subtract one C-17 pilot and add one F-16 pilot (-1 + 1 = 0); net gain, zero. But yes, ultimately, if we are going to do that, they will need all the training that it takes to get someone to that spot - i.e. UPT phase 3 in T-38s plus IFF. Whether or not it is reasonable, I think Duck hits it with the following: The USAF needs to examine dollars and sense right now and also needs to understand why they aren't able to hang on to these year groups. It has little to do with the culture right now (IMO) and much more to do with the prevailing culture in which these year groups spent the previous 6-9 years growing up. People come up through a system and make decisions based on the sum total of decisions that they witnessed the AF making over their 10-yr ADSC. Few people wake up one morning in a vacuum and just pull the handle and jettison their careers. These are complex decisions people make by taking in the totality of personnel and other decisions that they see staffs making over the course of 1/2 a career. I'm not sure the Air Force realizes how important it is to maintain a consistent personnel system, deployment framework, promotion system, etc, for motivating people to stay for a career. The AF has been nothing but whiplash in those categories for far too long, and they are now reaping what they've sown. They will make the most money by fixing the culture, and leaving it fixed. This will ensure they have a hope of holding on to the majority of dudes who still have 5+ years of ADSC remaining. Sorry, I realize I wandered off topic there.

Well in any case, there is a big difference. Fly along side different "fighter pilots" who come from different cultures and backgrounds, i.e. people who may have drastically different ideas about what "fighter pilot" means (it's not just flying a pointy nosed jet), and you'll start to grasp the difference I'm talking about. In a sentence, it's about your attitude towards yourself and own flying skills, rather than a self-aggrandizing projection you put out towards the world and other people. Many pilots from other cultures don't have the right attitude towards their J.O.B., and it reflects in their Air Force's capability. Our Air Force isn't immune to those attitudes, but in general they are far less prevalent. Further, the community has a way of making those types your "one and done" crowd - of course, this all exists within the constraints of "needs of the AF" and "luck and timing are everything." Hell, you can plunk down $2K and "fly a fighter" (https://aircombat.com/flight-programs/combat-flight-programs/advanced-air-combat-tactics-maneuvering/) - I don't think anyone would argue that experience doesn't make you a fighter pilot. Lol, I don't think anyone is 'gatekeeping' as you put it, and also agree that plenty of "heavy" dudes could hack it if given the opportunity. I think the main objection to your original post was that you seemed to imply that four years spent flying C-17s/130s would somehow translate to walking right into a fighter FTU...most people's objection was to that implication. Finally, the only real question here is if the USAF does need to pull from the MAF to staff fighter cockpits, why shouldn't they pull from those who have already spent six months flying something (T-38s) that builds the core skill set that translates directly to flying something else fast? You'll likely have greater success than if you roll the dice on those who haven't. It's a numbers game here, right? Of course there are exceptions, but if you are making decisions at an institutional level, you've got to draw the line somewhere. At the end of SUPT is probably the appropriate place to do that.

"fly a fighter" being the operable phrase - there is a large difference between "flying a fighter" and "being a fighter pilot" - Saudi "F-15 pilots" are not equivalent to US F-15 fighter pilots. Yuuuuuuuge difference. So I guess I agree with you?

6.9 second google search suggests otherwise: Fall 2015, 11F shortage: 511 (https://www.airforce-technology.com/features/featurekeeping-them-flying-the-us-air-forces-struggle-to-retain-fighter-pilots-5776168/). Spring 2016, 11F shortage: 723 (https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/08/10/the-air-force-fighter-pilot-shortage-is-already-a-crisis-and-it-could-soon-get-even-worse/). Aug 10, 2016: "Air Force Secretary Deborah James said that the service could be short about 1,000 fighter pilots “in just a couple years,” prompting the service to ask Congress for the ability to boost financial incentives to recruit and keep pilots." To me, a "couple of years" suggests 2018 - at the earliest. Six months later... Spring 2017, 11F shortage: 1211 (https://www.airforcetimes.com/articles/the-air-force-is-thinking-about-paying-pilots-up-to-455-000-to-stay-in-uniform). No issue there? That didn't take long. Finally, last time I checked, when Congress is "probing" your organization, it's usually because you're not nailing it (https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1135200/congress-probes-military-pilot-shortage/).

Yeah, most of what he said. Congress (#2) is a great idea, and one that I think would go a long way to proving the USAF cares about the capability provided by aviators. Establishing trust (and maintaining it) is multidimensional and takes years. Why the bonus and flight pay have been allowed to languish for the last 20+ years is criminal, and sets a clear non-verbal subtext that we are not important and/or that the AF has become complacent. Congress (#3) is probably the most important factor I see as going towards dudes bailing out. No one wants to live in Cannon, Creech, anywhere else in BFE New Mexico, or wherever TF else there are powerful politicians who are allowed to keep certain communities alive by sucking off of the DOD tit. This alone causes millions of $$$ of AF assets to walk away every year for greener pastures. JCOS (#1) and USAF (#5) are also valid. The boils down to proper utilization of resources, which, given the AF's proclivity towards buying up big-screen TVs like they're going out of style, gives me little hope that it will change. I always put the 179 idea in the AF responsibility bucket. Maybe that idea was/is by direction of the JCOS, but I think even if it is, the AF should be much more verbal about a service-level requirement that only exists for one reason: to not give people their due credit for service provided.

I call BS. It's department heads that are O-6s while in the position - after they are done, they then retire as O-7s.

Ever heard of a "no-stepper"? Try it out sometime. It'll fix SNAPs pretty quick. And, it can be fairly therapeutic:

The F-16...outlasting the F-4, F-15C, F-15E, F-18, F-22, and, probably, the F-35 since 1979...

Yeah, this - I don't know anyone who DOESN'T fly with one.

Oh sorry, I checked CNN and as of two seconds ago, they had nothing up...I get it now...

Come again? Say reason for thread title.

This. Had we not required the airframe to be compatible with the less-than-critical (read useful) capability to V/STOL we would have better-than-F-22 capabilities. As it stands, we don't, and the sole reason (IMO) is because of design sacrifices made to appease the Marine Corps. Don't forget that the F-22 also had major problems and software issues early on, but few would argue its current pre eminence as an air-to-air fighter - those are problems that can be (at least in principle) solved. Lockheed would have been more than capable to build the next gen fighter without the requirement to make an aircraft also a helicopter. Take one look at the "competition" to the F-35 and you'll have no illusions about how requirements influenced design choices: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_X-32. Lockheed was able to "package it up" in a prettier container, but she's still a pig.

Lesson (not) learned is that you don't let a kid (the Marines) sit at the grown up's table when making important DOD-wide acquisitions, or if you do, you don't allow them to have disproportionate influence on the outcome.

I wonder if they could have done $34,999.99? That would have made me laugh out loud, and I would have actually enjoyed being the staff-O that got to type up the MFR or whatever. "It is 'tiered', congressman..." I understand this better now, and FULLY grasp that everyone in the AF answers to someone, including the COS. HOWEVER, the fault of the AF isn't that they currently have their hands tied by Congress/must do what they say. No one is blaming them for that, but there is NO DOUBT the AF could have and should have seen this coming and postured themselves earlier during "cold ops" to deal with the inevitable. Congress will likely almost always say "no" to one of their "children" at first request. The AF (at least parts of it) interfaces with Congress on a daily or weekly basis. Those individuals who do, know this, grasp how the sausage is made, and understand that they're not going to get something the first time they ask. The point? They were negligent in not initiating this effort years ago - that's the problem and complaint. Bitching about $35K vs $34K is just good fun. I don't like blaming the messenger either, but I do think the AF has played a greater role in this "crisis" than just a message passer between the country's legislators and the line fliers. The 5-year hiatus on airline retirements built up a 5-year backlog of hiring that was certain to affect retention. Now, we're reacting, when we had all the opportunity in the world to be proactive. Seems like a missed opportunity, and one which, if properly addressed, would have been a staff effort actually worthy of receiving OPR bullets.

Mostly agree with you, but not on your point that paying everyone the same is a solution (hello socialism). If someone has a skill set that is in higher demand it can command a higher price, and it should. Now, the $1K difference between AFSCs is amusing AF logic, as if it was the product of some Rube Goldberg device, and I agree with you that if they're going to pay people equivalently the same amount/bonus, they should just make it the same across the board - $1K difference between 11Xs ain't going to make a difference in retention for those seeking money - it will make a difference for those who want to feel like they are valued by the organization - which a bonus structured like this goes a long way to undermining. That said, if there is a (much) greater need for certain AFSCs, they should reflect that in the bonus they offer. Ultimately though, I'm not one for bonuses and would prefer to see the AF tackle this problem in a completely different way that represents the value provided to the DOD that each AFSC brings. I would rather have them divorce the pay scale from O-whatever and align it with AFSC. At this point in my career, I struggle more with the logic of paying O-1/2/3/4/5/6s the same when different AFSCs bring inherently different value to the warfighting table. Same is true for Es.

For a recent example, check out his "analysis" on the Thunderbird mishap...laughable.

Does this mean the USN gets back Miramar?

If it was X-dollars pegged to inflation/pay raises, meaning they recognize its value decreases as other pays increase, I would have taken that as a signal that they realized there was a systematic issue with the bonus of the last 25 years - as it is, I don't really any positive signals being sent with the current suggested bonus levels.