Beaker16

For HCs, it's a great community with an awesome mission set. Moody and DM are the only AD locations, Guard units are at Elmendorf (AK), Moffett (CA) and Gabreski (NY) and Reserves are at Patrick SBF (FL). I was at Moody for five years and got to DM in early '24. I've been gone a bit amount between 4 deployments, LFEs and TDYs. Upgrade timelines depend on ops tempo, I upgraded to AC ~2.5 and IP 4 years as a pipeline guy. Our community has a lot of leeway in our operations between sitting CSAR/PR alert and collateral support missions, conducting airdrop, AAR tanker, AAR receiver, airland, NVG LL, FARP. Deployments are 4-6 months, with a 1:2 dwell. Units are tasked with IRF (short notice deployments) and there have been activations for various reasons. As for joint spouse cross MDS, the A-10 is leaving DM and Moody. AFSOC is planning on moving multiple MDSs into DM, the F-35 is headed to Moody. While DM is the preferred location, Moody is good for family life and relatively close to a lot of major cities for day trips/weekends away. DM me for more specifics or questions, more than happy to chat.

I got to Vance Aug of 2016 and there were a max of 10 students per class T-38s between AD assignables, Guard and international. Luck and timing if you had a lot of the latter two, I saw one class with 3 AD students. If you tracked -38s you had a high likelihood of going 11F, to the extent you needed to be non-recommended. Towards the end of the year was heavily bias towards AD and almost everyone got an 11F, to the point it was a running joke if you tracked T-38s and completed your consolation prize was a Viper. FY17 to FY18 was max AB to reverse with drops. The first 3 classes had 3 11Fs between the JSUPT bases. It eased up and my Vance class (18-05) had 4 11Fs and 3 heavies. As others have stated, APFC ed over the FTUs and OPS units, guys and gals sat waiting for following courses for a year plus. There is a recent RAND study on pilot absorption at the ops units, creating a CMR pilot. It takes a lot of investment to create an E coded IP in a lot of MDSs. I became one 4 years from getting to my OPS unit and deployed 3 times in the process. It’s a difficult problem with a lot of teams but at this point I don’t even know the problem. Is it retention, is it a pilot shortage, is it a training efficiency issue, tasking issue even (air shows at JSUPT bases)? Mind boggling the shortsightedness on repeat.

I’ve been in the HC-130J for 6 years now, and flying is always awesome. At this point in my career routine sorties are a reprieve from admin duties and tasks. After making instructor I’ve found it extremely rewarding from brief, execution and debrief both homestation and deployed. There is a bit for the variety of mission events we accomplish and it is always different knowledge levels across crew positions and individual experience. Hopefully landing on unlit LZs or flying dissimilar formation at on NVGs will never feel like a job. If it does that would be my cue to leave.

I've heard of a valid Q3/1. Early OEF with sorties going around the clock a crew over torqued all four engines. DECTO 3/1'd the pilots and FE so the story goes to alleviate requal requirements while deployed. I agree, missing a level off by <100' and getting a 3/1 is asinine...monetary deviations and all. Even getting a Q2, or a line item downgrade for that is a bit much for a one time occurrence not on an IAP.

I fly block 6.0 HC-130Js, which is not certified for terminal area RNAV operations. There was a recent stick up about flying RNAV 1 STARs, since while certified our V3 specifically approves "enroute" RNAV operations. CTRL+F saved me and other experienced hours of digging through 5+ years of FCIFs, crosschecking FARs, HHQ directives and TOs to submit a pubs change. Plus it makes testing a breeze. Years ago I broke down learning pubs into three phases; raw knowledge, data and authority. 1. Know the black and white; TOs, checklist steps and restrictions, pubs and how does that translate to execution in the aircraft. 2. The data behind the checklist; how do all the supplements, -1-1, -1-4, FCIFs feed into themselves? Provides context to "why do we do this" questions. You can "know the back and white," but understanding and teaching it is another thing. 3. Who has the authority to change the pubs; improve execution procedures, waiver authorities (who I should be asking for a waiver, and have the deviation properly backed up with knowledge data) The age old "it was harder when I went through" discussion is valid imo. When folks don't get the trial by fire, perform or get out treatment though a rigorous syllabus emphasizing the basics and gain experience through hours, they end up at an ops unit inexperienced and below average hands. It takes a lot of effort by the line IPs help them progress to be at least SA neutral on the aircraft. I've personally seen two folks get reclassed out of an ops unit, and heard of others struggle to upgrade to AC.

That article reminds me of a UPT sortie. During my -38 cross country a bunch of tails were fueled that was contaminated with DEF. I'm in the backseat of one of the effected jets, and after an uneventful departure and cruise we're on vectors at KAMA. I put power in leveling out on final to not get slow 5nm from the FAF and nothing happens. I move them up more RPM doesn't change, no MGT rise. My IP took it at that point and goes to the mil stop, into AB, and back to what felt around 90 and the RPM doesn't shift from 80/82 respectively. Even as a dumbass stud I knew we were in a negative energy state for level flight, clean. He briefly says to the effect "get your stuff together, we might need to get out." I trusted him (and the seat) through that pattern and we landed flaps 60%, and even with that the jet fell out (read stalled) in the flare. For the MIG-23 incident, I can see potential confusion on verbiage and ejection decision criteria, especially if it was someone with limited aviation experience. The NTSB preliminary report mentions if either seat goes both go. In non 0-0 seats I would not delay the decision to eject, and doubt those were. https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/343511

Yep. I saw a copy/paste from a HAF prerelease, to be effective 1 Jan ‘23. Bonkers I might need a masters to make major, but not even a bachelors to go fly for one. Edit - checked my email, and sure enough had a forwarded message from my CC with Gen Miller’s release. This is definitely going to catch out some 2015 YG folks.

Updated article: Ukrainian missile defense systems currently reported to be the kinetic effects. https://apnews.com/article/225dd98252e778bdc678f8596962833c ____ Initial post: Russian missiles impacted in Poland, killing two. If confirmed, interested to see the response. https://apnews.com/article/9202c032cf3a5c22761ee71b52ff9d52

I'm curious how the board process has changed/if at all with the shift to the 2-line PRF, elimination of BPZ/IPZ/APZ and new stratification criteria. WRT bullets being readable to all career fields, I've seen recent feedback from a NAF to try and avoid acronyms to enhance general readability...at what point to CCDR/CCMD, hell even TDY become "standard" acronyms? Isn't the purpose of line operational units to provide combat mission ready forces to combatant commanders? There should be a APFC owned publication similar to the AFTTP 3-2.5 or DOD Style Issuance Guide with common use acronyms that DAF can point to and say to use this. But that would make too much sense and take away people's subjective "in my experience" say.

I think a justifying a Q3 with "documenting" a discrepancy is asinine. If we banish folks for smaller mistakes, it creates a culture of non-reporting and non-accountability. The ultimate goal is to debrief every sortie and preform to a higher standard during the next hack. Every aircrew member should be on their game every time they step, meet Q1 standards and discuss with the dudes and dudettes when they were exceeded. I get there are black and white standards in MDS Vol 2s. As tac mentioned it takes a strong core of line IP/EPs to holistically uphold those standards and foster a Squadron and intern community that fosters development. For example, I previously violated my MDS V3 by accomplishing a mission event under a training LAA (1000AGL vs 1000MSL). It was as an honest mistake that we overlooked. Before we did it we discussed COAs as a crew, accomplished an inflight terrain analysis and pressed. It ultimately lead to no downgrades, and we passed a emphasis point that LAAs are easily misattributed, specifically when operating close to sea level. Since then I've heard three stories with a eerily similar root causes that weren't discussed.

This eerily summarized my stint there. My unit was there middle of July through the end. Day to day was extremely frustrating at best. I (along with all my friends that were there) are still working through with what we experienced, and there is no singular answer to any of the problems we saw, or that have been noted throughout this thread.

WRT smallpox, I was vaccinated in 2019 for CMR requirements. The vaccine (ACAM2000) was administered with the 15 pokes method. Only vaccine I've received with a 3 week care time.

I don't believe the strike was a consolation prize by any means. In my opinion it was warranted based on a credible threat, but failed in execution due to the ISR and C2 limitations at the time. Senior leadership briefed the press with their knowledge at the time, and then the NYT did there own research and uncovered facts contrary to what was previously briefed. Gaps in information occur all the time - almost every damn decision made over the last 2 months was done in an asymmetrical information environment due to a multitude of factors. As for leadership being fired, do you think the strike is a singular reason for that, or the entire withdrawal CF? __ For the ongoing ROE and strike authority conversation, if you have the clearance please take the time to look SIPR/JWICS and read the baseline docs.

I can say with high confidence they're not going to fly again, let alone be moved from their current spot.

Recently went through the HC- schoolhouse being -38 trained. My stick partner was also -38 trained, and we didn't have many CRM issues, rather a pretty big personality conflict. Personally, once I realized that being more proactive as both PM/PF rather than just doing what the checklist said things got exponentially better, and was a pretty good primer for going to my OPS unit. Also studying* effectively** as I had 2 other aircraft to compare to when it came to systems, terminology and application meant I was translating relatable things rather than starting from zero. I didn't understand TOLD outside of the basics and SEROC post UPT, and after the schoolhouse and a few conversations with IPs it clicked. For the most part all of the new copilots that have come in the last year and a half are up to speed and willing to learn. We have three separate syllabi to complete post Kirtland before we're CMR, and I got those done fairly quickly due to manning and IRF requirements.