SOS/ACSC information

[Fuzz]

As to your early examples of CSAFs, a lot has changed in 60 years. The structure of the military is entirely different, the way we wage war is different (air, land & sea vs air, land, sea, cyber & space), and the world has changed. These require our leaders become educated, there's more to leading military than tactical prowess, eventually one needs to learn to operate as higher levels by building on their tactical knowledge. Yes we overeducate our leaders in quantity but not in quality. Fewer high quality programs would be more valuable, ones that actually required significant effort but made the effort worth the time put in, and not cramming a 2 week course into 5. We need highly educated leaders but we need to max perform these education opportunities to return them to the operational front as soon as possible to leverage what they've learned not sit them on the side lines for 4-5 years.

[bfargin]

Sadly what most of you are describing as currently valued characteristics in AF leadership can be seen in the civilian world as well (paperwork over substance). I got out of the AF back in 1992 and am now a university business professor. I have said for several years that we are the most educated we have ever been as a nation, but have less sense than ever. We value the degree (paperwork) over actual learning (either through study or experience). The importance of degrees (the more the better) is way overrated by our culture. And yes, I do realize that demand is why I get paid as much as I do.

As an experiment one semester (with his department head's permission), a friend of mine offered on the first day of a Junior level required class (quantitative analysis) the option of each student taking a C- but never attending class again or attending class and receiving the grade they earned through study and effort. 13 of his 30 students took the C-. They just wanted the class credit (since it was a course known to require some thought/work). He's at a good business school on a prominent university's campus (not top 20, but AACSB accredited and well respected).

Edited June 3, 2016 by bfargin

[Muscle2002]

1 hour ago, TnkrToad said:

       I get what you're saying, but I think you're missing my point. The men I mentioned were effective as both combat leaders and as organizational leaders of an Air Force that was substantially larger than the one we have today, despite having gotten little in the way of PME. Bottom line, I see no evidence that having those who are being groomed for senior Air Force leadership spend so much of their careers in school (as indicated in my previous post) directly correlates to proportional increases of battlefield effectiveness or at the very least organizational efficiency. To get more academic-like, there's an imbedded counterfactual in your argument--you seem to indicate that: (1) if the functional equivalent of USAFA/AFROTC, ASBC, SOS, JPME II and Air War College had existed before the war (arguably ACSC already existed, in the form of ACTS), and (2) Tooey Spaatz, Hoyt Vandenberg, Nate Twining, Tommy White, Curt LeMay, etc., had the spent more time in those schools, that the Air Force wouldn't have been so bomber-myopic during the Second World War and the early Cold War. In fact, I would say the opposite is true. If they had spent more time getting the HAPDB doctrine preached to them during the interwar years, would they not have been even more misguided?

      The weird thing is that the first dyed-in-the-wool bomber pilot to become CSAF was John D. Ryan--in 1969. His six predecessors--Spaatz, Vandenberg, Twining, White, LeMay (yes, even including Curt LeMay) and McConnell--started their careers as fighter pilots. All but LeMay were, if anything, more aligned with fighters than bombers throughout the bulk of their respective careers. If they were bomber zealots, even though they came from fighter backgrounds and spent little to no time in PME schools which preached the virtues of strategic bombing, I can only imagine how bomber-focused they would have been in a more fully-articulated interwar airpower PME system. 

       You mention SAASS, which highlights a significant concern about the period of over-professionalization:

- Step 1: take your smartest, highest-potential folks from the already-selective IDE pool and put them through an additional year at SAASS (so far so good)

- Step 2: pick the smartest/most articulate SAASS students and sponsor them to get their PhDs (taking them out of operations for another three years--not so good). This is done because unwashed non-SAASS grads certainly couldn't teach SAASS students, and surely if a little education is good, then more must certainly be better.

- Step 3: send those smart guys to schools that aren't configured to let them get through in 3 years (which describes most civ Ph.D. programs), such that only about half complete their Ph.D. programs on time (oops--our very smartest folks spend up to 5 straight years in school--IDE-SAASS-Civ Ph.D) and now half of them are screwed (five years out of ops/not exactly operationally relevant, yet don't have Ph.D.s in hand, so can't teach at SAASS, as originally intended--really not good)

But we have to risk ruining our smartest folks' careers and denying the valuable services they otherwise could be providing to the operational Air Force because having more PME credentials and spending more time in school is magically going to make us smarter than real-world experience.

Alternatively, the folks who do get their Ph.D.s in the allotted 3-year timeframe spend most of their careers at Maxwell teaching, rather than leading or serving on senior staffs where they could have value-added operational effects. 

Education is awesome. The hyper-education I see for our senior leaders, which has second- and third-order effects such as I described above, does more harm than good (IMHO). 

Not trying to get into a pissing contest, but rather hoping for substantive discussion. I do find it interesting that we're arguing about military history, yet you don't specifically list military history as one of the fields we should be sending folks out to study at civ universities. By the way, the faith in strat bombing wasn't blind, certainly not by the end of the war. You can figure that out by reading (former SAASS instructor) Rob Ehler's book Targeting the Third Reich. Perhaps his book and others like his are being ignored in PME. If so, I really don't know why we have such an extensive PME program.

I would say you were very lucky to get a SAASS slot, without having had to attend ACSC beforehand.

TT

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

I likely worded my argument poorly regarding the educational background of the early USAF leaders.  My point, and the intended use of a counterfactual was to suggest that had those leaders spent time in real educational programs instead of PME, maybe one would have emerged to question the legitimacy of area bombing, unescorted bombing, industrial web-theory, etc.  In other words, I think less PME, and instead real education, could have been influential.  My statement that there was a blind faith in "strategic bombing" was likely hyperbolic.  Nevertheless, it took until 1944 for AAF leaders to understand that the trope, "the bomber will get through," was completely wrong.  Moreover, despite the fact that leaders adjusted techniques in bombing (see The Science of Bombing by Wakelam), many still adhered to the idea that relentless bombing would break the morale of the German people, which has been shown not to be true (see Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare by Tami Biddle Davis).  Still, strategic bombing was effective, just not in the way that advocates promised.  Adam Tooze's The Wages of Destruction argues this point quite well.  BTW, thanks for the suggested reading.  I have not read that book, but Ehler's book on the Mediterranean air campaign was fantastic.

I mention all of that not to get into a pissing contest either (I, like you, want substantive discussion as well), but to suggest that maybe had some leaders been exposed to a real educational program, where critical thinking was emphasized, they may have had enough exposure to ideas that would cause them to challenge the doctrine of the time.

I was fortunate to be selected for SAASS, but I was not the first nor last to attend without going to IDE in-residence.  I did get credit for IDE through another program, which likely helped my case.

ETA: My omission of history was unintentional.  I included the humanities, which history, IMO, is a part.

Edited June 3, 2016 by Muscle2002

[TnkrToad]

1 hour ago, Muscle2002 said:

I likely worded my argument poorly regarding the educational background of the early USAF leaders.  My point, and the intended use of a counterfactual was to suggest that had those leaders spent time in real educational programs instead of PME, maybe one would have emerged to question the legitimacy of area bombing, unescorted bombing, industrial web-theory, etc.  In other words, I think less PME, and instead real education, could have been influential.  My statement that there was a blind faith in "strategic bombing" was likely hyperbolic.  Nevertheless, it took until 1944 for AAF leaders to understand that the trope, "the bomber will get through," was completely wrong.  Moreover, despite the fact that leaders adjusted techniques in bombing (see The Science of Bombing by Wakelam), many still adhered to the idea that relentless bombing would break the morale of the German people, which has been shown not to be true (see Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare by Tami Biddle Davis).  Still, strategic bombing was effective, just not in the way that advocates promised.  Adam Tooze's The Wages of Destruction argues this point quite well.  BTW, thanks for the suggested reading.  I have not read that book, but Ehler's book on the Mediterranean air campaign was fantastic.

I mention all of that not to get into a pissing contest either (I, like you, want substantive discussion as well), but to suggest that maybe had some leaders been exposed to a real educational program, where critical thinking was emphasized, they may have had enough exposure to ideas that would cause them to challenge the doctrine of the time.

I was fortunate to be selected for SAASS, but I was not the first nor last to attend without going to IDE in-residence.  I did get credit for IDE through another program, which likely helped my case.

ETA: My omission of history was unintentional.  I included the humanities, which history, IMO, is a part.

Copy all; problem is it's awfully hard to find civilian schools where true critical thinking is happening. I can only speak to the history side, but in current-day academia, what passes for critical thinking is figuring out how to take a historical event--no matter what the event is--and turn it into race/class/gender/sexuality narrative. Not many schools out there with military historians who actually do operational mil history. Good on ya' for reading Tooze, btw--I'm still bitter at him for not writing a good conclusion chapter. 

Regarding ACTS, the bottom line is this: the majority of the faculty in the mid-30s were fighter pilots, and the vast majority of the students were fighter pilots, too. A substantial number of instructors and students were graduates of ivy league schools; Hal George forewent the opportunity to clerk for a Supreme Court justice to become a pilot. Grandison Gardner had a master's from MIT. Leon Johnson (he was just a student, not instructor) had a master's from Cal Tech. I could go on. Possum Hansell had a master's in mechanical engineering from Georgia Tech. He entered ACTS as a fighter pilot--he was even part of Chennault's demo team--and graduated a diehard bomber advocate. Bottom line, despite being outnumbered, the bomber mafiosos somehow still got everyone to buy into the notion of unescorted HAPDB doctrine. Either the fighter instructors--which included future four-stars Vandenberg and Partridge--couldn't argue their way out of wet paper sack, or (more plausibly) the bomber guys made some pretty darn good arguments. 

If you're really interested, Conrad Crane just came out with a new book, American Airpower Strategy in World War II: Bombs, Cities, Civilians, and Oil. I haven't read it yet; it'll probably screw up everything I know about WW II strategic bombing. 

TT

[Chuck17]

Logical, fact based, unemotional opinions backing arguments of substance over an issue that matters to the future of the USAF... Seems like an anomaly around here sometimes...

FWIW, I'm an in-res IDE guy who followed on to ASG. Like others, I found the first year to be almost a complete waste. It gave me a sister-service networking opportunity and a chance to write - something I plan to do upon retirement. Other than that, I went to school to go to a second year of school. The real learning was in the second year, and made the entire experience worth it. Scoff what you will, this same model (two-years of mid-career PME) has been used for centuries by some of the most successful armed forces in history. We aren't inventing new ways to educate here... We are in fact lagging behind in that department in my opinion. 

We don't have it all figured out. In fact, the over-education of our officer corps as they proceed toward O-6 is a real topic of discussion... But there has to be a balance. Not everyone can depart the line for two years mid career. Not everyone should. Not everyone has the drive, brains, or desire to. That's not a bad thing. That's expectation management. But sending officers of 20+ years experience to just a little under three and a half years of schooling in their service is not overeducation IMHO -- ASBC (4 weeks), SOS (6 weeks), IDE (1 year), ASG (1 year), War College (1 year) - three years, spread out over the career, is nothing. Just my opinion. And realizing there's other things that pull dudes off the line for months/years -- WIC, TPS, JPME-II, Safety School, staff, etc -- I guess my question is, what's the alternative?

Where do our officers get the education they need to be effective in the joint world? Because I'm telling you, the USAF is getting murdered in the joint environment. It should be our wheelhouse, and we suck at it - something that's still shocking to me given the quality of some of the dudes I was at school with. Short of throwing folks into the deep end and letting them sink or succeed on the job, the only prep for entry into that world is PME (of all forms, correspondence included) - comments on the quality of that prep aside.

These aren't things I knew about or cared about on the line. They are things that I touch daily now, in a joint and service-headquarters level environment in which there is far too little understanding of history, theory, politics, and doctrine to go around. That speaks directly to the quality and breadth (read: civilian schools and PME) of our education programs... You're on to something when you talk about broadening/diversifying the school experience. But there is an element of quantity that has to come into play as well - because flying the line forever isn't an option yet, and if you're going to go to staff anyway I'd rather have you be trained and educated at the staff than not. 

Spears accepted willingly.

Cheers, 

Chuck

--spelling edits

Edited December 30, 2022 by Chuck17

[Muscle2002]

If you're really interested, Conrad Crane just came out with a new book, American Airpower Strategy in World War II: Bombs, Cities, Civilians, and Oil. I haven't read it yet; it'll probably screw up everything I know about WW II strategic bombing. 

TT

I will take a look. I enjoyed his American Airpower Strategy in the Korean War.

[Fuzz]

2 hours ago, Chuck17 said:

But sending officers of 20+ years experience to just a little under three and a half years of schooling in their service is not overeducation IMHO -- ASBC (4 weeks), SOS (6 weeks), IDE (1 year), ASG (1 year), War College (1 year) - three years, spread out over the career, is nothing.

Chuck, I think you are correct. Which is why I said quantity versus quality. Let's look at the schooling a officer receives:

ROTC: Little to no education on how the AF or the military as a whole works, but damn did I know how to perform a right column, some useless leadership quotes and AFI 36-2903. What I wished I had learned: What the career timeline looks like, not talking careerist stuff, but opportunities that are available at different points in a career. Also things like what the different levels of PME are, how school selections work, what types of schools are available at each level (NPS, NDU etc), about programs like SAASS and SAMS.

ASBC: Now defunct and pretty much an extension of college, usually known for finally being able to afford to get shitfaced and not eat ramen for the rest of the month because you have a paycheck. (I never attended because it was closing down when I joined, but this was what friends told me).

SOS: Have yet to hear anyone say they learned anything at the course, besides how out of touch many support O's are with actual operations. Also who can forget Icarus or Flickerball?

IDE: Your words speak for themselves.

ASG: So after 1 year and 3 months of schooling and 3 courses (plus a couple months for PCS's), you finally attended a worthwhile education program. 

War College: I've heard mixed reviews of these courses, and there certainly isn't any shortage of articles critical of the state of all the War Colleges.

Why do we get killed at the Joint Level? Maybe because the Army's version of O-3 PME is 3 months long or their officers attend IDE/CGSC early than our officers (still Captains). We do a pretty shitty job of educating our officers on how the military works and then seem surprised when they don't perform at joint schools. Ideally a lot of this should happen via mentoring by leaders but we do need to provide better education earlier in our officer's careers.

*For the record I haven't attended SOS yet, this is just something I'm interested in and have talked to a cross section of officers across multiple branches including up to the O-6 level.

[Karl Hungus]

9 hours ago, Chuck17 said:

 Where do our officers get the education they need to be effective in the joint world? Because I'm telling you, the USAF is getting murdered in the joint environment. It should be our wheelhouse, and we suck at it - something that's still shocking to me given the quality of some of the dudes I was at CGSC with. Short of throwing folks into the deep end and letting them sink or succeed on the job, the only prep for entry into that world is PME (of all forms, correspondence included) - comments on the quality of that prep aside.

So you're an advocate for PME in its current form (ASBC/SOS/ACSC, all of which are wastes of time/money and should be canceled/already have been canceled)... yet the people who have attended said wastes of PME, the ones we depend on to "be effective in the joint world", are the ones getting "murdered in the joint environment".  So, the current system is a failure... but we should stick with the current system.  WTF?

[Chuck17]

Did you even read the next paragraph after the one you quoted? The one where I further explain what we don't have enough of...? Floated an idea of what we need more of? 

Advocate of the current system is a bridge too far, as I said earlier in my post when I said the first year was a waste. However, I'm an advocate of PME in some of the current forms - others need to go or be heavily modified and or incentivized.

What I am not an advocate of is thinking that since I got these here wings on my chest that I know everything and need no further value-added education in any form, specifically that of PME. But I don't expect that line of thinking to resonate much here.

Chuck

+1 edit to clarify

Edited June 4, 2016 by Chuck17

[panchbarnes]

9 hours ago, Chuck17 said:

Where do our officers get the education they need to be effective in the joint world? Because I'm telling you, the USAF is getting murdered in the joint environment. It should be our wheelhouse, and we suck at it - something that's still shocking to me given the quality of some of the dudes I was at CGSC with. Short of throwing folks into the deep end and letting them sink or succeed on the job, the only prep for entry into that world is PME (of all forms, correspondence included) - comments on the quality of that prep aside.

These aren't things I knew about or cared about on the line. They are things that I touch daily now, in a joint and service-headquarters level environment in which there is far too little understanding of history, theory, politics, and doctrine to go around. That speaks directly to the quality and breadth (read: civilian schools and PME) of our education programs... You're on to something when you talk about broadening/diversifying the school experience. But there is an element of quantity that has to come into play as well - because flying the line forever isn't an option yet, and if you're going to go to staff anyway I'd rather have you be trained and educated at the staff than not.

My personal observations:

No amount of PME will ensure success in the Joint environment

Factors (in no particular order):

Politics - Which service historically *owns* this particular Command (can't speak for the Puzzle Palace).  Do you have top cover from the big boss?

Street Cred - What do you bring to the table? (combat exp, exotic quals, and/or other warfighting skillsets).  Are you fighting to get additional combat time/skillsets for yourself and future Airmen?  I've not seen AF leadership push subordinates for street cred (again my observations), because it's not what gets Airmen promoted (careerism).  You can't influence anyone based on exec/TMT/party planning experience.  No one in the Joint world cares how many AADs you have.  The successful Joint officer gets people's attention because he/she has BTDT.

Personality - Are you a pompous asshole or are you a bro/sis? Team player or back stabber?  Just working to get by, or fighting to move the mission forward?  This is not exclusive to the AF.  A good dude/dudette is going to be successful no matter where he/she goes.

Leadership - This is where AF gets crushed (IMHO) because we don't push our Os into *real* leadership positions early on (unlike the USN/USMC/USA).  Instead we mold them into managers, and guess what happens when they get into a Joint billet?  They get pushed into managerial/support billets because they lack the leadership skills and street creds. 

Lastly, I find value in AU's in-residence officer PME programs (lectures/seminars/networking/discussions).  But I hate the location, and I hate the fact that none of the learning matters outside of Montgomery, Alabama. 

 

 

[General Chang]

We get killed in the GO Joint billet competition because our fast burners only have 22-24 months of Joint time.  We lack credible Joint FGO time (compared to other services), plain and simple.  It has zero to do with education, PME or otherwise.

[SurelySerious]

We get killed in the GO Joint billet competition because our fast burners only have 22-24 months of Joint time.  We lack credible Joint FGO time (compared to other services), plain and simple.  It has zero to do with education, PME or otherwise.

[Chuck17]

Chang, I get what you're saying, but I'm living it, and I disagree. Im sure it manifests differently and is amplified at the GO level. Education lays the foundation for experience, just as experience does for leadership - we aren't getting that right.

Chuck

[HeloDude]

1 hour ago, General Chang said:

We get killed in the GO Joint billet competition because our fast burners only have 22-24 months of Joint time.  We lack credible Joint FGO time (compared to other services), plain and simple.  It has zero to do with education, PME or otherwise.

Funny, based off your comments in this and other threads, you seem to lack credibility on most issues you comment on.  Not a personal attack, just an observation.  Or are you still trying to tell us there isn't a problem keeping in pilots?  

[pawnman]

4 hours ago, General Chang said:

We get killed in the GO Joint billet competition because our fast burners only have 22-24 months of Joint time.  We lack credible Joint FGO time (compared to other services), plain and simple.  It has zero to do with education, PME or otherwise.

And why do so few of our officers get joint time?  Seems like it would lead us back to that manning crisis that you keep insisting we don't have.  If manning were healthy, we wouldn't have to send only the top 10% of our school graduates to joint assignments like it was some kind of reward.

[di1630]

JOINT TIME IS NOT REQUIRED TO BE A GOOD LEADER.

NATO is a shitshow, and our services still are full of generals who would rather stamp their name on a pet project than kick our enemies asses. The best future Generals have already left for the airlines.

[General Chang]

On June 6, 2016 at 3:37 AM, pawnman said:

And why do so few of our officers get joint time?  Seems like it would lead us back to that manning crisis that you keep insisting we don't have.  If manning were healthy, we wouldn't have to send only the top 10% of our school graduates to joint assignments like it was some kind of reward.

In this context, manning matters not.  We don't need to send more people joint in order to compete for high-level joint positions.  We need to send the top 10% to more joint assignments (and definitely not curtail the first assignment at the 22-month point).  The CSAF also supports this line of thinking.

The difficulty: the O-7 pole year is at 24 years ("in the zone" for O-7, if you will).  This is the earliest of any service.  In fact, a couple of years ago, we selected more O-7s in one class year at their 23-year point than 24-year selectees, although we are back to predominantly 24-years at the most recent board.  Couple this with an already tight career developmental timeline that (typically) includes two O-6 commands and several years of the aforementioned schooling, and it suddenly gets very difficult to push our best through significant, important joint positions.  

I'm sure this facts-based post will harness double-digit thumbs-down responses.  Doesn't make it any less true.

[Skitzo]

In this context, manning matters not.  We don't need to send more people joint in order to compete for high-level joint positions.  We need to send the top 10% to more joint assignments (and definitely not curtail the first assignment at the 22-month point).  The CSAF also supports this line of thinking.

The difficulty: the O-7 pole year is at 24 years ("in the zone" for O-7, if you will).  This is the earliest of any service.  In fact, a couple of years ago, we selected more O-7s in one class year at their 23-year point than 24-year selectees, although we are back to predominantly 24-years at the most recent board.  Couple this with an already tight career developmental timeline that (typically) includes two O-6 commands and several years of the aforementioned schooling, and it suddenly gets very difficult to push our best through significant, important joint positions.  

I'm sure this facts-based post will harness double-digit thumbs-down responses.  Doesn't make it any less true.

If we are the earliest of any service and this causes constraints then why? Don't we also have more general officers per capita than other services? What advantage does it provide us? More time before mandatory retirement? What does that provide?

Why does a Lt Col need to command a flying squadron? Why can't a Major? Why can a Major command a MX Sqd? Why can't a Lt Col command a Group? Maybe one single Colonel to command a Wing?

Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

[hispeed7721]

it suddenly gets very difficult to push our best through significant, important joint positions.

It's difficult to push our very best through significant jobs positions because they're all breaking the gate down to get out. That's why it's hard to get good senior leadership. Fix retention and you'll suddenly find a wealth of great leaders available

Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

[di1630]

More sh-t about career development....you'd think our mission was to produce generals and compete jointly by Chang's take. Personally, I'd rather get some competent leadership who knows how to win fights vs make rank by getting "pushed through the career pipeline"

Currently our leaders cannot:

-Effectively manage personnel

-Efficiently procure new weapons systems

-Retain most valuable talent

-Formulate a winning strategy in the Middle East

-Understand the most used mission set in the past 20 years (CAS)

But damn, they did a helluva job making rank.

[pawnman]

21 hours ago, General Chang said:

In this context, manning matters not.  We don't need to send more people joint in order to compete for high-level joint positions.  We need to send the top 10% to more joint assignments (and definitely not curtail the first assignment at the 22-month point).  The CSAF also supports this line of thinking.

The difficulty: the O-7 pole year is at 24 years ("in the zone" for O-7, if you will).  This is the earliest of any service.  In fact, a couple of years ago, we selected more O-7s in one class year at their 23-year point than 24-year selectees, although we are back to predominantly 24-years at the most recent board.  Couple this with an already tight career developmental timeline that (typically) includes two O-6 commands and several years of the aforementioned schooling, and it suddenly gets very difficult to push our best through significant, important joint positions.  

I'm sure this facts-based post will harness double-digit thumbs-down responses.  Doesn't make it any less true.

Maybe we should start considering people for leadership positions based on things other than how fast they make Lt Col or Col.

[Herk Driver]

Maybe we should start considering people for leadership positions based on things other than how fast they make Lt Col or Col.

But then you would have to disregard the RAND study that told us we had to make the pole year at 24 years. And that in order to be competitive that you had to be a graduated or sitting Wing CC. How else do you get there without being a BTZ guy?

[Muscle2002]

22 hours ago, General Chang said:

In this context, manning matters not.  We don't need to send more people joint in order to compete for high-level joint positions.  We need to send the top 10% to more joint assignments (and definitely not curtail the first assignment at the 22-month point).  The CSAF also supports this line of thinking.

The difficulty: the O-7 pole year is at 24 years ("in the zone" for O-7, if you will).  This is the earliest of any service.  In fact, a couple of years ago, we selected more O-7s in one class year at their 23-year point than 24-year selectees, although we are back to predominantly 24-years at the most recent board.  Couple this with an already tight career developmental timeline that (typically) includes two O-6 commands and several years of the aforementioned schooling, and it suddenly gets very difficult to push our best through significant, important joint positions.  

I'm sure this facts-based post will harness double-digit thumbs-down responses.  Doesn't make it any less true.

 

Beyond maximizing the remaining years of service before mandatory retirement, why does the USAF need to make GOs so early?  If by accelerating an officer, the service necessarily truncates meaningful joint time, and that lack of joint time is a reason the USAF often loses to the other services in filling key joint GO billets, then would it not make sense to slow the timeline ever-so-slightly?  

Superficially, the reasoning for a pole year at 24 years reads like a tautology.  The USAF needs GOs at the 24-year point because it needs GOs at the 24-year point.

[tac airlifter]

7 minutes ago, Herk Driver said:

But then you would have to disregard the RAND study that told us we had to make the pole year at 24 years. And that in order to be competitive that you had to be a graduated or sitting Wing CC. How else do you get there without being a BTZ guy?

You can be a sitting WG CDR at 24 years as an IPZ guy your whole career.  AFSOC just had one picked up for a star.  The problem isn't the math, it's the erroneous assumption that BTZ is required to compete for GO.

di1630s post was so incredibly spot on.  The facts are undeniable after 15 years of losing wars: we suck.  Much like an alcoholic must first admit they have a problem, our force, at every level, needs to accept the reality that we are not accomplishing the tasks set before us.  There should be a firestorm of debate about why, and a willingness to examine and scrap all aspects of our institution that have brought us defeat.  Instead no one is talking about this, they all want to preserve the system that did them a solid despite the fact we are failing.  The careerists all keep chugging along "mentoring" younger people to be like them.  Disgusting.  

[Herk Driver]

You can be a sitting WG CDR at 24 years as an IPZ guy your whole career.  AFSOC just had one picked up for a star.  The problem isn't the math, it's the erroneous assumption that BTZ is required to compete for GO.

di1630s post was so incredibly spot on.  The facts are undeniable after 15 years of losing wars: we suck.  Much like an alcoholic must first admit they have a problem, our force, at every level, needs to accept the reality that we are not accomplishing the tasks set before us.  There should be a firestorm of debate about why, and a willingness to examine and scrap all aspects of our institution that have brought us defeat.  Instead no one is talking about this, they all want to preserve the system that did them a solid despite the fact we are failing.  The careerists all keep chugging along "mentoring" younger people to be like them.  Disgusting.  

Where is that sarcasm emoticon when you need it?

I don't disagree...what I am saying is that you have to convince the powers that be to throw the logic behind this study out. 24 year is the primary look for GO, in order to groom a guy for CSAF with all the requisites that entails, we have to make you a GO by that point. In order to make you a GO at 24 years you need x, y and z. These are many of the reasons that the A1 community does everything that it does...it all revolves around this jacked up reasoning.

Funny that other services make Chiefs of their services without the 24th year being the magic year. And for all of our planning and grooming, we (the AF) still compete poorly with the other services.