SOS/ACSC information

[TnkrToad]

3 hours ago, tac airlifter said:

di1630s post was so incredibly spot on.  The facts are undeniable after 15 years of losing wars: we suck.  Much like an alcoholic must first admit they have a problem, our force, at every level, needs to accept the reality that we are not accomplishing the tasks set before us.  There should be a firestorm of debate about why, and a willingness to examine and scrap all aspects of our institution that have brought us defeat.  Instead no one is talking about this, they all want to preserve the system that did them a solid despite the fact we are failing.  The careerists all keep chugging along "mentoring" younger people to be like them.  Disgusting.  

I get what you're saying, but I don't see how failures in Iraq and Afghanistan (the 15 years of losing wars you refer to) indicate failures within the Air Force. Somehow, I don't think the strategic decision to put a helluva lot of boots on the ground in Afghanistan, in order to try to turn it into a modern Jeffersonian democracy, was driven by Air Force leaders. Likewise, was it not the ground planners' responsibility to win the argument that they needed more soldiers/marines for the Iraq invasion, in order to forestall an insurgency? Somehow, during all this, I don't recall the CENTCOM commander billet being filled by an Air Force general. 

I absolutely believe that we need to have competent Air Force senior leaders in positions of authority in the joint arena--and we need adequate numbers of quality folks in value-added joint FGO billets--in order to keep our civilian masters and morons in other services from dragging us into more quagmires (which no amount of airpower--whether A-10s or F-35s--can unscrew).

GC/our overall senior leaders' approach to growing/placing leaders--not ones who fit a magical formula and timeline, but folks who truly get the proper employment of airpower and who understand that the social justice and square-filling culture they're implementing is antithetical to taking care of people--ain't helping our cause. Neither is the failure to provide adequate incentives to keep people in, nor is the failure to eliminate the many needless irritants that drive people with better options away from the service. 

Beat up our senior Air Force leaders all you want--they provide plenty of material--but I don't see how they can be blamed for getting and keeping us in ground force-centric quagmires.

TT

[tac airlifter]

TT, I was expecting that reply.  But we've treated these expanding wars as a sideshow for years, to our national detriment.  The USAF is leading the preponderance of KS activity.  We don't get a pass on the outcome.  Vietnam was a war plan authored with fail above our level, but we still have tons of L2 about our own failed implementation practices.  

If we're being tasked incorrectly, and we are, where are the GOs advocating better usage?  It's a cop out to blame politicians when our leaders are the ones championing shitty practices.  Where is the AT-6 or equivalent?  Where is the advocacy for better intel analysis practices?  Where is the equitable distribution of work load?  Why do I see so many O4/5's who haven't deployed at all while others have done a 1-1 for a decade?

we suck, and it's our fault.  Until we have done everything in our power to be better, it's wrong to blame politicians.  Yes, building a Jeffersonian democracy in a culture thousands of years entrenched in tribalism is stupid.  Where are the GOs saying that?  I could go on and on, from streamlining the strike approval process to ending dumb ass wasteful 365's, to constantly sending brand new know nothing BPZ never deployed types to command units downrange allowing them to check the command box without ever judging the merit of their work.  WTF are we doing?  From strategy to administrative implementation, we suck.  The line guys are kicking ass.  The institution is failing.  And there is value in saying that fact, because until we acknowledge our failures we can't hope to fix anything.  It's past time for us all to be on the same page: we are losing wars, the enemy is gaining ground, and it's our fault.  So what do we do about it?

[di1630]

Bingo...our generals aren't advocating/using resources correctly.

We send B-1's at a cost of $69k plus per flight hour to do XCAS in Afghanistan. After 15 yrs, we should have 6-9 sq's of A-29's doing that stuff. Instead our inept leadership wants to do it with F-35's because they learned Cold War techno-strategy at PME but can't critically think/adapt.

If our generals were held accountable like civilian company management, they'd all he fired for severe incompetence or in jail for defrauding shareholders (aka taxpayers in this case).

[TnkrToad]

1 hour ago, tac airlifter said:

TT, I was expecting that reply.  But we've treated these expanding wars as a sideshow for years, to our national detriment.  The USAF is leading the preponderance of KS activity.  We don't get a pass on the outcome.  Vietnam was a war plan authored with fail above our level, but we still have tons of L2 about our own failed implementation practices.  

If we're being tasked incorrectly, and we are, where are the GOs advocating better usage?  It's a cop out to blame politicians when our leaders are the ones championing shitty practices.  Where is the AT-6 or equivalent?  Where is the advocacy for better intel analysis practices?  Where is the equitable distribution of work load?  Why do I see so many O4/5's who haven't deployed at all while others have done a 1-1 for a decade?

we suck, and it's our fault.  Until we have done everything in our power to be better, it's wrong to blame politicians.  Yes, building a Jeffersonian democracy in a culture thousands of years entrenched in tribalism is stupid.  Where are the GOs saying that?  I could go on and on, from streamlining the strike approval process to ending dumb ass wasteful 365's, to constantly sending brand new know nothing BPZ never deployed types to command units downrange allowing them to check the command box without ever judging the merit of their work.  WTF are we doing?  From strategy to administrative implementation, we suck.  The line guys are kicking ass.  The institution is failing.  And there is value in saying that fact, because until we acknowledge our failures we can't hope to fix anything.  It's past time for us all to be on the same page: we are losing wars, the enemy is gaining ground, and it's our fault.  So what do we do about it?

Dude, I get it. Hence my "Beat up our senior Air Force leaders all you want--they provide plenty of material" comment. I disagree with you on one major point--it is right to blame politicians for the stupid political decisions they make, and the other services for their failures to convince politicians to stay out of quagmires, while we simultaneously look internally at the many things we're screwing up all on our own. 

I don't know which our our GOs are saying or not, since I ain't nowhere near any of them right now. I do know that Deptula was plenty vocal, and still is, about the insanity of the LOBOG (Lots of Boots on the Ground) we pursued/are pursuing. He retired as a three-star, even though he's helluva lot smarter and had/has more experience than those who pinned on 4 stars instead of him. Others will have to give insights as to what our senior leaders are doing to fight the stupidity at the joint level. Streamlining strike approval? I dunno--talk to the CAF guys. Better intel analysis? Hmm...talk to the CAF guys. I don't have a good answer for why we haven't bought a bunch of Super Tucanos; of course, I'm a tanker guy...again, talk to the fighter guys who mostly run the Air Force. Of course, that would require providing adequate incentives for them to want to remain on active duty or at least not driving them out through queep and stupid social justice policies. I can't/won't defend the stupid 365s, nor will I attempt to explain the square-filling that counts for professional development. Regarding O-4s/O-5s who get protected while others get kicked in the teeth with deployments, been there/done that...contrary to TC's arguments on JQP, I'm not sure CCs should be allowed to protect their shiny pennies from deployment taskings. 

Having done a full 3-year joint tour, I am convinced that some folks from other services simply don't/won't get airpower. Whether due to good old fashioned service parochialism or being blinded by their paradigms, it can take a huge amount of effort before they get a clue. Personal example: try telling a long-tab Special Forces guy that, no, you can't just launch a plane, get dip clearances to overfly Country X while the plane is en route, and get those dips communicated to the crew in a matter of a few hours (at which time the plane would be entering Country X's airspace). Even talking really slowly and using simple words didn't help. Motivation and effort can get people to do some pretty amazing things, but--barring something truly extraordinary (and this situation wasn't all that urgent)--not stuff like that. To some extent, the only way to prevent stupid ideas is to put air-savvy folks in positions of rank/responsibility, so they can tell those from other services to shut up and color when they push horribly bad ideas.

What to do about it? Since this is the SOS/ACSC thread, I'll suggest the following: 

- The only requirement for teaching a PME program should be having attended that PME program (think ACSC & SAASS). Or, perhaps better yet, have your active-duty ACSC and SAASS instructors be guys who are smart and have decent operational backgrounds (but are not in-res types) be the instructors. Funny, we hear about the ACTS bomber mafia, and how it somehow managed to brainwash a generation of interwar leaders with their strategic bombing doctrine, yet we forget that for most of them the only academic qualification they had was their ACTS diploma. By eliminating the need to have active-duty folks with the "right" credentials to teach courses, we can maximize the number of "shiny penny" types out in the field, doing useful work.

- Have some form of a companion trainer program at Maxwell/the P-gon/perhaps other bases, so that quality individuals can meet their flying gates and maintain their sanity/some semblance of connection to the flying world while teaching/working as staff weenies. Worked pretty well in the ACTS days.

- Rather than falling all over ourselves to celebrate biological diversity--race/gender/sexuality--for schools/promotion, select based on merit, while ensuring a mix of the best & brightest from across the mission sets (experiential diversity)

Plenty of other ideas, most of them probably better than mine...

TT

[BashiChuni]

stop making 1st LT's golden boys Execs

[waveshaper]

8 hours ago, TnkrToad said:

Beat up our senior Air Force leaders all you want--they provide plenty of material--but I don't see how they can be blamed for getting and keeping us in ground force-centric quagmires.

TT

This USAF senior leadership stuff is way out of my lane but I seem to remember "off the top of my head" one USAF General that had a wee bit of influence (four years worth) of setting the stage for this quagmire.

This guy (short excerpt from wiki); General Myers became the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs on October 1, 2001. In this capacity, he served as the principal military advisor to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council during the earliest stages of the War on Terror, including planning and execution of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. On September 30, 2005, he retired.

[17D_guy]

On 6/8/2016 at 9:45 AM, General Chang said:

In this context, manning matters not.  We don't need to send more people joint in order to compete for high-level joint positions.  We need to send the top 10% to more joint assignments (and definitely not curtail the first assignment at the 22-month point).  The CSAF also supports this line of thinking.

The difficulty: the O-7 pole year is at 24 years ("in the zone" for O-7, if you will).  This is the earliest of any service.  In fact, a couple of years ago, we selected more O-7s in one class year at their 23-year point than 24-year selectees, although we are back to predominantly 24-years at the most recent board.  Couple this with an already tight career developmental timeline that (typically) includes two O-6 commands and several years of the aforementioned schooling, and it suddenly gets very difficult to push our best through significant, important joint positions.  

I'm sure this facts-based post will harness double-digit thumbs-down responses.  Doesn't make it any less true.

This self inflicted timeline failure is amazing.  Basically the AF is destroying itself to identify people earlier than any other service for GO positions years in advance, because otherwise they won't get to an important position 20 years from now?  And.. that's on a timeline we set. 

As a service we're aware of it.  I've spoken to a few Col's now who've stated it's a problem, as well as a retired 2-star.  We're aware of what it's causing in the force, causing in leadership positions, causing in promotions... and we continue to do it.

So.. we control the totality of the development timeline.  We control the training, evaluations, assignment, education and even living locations and conditions of those who the Air Force has decided will one day assume responsibility for vast portions of the Air, Space and Cyber enterprise.

But we just can't seem to get it done compared to the other services who identify their folks later in their careers?  

[pawnman]

15 hours ago, TnkrToad said:

 

What to do about it? Since this is the SOS/ACSC thread, I'll suggest the following: 

- The only requirement for teaching a PME program should be having attended that PME program (think ACSC & SAASS). Or, perhaps better yet, have your active-duty ACSC and SAASS instructors be guys who are smart and have decent operational backgrounds (but are not in-res types) be the instructors. Funny, we hear about the ACTS bomber mafia, and how it somehow managed to brainwash a generation of interwar leaders with their strategic bombing doctrine, yet we forget that for most of them the only academic qualification they had was their ACTS diploma. By eliminating the need to have active-duty folks with the "right" credentials to teach courses, we can maximize the number of "shiny penny" types out in the field, doing useful work.

- Have some form of a companion trainer program at Maxwell/the P-gon/perhaps other bases, so that quality individuals can meet their flying gates and maintain their sanity/some semblance of connection to the flying world while teaching/working as staff weenies. Worked pretty well in the ACTS days.

- Rather than falling all over ourselves to celebrate biological diversity--race/gender/sexuality--for schools/promotion, select based on merit, while ensuring a mix of the best & brightest from across the mission sets (experiential diversity)

Plenty of other ideas, most of them probably better than mine...

TT

Funny you should say that.  I have a guy in my squadron who taught ACSC for three years, but because he wasn't a select to go to the school, couldn't get in-residence credit following the assignment.

[TnkrToad]

11 hours ago, waveshaper said:

This USAF senior leadership stuff is way out of my lane but I seem to remember "off the top of my head" one USAF General that had a wee bit of influence (four years worth) of setting the stage for this quagmire.

This guy (short excerpt from wiki); General Myers became the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs on October 1, 2001. In this capacity, he served as the principal military advisor to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council during the earliest stages of the War on Terror, including planning and execution of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. On September 30, 2005, he retired.

Good point--I forgot about Dick Myers. Of course, Army General Tommy Franks was CENTCOM commander from July 2000-July 2003. He had plenty of access to the President and SecDef, was sure happy to be seen on tv, and I imagine he made some good money on his book American Soldier. It would also be nice to know how vociferously Marine General Pete Pace (Vice CJCS for the entirety of Myers' chairmanship) argued against the Afghanistan/Iraq missions. 

Bottom line, of course we've should look first and foremost at our internal issues and strive to address them. My main point remains valid: when we look at the truly moronic way we often conduct tactical and operational-level air ops, and even more so make strategy that intrinsically involves air ops, I think we too easily ascribe failure to just airmen. 

Feel free to bash away at Air Force leadership, though. The problems noted above are real; it's funny that our fighter pilot-dominated Air Force seems to have so much difficulty figuring out how to manage the fighter enterprise--on the high end, with the F-35 debacle, and the low end, with the decision not to buy a whole bunch of Super Tucanos for COIN. It ain't just the fighter generals goofing up, though--I'm still waiting to see the first operational KC-46 to show up on an Air Force ramp, to start replacing the almost 60-year old tankers we're flying now. Maybe ACSC should be turned into a one-year acquisitions course...

TT

[ATIS]

The Navy is firing skippers right and left...so you aren't the only service with issues.  I think the Nav also has an issue with ID-ing folks with good paper too early that lack the BOG/Task and Purpose mentality of leading men and women in harms way.  Most are too scared about F-ing up.

 

ATIS

[waveshaper]

On ‎6‎/‎10‎/‎2016 at 8:51 AM, TnkrToad said:

Good point--I forgot about Dick Myers. Of course, Army General Tommy Franks was CENTCOM commander from July 2000-July 2003. He had plenty of access to the President and SecDef, was sure happy to be seen on tv, and I imagine he made some good money on his book American Soldier. It would also be nice to know how vociferously Marine General Pete Pace (Vice CJCS for the entirety of Myers' chairmanship) argued against the Afghanistan/Iraq missions. 

TT

I agree with 90% of your previous statement about not laying the blame on the USAF for the mess in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Yemen, the rest of the Middle East, Sub Saharan Africa, etc. I may even use some of your statements (quotes) to defend the honor of the USAF against mostly ill informed ground pounders and squids on another forum.

Here's a few more USAF big-shots (active duty/retired) that helped shape the lasts 15 years of this endless series of conflicts. These guys were all part of the Presidents inner circle and statutory members of the Presidents National Security Council.

-  USAF General Michael Hayden (retired from the USAF on July 1, 2008); Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence (April 21, 2005 – May 30, 2006). Director of the CIA (May 30, 2006 – February 12, 2009). Note; the CIA is no longer a statutory member (the CIA Director/Deputy Director only attends these council meetings when specifically invited). The CIA seat is now filled by the Director/Deputy Director of National Intelligence.

- USAF Lieutenant General James R. Clapper (retired from the USAF in 1995); Director of National Intelligence (August 5, 2010 – present).

 

Edited June 16, 2016 by waveshaper

[Clark Griswold]

1 hour ago, TnkrToad said:

Feel free to bash away at Air Force leadership, though. The problems noted above are real; it's funny that our fighter pilot-dominated Air Force seems to have so much difficulty figuring out how to manage the fighter enterprise--on the high end, with the F-35 debacle, and the low end, with the decision not to buy a whole bunch of Super Tucanos for COIN. It ain't just the fighter generals goofing up, though--I'm still waiting to see the first operational KC-46 to show up on an Air Force ramp, to start replacing the almost 60-year old tankers we're flying now. Maybe ACSC should be turned into a one-year acquisitions course...

Copy - cleared hot

Just two cents worth of opinion but of all the problems with the AF, that we have an X type of general for decades running it is the problem, in reality as we are a large organization with a diverse set of missions, we need a leadership cadre with a diverse career / operational background.  Generalists not specialists in charge.

I doubt we need dudes who spent the majority of their careers in the CAF, MAF, SOF or Strategic parts attaining the highest levels of qualification, we need smart, fast learners to gain experience and insight, then move to another major section of the AF to gain experience and insight there as they move towards upper leadership.

Being a 4 ship flight lead is a good indicator of a smart guy but those particular smarts may not make him/her a great GO, same would apply to a formation air drop qual'd MAF pilot.

Leadership has to have the strategic ability not necessarily the tactical ability.  

Can't agree more on the failure of CAF leadership on the epic fail to not acquire a low cost COIN / permissive environment platform and the MAF dropped the ball too by its epic fail on a light intra theatre mobility platform.  A prestige thing I believe, CAF generals think it is beneath the AF to fly an A-29 and MAF generals didn't want the Army to get a C-27 and then they shit canned it for spite, but I'm not cynical, not one bit...

[TnkrToad]

9 hours ago, pawnman said:

Funny you should say that.  I have a guy in my squadron who taught ACSC for three years, but because he wasn't a select to go to the school, couldn't get in-residence credit following the assignment.

Gotta love Air Force logic. Actual knowledge/competence (ACSC instructor learns more than his students in the process of teaching his lessons) takes a backseat to square filling (officer X had good timing/was lucky enough to get an alternate slot at ACSC, and gets in-res credit). Funnier one is: IDE or SDE select gets picked to go to a civ school to get an advanced academic degree. Since said individual is in the window for going in-res, he/she automatically gets in-res IDE/SDE credit. The non-select from the same year group puts in the same effort/gets the same civilian degree, and gets no in-res credit. 

Does it make sense? Not to me. Maybe to GC . . . 

[SnapLock]

21 hours ago, 17D_guy said:

This self inflicted timeline failure is amazing.  Basically the AF is destroying itself to identify people earlier than any other service for GO positions years in advance, because otherwise they won't get to an important position 20 years from now?  And.. that's on a timeline we set. 

As a service we're aware of it.  I've spoken to a few Col's now who've stated it's a problem, as well as a retired 2-star.  We're aware of what it's causing in the force, causing in leadership positions, causing in promotions... and we continue to do it.

So.. we control the totality of the development timeline.  We control the training, evaluations, assignment, education and even living locations and conditions of those who the Air Force has decided will one day assume responsibility for vast portions of the Air, Space and Cyber enterprise.

But we just can't seem to get it done compared to the other services who identify their folks later in their careers?  

I've always felt that we identify our leaders too early and then anoint them for grandeur without paying attention to their continued performance enough.  How many times have we all seen a douche bag CC that is a swinging dick that couldn't lead his way out of a paper bag?  Then because said CC is anointed he continues on up the ladder regardless of performance and his toxic leadership because he was an "SDE select" at his O-5 board.  I'm frankly tired of it.  I've seen so many great dudes who are just as smart and with better tactical and leadership skills brushed aside because they didn't go to school.  Ridiculous.  

Maybe if the AF cared more about the environment it is creating and actually putting THE best guy up for DO or CC instead of the guy who was anointed for it at his majors board then we might not have so many retention issues.  But, no we've got to groom the in-res guys to be CSAF of the AF someday and we've got to beat out the other services for senior officer positions.  

Edited June 11, 2016 by SnapLock

[Clark Griswold]

2 hours ago, SnapLock said:

I've always felt that we identify our leaders too early and then anoint them for grandeur without paying attention to their continued performance enough.  How many times have we all seen a douche bag CC that is a swinging dick that couldn't lead his way out of a paper bag?  Then because said CC is anointed he continues on up the ladder regardless of performance and his toxic leadership because he was an "SDE select" at his O-5 board.  I'm frankly tired of it.  I've seen so many great dudes who are just as smart and with better tactical and leadership skills brushed aside because they didn't go to school.  Ridiculous.  

Maybe if the AF cared more about the environment it is creating and actually putting THE best guy up for DO or CC instead of the guy who was anointed for it at his majors board then we might not have so many retention issues.  But, no we've got to groom the in-res guys to be CSAF of the AF someday and we've got to beat out the other services for senior officer positions.  

2

Not sure if it was on this forum or solving the world's problems over two beers at the Bra but the rationale to that I have heard is that once they have found the right guy they have to make sure he will be the right guy for the next promotion, select opportunity, recognition, etc... the attitude expressed to me, not one I accept mind you, is that the AF considers the sunk cost once it puts a person on the path to power and it is very reluctant to cut loose that investment even when evidence to the contrary that said person was a good pick comes up... F'd up reasoning in my humble opinion, good coaches and investors cut their losses if they see problem that is perennial, not fixable, getting worse and or all them.  

They don't wait to see if the problem will just go away on its own, they cut it out...  not saying at the first problem a leader at any level should get his/her walking papers but as an institution if it is apparent that they have gone as far as they can go or should, then for the good of the team take necessary but likely unpleasant action.

In reference to the second boldface point, they don't (big shocker) - from the attitude of you are replaceable from the CSAF himself, the detachment from the mission / day to day environment is incredible.  To some degree I think this is unfortunately probably an unavoidable trait of air forces in general not just the USAF.  We have lots of people, the vast majority are not in operations and of those in operations, only a small percentage participate in direct combat, combat support or other operations in a tactical environment where there is an appreciable amount of risk which has a tendency to keep the mind focused on that which is truly important.  The other members, God bless them, just may not realize this on an intuitive and conscious level and hence you get shoe clerks who believe some meaningless CBT, whose training has no real world value, is the most important weapon we wield.

It would really be a cultural shock but greatly limiting the rank available to certain sections of the AF might be a feasible solution, not easy as the entrenched shoe clerks would fight like hell to keep the status quo, but keeping their ranks high enough to manage their people but low enough to not cause trouble with make work projects could be done.

[pawnman]

On 6/10/2016 at 9:35 AM, ATIS said:

The Navy is firing skippers right and left...so you aren't the only service with issues.  I think the Nav also has an issue with ID-ing folks with good paper too early that lack the BOG/Task and Purpose mentality of leading men and women in harms way.  Most are too scared about F-ing up.

 

ATIS

At least the Navy is willing to fire these guys instead of protecting their investment, no matter how bad the decision turned out to be.

[Ram]

I think it's also an issue of Navy commanders operating much more without a net compared to USAF commanders.  A SQ/CC almost always has some sort of leadership network close at hand, whereas a Navy skipper is much more independent, forced to be self-reliant, and also consequentially works with MUCH less direct oversight.

 

Thus, when a skipper screws-up, it's huge and makes headlines.  Thus, the axe has but no choice but to swing.

[Jaded]

The axe has no choice but to swing? No choice based on what? 

[Ram]

I'm saying that big leadership screw ups that make the news will almost always result in a firing.  

USAF leadership failures at the O-5 level seem to happen much more quietly.  Because your standard USAF O-5 commander is usually safely ensconced at a base with multiple senior ranking leaders and plenty of peers close by, it's easier to keep a lid on mistakes, and I also think that there's more opportunity in the USAF for CCs to receive rapid and informal correction/mentoring from their peers and superiors.

Thus, failures of leadership in the USN seem to manifest in a much more large and serious sense.  Because they typically come to light late and after the damage has been done, the Navy's only recourse in many cases is removal from command.

[abmwaldo]

I'm finishing Joint Air Operations (ACSC DL 6.0) and I just want to kill the last lesson (exercise) this weekend. IT won't work on my MacBook with Safari. Anyone had any luck getting the .xml to work on a MacOs?

[Magellan]

9 hours ago, abmwaldo said:

I'm finishing Joint Air Operations (ACSC DL 6.0) and I just want to kill the last lesson (exercise) this weekend. IT won't work on my MacBook with Safari. Anyone had any luck getting the .xml to work on a MacOs?

Check the course discussion board in the lesson.  There is a lot of good advice to be had.  The ILAs and exercises in the last two self paced courses will anger you to no end.

[VMFA187]

Perhaps a bit off topic from what is being discussed here of late, however how would a Guard unit view a rated pilot from another service who is looking to join as an O-3? I've chosen not to complete USMC PME for O-4 promotion, but am 75% complete with SOS DL Course 22 having started in January. Am I wasting my time? Or would it be viewed favorably?

[Tunes3]

17 hours ago, abmwaldo said:

I'm finishing Joint Air Operations (ACSC DL 6.0) and I just want to kill the last lesson (exercise) this weekend. IT won't work on my MacBook with Safari. Anyone had any luck getting the .xml to work on a MacOs?

Use google chrome, I did this on my Mac last month.  Also, read the discussion board for the hint that will keep you from punching the computer after hour 6.9.

[abmwaldo]

Thanks. Chrome worked for me. Now the last applied section; I'm sure it will be riveting.


Sent from my iPhone using Baseops Network Forums

[slc]

Haven't started the last two applied sections but curious as to what this hint is?