USAF and Operation Anaconda

[Steve Davies]

I have just finished reading Not A Good Day To Die, which recounts Operation Anaconda principally from a ground pounder perspective.

While the book makes clear that both pre-planned and on-call CAS was crucial to the operation from the get-go, and concedes that the Air Force was only vaguely involved in the planning of the operation, it does little to analyse the eventual failures of fixed wing CAS (both the pre-planned and the on-call) that it says occurred.

Several things from the book struck me as curious:

1) That AF planners at the CAOC seemed so inflexible when an expanded list of targets was created in the build-up to the operation, despite seemingly having significant assets available to hand

2) That the AF and Army seemingly made no attempt to organise Fast FACs for the operation

3) That coordination between ground commanders and CAS assets was poor, despite the presence of TACPs and ETACs embedded with both SF and regular troops

4) That the A-10 was deployed to theater so late in the day

5) That ground pounders felt like they were having JDAM 'forced' on them when they called for CAS - what they really wanted, the book claims, was twenty mike mike

6) That the AF was unable, or unwilling, to fly an hours' worth of pre-planned precision strikes against targets before the operation was to start

7) That documented briefings, commands/orders and planning between Army/Air Force C2 cells/CAOC seems to have been almost non-existent

I just wondered if there is an unclassified report that details what the USAF made of some of these questions post-operation, or whether some of the old salts here are able to comment on the unclassified lessons learned from all of this?

The book, which I thought was excellent despite mixed reviews on Amazon, derided some of the USAF's leadership within CENTCOM (with good reason, it seems), but I'll leave that to another discussion.

Any thoughts suitable for open source reading much appreciated.

[ClearedHot]

Steve,

The book you mention (I won’t), is a very one-sided and partial explanation of the facts as the author understands them, not necessarily as they occurred.

I will not look back and say the USAF was perfect in it’s employment during Operation Anaconda, but the charges the book and others in the Army like General Hagenbeck make are ludicrous attempts to shift blame for their own mistakes.

Let me attempt to address some of your questions from my uninformed perspective.

1) That AF planners at the CAOC seemed so inflexible when an expanded list of targets was created in the build-up to the operation, despite seemingly having significant assets available to hand

Un-true and the report lists the actual number of sorties and strikes that were flown. Part of the problem was that Army planners and leadership fail to understand that the AF actually flies to a target and that we cannot overcome the time space continuum. Strike assets were flying very long distances (many F-15E and F-16 sorties were over 12 hours), and you actually do have to take some time to load and fuel the jets…I digress.

2) That the AF and Army seemingly made no attempt to organise Fast FACs for the operation

I don’t have first hand knowledge, but in my opinion, the tactical problem was not something that Fast FAC’s would have solved. Yes there is the story of the resupply truck that the AF could not seem to strike, but the real issue in my mind was how to deconflict all of the strike assets that were trying to operate in a very small piece of airspace. To illustrate how simple some folks that that process is let me share a quote from the Army perspective about deconfliction;

The GFAC on the ground literally goes all the way back to the source of airpower

to the CAOC, by-passing any kind of natural hierarchy that we build and structure

into Army, Air Force, air-land battle. There was no hierarchy at all. That system

and part one of the war actually was quite effective because you have a large land

mass, a lot of air space, little bitty airplanes with a lot of bombs. Everybody’s a

bad guy, everything’s basically a target. With very small U.S. forces, it’s a

wonderful way to do it. There are no restrictions to air whatsoever. All of the

airspace control measures that you would normally have to worry about in terms

of air/ground relationships are not there. All you basically have to worry about is

that airplanes don’t run into other airplanes. AWACS does a great job of that.

None of the battlefield deconfliction was necessary…

3) That coordination between ground commanders and CAS assets was poor, despite the presence of TACPs and ETACs embedded with both SF and regular troops

This is perhaps the most maddening accusation of the entire encounter. In order to answer that accusation, I would ask Hagenbeck why he left his TACPs at home. Yes, he deployed without the folks he had been training with for years and only when it became obvious that he needed TACP support did they rush TACPs from other units forward. We preach joint training everyday, we have a constitutional amendment that requires we train together so that we are a more effective fighting force, yet the ground force commander decided to deploy his forces without his integrated AF personnel, only to turn around and complain that the AF did not support him. Unconscionable! What makes his accusations even more laughable, is that instead of TACPs he took AIR DEFENSE to fight the Taliban. YGFSM!!!!

To take it a bit further, read what Hagenbeck did when the questioned why he was not taking his TACPs;

Originally they did not take their TACPs that are normally embedded and lived

with them at 10th Mountain. We argued that they made a big mistake. I

personally told General Hagenbeck it was a big mistake. He took more air

defense. I said, “Sir, the only people I am aware that you are going to shoot

down,” I said, will be those aircraft that say “United States Air Force, United

States Navy on the tail.94

4) That the A-10 was deployed to theater so late in the day

Simple answer Steve, the jet is so slow that they left when the war started and were lucky to make it before the war was over. Actually, I can’t answer that question. The A-10 like the AC-130 is a purpose built CAS machine that would have changed the calculus of the fight. I cannot speak to the decisions and situations that delayed the deployment of the Hogs.

5) That ground pounders felt like they were having JDAM 'forced' on them when they called for CAS - what they really wanted, the book claims, was twenty mike mike

Partially a function of the distances that were being flown and they types of support assets available and to some extend a lack of understand of AF employment. At that point it was not common for assets other than the A-10 to stick their nose in the dirt and do night strafe. That being said, some dudes did an INCREDIBLE job and put it all on the line to help the guys on the ground. In the post Anaconda days, the AF has placed increased emphasis on strafe. In fact, there is a bit of a renaissance with regard to strafe not just from Anaconda but from OIF as well. Don’t be surprised if you see Albinos rolling down the chute some day…

6) That the AF was unable, or unwilling, to fly an hours' worth of pre-planned precision strikes against targets before the operation was to start

Not true. I understand the perception, but a major contributing factor was the close proximity of SOF teams to each other and to conventional ground units. SOF teams were competing against each other to get support and often calling strikes down within lethal distances of other friendly positions. Had the AF been told of the size and scope of the plan they most certainly would have increased the size and capability of the SOLE.

7) That documented briefings, commands/orders and planning between Army/Air Force C2 cells/CAOC seems to have been almost non-existent

Shack! That is what happens when you bring the Air Component in at the last minute expecting them to overcome the time-space continuum. Let me share a quote from that report that places some perspective on how well the Army brief the AF on the plan;

”Although working level coordination was under way, the CAOC Director, Major

General John D. W. Corley, U.S. Air Force, first learned of Operation ANACONDA

during a routine nightly conference on 22 February 2002. “I was horrified to discover that

by the time I had been briefed, the OPORD had already been published without what I

thought was the CFACC’s knowledge.”66 “I became a little pessimistic about it when the

A-heads [senior CAOC staff officers] at the table were not aware of it either,” General

Corley reported. “That’s where I sought to immediately make General Moseley aware so

he could engage on it.”

I just wondered if there is an unclassified report that details what the USAF made of some of these questions post-operation, or whether some of the old salts here are able to comment on the unclassified lessons learned from all of this?

There is in fact an unclassified report on the subject, General Jumper was so mad when he read Hagenbeck’s article that among other things he insisted on an investigation that led to Operation Anaconda, an Airpower Perspective

Finally, I will throw a bone to the AC-130 folks that flew in Anaconda. The gunship is mentioned a few times in the report, but their munitions and sorties are not listed in the official report. Probably not an overt omission, just a reflection of the fact that they were tasked under SOCOM, not the CAOC. However, they, like others that flew in Anaconda, did heroic things that most will never speak of.

[pawnman]

I, too, read the book, but I don't have any extra inside information. From the book alone, it seems like there was a real lack of cohesion and no unity of command, and that created all manner of problems. It wasn't just the Air Force that had trouble getting integrated...they cut the local guy, Zia Lodin, out entirely, and they landed three helicopters on the exact same hornet's nest of bad guys. The C2 was almost non-existent from the start of the mission.

[Zepplin559]

Steve,

Check out "Air POwer Against Terror" written by Benjamin Lambeth and published by RAND. He spends quite a bit of time explaining how that mess happened. Its a really interesting book. Once again, the Army can't play well with others, then try to blame the Air Force for their screw ups.

[ClearedHot]

Steve,

Check out "Air POwer Against Terror" written by Benjamin Lambeth and published by RAND. He spends quite a bit of time explaining how that mess happened. Its a really interesting book. Once again, the Army can't play well with others, then try to blame the Air Force for their screw ups.

Actually...DON'T READ Lambeth's new book.

I was one of his biggest fans until this book was published (I even gave copies of the Transformation of American Airpower, to my Marine colleagues at SAW).

The book is at best a farce and a worst a direct insult to the AF. It was PURPOSELY removed from the CSAF reading list because of the way he refers to an incident that occurred during OEF. He based his research for certain incidents solely on reports from CNN and the Taliban...yes the Taliban. He refuses to acknowledge CENTAF reports with regard to civilian deaths. When he was challenged by his colleagues at RAND and the USAF he became very defensive and belligerent. Subsequently, his book was removed from the CSAF list.

[Batman]

Good post, CH. I've read that "Operation Anaconda: An Airpower Perspective" a few times and it should be a mandatory read by all.

Batman

[Steve Davies]

Gents

Many thanks for the responses. I will go away and read the Airpower Perspective and see if I still have questions.

I am now also curious about Airpower Against Terrorism, although I will heed CH's caution.

Cheers

Steve

[sputnik]

I have just finished reading Not A Good Day To Die, which recounts Operation Anaconda principally from a ground pounder perspective.

For what it's worth (probably not much) I spent a few weeks in Kuwait a year ago working with an Army O6 who had been the Apache Battalion Commander during the fight. I'd just read "Not a good day" and thought I'd ask him about it--the book and the fight and the controversy. Far as the book goes, he had mixed feelings on Naylor that he wouldn't completely expand on, seemed there may have been something personal involved. He said the book was about 80% accurate, and thought that wasn't bad for a history book.

I then asked him about his feelings on Air Force support during the fight. Not sure what I expected but it wasn't what I got. He immediately got pissed off, started wagging his finger and raising his voice. Said he was at War College and they were recieving a brief on Anaconda very harsh on AF. Said he made it a few minutes into it, then stood up and said "This is a total BS, I was there, you weren't, the AF saved my life many times, dropped bombs when and where I needed, saved my men's lives repeatedly and to top it off one of their helos came and picked my ass up off a downed bird while under fire. Anyone who says they didn't support us is full of sh1t." Obviously I don't remember what he said verbatim but it was pretty close. Didn't appear he had to buy beer the rest of his War College career, the AF guys took care of him I think. He for one was pretty emotional on the topic, answered my question anyway.

I also worked with/for BG Wiercinski (a total fvcking stud BTW, don't get to meet a lot of guys who killed people with M4's as O6s). I never got a chance to ask him directly about the fight, but he definately loved the Air Force so I assume he wasn't bitter. It was a lot of fun watching him and the Apache guy sit back and BS on Anaconda, old high ranking guys talking about killing a lot of people at very close range. Very cool to sit there and watch these guys I'd read quite a bit about in a number of books.

[okienav]

Thanks for the link to the Air Force report, I did not know they ever released one and my knowledge of any air stuff was based on Naylor's book. Going to the SOLE course soon so that should help open my eyes a bit also.

[Steve Davies]

For what it's worth (probably not much) I spent a few weeks in Kuwait a year ago working with an Army O6 who had been the Apache Battalion Commander during the fight. I'd just read "Not a good day" and thought I'd ask him about it--the book and the fight and the controversy...

Interesting. Thanks for sharing.

[pbar]

I too have been confused at some of the charges leveled by some Army guys that we didn't support them during Anaconda. Every sortie I flew there, I took home weapons (JDAMs) as did my squadron (B-1s) on the majority of our sorties. It was normal for us to leave the fight with gas and weapons when the next bomber (B-1 or B-52) showed up. Thus, it would seem to me that it wasn't a lack of effort on the AF's part. We even dropped dumb Mk-84s just to crater a possible enemy exfiltration route and that seemed very Vietnam-suspected-truck-park-in-the-jungle to me...

PBAR