Af Missile Crew Sleeps On The Job

[Herk Driver]

but you don't sabotage a whole career over it.

For argument's sake, have you seen a Q-3 sabotage a career before? I haven't. FEF's don't meet promotion boards. Not that I disagree with the sentiment of your post. However...

Again, UFB! Who the fuck can tell 1-2 knots on those 50 year old airspeed and flap indicators?

I would ask the crew chief, "Would you have wiped that off, had you seen it before me?" 100% of the time the answer was "yes". I took the jet. I am not going to cancel a combat sortie for 1 drop of hydraulic fluid, especially if the gear only has to come UP 1 time, and I can manually lower it.

Exactly. Never flown the -135 but... In the legacy -130, what is more accurate the drum or the needle for airspeed? They may not always be the same. So, which one do I use to write-up the flap overspeed?

BL: The copilot knew what the reaction from the squadron leadership would be. The AC can be heralded all day for doing the right thing, and in the end (sts) she has to live with her decision. Not any of us.

Edit: to add legacy

Edited July 16, 2009 by Herk Driver

[slacker]

The C-130J is down to the knot, and it will tell on you. You've got to write it up, or you can get spanked.

[Herk Driver]

The C-130J is down to the knot, and it will tell on you. You've got to write it up, or you can get spanked.

Yea, I should have said legacy 130.

[Spoo]

He was a prior C-17 guy. Major douchebag.

A Maj as a SQ/CC? Cool. I think I know this Major, he works down the hall from me. Is he related to General DB? Cuz I know him too. Ok, I'm done.

Does the missileer eat-your-own mentality have anything to do with the fact that they are "handling" big nuclear missiles? I know back in the days of SAC they took anything to do with nukes VERY seriously; Q-3's, LOR's, etc were pretty common for seemingly insignificant infractions. I'm basing this on a lot of "back in the day" stories I've heard. You know back in the Cold War when the Nuclear mission was THE mission. Any bomber guys care to comment?

Edited July 16, 2009 by Spoo

[tac airlifter]

Q3 for a 1-2 knot overspeed? That is the most absurd thing I've heard in a long time. The second most absurd thing is writing it up at all. I oversped the ramp and door by about 3 knots a few years ago. I landed and told MX what happened, wrote it up, watched them conduct the inspecdtion and bought them a case of penalty beer. When all was said and done the FE who I respected said "Sir, do what you want but I'd call 3 knots gauge error." Additionally most MX dudes won't even conduct an inspection for a gust that momentarily pushed the airspeed needle around.

[ExBoneOSO]

A Maj as a SQ/CC? Cool. I think I know this Major, he works down the hall from me. Is he related to General DB? Cuz I know him too. Ok, I'm done.

Does the missileer eat-your-own mentality have anything to do with the fact that they are "handling" big nuclear missiles? I know back in the days of SAC they took anything to do with nukes VERY seriously; Q-3's, LOR's, etc were pretty common for seemingly insignificant infractions. I'm basing this on a lot of "back in the day" stories I've heard. You know back in the Cold War when the Nuclear mission was THE mission. Any bomber guys care to comment?

We never seemed quite as anal retentive as the missileers were..I'm not personally aware of anyone getting Q-3'd or spanked for any infractions. Worse thing I saw was an AC who's crew busted a CCP test, and for penance, was sent to the Command Post for 6 months. When I was at Grand Forks, we had a "buddy squadron" in the Missile Wing. The Wing CC's wanted to make sure that we all got an appreciation (yeah, I know..) for what the other side did. We were supposed to go visit them on alert, and they got tours of the jet. The one time I showed a conehead the airplane, all he wanted to know was "so, you guys in the back decode the messages? That must be exciting! We can't wait to do that on alert..wow, is that a SATCOM!?" It was all I could do to not chuckle out loud..

[Jughead]

accept the fact that the flaps might still be moving just a bit as you hit flap placard speed (within 1-2 knots)

That was always the generally accepted version when I was flying R-model -135s. The (widely understood) interpretation of flap limit speed was that if the flaps were rolling up by the time you hit the limit, you hadn't exceeded the limit. Not anymore?

[Spoo]

Q3 for a 1-2 knot overspeed? That is the most absurd thing I've heard in a long time. The second most absurd thing is writing it up at all.

2. There has got to be more to that story.

[ol-IEWO]

I know back in the days of SAC they took anything to do with nukes VERY seriously; Q-3's, LOR's, etc were pretty common for seemingly insignificant infractions. I'm basing this on a lot of "back in the day" stories I've heard. You know back in the Cold War when the Nuclear mission was THE mission. Any bomber guys care to comment?

No, bomber crews did not kill their own. I was in B-52H's for a few years back in the 60's, when nuclear deterrence was the mission. Generally, the only things that could get a person in trouble was "human reliability"; being solo in a "No Lone Zone," having a bad bomb during an ORI, doing an unsafe action, or a real, real bad attitude. Those could get you banished from SAC, transferred to a stateside non-SAC base (and it was no surprise when it happened) and bad rating on your annual review which all but killed any chance for a promotion.

I have seen various other things screwed up with no repercussions. Some times they were very obviously ignored. Some things I was involved in and others I was along for the ride STS. One of the incidents that happened to the crew I was on (we had hard crews) was pilot error but because of the out come neither pilot was hung out to dry. We could have crashed but didn't and there was only minor damage to the aircraft. It became a lessons learned thing, changed some procedures and added a training item for pilots.

As it relates to the situation with the missile crew: the wing I was in had a situation involving "code components." As I recall, three different crews were involved. At the end of the first crew's alert tour, they handed off the aircraft and code components to the second crew who at the end of their tour handed off to the third crew. An inventory was conducted at each hand off and they all made the same mistake. A member of the wing staff was the first person to become aware of the situation. An investigation determined what had transpired and that at all times the code components had been in a guarded restricted area; that the code components themselves had not been tampered with, no seals were broken, and that there was absolutely no compromise. Nobody was formally reprimanded. All crews were instructed in the proper procedure regarding control and handling of the code components. End of story, IIRC, everyone lived happily ever after.

No, we did not stab each other in the back, nor did our commanders. At least not at the Wing I was in.

[BQZip01]

A Maj as a SQ/CC? Cool. I think I know this Major, he works down the hall from me. Is he related to General DB? Cuz I know him too. Ok, I'm done.

Does the missileer eat-your-own mentality have anything to do with the fact that they are "handling" big nuclear missiles? I know back in the days of SAC they took anything to do with nukes VERY seriously; Q-3's, LOR's, etc were pretty common for seemingly insignificant infractions. I'm basing this on a lot of "back in the day" stories I've heard. You know back in the Cold War when the Nuclear mission was THE mission. Any bomber guys care to comment?

My dad was an "old bomber guy" (I just spent yesterday listening to him and his crew rehash old cold war stories. 3 of the 5 came to my graduation; pretty impressive to see that kind of dedication from guys you knew 30 years ago!). Back in the SAC days, some did eat their own. A lot of commanders were fired over innocuous things (like a memo being filed without being signed by everyone). The same went for the aircrews.

I'm glad to say things have changed in the bomber community, somewhat. When it comes to nukes, it is a ZERO mistake environment, but if you just do what you are supposed to do and leadership backs you up by providing appropriate T.O.s, guidance, and support, there is no reason it can't be done properly.

Edited July 18, 2009 by BQZip01

[arg]

The C-130J is down to the knot, and it will tell on you. You've got to write it up, or you can get spanked.

OT

Down to the knot of what the computer, that tells on you, thinks your flying.

The pitot system isn't any better than the H-2s and up.

Also the flap gage can be as much as 7% off depending on position.

My Gay model knowledge is limited but I think I'm pretty close.

[Fud]

When it comes to nukes, it is a ZERO mistake environment, but if you just do what you are supposed to do and leadership backs you up by providing appropriate T.O.s, guidance, and support, there is no reason it can't be done properly.

The problem I have with this statement is that there is no human being possible of not making a mistake. I constantly hear this contradiction in terms from my leadership "Perfect Ops, but we we know mistakes happen" which makes absolutely no sense. An unforgivable mistake in nukes is the accidental detonation, theft, or damage to a nuclear weapon that yields radiation. Other than that, everything else is forgivable.

A note on the backstabbing that goes on in the missile world, which seems to be more prevalent to me than any other place on earth. When you have a mission that is only capable of ending in a "Doomsday" scenario, it makes quality of life pretty difficult. There is no satisfaction in mission completion other than "Damn, I'm glad it was a quiet alert today" or "I hope I never have to launch these things". On the other side of the spectrum, the bomber crews have to rely on each other to live through a flight. Whether you like your crew or not, you still have to rely on them to get the job done. It is also difficult to be called a "warrior" since all I do is sit on my ass and watch a computer screen. There is no incentive to do well in the job, simply because you will get extended. There are no deployment opportunities, and it is difficult to get a job of your choice, or try to cross-train into another careef field.

When extreme punishment for even the smallest mistakes happens, you will end up getting a culture where people cover things up. I see this every day in small mistakes that happen. When people are late to meetings, briefings, formations, no LOCs or MFRs are made. When you don't do the little things right, you end up having incidents like you see in "Darker Shades of Blue". The culture of compliance will end up hurting you in the long run, whether it causes death or not.

A last note about nukes...I don't know who keeps changing the procedures every 3-6 months, but this crap needs to stop. Any job dealing with nukes should be so incredibly simple, that it leaves out all room for error. If you want fewer mistakes, make processes more simple. A blinde, deaf, dumb, retarded invalid should be able to operate a nuke with the proper clearance level. Changes can be submitted even at the lowest levels, but I rarely see them come back approved. In my opinion, it will take a dynamic leader to change these things, but I haven't seen many of these in the USAF. I've only read about these men in the past who were snubbed for being free-thinkers and mavericks by today's standards.

Edit: adding more madness!!!

Edited July 19, 2009 by beast05

[afnav]

The problem I have with this statement is that there is no human being possible of not making a mistake. I constantly hear this contradiction in terms from my leadership "Perfect Ops, but we we know mistakes happen" which makes absolutely no sense. An unforgivable mistake in nukes is the accidental detonation, theft, or damage to a nuclear weapon that yields radiation. Other than that, everything else is forgivable.

I can agree with you on this for the most part. Not knowing you have nukes on your plane (or snakes) is unforgivable.

A note on the backstabbing that goes on in the missile world, which seems to be more prevalent to me than any other place on earth. When you have a mission that is only capable of ending in a "Doomsday" scenario, it makes quality of life pretty difficult. There is no satisfaction in mission completion other than "Damn, I'm glad it was a quiet alert today" or "I hope I never have to launch these things". On the other side of the spectrum, the bomber crews have to rely on each other to live through a flight. Whether you like your crew or not, you still have to rely on them to get the job done. It is also difficult to be called a "warrior" since all I do is sit on my ass and watch a computer screen. There is no incentive to do well in the job, simply because you will get extended. There are no deployment opportunities, and it is difficult to get a job of your choice, or try to cross-train into another careef field.

One of the most fortunate events in my life is when I left my crew tour early to go to flying training. I was 27, which helped.

When extreme punishment for even the smallest mistakes happens, you will end up getting a culture where people cover things up. I see this every day in small mistakes that happen. When people are late to meetings, briefings, formations, no LOCs or MFRs are made. When you don't do the little things right, you end up having incidents like you see in "Darker Shades of Blue". The culture of compliance will end up hurting you in the long run, whether it causes death or not.

A last note about nukes...I don't know who keeps changing the procedures every 3-6 months, but this crap needs to stop. Any job dealing with nukes should be so incredibly simple, that it leaves out all room for error. If you want fewer mistakes, make processes more simple. A blinde, deaf, dumb, retarded invalid should be able to operate a nuke with the proper clearance level. Changes can be submitted even at the lowest levels, but I rarely see them come back approved. In my opinion, it will take a dynamic leader to change these things, but I haven't seen many of these in the USAF. I've only read about these men in the past who were snubbed for being free-thinkers and mavericks by today's standards.

When I was in a staff job with the ability to change things, I constantly solicited the help of the crew force. I could not always use their suggestions for procedural (or other) reasons, but I never told anyone to shut up - except if they were disrupting my CCP class.

Edit: adding more madness!!!

[tac airlifter]

I know there are some good guys in the missle field because I had the pleasure of meeting some of them at SOS. I'm not being sarcastic, the guys in my flight were great. So why is the career field dominated by people who think this madness you describe is normal? Are they attracted to the job or is that just the culture that thrives in your career and they turn that way to succeed? Also, do you missle guys think things would be better if the opportunity to crossflow was easier?

[brickhistory]

I know there are some good guys in the missle field because I had the pleasure of meeting some of them at SOS. I'm not being sarcastic, the guys in my flight were great. So why is the career field dominated by people who think this madness you describe is normal? Are they attracted to the job or is that just the culture that thrives in your career and they turn that way to succeed? Also, do you missle guys think things would be better if the opportunity to crossflow was easier?

The only way for "leadership" to show they are leading is to hammer their folks for any infractions. As the song goes, "Same as it ever was."

Unless something goes boom or somebody breaks something, there is no difference in a guy pulling an alert exactly according to the book and a guy who skates. Thus, the only way for any squadron leader to know how his guys perform is to notice the ones who don't get their attention which is an oxymoron.

As noted above, that leads to either covering up mistakes instead of learning from them or applying a sledgehammer when a quite chat would do.

SAC missiles prided itself on eating its young, so most fled ASAP.

I did.

[Fud]

The only way for "leadership" to show they are leading is to hammer their folks for any infractions. As the song goes, "Same as it ever was."

Unless something goes boom or somebody breaks something, there is no difference in a guy pulling an alert exactly according to the book and a guy who skates. Thus, the only way for any squadron leader to know how his guys perform is to notice the ones who don't get their attention which is an oxymoron.

As noted above, that leads to either covering up mistakes instead of learning from them or applying a sledgehammer when a quite chat would do.

SAC missiles prided itself on eating its young, so most fled ASAP.

I did.

2 on everything you said Brick...and yes it is next to impossible to do anything else. I know about ten people that just got out, and three of them are going to reserve jobs so they can do what they wanted to do originally. We are all praying that the new START treaty shuts every missile wing down.

[F16Rooster]

A last note about nukes...I don't know who keeps changing the procedures every 3-6 months, but this crap needs to stop. Any job dealing with nukes should be so incredibly simple, that it leaves out all room for error. If you want fewer mistakes, make processes more simple. A blinde, deaf, dumb, retarded invalid should be able to operate a nuke with the proper clearance level. Changes can be submitted even at the lowest levels, but I rarely see them come back approved. In my opinion, it will take a dynamic leader to change these things, but I haven't seen many of these in the USAF. I've only read about these men in the past who were snubbed for being free-thinkers and mavericks by today's standards.

This is the one that kills me. The weapon's been around for 40+ years and yet the regs/procedures change every few months...then change back to the way they were originally. It's to the point that as an evaluator, I still have trouble keeping track of what the "correct" way to do something is. Whatever, single-digit time left.

[afnav]

This is the one that kills me. The weapon's been around for 40+ years and yet the regs/procedures change every few months...then change back to the way they were originally. It's to the point that as an evaluator, I still have trouble keeping track of what the "correct" way to do something is. Whatever, single-digit time left.

I know that in the bomber community, when SAC stood down, ACC took great pride in throwing as much of their regulations and procedures in the shredder as possible. They tried to screw up missiles, too, but they escaped before they could be permanently crippled. ACC doesn't understand nukes, and will never understand nukes. Why? Because they don't want to understand it.

There are too many people in influential positions that don't understand the mission, the hardware, the people, and the procedures. True, the mission has changed. Wouldn't it be easier to let the people that are the experts change it to conform to current policy instead of giving it to amateurs? The Schlesinger Report got it right.