AF Light Air Support Aircraft

[Clark Griswold]

8 hours ago, HU&W said:

I've been a supporter of light strike for a long time, but as time goes on, I'm starting to see more and more holes in the idea.  The real question that's bugging me is, why do we need it?  What strategic or tactical need does it fulfill that's not covered by our current menu of options, or would it be creating a new role for itself?  For us, it would fall somewhere between the MQ-9 and the A-10 as a CAS aircraft on the persistence/survivability/armament scale.  Sure, a gap exists between those aircraft now, but it could be as easily filled by upgrading the MQ-9 as creating a whole new aircraft to address its shortcomings.  

I do think it definitely could fill a broader strategic role of Kinetic FID like we did for the Afghans.  For conventional missions, however, what does it bring to the fight that an existing asset (or a slightly upgraded existing asset) doesn't?

Legit points but the LAAR is not a direct competitor or substitute for an RPA, but I believe a system to be used in combination with one, like an LOS Tier I RPA or maybe a Tier II.  

The LAAR does bring a lower cost operation and lower risk in some ways when operating in conjunction with other manned players but it's strongest point is its autonomous operational capability.

No LOS, satellite footprint, no comms with the IMC, no problem - brief the crew and cut 'em loose.  

Start point, call sign and frequency - get the details at check-in.  I'm not for just winging it but sometimes we need a capability to just operate on little planning or support, a LAAR seems to be able to meet that need.

[Sprkt69]

18 hours ago, Clark Griswold said:

No LOS, satellite footprint, no comms with the IMC, no problem - brief the crew and cut 'em loose.  

Then how is "leadership" going to micromanage?

[Clark Griswold]

7 hours ago, Sprkt69 said:

Then how is "leadership" going to micromanage?

Sacrifices must be made.

Given the habits formed from the last 15+ years of ops in permissive environments and the generous growth in links back to C2 and ITCs (not all bad, having access to ground based resources is nice), it might do some good to wargame VDL degraded / denied  scenarios to flesh out TTPs for LAARs in Observation / ISR / Strike.  Ask any of the perspective vendors, they would fall all over themselves to make this happen FOC.

Not sure if it would be exactly FAC-A but seems pretty close to it.

[Sprkt69]

2 hours ago, Clark Griswold said:

Sacrifices must be made.

Given the habits formed from the last 15+ years of ops in permissive environments and the generous growth in links back to C2 and ITCs (not all bad, having access to ground based resources is nice), it might do some good to wargame VDL degraded / denied  scenarios to flesh out TTPs for LAARs in Observation / ISR / Strike.  Ask any of the perspective vendors, they would fall all over themselves to make this happen FOC.

Not sure if it would be exactly FAC-A but seems pretty close to it.

While I agree with you, many in the upper echelons of management are operating 180 out. Just ask some of your bros that sat through this past WEPTAC and can read between the lines

[Clark Griswold]

19 minutes ago, Sprkt69 said:

While I agree with you, many in the upper echelons of management are operating 180 out. Just ask some of your bros that sat through this past WEPTAC and can read between the lines

Copy that.

There's something that happens to people when they stare at video feeds, BFT maps, etc... at an AOC, the illusion of control is slow, subtle and inevitable maybe.  

History doesn't repeat but it rhymes, trite but true.  This micro control is reminiscent of LBJ, McNamara, et al in the Vietnam War directing what targets, when, what weapons from the White House... guess they didn't cover that at Maxwell...

[Lawman]

Copy that.
There's something that happens to people when they stare at video feeds, BFT maps, etc... at an AOC, the illusion of control is slow, subtle and inevitable maybe.  
History doesn't repeat but it rhymes, trite but true.  This micro control is reminiscent of LBJ, McNamara, et al in the Vietnam War directing what targets, when, what weapons from the White House... guess they didn't cover that at Maxwell...

Funny enough...


Our current Army operations in OIR have through a combination of limited footprint for forcecap and minimal equipment due to fragmenting out resulted in a lot of bottom level mission command delegation. We actually have air mission commanders being air mission commanders again because the TOC doesn't have a way to get themselves in the decision circle jerk.


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[Clark Griswold]

12 minutes ago, Lawman said:

Funny enough...

Our current Army operations in OIR have through a combination of limited footprint for forcecap and minimal equipment due to fragmenting out resulted in a lot of bottom level mission command delegation. We actually have air mission commanders being air mission commanders again because the TOC doesn't have a way to get themselves in the decision circle jerk.

Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

 

Nice.

 

[Cooter]

Not sure if the delegation of authorities discussion going on right now is support or hinderance to this type of cape. GCCs could clench harder at actually having to make decisions or man up an accept responsibilities for their decisions. 

Cooter

[Clark Griswold]

Textron gets a demo event this summer for the USAF...

https://www.defensenews.com/articles/textron-sets-its-sights-on-air-forces-light-aircraft-experiment

[FlyinGrunt]

1) Lawman, thanks for acknowledging that it doesn't take an 11F to deliver all the bombs.  It's not just the 6th SOS that is ready for this, btw.  I love my fighter comrades, but those who think only that they can deliver ordnance should read up Apollo's Warriors.  Google is your friend.  AFSOC is just a late 20th century name for what AF Special Operations has been doing for decades.

2) CH, as usual you are also right.  However, if we got a CSAF level of priority in terms of quantity (as well as quality) folks, we could train those folks pretty quick per AFSOC firehose standard.  (though, in the gunship world, hardware is at a premium)  AvFID takes more training, I know, but from a schoolhouse perspective, if we just had more folks who didn't suck available to speed through, there's so many ways to accelerate training and experience.  As you know, often combat IS part of our training plan, and those opportunities are widespread.  

3) To that end: reviving Commando Look has been met with a wall of opposition in the past few years, as I'm sure you know better than I.  However, given the number of students we hook across MDSs, if we WERE to get support for bringing that back, along with the resources to make it feasible, we could fix our manning and proficiency levels quickly.  I'd say 1 year, if we got some more RPA tenant units in non-Cannonistan locations; 2 years, if not.

4) The problem is, our fighter comrades are hurting badly, as is the UPT capacity to train more raw material.  This is absolutely a zero-sum game, and I realize that priorities are not SOCOM-centric.  That having been said: UPT studs, if you want to kill bad guys, come to AFSOC.  Our exponentially smaller size, given the number of carnivore assets/units we have, means that you WILL do that.  A lot.  ACC kills people, but ACC is huge.  And we offer a FAR closer relationship with America's best on the tip of the spear . . .

[FlyinGrunt]

On 3/14/2017 at 11:12 PM, Cooter said:

Not sure if the delegation of authorities discussion going on right now is support or hinderance to this type of cape. GCCs could clench harder at actually having to make decisions or man up an accept responsibilities for their decisions. 

Cooter

If I understand your point correctly, that is to say that CDRCOCOMs want to have the individual sign-off on every strike in every theater, then I will respond with this: 1) Your concern is valid.  2) If they refuse to delegate approval to the PIC or at least GFC, then they are micromanaging cowards.  WWII was not won by Eisenhower confirming LOAC requirements for all the targets on the ATO, much less the CAS furball.  Not that such a possibility would surprise me.

[Clark Griswold]

On 3/15/2017 at 1:12 AM, Cooter said:

Not sure if the delegation of authorities discussion going on right now is support or hinderance to this type of cape. GCCs could clench harder at actually having to make decisions or man up an accept responsibilities for their decisions. 

Cooter

 

18 hours ago, FlyinGrunt said:

If I understand your point correctly, that is to say that CDRCOCOMs want to have the individual sign-off on every strike in every theater, then I will respond with this: 1) Your concern is valid.  2) If they refuse to delegate approval to the PIC or at least GFC, then they are micromanaging cowards.  WWII was not won by Eisenhower confirming LOAC requirements for all the targets on the ATO, much less the CAS furball.  Not that such a possibility would surprise me.

On the subject of who's in charge...

I can understand (somewhat) the hesitation to not let go of control of the mission if the target has been surveilled and developed prior to arrival of the asset on station and that asset is continuing the persistent stare with VDL back to a GCC or other ISR element but when a target is developed in the mission either by the air asset or by cue from another ground or air asset, the authority should / needs to remain with the mission crew.  

For a LAAR, this should be it's primary modus operandi (IMO) and lends itself more to the proposed Observation mission than ISR as doctrine defines that mission now.

Observation mission as proposed by a previous reference in this thread article from a War on the Rocks:

https://warontherocks.com/2016/08/oa-x-more-than-just-light-attack/

How to get leadership on board with this?  Not sure, but the arguments I see supporting it are:

- Shortened kill chain, fewer levels of approval.  Possible risk in that understood.

- Lower footprint due to lower amount of FMV requiring PED from ground element in rear echelon, PED is to be usually organically supplied by supported element or mission crew if customer is not VDL capable.

- Can be allocated to customers / targets that are lower priority for high persistence assets thereby allowing greater focus of high persistence, ISR focused assets against higher value targets.  Allows longer surveillance of targets that should be under constant stare. 

- Concept of Employment and primary mission of Observation / Light Strike in direct support / coordination with GFC or JTAC not aligned with longer decision cycle involving rear echelon ground elements.

 

Edited March 18, 2017 by Clark Griswold
grammar fix

[nsplayr]

Some nice academic theories we got here guys, but when you forward deploy an asset with capable sensors, data links and a good amount of stations time, that asset is gonna get tasked with ISR support as directed by the ITCs.

There isn't enough DA going on consistently anymore to afford constantly-airborne armed overwatch/observation/whatever and it's equally unlikely you leave good jets on the ground idle, cocked and ready to respond. 

The community and individual crews just need to work within the confines of the system and develop strategies to avoid, minimize and squash attempts at being micromanaged. It's not rocket science and it's been done successfully. 

Edited March 18, 2017 by nsplayr

[magnetfreezer]

2 hours ago, nsplayr said:

Some nice academic theories we got here guys, but when you forward deploy an asset with capable sensors, data links and a good amount of stations time, that asset is gonna get tasked with ISR support as directed by the ITCs.

There isn't enough DA going on consistently anymore to afford constantly-airborne armed overwatch/observation/whatever and it's equally unlikely you leave good jets on the ground idle, cocked and ready to respond. 

The community and individual crews just need to work within the confines of the system and develop strategies to avoid, minimize and squash attempts at being micromanaged. It's not rocket science and it's been done successfully. 

The intent is to give the crews engagement authority, so the ISR turns into DT/SCAR (find target indicators that match your planned matrix, kill target) not find target indicators, intel goes into the black hole of joint targeting and ISIS lives to fight another day.

[SurelySerious]

Some nice academic theories we got here guys, but when you forward deploy an asset with capable sensors, data links and a good amount of stations time, that asset is gonna get tasked with ISR support as directed by the ITCs.
There isn't enough DA going on consistently anymore to afford constantly-airborne armed overwatch/observation/whatever and it's equally unlikely you leave good jets on the ground idle, cocked and ready to respond. 
The community and individual crews just need to work within the confines of the system and develop strategies to avoid, minimize and squash attempts at being micromanaged. It's not rocket science and it's been done successfully. 

Or how about we innovate and find a better way to do things instead of using a system that doesn't fit the current ops environment?

[nsplayr]

IDK, I've not found the current targeting and approvals process to have significantly harmed our ability to prosecute targets, at least on the SOF side of the house. YMMV.

Definitely seen ITCs and GFCs in the JOC too big for their britches and there are times when I wished the overall C2 apparatus would just let us loose with an intent and a "good luck," but I guess the former just didn't happen that often and the latter isn't really realistic in a permissive, BLOS-enabled environment.

I'd rather teach a guy how to make smart decisions in the plane and BFM the system when absolutely necessary than try to wish for something different when I'm fairly certain the system we have won't appreciably change.

[nsplayr]

And I'm the first one to advocate for using the doctrine we have, like SCAR for instance, instead of the bastardized CAS pseudo-9 lines that are common today, even when there are no friendlies on the ground within 100nm.

+1 for any effort to make smart changes to that effect. 

[Clark Griswold]

4 hours ago, nsplayr said:

And I'm the first one to advocate for using the doctrine we have, like SCAR for instance, instead of the bastardized CAS pseudo-9 lines that are common today, even when there are no friendlies on the ground within 100nm.

+1 for any effort to make smart changes to that effect. 

Maybe but SCAR may not go far enough in empowering the mission crew and FAC(A) is probably too much for what I think we are discussing, release authority for a LAAR acting independently of a C2 node when there is no real risk of fratricide. 

From the Lemay center, AF doctrine annex on Counterland missions (derivative missions)

https://doctrine.af.mil/download.jsp?filename=3-03-D08-LAND-Derivative-msns.pdf

...Forward Air Controller (Airborne) (FAC[A]). FAC(A) missions provide terminal attack control (TAC) for CAS aircraft operating in close proximity to friendly ground forces. Because of the risk of fratricide, FAC(A)s are specially trained aviation officers qualified to provide delivery clearance to CAS aircraft. The FAC(A) is the only person cleared to perform such control from the air, and can be especially useful in controlling CAS against targets that are beyond the visual range of friendly ground forces...

FAC(A) doesn't really fit as the training requirements are very high and again this is not release with friendlies close.

SCAR missions use aircraft to detect targets for dedicated AI missions in a specified geographic zone. The area may be defined by a box or grid where worthwhile potential targets are known or suspected to exist, or where mobile enemy surface units have relocated because of ground fighting. 

...Even though some SCAR responsibilities are similar to that of a FAC(A), SCAR aircrew do not have the authority to conduct terminal control of CAS. FAC(A)s undergo specialized training to effectively coordinate and integrate air-ground forces to conduct TAC safely during CAS—a SCAR aircrew does not have release authority, nor do they clear other aircraft for employment of munitions...

SCAR doesn't seem to give a LAAR enough independence of control.

A new mission that emphasizes independence of control from a rear echelon C2 or ISR cell but using the ground element as required and having independent release authority if there are no friendly ground forces in the immediate vicinity of a kinetic action seems in order.

What we have works but could be improved, just rantings from the internet.

Edited March 19, 2017 by Clark Griswold
needed fix

[SurelySerious]

Maybe but SCAR may not go far enough in empowering the mission crew and FAC(A) is probably too much for what I think we are discussing, release authority for a LAAR acting independently of a C2 node when there is no real risk of fratricide. 

From the Lemay center, AF doctrine annex on Counterland missions (derivative missions)

https://doctrine.af.mil/download.jsp?filename=3-03-D08-LAND-Derivative-msns.pdf

...Forward Air Controller (Airborne) (FAC[A]). FAC(A) missions provide terminal attack control (TAC) for CAS aircraft operating in close proximity to friendly ground forces. Because of the risk of fratricide, FAC(A)s are specially trained aviation officers qualified to provide delivery clearance to CAS aircraft. The FAC(A) is the only person cleared to perform such control from the air, and can be especially useful in controlling CAS against targets that are beyond the visual range of friendly ground forces...

 

FAC(A) doesn't really fit as the training requirements are very high and again this is not release with friendlies close.

SCAR missions use aircraft to detect targets for dedicated AI missions in a specified geographic zone. The area may be defined by a box or grid where worthwhile potential targets are known or suspected to exist, or where mobile enemy surface units have relocated because of ground fighting. 

...Even though some SCAR responsibilities are similar to that of a FAC(A), SCAR aircrew do not have the authority to conduct terminal control of CAS. FAC(A)s undergo specialized training to effectively coordinate and integrate air-ground forces to conduct TAC safely during CAS—a SCAR aircrew does not have release authority, nor do they clear other aircraft for employment of munitions...

 

SCAR doesn't seem to give a LAAR enough independence of control.

A new mission that emphasizes independence of control from a rear echelon C2 or ISR cell but using the ground element as required and having independent release authority if there are no friendly ground forces in the immediate vicinity of a kinetic action seems in order.

What we have works but could be improved, just rantings from the internet.

Your data on SCAR is misinterpreted. It is exactly for localized control of a full F2T2EA process emphasizing decentralized execution in low to medium threat environments. Final attack control isn't part of the SCAR responsibilities because it isn't needed in an environment where close proximity to FF and detailed integration don't exist. All you need is someone doing task/employment/airspace deconfliction.

 

So for air interdiction of emerging target sets where you don't need the detailed integration for friendly forces, the SCAR will have authority to issue Investigate/Target/Smack tasks. If the JFC/JFACC actually delegate the authority as intended.

 

The ALSA MTTP has a lot more specifics.

[nsplayr]

3 minutes ago, SurelySerious said:

So for air interdiction of emerging target sets where you don't need the detailed integration for friendly forces, it's perfect. If the JFC/JFACC actually delegate the authority as intended.

^^ yep. Emphasis on the last sentence...if the CC delegates as intended. Haven't seen that critical element outside the textbooks yet.

[Clark Griswold]

7 minutes ago, SurelySerious said:

If the JFC/JFACC actually delegate the authority as intended.

Valid.

 

[HU&W]

Politics favors detailed integration, even when no ground forces exist.

[Clark Griswold]

Copy that.

If someone can speak to this (OPSEC allowing) has there been any planning / discussion on if a LAAR is to be purchased, how they will be integrated into the AF?  

Most of the discussion that I have seen in open sources has not really addressed that and if the green light is given, a plan in place to stand up units, change MWS of existing units, etc... 

The logistics and manpower could be a stumbling block even if an aircraft purchase is approved.

[Ulysses]

So I've been trying to do some reading up on this, both retroactively through this thread and through a few other sources. Are the most serious contenders right now the A-29 and maybe the new kid Scorpion? I've seen gradually less and less on the AT-6 and the Bronco as time has gone on and more pieces are written on this. And although we currently fly the A-29 training the Afghans, is there a chance that we'd run into acquisition trouble what with it coming from Embraer? The Navy's similar Imminent Fury program fell through a few years back partly because Congress didn't want a foreign plane.

With reference to pbar's article a few weeks back, that was a super helpful analysis. Is there any chance Boeing's proposals of sprucing up the OV-10 for modern conflicts will be followed through on? The article said it had a 500lb payload, which seems absolutely minuscule to the point of maybe being inaccurate, but I wouldn't know. Part of me just likes the kind of retro appeal of the Bronco and I want to think it's got a shot here, but that's irrelevant.

[Clark Griswold]

1 hour ago, Ulysses said:

So I've been trying to do some reading up on this, both retroactively through this thread and through a few other sources. Are the most serious contenders right now the A-29 and maybe the new kid Scorpion? I've seen gradually less and less on the AT-6 and the Bronco as time has gone on and more pieces are written on this. And although we currently fly the A-29 training the Afghans, is there a chance that we'd run into acquisition trouble what with it coming from Embraer? The Navy's similar Imminent Fury program fell through a few years back partly because Congress didn't want a foreign plane.

With reference to pbar's article a few weeks back, that was a super helpful analysis. Is there any chance Boeing's proposals of sprucing up the OV-10 for modern conflicts will be followed through on? The article said it had a 500lb payload, which seems absolutely minuscule to the point of maybe being inaccurate, but I wouldn't know. Part of me just likes the kind of retro appeal of the Bronco and I want to think it's got a shot here, but that's irrelevant.

Don't count out the AT-6, it has a lot of strong points and the Scorpion is ready for prime time now with its production configuration set.  The A-29 is still the front runner (IMO) but just pick one AF...

This has probably been posted on this thread or the other ones that are on the subject of the LAAR:

https://warisboring.com/the-pentagon-has-two-choices-for-light-attack-planes-2e4306197b1e#.utts1rvlb

The concept OV-10X would have been sweet (particularly if they incorporated a turret mounted belly 20 or 25mm) but Boeing had nothing more than a proposal and some cool photoshopped graphics, the line was not ready to crank out one new airframe and there are not enough existing OV-10s in serviceable condition to be a viable option.

I quoted CH from the beginning of this thread as he has actually flown both and can speak best to this...

On 8/3/2009 at 8:51 PM, ClearedHot said:

Let the food fight begin.

My guess is an epic power-struggle has already begun between multiple communities.

The A-10 vs F-16 fight will focus on BRACed units wanting this platform, each claiming they are more suited for the role.

ACC already has a death grip on the program, but for all the wrong reasons. Publicly they will claim tremendous interest in the COIN mission when in reality they see this as a way maintain cockpits and season dudes for other platforms.

The Reserve and Guard will also use the BRAC argument to keep UAS' off their ramp and as always they will over-promise their ability to deliver qualified people.

AFSOC should have the airplane and the COIN mission, but they are too busy RECAPing the fleet and building a cadre of pilots for other systems.

I've flown the AT-6 and prefer it over the Super Tucano. Yes the Super Tucano has slightly better performance in a few areas, equal in others, but from a business model perspective the AT-6 makes more sense given the USAF has been flying and maintaining them for almost 10 years.

CH - have you had anymore participation on the LAAR project since this 2009 post?  

AT-8, A-29 or Scorpion Jet?