JS Posted April 26, 2011 Posted April 26, 2011 My checkrides have always ceased on the ground in the AOR (per directive or not) and reengaged after departure from the AOR. But I've always flown jets where that was possible. You don't have to be on a checkride to get a Q-3. Nor does an evaluator or your commander even have to be in the same time zone as you for you to get a Q-3.
Chapter29 Posted April 26, 2011 Posted April 26, 2011 Are we up to "D" in this list, or "4?" Perhaps "iv" would be next in the series. My thinly veiled sarcasm was, perhaps, too thinly veiled.
Guest Crew Report Posted April 26, 2011 Posted April 26, 2011 You think we're bad, you should see our Evaluator Loads, FEs, and Booms. Yikes. Boom checkrides are 1,000 times worse than Pilot checkrides in my community.
Herk Driver Posted April 26, 2011 Posted April 26, 2011 (edited) I can't tell if your post is cynical or not, but do you feel that the training rules work and that guys playing the "this is war" card are wrong when they do things differently over there? Or are you saying that stateside training needs to be de-pussified to match the additional risks that are being taken on a regular basis in the CENTOM deployed environments? Not trying to be cynical at all. I, too, am sick of the zero risk tolerance attitude by leadership and fortunately I work for a great boss right now that has the right sight picture wrt risk. Big picture: When properly managed, risk is OK. In that same breath, I don't mind the training rules nor do I mind flying by the rules and then explaining myself or my actions when given the chance during the Monday morning QB session. I mean if you look at the way we fly into AFG there is substantial risk associated with day-to-day operations and the PIFR system that we use. We are, as an AF, taking additional risk everyday. Following those rules to the "T" is what keeps all of us safe within the confines of knowing what the other guy is doing. But that doesn't always happen. As a matter of fact sometimes crews don't exercise even a basic amount of common sense. I mean, hell, I know crews that have put the sunshades up in the cockpit to block out the light so they could watch a damn movie while flying on the PIFR. Doing this all the while saying, "well, we had TCAS to back us up". Really? When you say does stateside training needs to be "de-pussified" are you saying the TTPs and AFIs that we use are too restrictive? Or just the way that many people try to employ leads to that. Flew just the other day and had a problem that I know several people would have went back in to MX for both in the states and in the AOR. But, Chap 4 clearly allows you to take the aircraft with this particular problem. Let's face it, flying a 40-50 year old aircraft isn't easy and you will hardly ever have the perfect airplane. I will grant you that there are times when your decisions are limited, but if your boss doesn't back you when you've pushed to the end of the day and could not have done anything more then your boss needs to find a new line of work. However, I've seen many crews try to break for something that was clearly allowed, yet some crewmember "didn't feel comfortable with it". When we had the waivers (2003) for half the equipment on the airplane we routinely flew with way more "problems" and I never heard anyone claim to not be comfortable with any of it. What has changed? I would argue that basic systems knowledge is lower these days for the "average" crewmember and that leads to people not understanding how to work around issues or what the implications of certain problems are. I've flown over here for a long time, as I know others have. There were a lot more waivers for a lot more high-time failure items back in the day. Simply put the JFACC or DIRMOBFR was willing to take more risk. Those days don't exist anymore. Even with the extra problems these restrictions impose, I've watched several squadrons rack up some out of this world numbers, all without breaking the rules and without taking an aircraft that was not "legal". The difference was hanging with the mission until you couldn't and pushing forward within the rules, when you could. In the end, I think that we (C-130s) need to modify, again, how we train to meet the demands of our operating environment. I just don't see that big of a difference right now and am willing to explain what happened when I can't finish the mission for some maintenance related reason. YMMV. Edited April 26, 2011 by Herk Driver
Champ Kind Posted April 26, 2011 Posted April 26, 2011 but if your boss doesn't back you when you've pushed to the end of the day and could not have done anything more then your boss needs to find a new line of work. Not to single out one single sentence of your response, but this really caught my eye. Unfortunately, there is really no way to tell for sure if your boss is going to back you or not until you've made the decision and await the ramifications. In today's "one mistake Air Force" culture, you may not get another chance to figure out what your boss' "true" philosophies are WRT to "leaning forward". At my last base I saw that pendulum swing wildly in just four years' time. Taking an airplane with a particular problem would get you labeled as a reckless cowboy by one and not taking a plane with the same problem would get you labeled a pussy by another. Luckily, I was able to see both sides and I consider both mentalities (and everything in between) when it comes down to crunch time, but the fact remains that you don't truly know how your commander is going to react when you are on the road or out on the line and try to exercise your authority as the "A" code without playing "mother-may-I" first. It's sad, but true.
HuggyU2 Posted April 26, 2011 Posted April 26, 2011 JS, Thanks for the clarification. Since you responded to Spoo, I thought you were directing your views toward the U-2. As for other communities like airlines, corporate, Air America, NASA, FAA, etc... I've found that although you only might see 1-3 folks directly during the interview phase, you can bet a bunch of folks are involved, to include folks that either know you, or know someone you work with. Nineline: I'll pm you on the differences.
HiFlyer Posted April 27, 2011 Posted April 27, 2011 (edited) So if the U-2 is the goal in a few years could those downgrades potentially kill the dream? In my experience (which is a little dated now) I'd say it's unlikely that a few marks on one early check (if its a Q-1) will be a major issue, unless they become a trend over multiple checks. In my day, a pattern of such things might indicate an inattention to detail, which can become ugly in the deuce. Huggy is a little more up to date and can respond also, but I'd be surprised if its much different now. Edited April 27, 2011 by HiFlyer
HuggyU2 Posted April 27, 2011 Posted April 27, 2011 ... but I'd be surprised if its much different now. Shack.
Champ Kind Posted April 27, 2011 Posted April 27, 2011 As far as the differences in evaluations between the CAF and the MAF, I have an idea, but I don't really know how to word it without sounding like I'm shitting on my community. Food for thought, though: I think the pointy-nose types might tend to focus on things where it really counts. Let's face it. It does take a lot of skill and airmanship to lead a four-ship (or more) of Herks across a DZ, on-time and on-target, and then ensure a safe recovery to a possibly austere field, and then be asked to do it in any weather and most likely on NVGs, and maybe even with people shooting at you. Not discounting that. I will say though that, while I haven't done it before, it takes a couple more brain-bytes to safely put bombs and bullets on target while talking to multiple airborne and ground-based personnel and, all the while, traveling a lot faster and having to worry a lot more about gas than us Herk types, not to mention in the aforementioned conditions. Because of this, I think SEFEs in the MAF are more focused on what would be called "queep" in the CAF because they feel that kind of stuff needs to be focused on. I think the CAF guys by-in-large have a more demanding mission in most cases, and therefore, if they make everything in their profile happen but don't fly the perfect ILS on the RTB, then it isn't a big deal. Will it ever change? I don't know, but it is what it is. Personally, I've heard some guys on here talk about making an upgrade training folder bleed if necessary because that's where the training really counts, and to use checkrides as a gauge as to whether or not someone is basically qualified in their MWS for the next year or so. I liked that thought process, and it's one that I am going to try to lean towards.
Toro Posted April 27, 2011 Posted April 27, 2011 This statement peaked my curiousity. Can you expand on this at all? U-2 thread.
Guest Crew Report Posted April 27, 2011 Posted April 27, 2011 Taking an airplane with a particular problem would get you labeled as a reckless cowboy by one and not taking a plane with the same problem would get you labeled a by another. Luckily, I was able to see both sides and I consider both mentalities (and everything in between) when it comes down to crunch time, but the fact remains that you don't truly know how your commander is going to react when you are on the road or out on the line and try to exercise your authority as the "A" code without playing "mother-may-I" first. It's sad, but true. The problem in the Herk community is that there are Sq/CC and DO's that will never have an "A" Code on the flight orders and never be in that position you just described. But they are very good at micro managing their people and armchair QBing every situation their young AC/IP's experience when they are the "A" Code. They're called Navs. 3 1
Muscle2002 Posted April 27, 2011 Posted April 27, 2011 The problem in the Herk community is that there are Sq/CC and DO's that will never have an "A" Code on the flight orders and never be in that position you just described. But they are very good at micro managing their people and armchair QBing every situation their young AC/IP's experience when they are the "A" Code. They're called Navs. CAF-guy question: what's an A code?
Jughead Posted April 27, 2011 Posted April 27, 2011 CAF-guy question: what's an A code? Pilot-in-Command. You fly with it, too--it's just a bit easier to figure out who's the PIC in a single-seater....
StainedClass Posted April 27, 2011 Posted April 27, 2011 You don't have to be on a checkride to get a Q-3. Nor does an evaluator or your commander even have to be in the same time zone as you for you to get a Q-3. Understood. I was refering mostly to the potential "conflict" of combat ground ops and a checkride at the same time. I've seen this affect engineers and loads more in this scenario. I believe at one time this was specifically addressed in the OPORD. Not sure if it is now. SC
Guest Posted April 27, 2011 Posted April 27, 2011 That's a great f-ing question. We have had that discussion several times while over in the desert. I try to tell my guys, "look, this 'war' is not going to be won by that extra airlift or refueling mission - pushing the envelope to imaginary wartime limits while putting us all at greater risk is just not worth it here." Really? Are you fucking kidding me? WWROD? Combat operations absolutely require you to take on extra risk. Being smart and managing that risk, while maybe not winning the war, is what saves people's lives. It is not your job to win the war or even worry about whether what you are doing wil win the war. Your job is to support the 18 year old on the ground, regardless if your mission is CAS or hauling rubber dog shit. In combat you press the gas and the weather and the threats and you do all those things with skill and poise under pressure. "Imaginary limits" that are "just not worth it"...WTFO? You need to turn in your wings today if you truly believe taking additional risks in combat is not worth it. Today. Do it. I can't tell if your post is cynical or not, but do you feel that the training rules work and that guys playing the "this is war" card are wrong when they do things differently over there? Training rules are for training. ROE is for combat. Or are you saying that stateside training needs to be de-pussified to match the additional risks that are being taken on a regular basis in the CENTOM deployed environments? You should train harder.
capt4fans Posted April 27, 2011 Posted April 27, 2011 The problem in the Herk community is that there are Sq/CC and DO's that will never have an "A" Code on the flight orders and never be in that position you just described. But they are very good at micro managing their people and armchair QBing every situation their young AC/IP's experience when they are the "A" Code. They're called Navs. Easy way around that one. Go to 17's or be a J pilot. No Nav!!! I keed, I keed. 2 1
Herk Driver Posted April 27, 2011 Posted April 27, 2011 Not to single out one single sentence of your response, but this really caught my eye. Unfortunately, there is really no way to tell for sure if your boss is going to back you or not until you've made the decision and await the ramifications. Right and in order for you to not take that out of context and add the context back, I also wrote, "I don't mind the training rules nor do I mind flying by the rules and then explaining myself or my actions when given the chance during the Monday morning QB session." I get it.
Champ Kind Posted April 27, 2011 Posted April 27, 2011 All well and good If you get that chance, and your rep isn't tarnished because of it (seen it happen).
Herk Driver Posted April 27, 2011 Posted April 27, 2011 Champ, I'm sure it has. Again, you have to live with your decisions at the end of the day and be able to answer for your decisions. I've never let the thought of a Monday morning QB session deter me from my decisions about whether to take an aircraft or continue a misson.
BQZip01 Posted April 27, 2011 Posted April 27, 2011 The problem in the Herk community is that there are Sq/CC and DO's that will never have an "A" Code on the flight orders and never be in that position you just described. But they are very good at micro managing their people and armchair QBing every situation their young AC/IP's experience when they are the "A" Code. They're called Navs. ...but they are Navs with G-series orders... :-) Nice to know that a few of 'em get command
JS Posted April 28, 2011 Posted April 28, 2011 Really? Are you fucking kidding me? WWROD? Combat operations absolutely require you to take on extra risk. Being smart and managing that risk, while maybe not winning the war, is what saves people's lives. It is not your job to win the war or even worry about whether what you are doing wil win the war. Your job is to support the 18 year old on the ground, regardless if your mission is CAS or hauling rubber dog shit. In combat you press the gas and the weather and the threats and you do all those things with skill and poise under pressure. "Imaginary limits" that are "just not worth it"...WTFO? You need to turn in your wings today if you truly believe taking additional risks in combat is not worth it. You should train harder. Rainman, I think there is a major difference between CAF and MAF operations that you are not taking into account, and also a major difference between when you and Clearedhot were opening up the war in 2001/2003 versus the sustainment operation it is today. Like someone on this board once said - you knew it is no longer a real war when services and the Chiefs/SGMGs started showing up. Back to my point. In the MAF world out in the desert, very rarely is the "combat" a life or death situation supporting the kids on the ground. More often than not, we are flying around planes that are 50% full, with dudes going home for R&R, or moving backlogged cargo into theater - old tires, generators, spare parts, etc. Every once in a while, we bring stuff that you can assume will have a relatively immediate, tangible impact on the mission - ammo, food, and water. I was also once told by a CC in the desert that "you will know it when you see it" with regards to a no-shit life or death scenario mission that must be accomplished. In four deployments, I have seen 3 or 4 such missions. The rest of the time, we are literally fighting dogshit weather, 0% illumination in mountainous terrain, and all kinds of threats just to bring in a palette of toilet paper (have done it first hand) or a palette that one of our loads marked on the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd time we brought the exact same palette into and out of the same LZ. Leaning forward and taking more risks in the name of this sustainment war, in my MAF airframe, is all good - until something goes wrong and the bosses have a reason to hang you. Then you see guys getting Q-3s (back to one of the main topics of this thread) given to them for pushing the envelope too hard to get a 3/4 empty plane into an LZ to bring 12 dudes out on R&R. Don't get me wrong, I love this plane and this mission, but 95% of the time, it can wait another day. That's my point. I am not talking about training "harder" on TTPs or anything like that. My guys know their shit just fine. I am talking about AFI and min-equipment limitations. I have seen the Herk sitting on an LZ, with engines running, with an MEL clean kill. The crew could accept the risk of the faulty equipment and get the palette of unused cement (seen it) back to the MOB without batting an eye - until something goes wrong, or the plane tells on us for flying with a MEL required item that is not functional. That's where Champ's concept comes in about how much is your boss really going to back you when you are knowingly violating a black and white AFI? Another example is all of the IFR/VFR rules we train for at home. Again, not life or death/guy on the ground needs us-type calculated risks. We are talking about getting an empty plane back from shithole/mountainous terrain airport to other shithole airport in Afghanistan. Is an H-model Herk really going to make 400'/NM on three engines? Or is the 45 minutes straight of flying in the soup "VFR" through mountains really legal? Those are the types of extra risks I see being taken in the name of combat all the time in the desert. Again, it all fine and dandy until something goes wrong and the boss asks 'why the fuck did you take that risk just to move 5 contractors when they could have taken the next scheduled airlift Herk out of there a few hours later, or the next day? That's what I think this thread is about - leadership defining and backing the crews up in an environment of increased calculated risks. I see guys getting lulled into thinking that they can take increased risks only to get burned when something goes wrong. Unfortunately, I have seen leadership turn their back on dudes way too many times in those situations. 2
PirateAF Posted April 28, 2011 Posted April 28, 2011 Rainman, I think there is a major difference between CAF and MAF operations that you are not taking into account, and also a major difference between when you and Clearedhot were opening up the war in 2001/2003 versus the sustainment operation it is today. Like someone on this board once said - you knew it is no longer a real war when services and the Chiefs/SGMGs started showing up. Two. PNFs don't get the "herbivore", "rubber dog crap", "trash-hauler" charmed life that we enjoy.
Homestar Posted April 28, 2011 Posted April 28, 2011 As far as the differences in evaluations between the CAF and the MAF, I have an idea, but I don't really know how to word it without sounding like I'm shitting on my community. Food for thought, though: I think the pointy-nose types might tend to focus on things where it really counts. Let's face it. It does take a lot of skill and airmanship to lead a four-ship (or more) of Herks across a DZ, on-time and on-target, and then ensure a safe recovery to a possibly austere field, and then be asked to do it in any weather and most likely on NVGs, and maybe even with people shooting at you. Not discounting that. I will say though that, while I haven't done it before, it takes a couple more brain-bytes to safely put bombs and bullets on target while talking to multiple airborne and ground-based personnel and, all the while, traveling a lot faster and having to worry a lot more about gas than us Herk types, not to mention in the aforementioned conditions. Because of this, I think SEFEs in the MAF are more focused on what would be called "queep" in the CAF because they feel that kind of stuff needs to be focused on. I think the CAF guys by-in-large have a more demanding mission in most cases, and therefore, if they make everything in their profile happen but don't fly the perfect ILS on the RTB, then it isn't a big deal. Will it ever change? I don't know, but it is what it is. Personally, I've heard some guys on here talk about making an upgrade training folder bleed if necessary because that's where the training really counts, and to use checkrides as a gauge as to whether or not someone is basically qualified in their MWS for the next year or so. I liked that thought process, and it's one that I am going to try to lean towards. I agree. In the tanker there isn't much to spend brain cells on between Gear - Up (P, CP) and Flaps - Up (P, CP), so if you can't manage to get your flaps up before you blast through your limiting speed with no SA on what's happened then you probably deserve what you get. I think most tanker EPs I've met are pretty big picture, but there are just a handful of those you-just-don't-do-that things that will get you.
Guest Crew Report Posted April 28, 2011 Posted April 28, 2011 I agree. In the tanker there isn't much to spend brain cells on between Gear - Up (P, CP) and Flaps - Up (P, CP), so if you can't manage to get your flaps up before you blast through your limiting speed with no SA on what's happened then you probably deserve what you get. I think most tanker EPs I've met are pretty big picture, but there are just a handful of those you-just-don't-do-that things that will get you. Most tanker EP's are big picture. Then you get the idiot upgrading to AC who loses and engine on takeoff in the sim (before S1), does the Abort boldface (doesn't have the Copilot run the rest of the abort checklist), and thinks that's it. The EP then resets the sim, gives him the exact same EP, and he does the Abort boldface again (again, doesn't have the Copilot run the rest of the checklist), get's Q3'd, and then bitches about it how that scenario wasn't fair.
bagasticks Posted April 28, 2011 Posted April 28, 2011 (edited) Most tanker EP's are big picture. Then you get the idiot upgrading to AC who loses and engine on takeoff in the sim (before S1), does the Abort boldface (doesn't have the Copilot run the rest of the abort checklist), and thinks that's it. The EP then resets the sim, gives him the exact same EP, and he does the Abort boldface again (again, doesn't have the Copilot run the rest of the checklist), get's Q3'd, and then bitches about it how that scenario wasn't fair. not sticking up for the Q-3'd at hand, but what kind of tool-bag EP pulls a motor before S1 on a AC checkride in the sim. . . . . let me guess, KLTS? Sim checkrides are retarded, for such bafoonery, EP's can dial up a "hook" with the press of a button. let's see I'll give this dude 25 kt crosswinds, 200' ceilings and 2 engines out on one wing and send him around because that is an accurate measure of one's ability to employ an MWS. . we have EP sims annually to practice dial-a-death type stuff, all that is required for an AC checkride (EP wise) is an EFTOC and a 3 engine go, so why would a so called "big picture EP" take it upon himself to add to that profile unless he was fishing for a taco. Edited April 28, 2011 by bagasticks
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