F-35 Lightning info

[Muscle2002]

I am NOT an Aero Engineer...but it seems like the article is mostly knocking the F-35's large fuselage area. Isn't that not necessarily a bad thing? Doesn't the F-15 make a considerable amount of lift from its fuselage?

Dumb it down for me here...

Yes, the F-15 generates considerable lift from the fuselage.

The critique in the article was directed at the fuselage shape and its affect on transonic drag.

[Swanee]

Yes, the F-15 generates considerable lift from the fuselage.

The critique in the article was directed at the fuselage shape and its affect on transonic drag.

Long, but good article.

F’d: How the U.S. and Its Allies Got Stuck with the World’s Worst New Warplane The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter was meant to improve the U.S. air arsenal but has made it more vulnerable instead

https://medium.com/war-is-boring/5c95d45f86a5

Hmmm, I wonder how much the author of that article knows about the tactics involved in running an intercept. Much less how to run an intercept when you know the dudes you're intercepting can't freaking see you.

Sorry bro, this airplane is happening, and it's better than what we've got now.

[Seriously]

I am NOT an Aero Engineer...but it seems like the article is mostly knocking the F-35's large fuselage area. Isn't that not necessarily a bad thing? Doesn't the F-15 make a considerable amount of lift from its fuselage?

Dumb it down for me here...

The article was knocking the Marine Corps' obsession with V/STOL requirements. The placement of the lift fan created to comply with the Marines' request widens the fuselage, limits the view of the pilot from the cockpit, and allows space for only one engine.

How much these things matter considering changes in tactics and the advancements of radar and stealth technology, I don't know. What I do remember from my aero design class back in college was that *everything* has trade-offs, and there's no such thing as a free lunch.

[Tulsa]

Name me one conflict in which the USMC has had to use the VSTOL concept in their MAGTF? Other than building shorter bo-ats we don't need it. The AV-8B is a piece of shit. Here is a brilliant idea, let's share a BOMB between us. I haven't looked at the actual design plans, but if it is true and the VSTOL is the reason for a majority of the ineptitude in the design,then we are buying a flawed product. Just curious, but does anyone know why we continue to feed this USMC VSTOL canard?

[Swanee]

Name me one conflict in which the USMC has had to use the VSTOL concept in their MAGTF? Other than building shorter bo-ats we don't need it. The AV-8B is a piece of shit. Here is a brilliant idea, let's share a BOMB between us. I haven't looked at the actual design plans, but if it is true and the VSTOL is the reason for a majority of the ineptitude in the design,then we are buying a flawed product. Just curious, but does anyone know why we continue to feed this USMC VSTOL canard?

We've been down this road before on this board. The Marine Corps wants fixed wing air support off of small deck (LHA/LHD) carriers to support the MEU. That's why we have the Harrier, and why we have the B model F-35. (Which is the only one with a full squadron btw)

Where the road gets rocky is when you discuss why the MEU needs the F-35B.

Let me paraphrase the next few pages of arguments:

AF Bubbas: "ROAR, we are AF, we rule the skies with our professionalism, we can do all 6 function of Marine Air for the USMC. They ruined our perfect airplane with their requirements, shit on Marine Tacair, we can do it for them, and we can do it much better than they can. ROAR"

USMC Bubbas "ROAR, F you guys, we're the Marine Corps and the basis of the MEU is to be able to do everything by ourselves, we don't need your stinking help. We are the Marine Corps. ROAR"

We always seem to forget that each service had it's own (vastly different) requirements, and that it was congress who said that we had to have 1 airplane for them all.

Edited November 9, 2013 by Swanee

[Tulsa]

USMC Bubbas "ROAR, F you guys, we're the Marine Corps and the basis of the MEU is to be able to do everything by ourselves, we don't need your stinking help. We are the Marine Corps. ROAR"

You still can't tell me why you need it. Your service came up with a requirement that it can't justify. It isn't 1944, we aren't island hopping around the Pacific with my short boats and POS harriers.

[Muscle2002]

We always seem to forget that each service had it's own (vastly different) requirements, and that it was congress who said that we had to have 1 airplane for them all.

THIS!

[Swanee]

USMC Bubbas "ROAR, F you guys, we're the Marine Corps and the basis of the MEU is to be able to do everything by ourselves, we don't need your stinking help. We are the Marine Corps. ROAR"

You still can't tell me why you need it. Your service came up with a requirement that it can't justify. It isn't 1944, we aren't island hopping around the Pacific with my short boats and POS harriers.

We've used the Harriers STOVL ability in Afghanistan early on in the war. There were some airfields that were completely bombed out, only helos and Harriers could use them until the runways were fixed.

We also used the capability during the march up to Baghdad. Harriers landing next to helos along the highway at FARPs. Oh, and that whole feint thing in Gulf War 1, where we had the entire 1MarDiv sitting off of the coast of Kuwait in amphibs, giving the Iraqis the idea that the Marines were coming across the beach dividing the Iraqi military and forcing them to deploy on two fronts- giving Gen Schwarzkopf's swinging door strategy even more leverage.

However, we regularly use it off of the small deck carriers. Why do we need it? Because the whole purpose of a MEU is to have a completely organic combine arms fighting unit (A Marine Air/Ground Task Force- MAGTF), complete with it's own Ground, Logistics and Air combat elements (Hence the GCE, ACE, and LCE) MEUs (and their expeditionairy strike group) deploy separately from a CSG.

The same reason that we Marines need the F-35b is the same reason the Navy and the Air Force need their model. The game is changing, if we have to escort a flight of MV-22s feet dry we need to ensure the way is clear for them so they make it to their destination. With emerging SA threats, and the places we may go I sure as shit don't want to do that in a Hornet, much less a Harrier. With the current fiscal climate in the military we can't afford the luxury of purpose built airplanes anymore. Therefore the F-35 has to be able to do everything that we need a tactical fixed wing airplane in support of the MEU to do. That means OCA to support a TRAP mission, DCA to protect the ESG, deep/stealth strike to take out those new and robust SA nodes, EA to send trons down range so those helos/Ospreys/and other F-35s flying through that SAM WEZ don't get shot down. We fly ISR regularly (ATARS) And of course, what is near and dear to the Marine Aviators heart- CAS. And we have to be able to do it from where the MEU is- onboard a ship that doesn't have catapults or arresting gear.

The bottom line is that we do a lot more than what most people think, we bring a lot of capabilities to the fight so that battalion can be there ready to kick the teeth in to anyone to who needs it anywhere in the world. We are self sufficient for as little as 14 days to as many as 30- that gives the AF, Army, and Navy enough time to mobilize and get their shit together to bring in the serious heat. We aren't designed to be a second land Army (though we were/are used as one in Afghanistan). We are the step between the SOF guys and the big Army.

If you don't think we need that, or you think that the AF could do better, or think that we don't need the Marine Corps all together, then join the club of naysayers. There are a lot of them - even in congress. The Marine Corps has survived worse times, and has had to defend itself and it's existence many times. Yet we always come out on top? Why? Because while America may not need a Marine Corps, America wants a Marine Corps.

Today (November 10th, 2013) marks 238 years of the United States Marine Corps. We celebrated our 101st year of Marine Aviation on August 20th. We aren't going anywhere, we aren't going to give up any capabilities, and we aren't going to relinquish the ACE over to the Air Force.

[nsplayr]

I don't think a lot of people are doubting the value of the Marines or what they bring to the fight.

The point is to me that while the theory of a STOVL fighter is great, the execution still sucks. The harrier sucks balls in real-life execution from my narrow view of having worked with them and the F-35B appears to be another train wreck of execution.

The fact that the B model is so derided inside of an entire program that is totally F-ed six ways from Sunday is notable.

Edited November 10, 2013 by nsplayr

[Swanee]

I don't think a lot of people are doubting the value of the Marines or what they bring to the fight.

The point is to me that while the theory of a VSTOL fighter is great, the execution still sucks. The harrier sucks balls in real-life execution from my narrow view of having worked with them and the F-35B appears to be another train wreck of execution.

The fact that the B model is so derided inside of an entire program that is totally F-ed six ways from Sunday is notable.

How many AD A and C model squadrons are there? 0. However there is 1 B model gun squadron in Yuma. I don't see how your argument has any validity. The B model will have more capabilities than the Harrier, both in the obvious tech as well as fuel and ordnance bring back. Yes, the harrier is laughable with a division checks in with a total of 3 gbu-12s while the flight lead has the pod. The F-35b will be better than that. In order for a fixed wing jet to operate off of an LHA/LHD(insert L platform here) it has to be VSTOL. does not having a lift fan give you more internal space for gas and such? Sure. The Navy has dealt with the same issue since day one of modern carrier ops. Bigger beefier gear take up space for gas and add weight, but that's the price you pay to be able to fly off of a CVN.

So, if the B model F-35 is so ed up, why is it the only model we are taking delivery of into AD squadrons? Also - what jet do we use that can be organic to the MEU and take off of an LHD? The F-22 is great, but guess what it can't do?

[Champ Kind]

Swanee, he's a Nav.

[nsplayr]

In order for a fixed wing jet to operate off of an LHA/LHD(insert L platform here) it has to be VSTOL.

False.

As Champ kindly points out, I am a nav (the horror!) but check out what this guys has to say.

BL: Although it sounds great in a world where $$ is no object and we can overcome any technical problem, I just don't see the fundamental need for launching 5th gen fighters off of the Corps' small carriers. Not at the price we're paying for that capability. I get that the Marines want organic air and they can have organic air, in a lower-tech package that we can actually afford produce successfully. The author proposes OV-10s or Super Ts, airplanes I think would fit a lot of bills in both the Marine Corps and the Air Force. Unfortunately for the "bigger is better" U.S. military mindset there seems to be a ton of reluctance toward using anything less than the most high-tech solution.

In December 2010 the Commandant was quoted as stating “there is not a plan B” to the F–35B program.₁ In effect our Marine Corps has “derivatives of plan A,” based on a 1998 decision, that all rely on the short takeoff/vertical landing (STOVL) F–35B being produced. “We decided we would skip a generation of what we called fourth-generation airplanes . . . and we would end up putting all of our money and our hopes in the F–35B.” This decision has become particularly troubling in regard to the high costs associated with the program, the program’s current status, and our United States Marine Corps reputation for plans and preparations. Part of serving as the Nation’s force-in-readiness is our ability to plan, prepare, and maintain both perception and reality that the Marine Corps is most ready when the Nation is least ready. One well-known statement toward Marine readiness came in 1971, during the “Pentagon Papers” investigation. When cross-examined and asked if the Marine Corps had been preparing to fight in Vietnam and Cambodia back in 1964, LtGen Victor H. Krulak famously replied yes and that “we were preparing to fight in a lot of other places, too.”

How do we describe the plan to develop the F–35B? Let’s try expensive to start. Development costs for the entire Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program were estimated at $25 billion at inception in 1996₂ and by 2004 had grown 80 percent. Thankfully, in 2008 the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found there had been no additional increases in development costs. Unthankfully, this was because “development costs were held constant by reducing requirements, eliminating the alternate engine program, and spending management reserve faster than budgeted.”₃ Late is an apt description for the program too. Once envisioned to have an initial operational capability (IOC) as early as 2010, IOC has now been put off to 2016. Our Marine Corps has had late weapons systems before. But we have never had a weapons system so expensive.₄

What about acquisitions costs? From program start in 2001, the JSF was estimated to cost $233 billion₅ for total program acquisition.₆ This was the teaser price, the estimate grew to $245 billion in 2004, $279 billion in 2007, and in 2008 the JSF program office’s estimate was $300 billion,₇ a 29 percent increase over the original figure. However, GAO found that this 2008 estimate was not reliable, comprehensive, accurate, well documented, or credible. Worse, no uncertainty analysis has been conducted (acquisition may cost $298 billion; it may cost $500 billion). The only thing that is certain, the $300 billion estimate was “virtually certain to be wrong.”₈ In 2010, after a Nunn-McCurdy breach—a required formal review whenever program costs increase anywhere from 15 percent to 50 percent over expectations—GAO’s latest 2011 estimate is a total JSF program acquisition cost of $383 billion. Using coarse analysis and acknowledging that from 2001 to 2011 estimated program cost grew about $16.7 billion a year, when IOC begins in 5 more years we might expect a $466 billion acquisition cost—exactly double the original estimate. (See Figure 1.)

Figure 1. Estimated F–35 acquistions and operations and support costs, in billions. (Graph provided by author.)

But procurement costs are less than half of the problem; life cycle costs are the lion’s share. In 2005 the estimated procurement and remaining life cycle costs, typically described as operations and support, were $245 billion and $344 billion,₉ respectively. In 2008, for the scheduled 2,457 aircraft, the program office’s estimate had grown from $344 billion to $650 billion in operations and support costs. GAO reports that historically operations and support represent 72 percent of total costs. If acquisition represents 28 percent of total costs and GAO’s $383 billion acquisition estimate holds true, then operations and support costs would be an estimated $985 billion. This figure grows to $1.198 trillion using the $466 billion acquisition cost estimate. For a more empirical and optimistic measure, assume support cost estimates increase by merely $306 billion over the next 6 years (as they have the past 6 years) for a total of $956 billion in support estimates in 2017. GAO says that the next official independent life cycle cost estimate for JSF is not scheduled until 2014.₁₀ However, a 21 April article appearing in Bloomberg News stated that the Pentagon’s cost analysis and program evaluation group, which estimates $1 trillion in operation and support costs, was to complete a major F–35 review in May.₁₁

So why are foreign militaries spending their money on the JSF? Simple, they are not. JSF’s principal international partners include Australia, Canada, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Turkey, and the United Kingdom (UK). None of these nations have received more than test models. Israel is a security cooperation partner, and the cost of their 19 F–35As has spiraled to $145 million each. Lockheed Martin is offsetting the costs by paying them $4 billion.₁₂ The UK, the only F–35B partner, canceled its F–35B program in favor of F–35Cs, which are capable of landing on an aircraft carrier and which won’t be available before 2019. A British study suggests that C model operating costs will be 25 percent less than B models. Spain operates a version of the Harrier but has no scheduled buys. Italy’s first four F–35s, scheduled to arrive in 2014, have been switched from STOVL to conventional aircraft.₁₃ At this point in the program, cancelling the F–35B only affects the Marine Corps.

This is the precipice where the STOVL variant stands now. In November 2010 the President’s Fiscal Commission,₁₄ and in April 2011 The New York Times,₁₅ called for the elimination of the F–35B (as well as the V–22). The Wall Street Journal₁₆ has made similar suggestions as early as July 2010. In January 2011 the Secretary of Defense put the F–35B program in a 2-year probation period stating, “If we cannot fix this variant in this time frame and get it back on track in terms of performance, cost and schedule, then I believe it should be cancelled.” This is after the program has been redesigned multiple times, and the program manager, a Marine major general, was fired in February 2010.

Program redesigns have not had favorable Marine outcomes recently. The expeditionary fighting (EFV) vehicle program had its final redesign in March of 2010,₁₇ when the projected acquisition cost was $12 billion. At the time our senior leadership stated, “We have high hopes for these new vehicles.”₁₈ Yet this did not prevent the program’s cancellation in January 2011 when costs had increased to $14 billion. When current leadership expresses their high hopes for the F–35B, we can be certain that the Marine variant is set for cancellation. Hope, as the saying goes, is not a course of action.

So what does an F–35B plan B look like? What if the F–35B is part of the $400 billion in Department of Defense (DoD) cuts the President announced in April that he wanted to make over the next 10 years? First, plan B must source replacement aircraft for our Marine attack squadrons (VMAs). According to the fiscal year 2011 (FY11) Marine Fixed-Wing Aviation Plan, the VMA’s mission is to “support the MAGTF commander by destroying surface targets, and escort friendly aircraft, day or night, under all weather conditions during expeditionary, joint or combined operations.”

More specifically, Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3–2, Aviation Operations, defines VMA missions as antiair warfare (AAW), offensive air support (OAS), and air reconnaissance, as well as escorting assault support missions. Marine leadership has a stated desire for aircraft able to deploy with the rest of our maneuver unit (i.e., STOVL jets flying off LHAs without well decks that the Navy built for us). This capability doubles the number of “carrier-type capital ships”—11 Navy carriers and 11 big-deck amphibs—that can deploy fifth-generation fighters. The FY11 plan, which preceded the F–35B program probation decision, called for a reduction in VMA squadrons from seven squadrons in FY13 to one remaining squadron in FY20. In light of the F–35B decision, the FY12 plan will deviate significantly from that proposed in FY11. Is the F–35B the only capability that can fulfill the VMA’s mission?

Second, plan B must facilitate the transition plan of ship- and shorebased F/A–18 model aircraft. The carrier-based F–35C does not appear to be in jeopardy of cancellation. The Marine Corps already plans to buy 80 F–35Cs,₁₉ so even if the F–35B is cancelled, our Marine all-weather fighter/attack squadrons (VMFAs) have replacements in the pipe. Hence, changes to carrier aviation are not a critical part of any new plan B, yet it bears mentioning and watching as F–35 program costs continue to increase.

Third, plan B must include an airborne electronic attack (AEA) replacement capability, with the suspense being the planned sundown of Marine tactical electronic warfare squadrons (VMAQs) in FY19. Although often underestimated, this is a critical aviation function. Electronic warfare is important in establishing air superiority, conducting strikes, supporting a broad array of efforts from shaping to decisive operations to stability operations, and in defeating modern antiaccess capabilities that may threaten our amphibious operations. Currently there are two Marine aviators on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. There are two STOVL aircraft the United States produces that can perform these required missions. If pay grades above our top two Marines decide to cancel the F–35B program, our Corps has two recourses—extend the other program (AV–8B) or completely redefine our requirement, concepts, and doctrines.

Politically, the easiest F–35B plan B would be to purchase F–35Cs earlier, while holding out hope for a reversal of the F–35B cancellation. This is essentially the plan General Electric (GE) enacted this year, continuing work on the JSF’s alternative engine,₂₀ even though funding was cut in April 2011. GE’s hope is that funding gets picked up again in the FY12 budget. Of the three requirements, this plan B merely hopes for a reversal in the cancellation of a desired VMA replacement, buys VMFA replacements earlier at more expense, and accepts undesirable risk in assuming that emerging jammer technology will fit into an immature JSF variant for VMAQ replacement. We can do better with less money.

The Marine Corps could start by departing from its recent history of leading edge, extremely risky acquisitions programs and focus on proven, efficient technologies. On the low end of the cost spectrum, a revised plan B could incorporate a small high-duration aircraft specializing in light attack, forward air control, and supporting counterinsurgency operations. This idea was proposed by the IMMINENT FURY project and supported by then Joint Forces Command’s Gen James N. Mattis in 2009. IMMINENT FURY suggested immediately using an OV–10 or EMB 314 Super Tucano (flyaway cost, $9 million), which can loiter 6 hours unrefueled. Such a platform, if capable of launching and recovering from LHAs, could fulfill all VMA missions except for AAW. A long-term replacement could be procured in the 2028 time frame, when the Air Force may look toward replacing the A–10C with a similar aircraft.

On the high end, the Marine Corps could opt for the most capable AAW platform available, the F–22. Embracing an aircraft Congress recently voted to stop producing may seem like an extreme course of action, but it makes the most sense for the Marine Corps for several reasons. First, F–22s could be purchased now and would be cheaper initially and cost less to maintain than F–35s in the future. The current DoD plan is to buy 50 Marine Corps F–35B aircraft through 2016 at a cost of $9 billion, or $190 million per aircraft.₂₁ In 2011, flyaway costs for the F–22 are a reported $150 million per aircraft.₂₂ The U.S. Air Force estimates flying hour costs for the F–22 are $44,259 per hour.₂₃ The 2008 GAO report₂₄ estimated $33,000 per flying hour in a JSF aircraft.₂₅ However, F–35B costs will likely be higher than A and C models. Additionally, the 2011 GAO update states that “current JSF life-cycle cost estimates are considerably higher than the legacy aircraft it will replace.” If their most recent estimate of $1 trillion in operations and support costs proves true, F–35 flying hour costs will exceed $50,000 an hour. In other words, using current estimates, total life cycle costs for every F–35 exceeds that of an F–22 by almost $100 million per plane. Certainly there would be a cost to restart the F–22 manufacturing base, but this expense is easily dwarfed by these F–35 life cycle costs.

Most significantly, the F–22 dwarfs the F–35 in stealth, speed, survivability, deployability, and firepower. With a more mature and more powerful active electronically scanned array radar, and with planned upgrades, the F–22 is a more credible and less risky investment to fulfill the VMAQ’s AEA mission. The F–22 also represents a better platform for AEA upgrades.

Significantly, this course of action would accept providing only 11 fifth-generation fighter-capable carriers. It may also require making inroads in positioning Marine F–22s in more expeditionary stations than those in Hawaii, Alaska, California, Nevada, New Mexico, Florida, and Virginia, where all F–22 aircraft are currently stationed. Forward postured Marine F–22s could provide the Nation with greater strategic reach than amphibious-based F–35Bs. With a supercruise speed of 1,220 miles per hour, an aerial refueled F–22 could make the 1,700-mile transit from Guam to Taiwan in less than 2 hours.

Future Marine Corps involvement with the F–22 program could include testing air-to-ground weapon loads on the four external 5,000-pound-rated hard points and incorporating some of the ambitious close air support-enabling avionics and software upgrades currently only planned in the F–35. In the future, this would provide the Marine Corps with the most capable, stealthy AAW fighter for day one of any campaign. In the latter days of a conflict, an upgraded F–22 could serve as our most efficient and effective OAS asset. With proper development, the same platform could serve as the MAGTF’s AEA asset; conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; or even provide control for other aircraft or missiles. This would be all at less cost than the F–35B and without the threat of cancellation looming the next 2 years.

A high/low plan B could focus on acquiring approximately 60 F–22 aircraft to replace 5 F/A–18D squadrons scheduled to begin decommissioning in FY14 and removed from service by FY20. These aircraft would provide more capability and cost less than the estimates for the F–35B. For the cost of one F–35B, the Marine Corps could acquire and support 10 counterinsurgency-focused aircraft with a 6-hour loiter time. Seven squadrons, each consisting of 14 OV–10-like aircraft, could provide AV–8B replacements, gap the STOVL requirement while waiting for technology to mature, and pass the savings on to the taxpayer as part of the Commander in Chief’s $40 billion a year in cuts. Other options are available at less risk than betting on F–35B continuation in the next 2 years. It is time for an F–35B plan B.

- See more at: https://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/article/f–35b-needs-plan-b#sthash.6smHdcBz.dpuf

Edited November 10, 2013 by nsplayr

[Swanee]

False.

As Champ kindly points out, I am a nav (the horror!) but check out what this guys has to say.

BL: Although it sounds great in a world where $$ is no object and we can overcome any technical problem, I just don't see the fundamental need for launching 5th gen fighters off of the Corps' small carriers. Not at the price we're paying for that capability. I get that the Marines want organic air and they can have organic air, in a lower-tech package that we can actually afford produce successfully. The author proposes OV-10s or Super Ts, airplanes I think would fit a lot of bills in both the Marine Corps and the Air Force. Unfortunately for the "bigger is better" U.S. military mindset there seems to be a ton of reluctance toward using anything less than the most high-tech solution.

Cool, you linked a Gazette article from more than 2 (almost 3) years ago. So your argument is someone else's argument from 3 years ago? Thumbs up.

You're not going to run an intercept in an OV-10X (really OV-10G is what they are calling it now, which I've seen fly and talked to the guys flying it) or a Super T. Those are strictly CAS and ISR platforms. We started putting APG-65 radars in Harriers and spooling them up on basic intercepts because (and please imagine me speaking a bit slower so that you can understand this) we need that capability. If you don't think that threat nations out there have the ability to F up an ESG with a couple of 1960s era airplanes...

Just as the AF can't afford to keep the A-10 or KC-10 around anymore we can't afford single role airplanes anymore either.

Have you sat through a TOPGUN or MAWTS (or whatever you guys call it, Fighter Weapons School?) threat brief? There is some scary shit out there that is being proliferated. We can't keep fighting yesterday's war.

[tac airlifter]

Yes, the harrier is laughable with a division checks in with a total of 3 gbu-12s while the flight lead has the pod. The F-35b will be better than that.

I'm unfamiliar with the capes on existing B squadrons, but you hit the nail on the head associating the stigma of AV8Bs with -35s. Two ships checking into a stack with 15 minutes playtime & a shitty sensor that prohibits tally, then dropping their bombs in the ocean because they can't land at that weight gets embarrassing fast. If the -35 is better: I can't wait to see it perform.

Swanee, he's a Nav.

how much experience do you have conducting airstrikes?

[Champ Kind]

how much experience do you have conducting airstrikes?

None at all. But I rarely pass up an opportunity to shit on a Nav.... Even if it's in jest.

Lighten up, Francis.

[tac airlifter]

Lighten up, Francis.

You just made the list buddy.

[nsplayr]

Cool, you linked a Gazette article from more than 2 (almost 3) years ago. So your argument is someone else's argument from 3 years ago? Thumbs up.

Yea, that's my argument. The author is more credible and makes it more convincingly than I would or could.

You're not going to run an intercept in an OV-10X (really OV-10G is what they are calling it now, which I've seen fly and talked to the guys flying it) or a Super T. Those are strictly CAS and ISR platforms.

Yes, I understand that.

...because (and please imagine me speaking a bit slower so that you can understand this) we need that capability.

Disagree, no need to speak slowly.

It's a cape that would be awesome to have. Trust me, I'd love to have a do-it-all super plane that can jump off of a helipad at max ord/fuel, evade the enemy's radar and blow up their shit. I'd even be happy to let the Marines fly it. I just don't think we're A) able to afford it and on top of that, B) I don't think the F-35B delivers on that.

Your need is my want, and while I want that capability I'd rather have the guaranteed capabilities of an OV-10 or Super T forward-deployed than wait and hope and pray that the F-35B works out ok.

Just as the AF can't afford to keep the A-10 or KC-10 around anymore we can't afford single role airplanes anymore either.

And the OV-10 and Super T aren't single-role airplanes; honestly neither are the A-10 or especially the KC-10 but I digress...

Have you sat through a TOPGUN or MAWTS (or whatever you guys call it, Fighter Weapons School?) threat brief? There is some scary shit out there that is being proliferated. We can't keep fighting yesterday's war.

Yes. On the other hand, we can and should fight today's war and capabilities we need right f*cking now are available at a cost we can afford. I'm willing to let the F-35C continue to mature and that can be our bo-at launched airplane of the future. Edited November 10, 2013 by nsplayr

[Clark Griswold]

... to be able to fly off of a CVN.

Question for Swanee:

Just looking at the dimensions of an LHD, using the USS Bataan as an example, which is about 850 feet x 105, pretty close to the size of some smaller carriers operated by the French or Brazilians, why didn't the USMC build straight deck pocket carriers and look for a light strike fighter that could do STOBAR operations to keep it simple? Serious question as it would seem a lot less technically difficult and still be Marine owned and operated?

Sorry bro, this airplane is happening, and it's better than what we've got now.

Agreed - the dye is cast for better or worse but why did USMC Aviation keep going with the idea of VSTOL fighters after the known performance limitations of the AV-8 and the lift-fan limitations/problems with the B model?

Edited November 10, 2013 by Clark Griswold

[Fuzz]

So we cut the F-22 production because it was too expensive, in favor of the "cheaper" F-35; which is now more expensive. This is why we are broke.

[Azimuth]

So we cut the F-22 production because it was too expensive, in favor of the "cheaper" F-35; which is now more expensive. This is why we are broke.

No, we're broke because we've been at war since 2001.

[Swanee]

Question for Swanee:

Just looking at the dimensions of an LHD, using the USS Bataan as an example, which is about 850 feet x 105, pretty close to the size of some smaller carriers operated by the French or Brazilians, why didn't the USMC build straight deck pocket carriers and look for a light strike fighter that could do STOBAR operations to keep it simple? Serious question as it would seem a lot less technically difficult and still be Marine owned and operated?

Agreed - the dye is cast for better or worse but why did USMC Aviation keep going with the idea of VSTOL fighters after the known performance limitations of the AV-8 and the lift-fan limitations/problems with the B model?

It's more expensive to build a whole new class of ship. I'm not sure why the Navy designed their amphibs the way they did- probably had to do with the well deck and how much space that takes up. (Though the new LPD doesn't have a well deck...)

As far as sticking with VSTOL, it goes back to the organic fixed wing issue. We used to have a lot more squadron deploy with the CVW on carriers. We now only have 3 squadrons that do that. We're getting smaller, and want all of our air support as part of the MAGTF. We're given the issue that the MEU will always be on amphibs. Until a better idea about to how to get that capability comes along I guess we throw money at the problem to fix it. It worked with the Osprey.

NSPlayer- what do you think the role of Marine Air is?

This paraphrase pretty much nails it: Sorry bro, this airplane is happening, and it's better than what we've got now.

[Fuzz]

No, we're broke because we've been at war since 2001.

Well that too, my comment was meant more for the continuously short sighted spending decisions we make (I.e new command center ect.).

[Swanee]

So we cut the F-22 production because it was too expensive, in favor of the "cheaper" F-35; which is now more expensive. This is why we are broke.

Yep. And we act surprised when the new advanced weapons system is more expensive than what we've got now.

Price check on the value of an 18inch color TV from Sears in 1980 vs a current LG 55inch flat panel LED with wireless internet connectivity, multiple audio and video decoders, and fully customizable picture qualities.

It is true that you can watch the superbowl on either one, but which one do you really want in your house?

[nsplayr]

Until a better idea about to how to get that capability comes along I guess we throw money at the problem to fix it.

My disagreement is over what that capability is. You say it's LO 5th gen fighters off a short boat, I disagree that we really need that. We can get, in my view, a ton of capability to support Marines coming ashore from a lower-tech platform that is capable of launching off of your current boats. To me if you get 69% of the capability for 10% of the cost that's a good value*.

*Values WAG'd

NSPlayer- what do you think the role of Marine Air is?

Not to be flippant, but to support the national defense. Let's configure it in the way that best supports our national interest, and part of that is considering cost and value. If we had unlimited money, which we basically did for about 10 years, we could buy the most high-tech military weapons our minds could imagine and our hands could produce. Under different circumstances, which I'd argue we're living in now, you have to take a harder look at value and leave no sacred cows. IMHO, the F-35B could be cancelled, we could use some of the savings to buy a whole fleet of OV-10s or Super Ts to give to the MAGTF, and could use the remaining 90% of the money saved and put it toward un-f*cking the F-35A and C.

This paraphrase pretty much nails it: Sorry bro, this airplane is happening, and it's better than what we've got now.

Yea, that pretty much does nail it. Despite my above arguments, the F-35 in general, and the -B model most likely, will happen because we as a country have mastered the idea of "too big to fail." We can't afford to let the F-35 fail so we won't. I just wish we could see that cutting the B model could be a net positive that would both help the budget and help the other models survive with less cost.

[Muscle2002]

So, if the B model F-35 is so ######ed up, why is it the only model we are taking delivery of into AD squadrons?

Because the Commandant of the USMC has accepted the risk of placing them in operational squadrons before DT is even complete. That's also why that variant can fly in some WX despite lacking instrument certification.