What's wrong with the Air Force?

[BFM this]

3 minutes ago, 08Dawg said:

Kicking the safety team out is a massive red flag. If I’m the wing chief of safety and I hear that, the answer is “Uh, no”

Lol, you don’t have to be a WCoS to know that’s a foul.  Hell, I’ll bet the LTs in the room knew it was fucked up like polio as soon as it was happening.

This is like busting a rule on a checkride; from the WG/CC’s perspective, his hands are probably tied with respect to the outcome at this point.

[Scooter14]

I’m trying to find his official bio online. I’m willing to bet he spent the majority of his career checking boxes as an exec and going towards schools vs. being in an ops squadron hacking the mission.

[FLEA]

13 minutes ago, Scooter14 said:

I’m trying to find his official bio online. I’m willing to bet he spent the majority of his career checking boxes as an exec and going towards schools vs. being in an ops squadron hacking the mission.

The culture in the AWACS community pretty much guarantees this is the case. Their priorities are often misaligned with the rest of the CAF. 

[Hugo Stiglitz]

49 minutes ago, Scooter14 said:

I’m trying to find his official bio online. I’m willing to bet he spent the majority of his career checking boxes as an exec and going towards schools vs. being in an ops squadron hacking the mission.

His public LinkedIn profile picks up 10 years into his career, but basically yes: 
NAF Staff > Legislative Fellow > Special Asst. to STRATCOM CC > 2 total years in ops as  Sq DO & Deployed Sq CC > NWC > HAF Staff > AFFSA Deputy CC > Celebrity

[Guardian]

That’s not a great career path. A lot of assignments you send someone on that you want to get rid of. How did he end up the OG?

[Scooter14]

That’s not a great career path. A lot of assignments you send someone on that you want to get rid of. How did he end up the OG?

He was probably the only one that hung around long enough and I’m sure he had someone somewhere pulling for him.

It’s like “the Rat 2.0” for those who remember that guy.

[Scooter14]

His public LinkedIn profile picks up 10 years into his career, but basically yes: 
NAF Staff > Legislative Fellow > Special Asst. to STRATCOM CC > 2 total years in ops as  Sq DO & Deployed Sq CC > NWC > HAF Staff > AFFSA Deputy CC > Celebrity

Air Force FLIGHT STANDARDS Agency Deputy CC...how ironic seeing that the OPR for 11-202v3 is AFFSA/XOF

Can anyone say “out of touch?”

[ThreeHoler]

[ThreeHoler]

[ThreeHoler]

I’ll always side with an AC who makes the best decision with the information they have…

But I also have lost count the number of times I needed to shift my sleep schedule for a mission departure and did it without No-Gos.


Sent from my iPhone using Baseops Network mobile app

[1:1:1]

You regularly invert your sleep schedule within 14 hours of reporting to fly? Not sure how that doesn't increase risk.

[jazzdude]

You regularly invert your sleep schedule within 14 hours of reporting to fly? Not sure how that doesn't increase risk.

I mean, that seemed to be the C-17 standard during my time actively flying the line... (Not saying it's right, especially for an exercise)

Nothing like waking up after a good sleep while on Charlie alert and getting the call to go into crew rest for an alert in 13 hours with a basic crew. Fun times.

[Sua Sponte]

Here’s the audio.

 

[BFM this]

Lest it be missed in all the discussion.  To that AC willing to stand up, stand by their decision, and get publicly shot in the lips: 

[SocialD]

You know why the flight doc denied them no-go's...because it's a fuckin exercise, they're not headed downtown, the OG can't seem to make the distinction.  The quote I was reminded of while listening to that overly dramatic tantrum.  

Edited July 18, 2021 by SocialD

[tac airlifter]

3 hours ago, SocialD said:  

For discussion purposes only: I don’t agree with that sign.  As a practical matter, ask the WC-130s.   As a philosophical matter:  How can you know where the real edges are in combat if you never explore them in training?  Lot of people out there unwilling to approach a training limit who are simultaneously certain they can react like pros if contingency circumstances required it.  They’re wrong.  
 

 

 

[Pooter]

21 minutes ago, tac airlifter said:

For discussion purposes only: I don’t agree with that sign.  As a practical matter, ask the WC-130s.   As a philosophical matter:  How can you know where the real edges are in combat if you never explore them in training?  Lot of people out there unwilling to approach a training limit who are simultaneously certain they can react like pros if contingency circumstances required it.  They’re wrong.  
 

 

 

🤦🏻‍♂️ No one is talking about the hurricane hunters. And I'm not sure what airmanship or proficiency you gain by flying into a thunderstorm. Sounds like a good way to damage your aircraft and thereby reduce the combat capability of your unit. The point of the sign is you shouldn't take unacceptable risks in training. Get-the-job-done-at-all-costs-itis kills more people at home station than combat does. People regularly lose sight of the fact that they are conducting training and push things well past the margin of safety. 
 

As for this instance, the OG has the right to be pissed. His people couldn't execute when the time came.  But his anger is directed in entirely the wrong direction, with a big bag of AFI ignorance to boot. Something in the chain broke down between the exercise planning and the squadron level where the aircrew were given a garbage plan. A good commander would have gotten up there and asked his people how this broke down to the point aircrew were forced to make that decision. And how they should approach exercises as a wing in the future so this doesn't happen again. But he didn't do that, and seems like a pretty big twat. I'll be eagerly awaiting the crucifixion. 
 

 

[SocialD]

36 minutes ago, tac airlifter said:

For discussion purposes only: I don’t agree with that sign.  As a practical matter, ask the WC-130s.  

 

Well that's their mission, not training, which is what the sign is getting at.  

 

36 minutes ago, tac airlifter said:

As a philosophical matter:  How can you know where the real edges are in combat if you never explore them in training?  Lot of people out there unwilling to approach a training limit who are simultaneously certain they can react like pros if contingency circumstances required it.  They’re wrong.  

 

I agree in one sense because we won't even fly through a thunderstorm on a combat mission.  We'll fly around it, but never through it. 

 

More on the subject in the context of this conversation.  I've never shown up to work only to been told to go home and come back in 12 hours to go fly without being offered go/no-pills.  If this training was important enough, then the docs would have given them the pills.  

Edited July 18, 2021 by SocialD

[Pooter]

21 minutes ago, SocialD said:

More on the subject in the context of this conversation.  I've never shown up to work only to been told to go home and come back in 12 hours to go fly without being offered go/no-pills.  If this training was important enough, then the docs would have given them the pills.  

Agreed, there's a weird sentiment in some communities that go/no go's are like a break glass kind of thing or only restricted to combat ops, and it makes zero sense. Getting adequate crew rest is a concern no matter what type of mission it is. 

[uhhello]

Someone transcribed the recording over on reddit.  

Colonel:

I’ve won four phase 1/phase 2 exercises in my time here. This is the first time I’ve seen a failure happen. And I’ll be honest, when I woke up at 1 o’clock yesterday morning I checked Mattermost and I saw a slip for 1 o’clock today, thought “shit, the aircraft [inaudible].” At no point in my mind did I think I would walk in and find out that America’s [inaudible], the operational heartbeat of the command and control enterprise for the free world would show up and say “I can’t execute this mission.” Not once did that cross my mind. I can’t express to you the level of disappointment I have right now and the results tell me two things: either you didn’t take it serious, or I’m preparing [inaudible]. I hope it’s not the second one, but I think it probably is.

When the mission calls on us to deploy, a [inaudible] by the President, approved through the Secretary of Defense, passed through Joint Staff, handed to the [inaudible] Chief of Staff of the Air Force, coordinated with the Secretary of the Air Force, sent to COMACC, and then handed to our Wing Commander. Everybody in that chain has said “this is the right thing to do for the best of Ameri- of, of the country.” You guys have got to figure out when to flip the switch. And I don’t mean going to Doppler. We aren’t going to Doppler.

So I failed you, and I apologize for that. I failed to set the expectation so that you take this as serious as you do. I failed to set the expectation in the mindset of the leaders who are leading this ops group to make the decisions that need to be made, to understand there’s a different calculation when you’re flying a peacetime training sortie than when you’re preparing to go to war. I will lead you better. But we have a learned lesson.

This is a critical point for us. We are being questioned. Our egos as warriors is being questioned. And I can’t stand that thought. That I’m leading people that don’t know the difference in responding to a national call for help and flying a T-sortie out of Oklahoma. Is this a realistic better believe it is. Chief can tell you all kinds of stories from his background.

Chief:

I can’t ever remember a time it wasn’t real. You know [inaudible] I’ve been sitting here thinking, [inaudible]. I’ve never seen a whole crew before sit down. [Inaudible]. And the bad things about it guys, this isn’t even the worst type of exercise you can ever see. [Inaudible] in 48 hours flying [inaudible] and spending the whole week and a half down there in MOPP 4, in and off the airplane. [Inaudible] in 10 degree weather — which is nothing [inaudible].

Is the time frames different from what you’re used to seeing? Yeah. It is. 48 versus 72 hours it was mentioned to me that way. It shifts. We got it in a [inaudible]. Before you got that [inaudible]. It looked like it was good, for real? That’s all the [inaudible] we had. There’s room to… you can’t ORM out. You have to walk up to the boss and say “yeah, I’m not going.”

Did you go? Alright.

And at some point — I think that’s what-what’s going through the most [inaudible] at some point I was reading you had time Friday at the squadron yet here you are, not to let you companions, not to let the rest of your flight crew down. This is the fastest way you get out the door. You fail. We fail. So when you [inaudible] these things after years of flying experience I can tell you’ve I’ve been there, I’ve done that.

If you come in at 7 in the morning and hey, you’ve gotta be back at 7 at night, you go home… you go home and you find a way to get that little nap and whatever it is. You pack a bag, you’re good to go, whether it’s [inaudible] resting your eyes, conserving your energy, cause the next 48 hours are gonna be hell. But you find a way to get through it. Every time.

Colonel:

So I think we’ve learned a couple things. And I’ll tell you a couple things that I’ve picked up. One is to put the decision in the wrong person’s hand. We will change [cough in audience] if this is in support of a higher headquarters mission. This is not in your decision space. This is not in the [inaudible] decision space. I would barely leave it in the commander’s decision space. You’re gonna tell me you can’t execute that mission and I’m gonna understand you why?

Why you didn’t understand the difference, why you can’t go through, why you can’t set a plan to get to “yes”, why you can’t put up over the time you’re gonna be airborne opportunities to take a nap so you need to make sure you fly safe this [inaudible]. I need to know that you guys are gonna be ready to execute this.

I know by far you are the most prepared squadron I have seen this entire year I’ve been here [inaudible] phase 1/phase 2. I’ve never seen anybody more prepared than you guys. I applaud you for that. But I guess that why the [inaudible] is so big in my disappointment, because never did I thought I would walk in and hear “ops isn’t a go.” I could not process the words.

So I need you to get focused, you’re gonna need to execute the phase 1 and phase 2, you guys are not flying today. Go get your mind right, go get reset, go get-go get yourselves prepared for what you’re gonna face through the phase 2 [inaudible].

Officers stay back, everybody else you’re dismissed.

Edited July 18, 2021 by uhhello

[pawnman]

I wonder if there's a recording of what he told just the officers. 

[Hugo Stiglitz]

Well he did a massive favor for the pilots on their future airline interviews by providing pure story-time gold! “TMAAT you disagreed with a superior/demonstrated leadership/upheld flight safety…”

[Ch33s3]

Wing responded on facebook - appears to defend the OG : https://www.facebook.com/552acw/posts/4418864084820167

 

Heres the text

America’s Wing,
 
Recently there have been multiple posts regarding toxic leadership and allegations of a lack of safety culture in the 552 ACW.  I would like to address these two topics briefly and reset some expectations:
 
Toxic Leadership: 
There is a difference between toxic leadership and intrusive leadership that holds people accountable.  Toxic leaders don’t care about their subordinates, they only care about themselves.  Toxic leaders don’t care if the organization fails, as long as there isn’t a perception that they failed.  Toxic leaders berate, belittle, and demean teammates to accomplish their purposes.  These are NOT the leaders in the 552!  Our leaders are concerned about our Airmen, they are concerned about your resources, the quality of your life, the productiveness of your training, safe practices, risk management, and your individual contribution to the success of our wing’s mission.  They will hold you accountable for decisions in a teaching way that encourages sound decision making practices and leadership qualities.  Sometimes they will be disappointed by decisions…this is because they care.  That is not toxicity.
 
Safety Culture:
I want it to be clear that safety is a driving factor in the execution of our worldwide mission every day and the procedures we have in place to triple check ourselves back up this assertion.  Additional to safety processes, we have feedback mechanisms to help leaders understand the level of risks being accepted in the execution of our duties.  At times, safety and risk will collide and generate great opportunities for learning and growth at all echelons of leadership.  Safety is still paramount.  This has not changed nor will it change during my tenure. 
 
Please continue to upchannel any concerns to your leadership.  There is not a commander in the 552 that isn’t interested in making things better.  We are here, we trust you, and we want to hear your thoughts and concerns!!
 
Tomorrow morning at 0730 CST in Fannin Hall will be a flight-crew (Pilot’s, Navigators, and Flight Engineers) all call.  If you are not on crew rest or engaged in a previous appointment, I would like to see you there.
 
Thank you for an outstanding week of training hard!!!  It is an honor to lead with you!!
 
Hitch

[Pooter]

"safety is a driving factor"

"and the procedures we have in place to triple check ourselves back up this assertion."

 

...like ORM and 11-202 crew rest requirements? ..That your OG just took a steaming shit on?

[FLEA]

8 minutes ago, Ch33s3 said:

Wing responded on facebook - appears to defend the OG : https://www.facebook.com/552acw/posts/4418864084820167

 

Heres the text

America’s Wing,
 
Recently there have been multiple posts regarding toxic leadership and allegations of a lack of safety culture in the 552 ACW.  I would like to address these two topics briefly and reset some expectations:
 
Toxic Leadership: 
There is a difference between toxic leadership and intrusive leadership that holds people accountable.  Toxic leaders don’t care about their subordinates, they only care about themselves.  Toxic leaders don’t care if the organization fails, as long as there isn’t a perception that they failed.  Toxic leaders berate, belittle, and demean teammates to accomplish their purposes.  These are NOT the leaders in the 552!  Our leaders are concerned about our Airmen, they are concerned about your resources, the quality of your life, the productiveness of your training, safe practices, risk management, and your individual contribution to the success of our wing’s mission.  They will hold you accountable for decisions in a teaching way that encourages sound decision making practices and leadership qualities.  Sometimes they will be disappointed by decisions…this is because they care.  That is not toxicity.
 
Safety Culture:
I want it to be clear that safety is a driving factor in the execution of our worldwide mission every day and the procedures we have in place to triple check ourselves back up this assertion.  Additional to safety processes, we have feedback mechanisms to help leaders understand the level of risks being accepted in the execution of our duties.  At times, safety and risk will collide and generate great opportunities for learning and growth at all echelons of leadership.  Safety is still paramount.  This has not changed nor will it change during my tenure. 
 
Please continue to upchannel any concerns to your leadership.  There is not a commander in the 552 that isn’t interested in making things better.  We are here, we trust you, and we want to hear your thoughts and concerns!!
 
Tomorrow morning at 0730 CST in Fannin Hall will be a flight-crew (Pilot’s, Navigators, and Flight Engineers) all call.  If you are not on crew rest or engaged in a previous appointment, I would like to see you there.
 
Thank you for an outstanding week of training hard!!!  It is an honor to lead with you!!
 
Hitch

The worst part about this is, noone on the wing can understand it was the wing that failed, not the air crews. The wings plan to out process and deploy 3 crews was simply not a good plan and didn't account for the physiological realities of sleep deprivation. But instead of saying "hey we fucked up and should make a better plan next time" they just want to blame the air crews for not takijg an unnecessary risk to their lives. This is toxic leadership despite what the 552 Wg is saying. In fact by the 552's definition they are all covering their own failure now. 

Edited July 18, 2021 by FLEA