What's wrong with the Air Force?

[raimius]

4 hours ago, Clark Griswold said:

Yeah, I'm sure he comes to the table with biases as we all do but I would not completely discount his point.

Bio and background info I found on Hendrix to give more context to his article and point:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_J._Hendrix

https://www.cnas.org/people/dr-jerry-hendrix

Classic argument of airpower, destroy his fieled forces vs. his centers of gravity.  Tactical vs. Strategic.  I would argue it is possible to do both simultaneously with the right mix of sensors/networks/platforms/weapons now.  

Deep Strike vs Air Superiority is false choice but his point has more merit than we in the current incarnation of the AF might want to admit.  Our enemies have built themselves to defeat us as we are now, a change of course may be necessary in force structure.

Makes the enemy spread himself too thin:

By attacking or presenting the capability to attack both levels of targets simultaneously we will force the enemy to spread his AF/IADS/A2AD resources allowing for greater possibilities of exploiting a gap or weak point in his forward or rear defenses.  A significant Deep Strike capability allows for this ability to "prep the battlefield" by forcing the enemy to posture himself in a way we prefer before we go offensive.  

We may have to:

A peer adversary would never let us fight how we have been fighting over the past 30 years in conventional conflicts with steady build up of nearby MOBs to be followed by a massive air campaign ala Desert Storm, Allied Force, etc... with strike assets supplied and enabled close to the target areas...long range, deep strike with as little strategic or tactical telegraphing as possible maybe the only possibility in conventional peer force on force conflicts in the future with the expanding capabilities of the latest A2AD systems and the inherent deterrent effect of holding all of the enemies targets at risk, not just his forward deployed forces.

More done per sortie, capabilities per sortie not possible except in a bigger platform:

Another potential advantages of Deep Strike assets vs. Tactical Strike assets and thus an argument to increase their share as portion of the force is their range/persistence/payload inherent in a larger platform.  A platform able to linger while searching or waiting to be cued from the network or a partner's sensor, deliver more PGMs over one mission and not require as many (or possibly any) support events (AR, EW support) factor towards the Deep Strike, IMHO.

Hard first hit stops an aggressor before the fight gets out of hand:

Deep Strike capable assets whether used Strategically or Tactically could deliver an unexpected bloody nose that might stop a fight before it starts also.  If in one night, X-hundreds of targets are struck and even if the enemy could still fight, his leadership might give pause...

That was just a list of what I think supports part of Hendrix's argument (that Deep Strike is more important than the AF has valued it of late) but I'm not 100% on board with his idea that that should be the focus of the AF either.  

But in practical terms, buy more B-21s, retire the B-52 & B-1to afford it and consider a survivable, reduced signature stand off arsenal platform to round out Deep Strike capabilities.

Question: how often has a large conflict been stopped/contained by a large initial strike?  It seems the popular psychology is that the bigger the hit, the more anger and demand for a strong response occurs.  I'm not sure taking out x-hundred targets on day 1 will give pause.  (Granted, if you are going to fight, taking out a lot of enemy capability at the start is a good move.)

Edited January 13, 2019 by raimius

[Majestik Møøse]

Google definition of weapon:

1. a thing designed or used for inflicting bodily harm or physical damage.
2. a means of gaining an advantage or defending oneself in a conflict or contest.

Definition 2 is why an aircraft without Definition 1 Weapons are considered Weapons Systems and have Weapons Instructors.

[Chuck17]

15 hours ago, Tank said:

...maybe I’m the stupid one...

Ignorance is bliss.

As for the rest... feel free to PM me, happy to pass the elevator speech on why having people in all communities who are experts in their MWS - as well as know a thing or two about how everyone does their job to support and integrate their MWS - is an Air Power force multiplier for the USAF. If you don’t think that’s a good idea, yeah, I’d say you’re stupid.

I’ll even back it up with historical examples of ops where fighter and bomber guys tried to plan mobility operations and fucked it all up... because “it’s just moving cargo / dropping paratroopers / air refueling.” (AKA “admin”, so how hard can it be, right??) 

And... for the record, there was a separate Air Mobility Weapons School run outta the Expeditionary Center at McGuire. Gen Jumper - a fighter pilot - closed it and rolled it into the WIC in the mid 2000’s.

Chuck

 

 

 

[raimius]

Having tactical experts is a great idea.  Calling all .mil aircraft "weapons" and having "weapons schools" for each muddies the waters, IMO.  

As of 4-5 years ago, AF UH-1s had zero mounted weapons, just armed pax.  We had plenty of tactics to make that work.  Having a "Weapons School" would have been a misnomer.  Having a school to teach and refine those tactics would have been nice though.  

Having some sort of place to teach tactics is a good thing, I just think it's dumb political posturing that every community wants a "Weapons School" to do that.  IMO it dilutes the seriousness of the task when transport and ISR communities have to argue that they are weapons.

[HU&W]

Not all weapons create kinetic effects.

[Chuck17]

1 hour ago, raimius said:

Having tactical experts is a great idea.  Calling all .mil aircraft "weapons" and having "weapons schools" for each muddies the waters, IMO.  

As of 4-5 years ago, AF UH-1s had zero mounted weapons, just armed pax.  We had plenty of tactics to make that work.  Having a "Weapons School" would have been a misnomer.  Having a school to teach and refine those tactics would have been nice though.  

Having some sort of place to teach tactics is a good thing, I just think it's dumb political posturing that every community wants a "Weapons School" to do that.  IMO it dilutes the seriousness of the task when transport and ISR communities have to argue that they are weapons.

You’re gonna have to explain what you mean by “political posturing” brother. 

Your post says having experts is good, having schools is good, but you’re hung up on the “Weapons” piece of it? Then you loop in the quip about ISR... and it tells me you don’t know what youre taking about.

And there’s no argument. The really interesting one is cyber. Those guys can have devastating effects... does what they employ classify as a weapon? Should they have a Weapons School? You’ll be hard pressed to find a warfighting commander willing to go to war without them...

As a commander I want to be able to have go to guys there when the shit hits the fan. I can look at the squadron/AOC/Staff, see the patches and universally across the USAF it’s understood what the patch means, what those guys do, what those guys know. From personal experience, when ops were being planned and despite the expertise in the squadron, I pulled in the patches first and everyone else second. 

Thats all we are talking about, and it’s the only piece about going to the WIC that matters.

Getting hung up on the “Weapons” piece of Weapons School is missing the forest for the first tree seen.

Chuck

Edited January 13, 2019 by Chuck17

[raimius]

18 hours ago, Homestar said:

Agree that what AMC does should probably be renamed Advanced Tactics School. I have no problem with them wearing a fighter pilot’s patch tho. 

Probably stated my opinion in a better way than I put it.

 

It is partially semantics.  Unarmed infil/exfil, Intel gathering, refueling, etc. are all important functions, but I would argue that they are not employing weapons to fulfill those functions.  I can see EW and offensive cyber, as they can disable enemy systems directly. 

Calling a school that teaches tactics for an unarmed aircraft/system that does not have direct effects on the enemy a "weapons school" rings hollow to me.  I call it political posturing because that is how you get the tactical experts in some communities to be taken seriously (e.g. people look for patches).  The patch and title of "weapons school grad" gives a base level of commonality and familiarity across communities.  

Yes, when I meet AMC dudes who have a patch, I assume they are good at their jobs.  What I don't think to myself is "wow, what an impressive weapon" when I look at a KC-135.

To me it fits in with the "everyone a warrior" idea.  Not everyone is a warrior.  That doesn't diminish their value.  We need docs, logisticians, engineers, network admins, etc, etc.  If you are in uniform, you should have training in combat skills, but that's for contingencies in most AFSCs.

Edited January 13, 2019 by raimius

[Prozac]

6 minutes ago, raimius said:

What I don't think to myself is "wow, what an impressive weapon" when I look at a KC-135.

 

That’s not what your mom said. 

[SurelySerious]

2 hours ago, HU&W said:

Not all weapons create kinetic effects.

Effects Based Operations for Air Force Bands. 

[Breckey]

2 hours ago, raimius said:

Having tactical experts is a great idea.  Calling all .mil aircraft "weapons" and having "weapons schools" for each muddies the waters, IMO.

There is a reason the final block of USAFWS is called Integration. That is the biggest thing a patch brings to the fight. A tanker patch may not be flying the night one vul up to the refueling track but you had better believe that they are intimately involved in the fuel plan for the push (if they're not editing PRFs for the Wg/CC). ICBMs have patches. It's not because they need tactical experts to employ their fire-and-forget missile, but because they are ostensibly experts at planning and integrating the available assets and target from the NTO into the OPLANs directed by JCS.

A Huey Weapon School (proper) would not work at this stage because there is not that integration. Yes, weapons are employed and tactics are used but outside of Security Forces nobody is integrated with (unless you add the AFDW mission but you know that they don't like to play nice with outside agencies). Any talk of it is just an OPR circle jerk by officers that want to put their name on things.

[Champ Kind]

Probably stated my opinion in a better way than I put it.
 
It is partially semantics.  Unarmed infil/exfil, Intel gathering, refueling, etc. are all important functions, but I would argue that they are not employing weapons to fulfill those functions.  I can see EW and offensive cyber, as they can disable enemy systems directly. 
Calling a school that teaches tactics for an unarmed aircraft/system that does not have direct effects on the enemy a "weapons school" rings hollow to me.  I call it political posturing because that is how you get the tactical experts in some communities to be taken seriously (e.g. people look for patches).  The patch and title of "weapons school grad" gives a base level of commonality and familiarity across communities.  
Yes, when I meet AMC dudes who have a patch, I assume they are good at their jobs.  What I don't think to myself is "wow, what an impressive weapon" when I look at a KC-135.
To me it fits in with the "everyone a warrior" idea.  Not everyone is a warrior.  That doesn't diminish their value.  We need docs, logisticians, engineers, network admins, etc, etc.  If you are in uniform, you should have training in combat skills, but that's for contingencies in most AFSCs.

Your position on the topic is obvious. For context, would you mind sharing your aircraft and if you graduated from WIC?

[Hacker]

12 hours ago, Clark Griswold said:

Deep Strike vs Air Superiority is false choice

Yes, and when your entire thesis is based on a logical fallacy (either false dichotomy or begging the question, take your pick) it creates major doubts about the actual credibility of whatever points are made within it.

[Chuck17]

2 hours ago, raimius said:

Probably stated my opinion in a better way than I put it.

 

It is partially semantics.  Unarmed infil/exfil, Intel gathering, refueling, etc. are all important functions, but I would argue that they are not employing weapons to fulfill those functions.  I can see EW and offensive cyber, as they can disable enemy systems directly. 

Calling a school that teaches tactics for an unarmed aircraft/system that does not have direct effects on the enemy a "weapons school" rings hollow to me.  I call it political posturing because that is how you get the tactical experts in some communities to be taken seriously (e.g. people look for patches).  The patch and title of "weapons school grad" gives a base level of commonality and familiarity across communities.  

Yes, when I meet AMC dudes who have a patch, I assume they are good at their jobs.  What I don't think to myself is "wow, what an impressive weapon" when I look at a KC-135.

To me it fits in with the "everyone a warrior" idea.  Not everyone is a warrior.  That doesn't diminish their value.  We need docs, logisticians, engineers, network admins, etc, etc.  If you are in uniform, you should have training in combat skills, but that's for contingencies in most AFSCs.

Youre going to have to explain what you mean by “direct effects.”

If I take an 29 ship of C-17s loaded with a brigade from the 82d, wrap them in a gorilla package of SEAD/Strike/CAS/ISR, and send them north of the DMZ to seize an airfield, that has “direct effects” on the enemy. They teach that at the WIC...

Or do you mean “weapons effects” when you say “direct effects”? If so, I’d say that limiting the WIC education to the employment of guns/bombs/missiles/radars is a Blue-4 level of understanding of the employment of airpower. The WIC is not about that (beyond Core One/Two academics...) it’s way more.

Your post is littered with double speak and lack of understanding of not only what the Weapons School teaches and produces but of the operational-level employment of American airpower. But it takes time and experience to comprehend how much one doesn’t know, especially about other MWS’s, employment, tactics, etc. and I’m far from an authority... Just trying to give you a view of what the WIC sees - take it or leave it.

It’s already been said - the WIC isn’t all about weapons employment. If the name is all that matters to you, I don’t really know what to tell you and you certainly don’t want to hear it from me.

Chuck

 

Edited January 13, 2019 by Chuck17

[osulax05]

Chuck nailed it as usual (sts). 

My observation as a MAF black border is that anyone who believes the non-CAF bros don’t belong at the USAFWS or somehow are less deserving of the patch have not spent time at Nellis truly integrating across the WPS’. 

 

 

[JeremiahWeed]

15 hours ago, Clark Griswold said:

More done per sortie, capabilities per sortie not possible except in a bigger platform:

Another potential advantages of Deep Strike assets vs. Tactical Strike assets and thus an argument to increase their share as portion of the force is their range/persistence/payload inherent in a larger platform.  A platform able to linger while searching or waiting to be cued from the network or a partner's sensor, deliver more PGMs over one mission and not require as many (or possibly any) support events (AR, EW support) factor towards the Deep Strike, IMHO.

I'm certainly not a "strike" expert, never mind "deep strike".  But, doesn't deep strike generally mean penetration into contested, probably highly defended airspace in a non-permissive environment?  Also, depending on how "deep" we're talking, the striker may not have other support assets like A/A, EA/EP, etc. 

Talking about "lingering" in such an environment doesn't seem to mesh with the classic "deep strike" scenario, especially if the striker has brought along some support assets.  Isn't the idea to employ weapons and GTFO ASAP?

[raimius]

11 hours ago, Champ Kind said:

 

Your position on the topic is obvious. For context, would you mind sharing your aircraft and if you graduated from WIC?

 

UH-1s.  No weapons school for that.

 

Also, concur with Breckey.  AFGSC Huey's don't have the course we should have, but a full-up Weapons School probably is not the right answer at this time, either.

 

[raimius]

9 hours ago, Chuck17 said:

Youre going to have to explain what you mean by “direct effects.”

If I take an 29 ship of C-17s loaded with a brigade from the 82d, wrap them in a gorilla package of SEAD/Strike/CAS/ISR, and send them north of the DMZ to seize an airfield, that has “direct effects” on the enemy. They teach that at the WIC...

Or do you mean “weapons effects” when you say “direct effects”? If so, I’d say that limiting the WIC education to the employment of guns/bombs/missiles/radars is a Blue-4 level of understanding of the employment of airpower. The WIC is not about that (beyond Core One/Two academics...) it’s way more.

Your post is littered with double speak and lack of understanding of not only what the Weapons School teaches and produces but of the operational-level employment of American airpower. But it takes time and experience to comprehend how much one doesn’t know, especially about other MWS’s, employment, tactics, etc. and I’m far from an authority... Just trying to give you a view of what the WIC sees - take it or leave it.

It’s already been said - the WIC isn’t all about weapons employment. If the name is all that matters to you, I don’t really know what to tell you and you certainly don’t want to hear it from me.

Chuck

 

By "direct effects" against the enemy, I mean that the weapon/system used kills bad guys or breaks their things.  

 

I try to avoid double-speak, but I'll yield on your other points.  It's a big AF, and I'm not an expert on your job.

Edited January 14, 2019 by raimius

[HossHarris]

6 hours ago, JeremiahWeed said:

I'm certainly not a "strike" expert, never mind "deep strike".  But, doesn't deep strike generally mean penetration into contested, probably highly defended airspace in a non-permissive environment?  Also, depending on how "deep" we're talking, the striker may not have other support assets like A/A, EA/EP, etc. 

Talking about "lingering" in such an environment doesn't seem to mesh with the classic "deep strike" scenario, especially if the striker has brought along some support assets.  Isn't the idea to employ weapons and GTFO ASAP?

If the bad guys don’t know you’re there .... or can’t do anything about it if they do know ... you can linger as long as you like, or as long as fuel allows for an air breathing asset. 

[Day Man]

32 minutes ago, raimius said:

By "direct effects" against the enemy, I mean that the weapon/system used kills bad guys or breaks their things.  

 

I try to avoid double-speak, but I'll yield on your other points.  It's a big AF, and I'm not an expert on your job.

A B-2 flying from SZL to a range in South Korea absolutely has a 'direct effect' on the enemy (and our allies). Acquiring various MiGs for the Red Eagles programs had 'direct effects'. A Mud Hen doing a low-level show of force during a TiC leading to the enemy breaking contact is a 'direct effect'...

[Clark Griswold]

19 hours ago, raimius said:

Question: how often has a large conflict been stopped/contained by a large initial strike?  It seems the popular psychology is that the bigger the hit, the more anger and demand for a strong response occurs.  I'm not sure taking out x-hundred targets on day 1 will give pause.  (Granted, if you are going to fight, taking out a lot of enemy capability at the start is a good move.)

To be honest, not to my knowledge.  The military value/effect of first wave heavy strike would likely matter more than the political/psychological effect.

11 hours ago, Hacker said:

Yes, and when your entire thesis is based on a logical fallacy (either false dichotomy or begging the question, take your pick) it creates major doubts about the actual credibility of whatever points are made within it.

I hear your point but I don't think he built his entire argument on that foundation, maybe half the house but not all of it.  

I agree with him that a change in force structure and organizational core function focus, etc. is needed but can't follow him on his dismissive view of "short range fighters".  A reasonable change not a radical one would be prudent, exactly what that is is the 69 billion dollar question. 

7 hours ago, JeremiahWeed said:

I'm certainly not a "strike" expert, never mind "deep strike".  But, doesn't deep strike generally mean penetration into contested, probably highly defended airspace in a non-permissive environment?  Also, depending on how "deep" we're talking, the striker may not have other support assets like A/A, EA/EP, etc. 

Talking about "lingering" in such an environment doesn't seem to mesh with the classic "deep strike" scenario, especially if the striker has brought along some support assets.  Isn't the idea to employ weapons and GTFO ASAP?

Yeah, I would agree with that idea, that Deep Strike is independent for the most part of support for the entirety or at least majority of its mission and that it is done before Air Superiority/Threat Suppression is complete.

As to lingering in a non-permissive, agree again with you that it is not part of the classic conception of deep strike but methinks it will become part of deep strike & aerial interdiction as some/more strategic/theater (AI or DAS type targets) will be mobile, have decoys and be harder to detect in the peer/near peer fights in the future.  Lingering will be required sometimes to find-fix-finish a mobile/evading target, be cued from another platform/sensor or re-attack immediately.  Not saying this will be a preferred tactic just that I think it will be required as the targets/threats will present themselves for short windows of opportunity.

[Champ Kind]

UH-1s.  No weapons school for that.

Copy. Your remarks make a lot more sense now.

[Ed_Brad86]

Apparently as of yesterday Friday patches/shirts/name tags are officially banned in the 1 SOW per the wing commander at Hurlburt. Wonder if this is a sign of the bullshit to come with Slife taking over AFSOC soon...

[raimius]

On 1/13/2019 at 11:43 AM, Chuck17 said:

Youre going to have to explain what you mean by “direct effects.”

If I take an 29 ship of C-17s loaded with a brigade from the 82d, wrap them in a gorilla package of SEAD/Strike/CAS/ISR, and send them north of the DMZ to seize an airfield, that has “direct effects” on the enemy. They teach that at the WIC...

Or do you mean “weapons effects” when you say “direct effects”? If so, I’d say that limiting the WIC education to the employment of guns/bombs/missiles/radars is a Blue-4 level of understanding of the employment of airpower. The WIC is not about that (beyond Core One/Two academics...) it’s way more.

Your post is littered with double speak and lack of understanding of not only what the Weapons School teaches and produces but of the operational-level employment of American airpower. But it takes time and experience to comprehend how much one doesn’t know, especially about other MWS’s, employment, tactics, etc. and I’m far from an authority... Just trying to give you a view of what the WIC sees - take it or leave it.

It’s already been said - the WIC isn’t all about weapons employment. If the name is all that matters to you, I don’t really know what to tell you and you certainly don’t want to hear it from me.

Chuck

 

In all sincerity, thanks for reminding me I don't always have all the details.  My argument is really a legalistic/nitpick of naming conventions (a ship that already sailed).   

 

Champ Kind, don't judge Huey crew dogs by my late-night arguments.

[MooseClub]

17 hours ago, Ed_Brad86 said:

Apparently as of yesterday Friday patches/shirts/name tags are officially banned in the 1 SOW per the wing commander at Hurlburt. Wonder if this is a sign of the bullshit to come with Slife taking over AFSOC soon...

Slife the Knife!  Get some 

[matmacwc]

18 hours ago, Ed_Brad86 said:

Apparently as of yesterday Friday patches/shirts/name tags are officially banned in the 1 SOW per the wing commander at Hurlburt. Wonder if this is a sign of the bullshit to come with Slife taking over AFSOC soon...

We’ve seen this in the fighter community, it’ll change, most likely some douchebag commander doesn’t like it.