Drone Pilots: We Don’t Get No Respect

[Danny Noonin]

3) The real question isn't personal/physical danger...

You're right. That's not the real question. But the author put that on the table when he made the "danger" faced by RPA pilots at home in the US part of his argument and stated that RPA pilots were perhaps in more danger than those flying in theater. It was an emotional argument, poorly chosen to support his theory. It was--quite frankly--absurd. So much so that it damaged the credibility of the rest of his argument and caused much of his intended audience to not even be able to see past it.

4) medals are simply an example of a way for the system to acknowledge this action and the sacrifice involved. An Air Medal is not correct...nor is Aerial achievement medal in my opinion. There is a distinct lack of a person in the air. Bronze star? (I'll refrain from the obvious jokes here) I don't think that's right either. There should be something different and new...the battlefield has changed, our terminology, culture, and by extension the system of reward and recognition must change as well.

I agree with you here. I personally don't give a crap about medals. But I understand your (and his) point that we have asked these dudes to do a job that most don't want to do. Then we don't give them any credit for it despite their contributions to the overall effort.

[deskjockey]

But the author put that on the table when he made the "danger" faced by RPA pilots at home in the US part of his argument and stated that RPA pilots were perhaps in more danger than those flying in theater. It was an emotional argument, poorly chosen to support his theory. It was--quite frankly--absurd. So much so that it damaged the credibility of the rest of his argument and caused much of his intended audience to not even be able to see past it.

Yep, that was unfortunate, and received equally emotional replies and name calling from the gallery. (within ROE maybe...)

He did come on here and try to get the proper argument to the front...much to the confusion of some.

Huh?

I think it's a valid discussion that should be taken on at ACC or higher and is a segment of a larger discussion on QOL for these guys. The standard answer has always been, "suck it up, you get to go home and bang your wife." That's a soda-straw look at the difficulty faced by these guys. It needs to change and reflects the equally flawed unofficial standard answer of, "Stop complaining, It could be worse". As for the article, I wish he would have eliminated the chaff from his writing and drilled more into the psychological impacts, tying that to an overall QOL problem (then offered solutions...which medals could have been a small part of) ...must be his crappy education. (note:sarcasm)

Edited May 4, 2012 by deskjockey

[AdVictoriam]

Thanks for the well-reasoned replies. I do appreciate Ryno's point, even though we do have our disagreements, I think that he has the courage to fight for the things he believes in and fight for them, and I respect that.

To engage the 'more at risk' point - the differential risk argument is not so much intended to be persuasive as to be plausible and thereby point out how weak a reed the logic of 'combat risk' is. I believe it is plausible, and thereby supports a more reflective look at how we define combat - killing or directly preventing good guys from being killed is a better overall metric.

Following up on DeskJockey's point, which I think is very astute, the marrow of the discussion is 'how do we as a culture adapt to change.' We culturally recognize things we find of value, but the context of those value assessments changes. Consider the Air Medal itself. I do not know what it's like, nor do any of us, to be on a B-17 crew when no crew has yet survived 25 missions. In that case, the Air Medal recognizes the importance the contribution of bomber crews to the mission requiring mostly physical courage. In Vietnam, the definition of physical courage included a set number of landings for a C-130 under fire into a firebase - the contribution to the mission was the same, but the context changed and the understanding of courage was broadened in a way to include different categories. For the majority of OIF/OEF, the air medal for manned aircraft is largely constituted by moral courage, namely the possibility of employing weapons in the context of vast technological superiority, with a small residual element of physical courage. The point of all of this is that every decade or two, we find ourselves in a position where we need to re-assess what we think we know in the face of a changing context (Boyd's Destruction and Creation speaks to this.) I believe that such a re-assessment is overdue and stalled, largely due to tribalism and an inability to see each other as comrades rather than competitors. Therefore, in such a re-assessment, it is possible that the Air Medal (as a symbol of the larger re-assessment) would be constituted as 1) entirely moral courage, therefore about the possibility of shooting, 2) still include an element of physical courage, and therefore find a new means of recognition in order to fit the new context, or 3) delete the element of moral courage, in which case counter medals would go away for all platforms. Any of these are viable options - the important thing is that the re-assessment occurs.

As a good friend framed it - tradition is important, and should be preserved if not in conflict with combat effectiveness. We periodically find ourselves in a place where context changes to such a degree that we must decide what to retain and what to update. RPAs have changed this context - our enemies cite RPA as the most effective air asset against them. This should be recognized in meaningful ways - not just words but also the costly markers of cultural value. The current conflicts, combiners with the changes of RPA, bring us to a point where we need to do such a re-assessment. With luck, this might build a new unity amongst the tribes so we could all do our mission better. At the end of the day its not about us - its about the mission and bringing Americans home safe. How we do that has changed. Therefore we need to reassess how we see ourselves.

[Danny Noonin]

To engage the 'more at risk' point - the differential risk argument is not so much intended to be persuasive as to be plausible and thereby point out how weak a reed the logic of 'combat risk' is. I believe it is plausible, and thereby supports a more reflective look at how we define combat - killing or directly preventing good guys from being killed is a better overall metric.

That's the problem dude. It's not plausible. Not at all.

If you think your pink body is even potentially more at risk at the controls of an RPA than a guy in a manned airplane (which is what you said) then your entire argument is tainted by your emotions. That just doesn't pass the sniff test.

The risk in combat is not entirely from enemy fire, although despite the statistics that danger does exist. It also simply includes the risk of riding a piece of metal through the air and is amplified by difficult, sometimes extremely challenging circumstances...troops in contact, weather, night, mountains, etc. That risk is there whether the bad guys are shooting at the airplanes or not. Take note of the aircraft losses in the last 10 years that were not caused by enemy fire. It seems to me the risk of flying in a combat theater caught up to those guys regardless of exactly why. The ground--it turns out--has a Pk pretty close to 1.0 and that's not a problem you face as an RPA pilot.

You might also take note of a few other threads near the top of the stack in this forum. Seems to me we lost a couple of airplanes quite recently.

My point with any of this is not to discredit what RPA guys do and the sacrifices you make (and I do believe they are sacrifices) . I would never do that. I sympathize and agree with much of what you said. I just can't believe you lobbed that ridiculous grenade out there in the midst of saying something potentially good. I wish you had focused more on the "what defines combat" part--which is a discussion worth having-- than the "we face more risks" and "we deserve medals too" parts which came across as pure whining and served to distract from the rest.

[deskjockey]

Yeah, I started to write that you should qualify your argument to say that specific airframes (and I was going to single-out tankers) have a similar operating environment in the AOR and are therefore at equal risk no matter where they are. Then I actually thought about it...Combine the high ops-tempo (flying every or every other day with no mission planning save 1 hour before step), real or perceived pressure to go, long missions with rapidly changing weather and limited divert options, servicing (yep, that's what I said) aircraft who are involved in action that sometimes presses them to or beyond their bingo to a runway, which then presses the tanker to stretch, shitty comms in the AOR...

...you get my point. There is an increased risk...to everyone relative to their home station ops. Apply that same criteria to others and the differences only get more dramatic up to and including the helo guys taking rounds on a daily basis. There is still a distinct place for a medal and/or acknowledgement of the increased risk that combat brings. Do I wish the Pedros and others who take way more risk than the tankers and strat airlifters would get a little more recognition, sure...but I know to most of them, the knowledge that we all know they have brass ones is enough. ...no change required.

So that's point #1...there is a difference for the guys in the air, both mobility and combat assets.

Now for your threat at home argument

I do not discount the possibility of terrorists in Clovis or Vegas increasing the threat...but that same thing is true for anyone who puts on the uniform at home in this age of global terrorism. For you to tie it to RPAs and part of the requirement for a cultural shift that "unites the tribes" is non sequiter (Termy can Google that). We already acknowledge the increased threat, however impotently, with the GWOT ribbon. Unless I am unaware of multiple plots involving targeted assassinations of RPA pilots (which is possible and not discussable here), I can point to Ft. Hood, Little Rock recruiting, and many more to say that trying to use this as part of your argument is not a great idea. Plausible usually doesn't come up as part of a good argument unless you're a defense attorney on TV. I'm just trying to help you refine your argument by pointing out that it's clearly the weak point. Look how much time you've spent defending that now, rather than talking about what you want to.

[Hacker]

if we limit the people who can comment on combat to those who have seen actual AAA (as opposed to small arms fire or curtain fire?) or "guided" SAMs (are you counting optically guided RPGs or IR MANPADs...or even other missiles that could be RADAR guided but were shot ballistically?) There's a very small amount of people who can comment, and it would be really boring. I don't think that's a qualification for commenting on combat, nor is getting shot at by anything or killing someone. Bringing it up simply detracts from the argument. If you stick to the narrow definition of qualification to speak given previously, stop reading. If you broaden it to "allow" small-arms, RPGs or ballistic shots...or (better yet) think it doesn't matter, as I do, read on to my actual discussion on topic.

I certainly in no way suggested that such experience be a barrier to participation in the conversation. Obviously it is not.

What I did suggest (and I am surprised that my post could be so significantly misunderstood) is that someone who did have such experience in person against a significant air-to-air or surface-to-air threat would not have ever made the comparison that Blair has in the first place. QED, Blair's combat experience in the Gunship during the surge, in which there was no air-to-air or significant surface-to-air threat, and later experience in the years of un-contested flying in the permissive environments in both Iraq and Afghanistan, incorrectly colored his opinion on what the actual threat to a manned combat aviator is.

As a side note, unfortunately there are a lot of folks in the USAF who think that the "combat sorties" that have been flown in the permissive environments of OEF and OIF are typical of all combat air operations, and have let that color their opinions about what capabilities are needed by the USAF to effectively accomplish our mission.

Anyway, I seriously doubt that anyone who has ever had to threat react to a guided SAM (or other such no-kidding life threatening experience in a combat AOR) would ever, ever have suggested there be any sort of parity between that and anything a RPA operator faces at any point in his duties, including the drive to and from work every day.

That being said...."optically-guided RPG"? DId I miss an intel brief on some fantastic new capability that makes an RPG into a guided missile, or are they still, as the name suggests, just "rockets"?

[deskjockey]

I got a little carried away with the RPG thing. Exaggeration for effect... Good kill.

There is a middle ground between the full understanding that actually puckering for a threat brings and complete ignorance...I'm hoping that Dave is closer to the former. I don't think he was comparing reacting to a no shit threat to driving to work. Rather suggesting both involve some threat. (which I agree with, but I think the level of driving threat is so small it is irrelavent and distracts from his overall argument.)

I like your broader point about the permissive environment coloring an entire generation of AF and navy's view of combat. I feel like that could have a bearing on the discussion as a whole ( culture change or temporary lull in air threat?). AdV...thoughts?

[Jughead]

non sequiter (Termy can Google that)

...though, he may want to spell it correctly to get the best results....

[deskjockey]

...though, he may want to spell it correctly to get the best results....

Nobody I like laughing at more than me...and that's funny right there. ...cheers

[AdVictoriam]

DeskJockey - Awesome. Yes. More to follow on this but I think that's exactly right.

But first, putting to rest the 'differential risk' piece (flossing a dead horse...) - everybody's right. We're talking past each other. It doesn't affect the paper's core argument about killing=combat.

[Warning: Statistics & Probability Theory follows. Feel free to skip.]

Conditional probability is the probability of x given y. Absolute probability is the probability of x. Differential probability is the increase in probability of x given y.

- The risk claim is that bounding current conflicts, for the sake of argument 2006-present, there is no significant difference in differential probability of general enemy-action-related risk given combat when comparing manned to RPA.

- To rephrase Hacker's argument, if we changed the bounds to include the opening phases of OIF, or a hypothetical opening phase of Iran, then this would not be true. This is very likely the case, as Risk(Intact IADS) > Risk(Creech Attack.) However, the institution continues to provide routine costly signals (combat pay, medals, prestige, etc. - albeit at a decreased rate) after the IADS has been INOP for more than half a decade. Absolutely agree with the pucker factor point. But this logic does not justify the current policy.

- On the core discussion here's what I mean, bounding to current combat zones:

1) Probability of Harm given Manned Aircraft > Probability of Harm given RPA

[Risk from CFIT, Aviation Hazards] > [Risk from crashing due to exhaustion]

2) Probability of Harm given a Manned Aircraft and Combat still > Probability of Harm given an RPA and Combat

[Risk from CFIT, Aviation Hazards + MANPADS/SMARMS, CONUS General Terror Attack] > [Risk from crashing due to exhaustion + Creech-specific Terror Attack.]

3) But Increase in Probability of Harm for Manned Aircraft given Combat ~ increase in Probability of Harm for RPA given Combat

[Risk for MANPADS/SMARMS, CONUS General Terror Attack] ~ [Risk for Creech-specific Terror Attack.]

- I believe most of the controversy is about claim 2, where my argument is about claim 3. Hence talking past each other.

- My point with this was to destabilize the conventional wisdom about 'combat risk' - that the reason RPA should not consider themselves in combat is because they do not experience a comparable increase of risk due to combat in current circumstances. This assumes a difference in baseline risk between RPA and manned aircraft. Therefore I need to make a weak but plausible claim. Given that our adversaries have expressed that RPA is their number one threat, and they have had more success with CONUS-based major attacks than downrange attacks, compared to the difficulties of acquiring and achieving a kill with MANPADS/SMARMS, it is plausible that the differential combat risk for being in the population of RPAs is higher than the differential combat risk for being in the population of manned aircraft.

- Unless I'm forgetting something, there are no data points for 10k+ aircraft crewmen in this timeframe lost to enemy fire, and no data points for a Creech attack. Therefore we fall back on weak Bayesian priors for risk in both cases, which are insufficient for a strong inference of difference. Accordingly, another definition is required. The fact that there are no data points is in both cases a tremendous credit to OSI (and SF.)

- As previously noted, this was unclear in the article, and regrettably detracted from the core argument. I agree with this critique.

[End stats.]

On the point brought up about losing friends - These are my friends as well and I have mourned them. The only way I know to honor them is to fight all the harder for the things they sacrificed for, and from what little I know, that is best done by fighting smarter and thinking harder about how to do things better.

Building a sustainable Pred community provides the tactically proficient operators that will finish dismembering what is left of our enemy's network in this war. It also builds the expertise we will need to ensure that whenever a future manned striker punches through the FEBA, it will do so with a flight of drones alongside - a swarm of robots willing to take a missile to save the crews' lives will bring more of our comrades home. Incentives matter because culture matters. Culture matters because performance matters.

Medals may or may not be the right answer. But the status quo with 60% to O-4 at Creech and minimal RPA DOs picked up for command certainly is not. Whether this is due to prior adverse selection or due to present conditions is irrelevant - in the first case we shortchanged the program from the outset, in the latter case we are shortchanging it at present - either way we're behind. For all of the deep problems that remain a decade and a half into this project, its in all of our interests to fix this. If it falls apart, it won't go away - the Joint community and the DoD absolutely won't let that happen, even if it means we bleed out the pilot corps again. Far more importantly, letting RPA flounder because of tribalism (i.e. the 'new navs' comment) lets the mission down and kneecaps capabilities that will ultimately come back around to helping out the manned community.

[guineapigfury]

The far greater statistical risk to RPA drivers is the drive to and from work. Especially if you are in NM, which is apparently the DUI capital of the known universe.

For all of the deep problems that remain a decade and a half into this project, its in all of our interests to fix this. If it falls apart, it won't go away - the Joint community and the DoD absolutely won't let that happen, even if it means we bleed out the pilot corps again.

If my conversations with my friends are any indication, the pilot corps is ready to bleed itself out with respect to manning.

[AdVictoriam]

@ DeskJockey - Returning to the point you made about how the nature of combat experience shades culture and reasoning. Very important point about gradations in risk, though I think it actually runs deeper than that, and very much includes the role of combat in the institution's hierarchy of values.

An academic named John Owen makes an argument about how cultural change happens - an orthodoxy grows up with a set of framing experiences, which informs what they think is important, and hence influences how they structure their culture. When conditions change, the next generation grows up under different conditions, with different values and structures. These values lead to heterodoxies when those values encounter the extant system. Eventually, these frustrations coalesce around a symbol, object or event, and this forces the orthodoxy to engage the heterodoxy and both end up changed - Reformation leads to Counter-Reformation which is different in certain ways from pre-Reformation thought. I think this model applies here, but it's not really about RPA.

I would argue that the fundamental cultural fissure is not manned/RPA, fighters/heavies, or even fliers/non-fliers, but ONW/OSW culture vs. OIF/OEF culture. These framing sets of experiences taught very different lessons, which are now fundamentally in conflict. In ONW/OSW, experience teaches one to be highly risk-averse, as the impacts on national policy for losing an aircraft is far higher than the benefit from killing an Iraqi SAM or fighter. Additionally, given the ops tempo relative to later OEF/OIF demands, there is enough surplus time that a good officer would spend that time getting an AAD and doing their PME. These are all right and appropriate in that context. But OEF/OIF is a very different context - many of us have never known a day in the military when we were not at war. The logic of wartime rightly accepts more risk because there's more at stake, and because political leadership is willing to accept more in the way of consequences. With the increase in demands on time, deployments involved less in the way of slack for studying, etc. This is also right and appropriate in context, but these are two very different contexts and we would expect to see Red Flag culture and Balad culture, for lack of better terms, clash.

Applying Owen's theory, this explains many of our cultural friction points. Reflective belts replace indulgences in the analogy - as the most visible and often ridiculous symbols of the culture of risk-avoidance, these provide a focal point for friction between these two cultures. The risk-accepting OEF/OIF culture learned, as a function of the innovation required in wartime, to make decisions on their own -- the idea of this cultural value being abrogated is then offensive. This escalates (i.e. defending indulgences until they become ridiculous) to the point where both sides conduct a power struggle over this object as a symbolic struggle over overall cultural values. The escalation of C2 amplified this struggle - new technologies enabled ONW/OSW risk-aversion to extend control deeper into the cockpit ('never let your connectivity exceed your maturity' is a good rule of thumb.) So as we come back home, the space where the OEF/OIF culture cut their teeth begins to collapse, and the ONW/OSW tries to reassert their vision of 'normalcy,' which is contested by the differing 'normalcy' of the OEF/OIF culture. This is parallel in many ways with Gen. Petraeus' reformation-of-sorts in the Army - his constituency was more the junior officers who were muddling through COIN with little help or even comprehension on the part of pre-OEF/OIF seniors. Their reform was quicker, as it was accelerated by the pressing needs of being on the ground in this fight. But as the war has gone on, and the logics of combat ebb and give way to routine, risk-averse behaviors (i.e. started at KAF, then BAF, now everywhere.) A clash over ideas is the result - ref the SWJ argument (makes this look like a flash in the pan) about 'Disruptive Thinkers.'

As another example - I think it captures the controversy about AADs. To ONW/OSW logic, a good officer should spend their time bettering themselves (though the rise of degree-for-profit institutions makes this a questionable assertion, ref. Switzer's Degrees as Costly Signals ASPJ piece.) To OEF/OIF logic, the war comes first, and combat is the cache that matters. So the fundamental argument about AADs is about differing cultural valuations - the orthodoxy holds to established structures, whereas the neo-orthodoxy challenges those structures.

There is a very strong case to be made on the part of OEF/OIF logic (I am tribal about that) but it can't be made if that group is at war with itself. If the neo-orthodoxy is fractured, the orthodoxy wins by default. Most CAF communities, most MAF communities, SOF, and RPA are all very much part of OEF/OIF thinking. As time goes on, the next generation might revert back to something more ONW/OSW-looking. So the more the OEF/OIF culture keeps combat in its portfolio, the stronger a showing they make. Emerging fronts are mostly RPA right now. Therefore, to move past some of these old logics that tie us to the past, the communities emerging from these wars need to move together. This is well beyond the original scope, so therefore apologies to anyone who is Winchester Attention Span.

[Champ Kind]

Brevity.

[Hacker]

In ONW/OSW, experience teaches one to be highly risk-averse, as the impacts on national policy for losing an aircraft is far higher than the benefit from killing an Iraqi SAM or fighter. Additionally, given the ops tempo relative to later OEF/OIF demands, there is enough surplus time that a good officer would spend that time getting an AAD and doing their PME. These are all right and appropriate in that context. But OEF/OIF is a very different context - many of us have never known a day in the military when we were not at war. The logic of wartime rightly accepts more risk because there's more at stake, and because political leadership is willing to accept more in the way of consequences. With the increase in demands on time, deployments involved less in the way of slack for studying, etc. This is also right and appropriate in context, but these are two very different contexts and we would expect to see Red Flag culture and Balad culture, for lack of better terms, clash.

Did you develop this philosophy based on your own experiences prior to 9/11? I see them as the opposite, because that hypothesis certainly doesn't reflect the atmosphere of the ACC fighter world in those two 'eras'.

I was raised in the ONW/OSW world, with Squadron/Group/Wing leadership who were all more or less DESERT STORM and ALLIED FORCE veterans. These were folks with a real combat mentality, and between 1995 and 2001 there was certainly NOT the same risk aversion and slavery to the PME machine (amongst the many ills that the AF is currently suffering) that there is now.

Here's an example: the night before OIF started, my SQ/CC gave us all the standard motivational speech. At one point, he addressed how we might handle EPs while we were engaged in a CAS scenario: "If you leave troops that are actively engaged, you'd better fucking be on fire or need to bail out. Otherwise, I expect you to stay there and support those guys. Electrical failures...hydraulic failures...suck it up and do your job so those guys get home to see mama alive."

These were leaders who had seen real no-shit warfare in ODS and OAF against actual threats which resulted in deaths and POWs from their squadron ranks. They expected their combat experience in OIF (and the previous year in Anaconda) to mirror somewhat those previous experiences where people had to face a real threat and show courage in the face of physical danger.

Unfortunately, it is the post 9/11 era (really, the post Shock-and Awe era) which has brought risk aversion and other current poisons in to fashion. I'd even venture that it's the post Johnny-Jumper-as-CSAF-era that has done the most to usher in this current era of pussification. Jumper had a lot of very 'old school' views on how the AF should be run and thought/acted/believed like a young fighter pilot who'd been raised by grizzled Vietnam vets. Let's not forget that Jumper is the one who said, 'if we wanted you to have a Masters Degree, we'd send you to go get one on the AF's time and dime, otherwise spend your time becoming a better warfighter or with your family.'

So, your theory is completely out-of-step with my experiences as a fighter dude over that time period.

[Danny Noonin]

But first, putting to rest the 'differential risk' piece (flossing a dead horse...) - everybody's right. We're talking past each other. It doesn't affect the paper's core argument about killing=combat.

No. This is what I'm trying to bitch slap into your skull. You are not right. And it does affect the paper's core argument.

You can pull whatever math textbook geekery out that you want, but there is no fucking way that you can say with a straight face that your risk is more than manned guys. I don't do statistics and probabilities, but I do caveman math and here's how it plays out: Falling to sleep on the way to work--How many dudes have you lost in the last 10 years doing that? Creech terrorist attack--How many guys have you lost to that? Then why don't you tell me how many dudes we've lost in manned airplanes in theater and tell me if that's more than the others. No formulas and gibberish can get you past that one.

The fact is that this does affect your core argument because your core argument 1) includes the concept of risk with regard to combat and 2) is intended to try and influence an audience. Your intended audience cannot see past your ridiculous statment. Therefore making that ridiculous statement--and continuing to defend it--means that your core argument is ineffective because it's not being heard.

FYI...you should know that your article has gone viral on AF email and the commentary all reads something like "UFB". I know you are trying to help your bros--and that's admirable--but this risk argument is an embarrassment to them. An absolute embarrassment.

[Dubs]

but when faced with the prospect of actually losing their guaranteed government-funded security blanket, will keep their head down and finish out their 20.

That is becoming less and less guaranteed...

[guineapigfury]

There's a difference between what people say, and what they will actually do.

These people said they wanted out, and put in for VSP. So they're walking the walk.

That is becoming less and less guaranteed...

I feel the safe choice is to get out, which is the complete opposite of the way things used to be. And this ties in to the original topic. Pilots stuck in drones get promoted at a much lower rate than their peers. With out being able to count on continuation to 20, they're going to do the sensible thing and start that second career a few years early. Oh, and as the cherry on top many of these pilots hate their jobs. What's this going to do for RPA manning? And someone thinks Air Medals are the answer? YGTBFSM.

[Darth]

Combat is breaking things and killing your enemies. Risk is strapping on your airframe and making your takeoffs equal your landings and this increases if it includes combat and depends on the level of threat/wx, etc. RPAs do combat (and do it rather well in the current environment) but the risk is non-existent unless your worried that your sensor operator doesn't like you and might hit you with something. Otherwise, the AF originally sent the dregs to RPAs and the system suffers from it still today. Growing a professional cadre of folks who know nothing else is a reasonably good idea. Who purposely wants to go from any manned airframe to sitting at a console? Although there are those who do because they just might recognize that being on the leading edge of something might be an interesting challenge. Maybe...

I also think as a product of the cold war, Just Cause, Desert Storm, OSW/ONW, Allied Force, AND OIF/OEF (I was in the AF for all these events although I am now retired and missed Odyssey Dawn), I think the argument that there is tribalism based on ones combat experiences is lacking. Tribalism exists for a variety of reasons (airframe specific, AFSCs, MAJCOMs, academic background, commissioning source) etc. (Look at how many times Rainman calls the Viper a lgpos.)

AdVictoriam - While it makes for interesting reading you are not helping your argument with big words, obscure references and uber-nerdy logic.

Sooo....RPAs are important - they are going to be here forever and it is boring unglamorous work but is a powerful system. If your feelings are hurt because some drunk raptor pilot made fun of you, get over it. They have their own issues to deal with.

[BolterKing]

Posts are getting too long, someone post a gratuitous picture of boobs.

[Jaded]

I don't see why they don't make RPAs a good deal non flying assignment. Man it properly so you work 40 hour weeks, put the shipping containers somewhere like Hawaii or Los Angeles, and make it count as an ALFA tour. Good clean family time. Maybe pilots will look down on it less if it isn't such a kick in the balls in every single possible way.

[AdVictoriam]

Re brevity. Touché. Copy tone down the academic. I'll take that spear.

Re Hacker. Good points. I appreciate your experience. I disagree with the idea that an argument is invalid unless experienced firsthand - I trust the Warnings in a Dash one and I have not done most of them myself - though in this case you've seen the substance firsthand. So a better way to make the culture clash argument is the 'logic of deterrence' (risk averse) v the 'logic of combat.' (risk accepting - not just risk to self.). Both fill different roles, but the first one is out of control - queep will kill us all. DeskJockey makes a good point - this has to do with formative experiences. One problem is that tribalism causes those in the logic of combat to squabble over the trappings and 'cool points' of combat, and hence the logic of combat loses out in the institution.

Re Restating arguments and slap down fail - flying=dangerous. Already covered. Risk factors are not cosmic, and covered well in safety theory. Combat is not a significant additive risk factor right now, and we still call it combat for manned. It is, but because of using weapons and guarding good guys. Re my main point, Vader says it better than I - RPA are in combat but not at risk. My argument is that combat is more important than risk in the context of our current AF. Re your point on viral name calling - this is tedious and uninteresting. This is an obvious consequence of making this argument - of course it would be met with a hail of spears, I knew that when I pressed send. Would you recommend only making arguments that will make other people think youre cool? This is a useless metric.

Re argumentation in general. This is one of the problems we continue to have - poor reasoning based on conventional wisdom and appeals to power. This damaged the service in the F-22 fight - when there was an good argument to be made at the time about recap and deterrence holding off the wars we can't afford to fight, we failed to engage with the arguments from the Joint Community, defense academics, all the people who let us buy these things, and did a lot of what we're doing here - namecalling, shouting down, cherry picking and going after strawmen. While this made good 'look at me I'm cool' play in the little puddle of people who agree, it was rejected out of hand as utterly devoid of content by the people who make these decisions. Similarly, the Navy just did find and replace on Soviet for Chinese on strategies from the 70s (those making the argument weren't in the navy the either - they do well by reasoning from history.) and got a ton of new systems while we're still squabbling for scraps and cutting A-10s we need. It does not concern me that these are the types of arguments leveled at me. It does concern me that these are the default ways of engaging anyone or anything we don't immediately agree with. Hence we lose arguments - and we have to eat things we don't like such as a dwindling fighter fleet, (hence TAMI, etc.) and so on.

[Hacker]

Man it properly so you work 40 hour weeks

That's a big part of the problem: there aren't enough people to have this kind of manning. Even the measures that the AF has been trying for years -- TAMI21, extended/indefinite assignments, nonvols, re-tread Navs, Beta class, RPA-only AFSC and training pipeline -- still haven't been able to make it so that the AF can satisfy all the needs of the supported units in theater AND have enough qualified operators to make it a "normal flying job" in terms of hours and work week.

Despite changes to the face of OEF and OIF, there is still an insatiable need for ISR. Without getting into specific numbers, the number of daily requests for ISR by supported units in theater outnumbers the total number of available ISR sorties (including all manned and unmanned ISR assets) over 6-to-1. It's an unbelievably big elephant to eat, even WITH the full-throttle press the AF has been involved in making RPA operators the last 5 or 6.9 years.

Anyone who has worked with those supported units knows there are more than a fair share of those ISR 'requirements' that are ground commanders gaming the system or wanting ISR just as a security blanket rather than for a true operational need: IMHO there is a lot of fluff in those requests because supported unit commanders often don't know what goes into generating that sortie in terms of time and effort by the USAF (having spoken to a number of green-Army types, ISR is mostly PFM as far as they're concerned). The ISR cells do a decent job of filtering out some of this when they do the daily ATO matches, but there's still a lot of fluff (meaning a lot of time with ISR assets on station watching things with no immediate value when there are other taskings that would have immediate value to the commanders). Until the supported units can get their requests under control, this insatiable need will continue.

[deskjockey]

AdV: I agree with Darth/Hacker. Your dividing line of OSW/ONW is a little awkward. I think the changes in culture tie more to the focus of the mission and organizational behavior which gives power and influence to the community who is most critical to the mission (and effectively parlays that role). It started with the switch to an independent AF, then SAC, moved to the fighter pilots, then to the MAF and AFSOC, I think that may be a better way to define the change. At each turn, the new guys or other community was scoffed at by the former kings of the hill. If you want to stick to threat/conflict change, I think Allied force is really your dividing line...maybe even Desert Storm (as the last war of the Cold War period...it was fought with massed force and everyone did their traditional roles) Since Desert Storm, roles and missions have been in transition. Air to air mission fighting for relevance, "tactical MAF", appearance of RPA, helos doing dustoff missions, etc. Reminds me of Vietnam when SAC struggled because the BUFFs were doing missions they never thought they would.

This larger identity crisis drives the RPA battle. Maybe you should take an RPA and sink the Ostfriesland...

[AdVictoriam]

Im checking off for a while - I have work to do this weekend. I appreciate the people who have seriously engaged with these arguments (which I think are the majority of people in the thread.). V/r.

[Hacker]

This damaged the service in the F-22 fight - when there was an good argument to be made at the time about recap and deterrence holding off the wars we can't afford to fight, we failed to engage with the arguments from the Joint Community, defense academics, all the people who let us buy these things, and did a lot of what we're doing here - namecalling, shouting down, cherry picking and going after strawmen. While this made good 'look at me I'm cool' play in the little puddle of people who agree, it was rejected out of hand as utterly devoid of content by the people who make these decisions.

I don't think we can qualify or categorize the arguments that the CSAF and SECAF were making to the SECDEF in 2006/7/8 based on what we've seen in the public domain.

We can read between the lines that Gates flat out disagreed with the USAF's position that we were responsible for maintaining capability in all aspects of air and space power (hence recapitalizing the fighter fleet). His stated opinion was that the USAF was more responsible for fighting the war on the table before us and supporting the needs for the overall Defense Department that he defined as SECDEF than we were for ensuring overall capability.

It's not a secret that the SECAF and CSAF were fired because of this strenuous advocation for the overall needs of airpower at the 'expense' of providing ISR for the gravel agitators.

None of that amounts to straw man arguments or any of the other logic fallacies that could be named in arguments being made in this thread. It wasn't that the USAF was crying like a bunch of babies who were being denied a new toy they wanted.