MC-12 Crash in Afghanistan

[10percenttruth]

Ok, everyone say it with me:

"MAX, RELAX, ROLL"

There, sign the GTAR, you're all current for another RAP cycle.

This isn't rocket surgery, it's a fucking stall. Procedures may vary slightly from airframe to airframe (P-factor & whatnot), but the basic principles of aerodynamics don't change: if a wing(s) is stalled, increase airspeed & decrease your AoA.

This is day one UPT stuff. Yes it should've practiced occasionally, but I don't need a quarterly class to tell me that trees get big when I push over & trees get little when I pull back.

[damastas]

Ok, everyone say it with me:"MAX, RELAX, ROLL"There, sign the GTAR, you're all current for another RAP cycle. This isn't rocket surgery, it's a ######ing stall. Procedures may vary slightly from airframe to airframe (P-factor & whatnot), but the basic principles of aerodynamics don't change: if a wing(s) is stalled, increase airspeed & decrease your AoA. This is day one UPT stuff. Yes it should've practiced occasionally, but I don't need a quarterly class to tell me that trees get big when I push over & trees get little when I pull back.

Correct me if I'm wrong as I'm just a mere sensor, but isn't the max part of that mantra a big part of what caused issues for Indy08? From the AIB it sounded like max throttles increased left yaw after the autopilot was disengaged and that's what pushed it into a stall. That and the part where radar pinged them at 283 knots vertical. I ask this as a backender without any formal piloty knowledge, and it's almost a taboo subject to bring up at the squadron. Hopefully someone here can answer this.

[Spur38]

damastas: This will give you the necessary aerodynamic information

Please see: https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/handbooks_manuals/aircraft/airplane_handbook/media/faa-h-8083-3a-3of7.pdf

A stall occurs when the smooth airflow over the airplanes wing is disrupted, and the lift degenerates

rapidly. This is caused when the wing exceeds its critical angle of attack. This can occur at any airspeed,in any attitude, with any power setting. Pilots must recognize the flight conditions that are

conducive to stalls and know how to apply the necessary corrective action.

As a retired Army C-12 IP, Like many aircraft mishaps, the Indy08 mishap had several red flag issues when you read between the lines...Aircraft Total Pilot Time, CRM, Identification etc. etc. etc.

What astounds me is when you said "I'm just a mere sensor and especially troubeling, "its almost a taboo subject to bring up at the squadron" I sure hope that all AF squadrons aren't like that. As a flying crewmember I would think that you should have an active part in any and all discussions talking about flight safety. You should also, as an aircrew member have a distinct role enabeling you to ask questions, offer assistance, speak up! Whatever, to ensure the safety of the flight....CRM

Just saying and thanks for what you do for all of us!

[damastas]

I said the only a sensor part to express any lack of formal flying knowledge. Everything picked up was from observation and interphone. And maybe more suited for the safety thread but it's rather disturbing to me how active the MC-12 community tries not to talk about it. I'm already flying with pilots in a deployed location who have not even seen the SIB or AIB. Completely unsat.

[Azimuth]

I said the only a sensor part to express any lack of formal flying knowledge. Everything picked up was from observation and interphone. And maybe more suited for the safety thread but it's rather disturbing to me how active the MC-12 community tries not to talk about it. I'm already flying with pilots in a deployed location who have not even seen the SIB or AIB. Completely unsat.

That's a major foul on leadership in that community then.

[tunes]

Ok, everyone say it with me:

"MAX, RELAX, ROLL"

There, sign the GTAR, you're all current for another RAP cycle.

This isn't rocket surgery, it's a ######ing stall. Procedures may vary slightly from airframe to airframe (P-factor & whatnot), but the basic principles of aerodynamics don't change: if a wing(s) is stalled, increase airspeed & decrease your AoA.

This is day one UPT stuff. Yes it should've practiced occasionally, but I don't need a quarterly class to tell me that trees get big when I push over & trees get little when I pull back.

only problem is, that exact procedure gets you killed in the MC-12 when you are in a climbing left turning stall.......

Edited November 14, 2013 by tunes

[10percenttruth]

only problem is, that exact procedure gets you killed in the MC-12 when you are in a climbing left turning stall.......

Which is why I wrote the second part. In this case, "RELAX, ROLL, POWER AS REQD" would have been better, but that isn't as catchy. To reiterate: procedures may vary from airframe to airframe, but the basic principles of decreasing AoA & getting more air over the wings still apply.

I still argue that it's airmanship 101

[Smitty3187]

Is there not enough rudder authority to counteract the P-factor?

only problem is, that exact procedure gets you killed in the MC-12 when you are in a climbing left turning stall.......

[Champ Kind]

only problem is, that exact procedure gets you killed in the MC-12 when you are in a climbing left turning stall.......

My interpretation of the SIB led me to believe that the main thing to focus on was how the plane entered the stall in the first place.

[addict]

Which is why I wrote the second part. In this case, "RELAX, ROLL, POWER AS REQD" would have been better, but that isn't as catchy. To reiterate: procedures may vary from airframe to airframe, but the basic principles of decreasing AoA & getting more air over the wings still apply.

I still argue that it's airmanship 101

Perfect example. In this case, you have probably zero familiarity with twin turboprops, but that wouldn't be much different when they would've handed you the A-code either I bet. If the auto-pilot is trimming along with the decreasing airspeed, the recovery is going to be tasty.

Is there not enough rudder authority to counteract the P-factor? -At a low enough airspeed...no... but if the pilot has his feet on the floor, it doesn't matter.

Edited November 14, 2013 by addict

[10percenttruth]

Perfect example. In this case, you have probably zero familiarity with twin turboprops, but that wouldn't be much different when they would've handed you the A-code either I bet. If the auto-pilot is trimming along with the decreasing airspeed, the recovery is going to be tasty.

Is there not enough rudder authority to counteract the P-factor? -At a low enough airspeed...no... but if the pilot has his feet on the floor, it doesn't matter.

Not so, I have about 600 hours in type, and I'm very familiar with how p factor works. In this exact instance, how they got into the stall is a more causal factor than the recovery procedures. Maybe the syllabus has changed, but I remember a distinct emphasis on not putting the autopilot into a VVI climb mode, to preclude this exact scenario.

In either case, poor recovery procedures & a lack of understanding how the plane was stalled didn't help.

[Bender]

Correct me if I'm wrong as I'm just a mere sensor, but isn't the max part of that mantra a big part of what caused issues for Indy08? From the AIB it sounded like max throttles increased left yaw after the autopilot was disengaged and that's what pushed it into a stall. That and the part where radar pinged them at 283 knots vertical. I ask this as a backender without any formal piloty knowledge, and it's almost a taboo subject to bring up at the squadron. Hopefully someone here can answer this.

This is really not true. I don't know if you are at Kandahar or Bagram, but if you're at Bagram send me a PM and we'll sit down for a few minutes and talk about it. You have a decent grasp on the confounding variable of power in the Indy08 situation (although it is the spin it would have contributed to, not the stall itself)...but there was, as has been non-sensically addressed here, a number of others that made the chain that eventually couldn't be broken.

It is not acceptable for either squadron to have the subject be taboo and equally unacceptable to even make you feel like it is.

only problem is, that exact procedure gets you killed in the MC-12 when you are in a climbing left turning stall.......

As with any other control inputs, it is the performance of the aircraft that is what's important. That mantra is applicable, however it takes a little more than just the blind application of mantras or even procedures to be a good aviator. While the application of boldface (or critical action procedures, if you will) are important to apply in a timely fashion, they still should not be done without critical thought. Doing things without thinking first gets you killed, in the MC-12 and every other aircraft ever made.

Which is why I wrote the second part. In this case, "RELAX, ROLL, POWER AS REQD" would have been better, but that isn't as catchy. To reiterate: procedures may vary from airframe to airframe, but the basic principles of decreasing AoA & getting more air over the wings still apply.

I still argue that it's airmanship 101

We have gone out and induced approach to stalls in the mission orbit climb profile and it is very easy (and disturbingly sad) to recover from. However, if you let the autopilot trim the climb, "relaxing" will do little to nothing for you. Rolling wings level will always help, as it will direct the lift where you really need it...while this is not necessary for recovery, it should always be done when available. The power at a low airspeed is needed to not lose altitude, but must be applied very judiciously and with the nose down trim...no rush, there is plenty of time...IF YOU PUT THE NOSE DOWN.

I've seen a number of similar situations where the lack of auto-throttles have led to rapidly decaying airspeed, with the autopilot ferociously trimming nose up. Put the nose back to where you need it to be and the situation begins to resolve itself. Control and performance...it very much is airmanship 101.

My interpretation of the SIB led me to believe that the main thing to focus on was how the plane entered the stall in the first place.

We should learn everything we can each time. I don't believe one should focus solely on one thing or the other. Some in the MC-12 community has learn a great deal from this tragedy, while unfortunately other have not. However, I would argue those people can't be helped until they help themselves first.

Not so, I have about 600 hours in type, and I'm very familiar with how p factor works. In this exact instance, how they got into the stall is a more causal factor than the recovery procedures. Maybe the syllabus has changed, but I remember a distinct emphasis on not putting the autopilot into a VVI climb mode, to preclude this exact scenario.

In either case, poor recovery procedures & a lack of understanding how the plane was stalled didn't help.

This was never once said to me during IQT. Had I not asked, I'm not sure anything about the flight guidance panel would have been said. However, the flip attitude of "it's airmanship plain and simple" is a little rough. Maybe that's just due to my current position, but I think even you (with an amazing 600 hours in type) could learn at least a thing or two.

Bendy

[Liquid]

Bendy, that was the best post I've read this year. Have you seen the MC-12 mishap video? Are you comfortable with the level of detail the SIB provided for mishap prevention? What can we do better to prevent future MC-12 mishaps?

[tunes]

This is really not true. I don't know if you are at Kandahar or Bagram, but if you're at Bagram send me a PM and we'll sit down for a few minutes and talk about it. You have a decent grasp on the confounding variable of power in the Indy08 situation (although it is the spin it would have contributed to, not the stall itself)...but there was, as has been non-sensically addressed here, a number of others that made the chain that eventually couldn't be broken.

It is not acceptable for either squadron to have the subject be taboo and equally unacceptable to even make you feel like it is.

As with any other control inputs, it is the performance of the aircraft that is what's important. That mantra is applicable, however it takes a little more than just the blind application of mantras or even procedures to be a good aviator. While the application of boldface (or critical action procedures, if you will) are important to apply in a timely fashion, they still should not be done without critical thought. Doing things without thinking first gets you killed, in the MC-12 and every other aircraft ever made.

We have gone out and induced approach to stalls in the mission orbit climb profile and it is very easy (and disturbingly sad) to recover from. However, if you let the autopilot trim the climb, "relaxing" will do little to nothing for you. Rolling wings level will always help, as it will direct the lift where you really need it...while this is not necessary for recovery, it should always be done when available. The power at a low airspeed is needed to not lose altitude, but must be applied very judiciously and with the nose down trim...no rush, there is plenty of time...IF YOU PUT THE NOSE DOWN.

I've seen a number of similar situations where the lack of auto-throttles have led to rapidly decaying airspeed, with the autopilot ferociously trimming nose up. Put the nose back to where you need it to be and the situation begins to resolve itself. Control and performance...it very much is airmanship 101.

We should learn everything we can each time. I don't believe one should focus solely on one thing or the other. Some in the MC-12 community has learn a great deal from this tragedy, while unfortunately other have not. However, I would argue those people can't be helped until they help themselves first.

This was never once said to me during IQT. Had I not asked, I'm not sure anything about the flight guidance panel would have been said. However, the flip attitude of "it's airmanship plain and simple" is a little rough. Maybe that's just due to my current position, but I think even you (with an amazing 600 hours in type) could learn at least a thing or two.

Bendy

agree 100% with everything you said. It's amazing how this community handles even the basic regulations....

[10percenttruth]

This is really not true. I don't know if you are at Kandahar or Bagram, but if you're at Bagram send me a PM and we'll sit down for a few minutes and talk about it. You have a decent grasp on the confounding variable of power in the Indy08 situation (although it is the spin it would have contributed to, not the stall itself)...but there was, as has been non-sensically addressed here, a number of others that made the chain that eventually couldn't be broken.

It is not acceptable for either squadron to have the subject be taboo and equally unacceptable to even make you feel like it is.

As with any other control inputs, it is the performance of the aircraft that is what's important. That mantra is applicable, however it takes a little more than just the blind application of mantras or even procedures to be a good aviator. While the application of boldface (or critical action procedures, if you will) are important to apply in a timely fashion, they still should not be done without critical thought. Doing things without thinking first gets you killed, in the MC-12 and every other aircraft ever made.

We have gone out and induced approach to stalls in the mission orbit climb profile and it is very easy (and disturbingly sad) to recover from. However, if you let the autopilot trim the climb, "relaxing" will do little to nothing for you. Rolling wings level will always help, as it will direct the lift where you really need it...while this is not necessary for recovery, it should always be done when available. The power at a low airspeed is needed to not lose altitude, but must be applied very judiciously and with the nose down trim...no rush, there is plenty of time...IF YOU PUT THE NOSE DOWN.

I've seen a number of similar situations where the lack of auto-throttles have led to rapidly decaying airspeed, with the autopilot ferociously trimming nose up. Put the nose back to where you need it to be and the situation begins to resolve itself. Control and performance...it very much is airmanship 101.

We should learn everything we can each time. I don't believe one should focus solely on one thing or the other. Some in the MC-12 community has learn a great deal from this tragedy, while unfortunately other have not. However, I would argue those people can't be helped until they help themselves first.

This was never once said to me during IQT. Had I not asked, I'm not sure anything about the flight guidance panel would have been said. However, the flip attitude of "it's airmanship plain and simple" is a little rough. Maybe that's just due to my current position, but I think even you (with an amazing 600 hours in type) could learn at least a thing or two.

Bendy

C'mon now, you can't bag on me for calling it plain and simple airmanship when you did the same thing seven sentences previous. And take it easy with the snark, I wasn't bragging about those hours, I was illustrating that I in fact did not have "zero twin turboprop experience". We could all always learn a thing or two, whether we have 6, 600, or 6000 hours. It's a highly perishable skillset & one that needs to be practiced to be effective.

[Bender]

Bendy, that was the best post I've read this year. Have you seen the MC-12 mishap video? Are you comfortable with the level of detail the SIB provided for mishap prevention? What can we do better to prevent future MC-12 mishaps?

I have seen the video recreation of the IE08 mishap and there is more than sufficient detail in the SIB (as is normally the case) for mishap prevention. There is very little to nothing that could have been put in the SIB that isn't there. I believe they did an excellent job in both the report and the briefings.

The first thing we can do is stop wanting to get out of the MC-12 program or the MC-12 program to get out of ACC. We have a large number of first assignment pilots who we are teaching a horrible example to with the caviler, often downright shitty, attitude we approaching it with and present.

The young guys/gals are in serious trouble when they move on to another community as in the MC-12 they are not currently encouraged, expected, or forced to excel at their jobs; getting the ATO lines flown seems to be enough. They are missing out on the huge opportunity presented to fly this many hours in combat with seasoned aviators from just about every airframe the air force has to offer. They are too young to know what they should ask, and a lot of guys are too jaded to offer.

There is a very sloppy culture with regard to work ethic, not on a personal level, but on a professional level. There are far too many examples to begin listing them out. However, it reaches all the way down to the very underlying basics: It's surprising how often a pilot flips a switch (such as the autofeather), without ever giving a thought to why it should be done. The checklist says "as required", not "off"...yet never after 500 hours of flying the plane thinks about why one might leave it on. Sure, it's not complicated, but you still have to apply some critical thought to your job.

The second thing we can do it to give up how busy we think we are. Even the C-17 and C-130 peeps think they are so busy flying their 5.0 sorties that we gasp at the thought of having to sit down and talk about tactical topics (and not so tactical topics). It's somehow okay to know just enough to get by...compounded with leadership that thinks we should complicate the situation with advanced capabilities like buddy lazing, while we don't remember that losing a generator makes the back of the plane go dark or who can talk on what radio when it does happen.

There has been so much wrong for so long now, that it might not be able to be fixed with the time the program has left in ACC. The elimination of the flow though manning construct will make strides towards providing the continuity required for lasting change, but it takes people (read IPs) to step up and make that change take hold.

Lastly (although there are many more), we can have discussions about mishaps...rather than grumble because we had to sit through listening to safety brief it to us. Alas, we are very busy...we fly pretty much everyday (unless you're lucky enough to be an Operations Supervisor or Supervisor of Flying). I need those other 14 hours of my day to check my Facebook and play my Zynga games. Ain't no one got time for talking about mishaps! This is the game, man. Why we going to sit around and talk about practice.

C'mon now, you can't bag on me for calling it plain and simple airmanship when you did the same thing seven sentences previous. And take it easy with the snark, I wasn't bragging about those hours, I was illustrating that I in fact did not have "zero twin turboprop experience". We could all always learn a thing or two, whether we have 6, 600, or 6000 hours. It's a highly perishable skillset & one that needs to be practiced to be effective.

Your defensive post has been noted.

[PropWash]

only problem is, that exact procedure gets you killed in the MC-12 when you are in a climbing left turning stall.......

The MC-12 community flat out does not understand VMCA period dot. I have heard some crazy theories about VMCA from IPs in this platform. It's something I brief the LTs I fly with.

[Champ Kind]

What is there to understand? There are a set of assumptions in determining the speed, and one should know the speed and avoid maneuvering below it if at all possible.

Edited November 17, 2013 by Champ Kind

[tunes]

wall of text....only quoting it this way for brevity sake.

I think the bigger problem with this community is the 200-hour wonder LTs thinking their shit doesn't stink. Won't listen to things MCs tell them (most of whom are IPs from a previous MWS), flip switches rolling down the runway and think that they know everything there is to know about flying...news flash, they don't.....another problem is upgrading these kids to be an aircraft commander when they have a whopping 600 hours of king air time flying from point a to point a. There have been countless examples out here of why these people should not be aircraft commanders because they can't make good decisions. Sure 95% of the time, the mission is mundane and they will do just fine, but its the 5% when the shit hits the fan and they have no idea what the hell they are doing.

The MC-12 community flat out does not understand VMCA period dot. I have heard some crazy theories about VMCA from IPs in this platform. It's something I brief the LTs I fly with.

or what an SDP is and how it works, or the 11-202, or the 11-217....the list goes on....

[Bender]

I think the bigger problem with this community is the 200-hour wonder LTs thinking their shit doesn't stink. Won't listen to things MCs tell them (most of whom are IPs from a previous MWS), flip switches rolling down the runway and think that they know everything there is to know about flying...news flash, they don't.....another problem is upgrading these kids to be an aircraft commander when they have a whopping 600 hours of king air time flying from point a to point a.

Hmmm...well, 600 hours isn't all that far off from when I upgraded to aircraft commander, so I don't think that's it. Do you think it could be in the way we try and teach them? I've found the LTs to be adequately receptive to what I have to say. I'm perfectly fine with the confidence, what I would expect from a type A flyer. Talking with them about things they should know, but clearly don't have a grasp of in the right way can break through that. If they don't seem to be listening, perhaps we could take a look at how we're conveying the message before we write them off completely. Anomaly aside, of course...there are some people that won't let you help them no matter how much you'd like to. Rolling and flipping switches?!? That's the non-standard standard...we have a lot of those.

or what an SDP is and how it works, or the 11-202, or the 11-217....the list goes on....

Sigh...well there is something to be said about asking when you don't know I suppose; just seems like a bit too much of the go to answer (don't worry, the DO will look it up for you and put out an SRF with the answer soon). Quite frankly, there are *'s, **'s, ***'s, and/or T's on that SDP I still can't figure out. It's in my flight bag to continue looking at until I somehow figure it out.

Bendy

Edited November 17, 2013 by Bender

[damastas]

Just the other day when wx was bad we get the Intel slide listing the other assets that'll be up.. Or in this case wx canx. Without going into specifics, there were 4 planes up in the entire AOR. I'll let you guess which 4. One of the hearts of the problem is the ATO no matter what mentality. I thought we were past that.

[KState_Poke22]

I think the bigger problem with this community is the 200-hour wonder LTs thinking their shit doesn't stink. Won't listen to things MCs tell them (most of whom are IPs from a previous MWS), flip switches rolling down the runway and think that they know everything there is to know about flying...news flash, they don't.....another problem is upgrading these kids to be an aircraft commander when they have a whopping 600 hours of king air time flying from point a to point a. There have been countless examples out here of why these people should not be aircraft commanders because they can't make good decisions. Sure 95% of the time, the mission is mundane and they will do just fine, but its the 5% when the shit hits the fan and they have no idea what the hell they are doing.

or what an SDP is and how it works, or the 11-202, or the 11-217....the list goes on....

Flipping a switch while the AC is moving is not exactly cosmic, just have some SA about it...

True many MCs have valuable previous MWS experience and that definitely counts for a lot but some of those LTs have a deployment under their belt and 700+ hours in the MC-12 airframe and mission and that counts for something too, especially when you're sitting next to a brand new MC who's only been through MQT and a few in-country indoc rides.

[tunes]

Hmmm...well, 600 hours isn't all that far off from when I upgraded to aircraft commander, so I don't think that's it. Do you think it could be in the way we try and teach them? I've found the LTs to be adequately receptive to what I have to say. I'm perfectly fine with the confidence, what I would expect from a type A flyer. Talking with them about things they should know, but clearly don't have a grasp of in the right way can break through that. If they don't seem to be listening, perhaps we could take a look at how we're conveying the message before we write them off completely. Anomaly aside, of course...there are some people that won't let you help them no matter how much you'd like to. Rolling and flipping switches?!? That's the non-standard standard...we have a lot of those.

Sigh...well there is something to be said about asking when you don't know I suppose; just seems like a bit too much of the go to answer (don't worry, the DO will look it up for you and put out an SRF with the answer soon). Quite frankly, there are *'s, **'s, ***'s, and/or T's on that SDP I still can't figure out. It's in my flight bag to continue looking at until I somehow figure it out.

Bendy

the non standard-standards need to go. 90% of the time flying with dudes who try to do that flow bullshit I always have to call them out for skipping steps in a checklist. Using a checklist isn't cosmic, don't understand at all what all the pushback about using them is.....lets also remember than when we upgrade these LTs their 250 hours of UPT time counts.....I don't know any other airplane that allows upgrades like that.....as for the lack of GK, it's astonishing. Senior leadership even doesnt know the regs (you said you are at BAF, so you know exactly what I'm talking about).

Just the other day when wx was bad we get the Intel slide listing the other assets that'll be up.. Or in this case wx canx. Without going into specifics, there were 4 planes up in the entire AOR. I'll let you guess which 4. One of the hearts of the problem is the ATO no matter what mentality. I thought we were past that.

Shack

Flipping a switch while the AC is moving is not exactly cosmic, just have some SA about it...

True many MCs have valuable previous MWS experience and that definitely counts for a lot but some of those LTs have a deployment under their belt and 700+ hours in the MC-12 airframe and mission and that counts for something too, especially when you're sitting next to a brand new MC who's only been through MQT and a few in-country indoc rides.

Rolling down the runway and going heads down flipping switches is NEVER a good idea.

My problem with the upgrades is the judgement factor. Like I said, 95% of the time they will do just fine, but when something actually happens, most don't have the ability to make the right judgement call......for example, you have a fuel leak that you can look out the window and see the fuel coming out of the wing....do you declare an emergency or not?

Edited November 17, 2013 by tunes

[KState_Poke22]

the non standard-standards need to go. 90% of the time flying with dudes who try to do that flow bullshit I always have to call them out for skipping steps in a checklist. Using a checklist isn't cosmic, don't understand at all what all the pushback about using them is.....lets also remember than when we upgrade these LTs their 250 hours of UPT time counts.....I don't know any other airplane that allows upgrades like that.....as for the lack of GK, it's astonishing. Senior leadership even doesnt know the regs (you said you are at BAF, so you know exactly what I'm talking about).

Shack

Rolling down the runway and going heads down flipping switches is NEVER a good idea.

My problem with the upgrades is the judgement factor. Like I said, 95% of the time they will do just fine, but when something actually happens, most don't have the ability to make the right judgement call......for example, you have a fuel leak that you can look out the window and see the fuel coming out of the wing....do you declare an emergency or not?

I don't know where you get your info but UPT absolutely does not count toward upgrades.

I'm sure we all have stories of somebody doing something stupid. I had an MC on my last deployment (Major type) try to tell me that the prop de ice worked like the boots on the wings do...

[tunes]

I don't know where you get your info but UPT absolutely does not count toward upgrades.

It doesn't anymore.......it did up until a few months ago....granted dudes that were upgrading had a deployment before upgrading and had more than 250 in type, but still.

Edited November 17, 2013 by tunes