The Limits of Airpower in Information-Dominant Warfare

[SurelySerious]

SAASS paper from LtCol Bryan Callahan that details a serious intelligence/operations divide at the AOC level, and a proposed way out in the current conflict that walks us to an AOC that will also function more effectively in future operations. Posted on SIPR Baseops.

[Craftsman]

Just read it yesterday. Great read, long but great none the less. Extremely informative about what RPA's deal with everyday. Thanks for posting it SurelySerious!

[deaddebate]

Didn't read the OP article, but I didn't want to start a new thread for what seems like the smae concept.

The Pipe Dream of Easy War

H.R. McMaster is an Army major general and the commanding officer at Fort Benning, Ga., who led the Third Armored Cavalry Regiment in Iraq as a colonel in 2005 and 2006.

The dominant assumption of the “Revolution in Military Affairs” was that information would be the key to victory. Concepts of “network-centric warfare,” “rapid, decisive operations,” “shock and awe” and “full-spectrum dominance” suggested that near-perfect intelligence would enable precise military operations and point a straight line to success. But in Afghanistan and Iraq, planning did not account for adaptations and initiatives by the enemy. American forces, deployed initially in insufficient numbers to keep pace with the evolution of those conflicts, struggled to maintain security. The lesson: The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, like all wars, were contests of will that unleashed dynamics that made future events impossible to predict.