C-17 4-engine flameout/SIB/FEB questions in here

[TheFranchise]

You guys got FEBd by AMC without an AIB and they probably used the SIB? WTF!!! (Winchester on acronyms)

[busdriver]

If "they" start a CDI after a SIB outbrief, there's only one reason.

[Muscle2002]

If "they" start a CDI after a SIB outbrief, there's only one reason.

Please pardon my ignorance, but a CDI is what exactly?

[Homestar]

For me, this incident (and others) demonstrates that the USAF (well, AMC at least) is really riding the edge of a wave of inexperience in the cockpit. Most flight departments wouldn't send their crews to do what the USAF does with the experience level the USAF operates with. It's a testament to our professionalism and attention to detail that we do it safely almost every day of the year.

Major props for coming onto this forum. I noticed as I left my previous airframe that our squadron really didn't want to talk about the stuff we screwed up (and well all screwed up stuff in varying degrees) in order to save face or whatever. If nothing else, this is a good reminder that we're all one misplaced switch away from disaster (or potential disaster). Good job on saving the crew, the jet, and the pax.

[Spinner]

Please pardon my ignorance, but a CDI is what exactly?

Commander Directed Investigation.

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[Snooter]

I imagine that if the US Airways Flight 1549 had been an air force airplane, Sullenburger would have been canned for taking off in a dangerous bird condition. Then he would have been raked over the coals because he and his FO didn't reference the landing with one or more engines inop, landing with erroneous airspeed indications, ditching, and and finally evacuation checklists before hitting the water. I imagine the scheduler would have laughed at him if he had said, "we're not going to go today because of the high probabilty of migratory bird patterns around the field." Well at least the AMC/CC got his golden parachute...

[stract]

CDI is in lieu of an AIB. Basically, the MAJCOM/CC can delegate an AIB down to the WG/CC and call it a CDI. ALL Class A mishaps MUST have a legal (aka non-privileged) investigation, there is no way around this. I worked a Class A SIB last year where we recommended to the MAJCOM/JA that there was absolutely no reason to convene an AIB/CDI, and they said their hands were tied on the matter.

[TheFranchise]

Does anyone else remember being briefed on this IRT to engine restarting by magic because no of the pilots ran the checklist or boldface? I knew that was a crock if shit when they told us that.

For an institution that supposedly values integrity this makes me sick.

[matmacwc]

I'm pretty sure not all SIBs have AIBs, for instance, I've been told the F-16 midair out of DC recently is not having an AIB.

[Butters]

Does anyone else remember being briefed on this IRT to engine restarting by magic because no of the pilots ran the checklist or boldface? I knew that was a crock if shit when they told us that.

For an institution that supposedly values integrity this makes me sick.

You must not have been listening very well. The crew (AC) did run the boldface, the AC called for the 4 Engine Flameout Checklist and as Day Man said he did not run it. The reason the checklist has you turn the fuel shutoff switches "off" is to reset the EECs. Day Man did not do that. The FDR confirmed all 4 EECs were offline. They subsequently relit by magic. P&W cannot explain why, EECs are not supposed to just come back on by themselves. If the checklist had been run, all 4 engines would have restarted. The two that "caught fire" were not on fire, they were is sub idle conditions and overheating. That happens when you have fuel going into and engine with the ignition going and not enough airflow.

As for diverting, I believe someone already said it. That radio call is a lot better than the one saying you flew through a level 5 Thunderstorm and flamed out all 4. Yes, the training in the new WX Radar was not the best, but you still knew that thunder storm was there. The CVR has you calling it out the first time you went by it before you turned away from the field. When you turned back and were headed to the field they said winds were 60kts on the field. You holding fix was over the field. No WX radar is needed to know 60kt winds are most often cause by severe weather.

Aviate Navigate Communicate! Sound familiar? When you read the SIB the crew’s primary concern was communication. Then you guys were worried about which direction they wanted you to turn in holding. Who cares? Aviating is saying, the weather sucks, the coms suck, I am going somewhere else.

I think you guys got screwed. However, the fact remains there were some pretty big screw ups. Not enough for shithead to overturn the FEB recommendation, but they were there none the less.

For the record, I have seen the video, so I know what was going on and what was not going on.

Edited October 4, 2013 by Butters

[Champ Kind]

So do you guys in the winglet community regularly fly through magenta returns since you don't rely on the accuracy of your radar?

Seems like I would take another approach.... If a magenta cell blocks your route of flight/destination, why not just be hair triggered to divert/turn around/overfly.

If that starts to happen on the reg, maybe your radar issues will be addressed.

[Butters]

So do you guys in the winglet community regularly fly through magenta returns since you don't rely on the accuracy of your radar?

Seems like I would take another approach.... If a magenta cell blocks your route of flight/destination, why not just be hair triggered to divert/turn around/overfly.

If that starts to happen on the reg, maybe your radar issues will be addressed.

The return was red. The Magenta, for some stupid reason, covers it up on modern WX Radars. Most crews are trained very well how to use it and know to go to WX only mode. it is labeled very well in civilian aircraft. In the C-17 you just have to know to go to manual. It has been address, all C-17 crews now know to go to manual it they are getting to many turbulence returns in the vicinity of thunderstorms.

[Day Man]

You must not have been listening very well. The crew (AC) did run the boldface, the AC called for the 4 Engine Flameout Checklist and as Day Man said he did not run it. The reason the checklist has you turn the fuel shutoff switches "off" is to reset the EECs. (Valid, but wasn't in the -1 prior to this. Also, P&W guidance says to cycle the switches, not turn them off) Day Man did not do that. The FDR confirmed all 4 EECs were offline. They subsequently relit by magic. P&W cannot explain why, EECs are not supposed to just come back on by themselves. If the checklist had been run, all 4 engines would have restarted. (P&W can't explain it, but you know they would have lit off...bet your life on it?) The two that "caught fire" were not on fire, they were is sub idle conditions and overheating. That happens when you have fuel going into and engine with the ignition going and not enough airflow.

Appreciate the Monday morning QB'ing, but I've had plenty in the past 3 years. If we knew the storm was that severe, do you honestly think we would have flown through it? If you have something constructive to add, please do. Otherwise, go add more nonsense to the IRA thread.

This was one of my points of this thread; decisions at 0/0 are different than when you are considering the implications of not going home. Post-flameout, I would do nothing different; I get to kiss my wife every day, and any changes that day could ultimately affect that.

Edited September 29, 2013 by day man

[addict]

Echo Homestar: Who in their right mind sends a MP with some FPQ's to Skardu?

Did your pallets look exactly like these, or different?

Edited September 29, 2013 by addict

[Day Man]

Echo Homestar: Who in their right mind sends a MP with some FPQ's to Skardu?

Did your pallets look exactly like these, or different?

There were 2 pilots. For the record, we didn't have any issues at Skardu

And yes the pallets were essentially the same; food, water, blankets, etc.

Edited September 29, 2013 by day man

[addict]

Skardu itself didn't hurt you, but the mission needed greater oversight from your leadership. They didn't provide that. Combat basic crew + FCC, hardly 3 weeks into a deployment. Make it happen:

-Combat Camera

-Airfield didn't have sufficient enroute support and combat offloads

-Thunderstorms enroute

-Thunderstorms at a destination

-Foreign ATC and language difficulties (KARACHI KARACHI !!!!)

-Procedural IFR

-Emergency airlift of passengers

Each of these added weight to the crew. Skardu diverted attention away from these things. What happened to the guy that signed your orders? And your CC?

Edited September 29, 2013 by addict

[Day Man]

Valid points.

Obviously nothing happened to any leadership. There's a whole section in the CDI regarding the "culture within the OG"...

- Dec 09 to Dec 10, 62 OG approved 270% more waivers than 437 OG (KCHS)

- A DO said "We had a guy during post-mission crew rest go to Altus without having any of the sims, flights, etc. That was fairly routine."

- 62 OG pilots had the highest rate of CAP at KLTS

Edited September 29, 2013 by day man

[WABoom]

I don't post as much as I read and this thread happens to be the reason I come back to BO each day. Not a pilot myself but still some great conversation about decision making that I can apply to my job.

We had a very experienced captain at FAFB during my last assignment that screwed up and violated airspace around Spokane. He got a briefing together, showed the radar track, played the ATC tapes, and even had the controller from Geiger Field come and talk to the crews. We all knew this guy was a great pilot, but things happen, he took owness of the situation, and that day we all learned something.

Day Man, like many have said already, thanks for posting your experience. Hangar Flies are always a good thing in my opinion. Good luck on your next chapter.

[LockheedFix]

Post-flameout, I would do nothing different; I get to kiss my wife every day, and any changes that day could ultimately affect that.

It sucks this happened to you guys and I would never wish what happened to you on my worst enemy, but three years later this is your take away from what happened? You probably don't realize it but hundreds of young co-pilots read this forum. You really still think the appropriate action after a four-engine flameout is to run zero checklists and pray the guy the in the other seat can maintain control of the plane? There was NOTHING you could have done to improve the outcome of the situation besides put the gear and flaps down? Good on you for starting this thread, but coming in with the attitude that you did nothing wrong is clearly erroneous.

For the record, I do think it was a huge foul for the AMC/CC to overturn the findings/recommendation of your FEB.

Edited September 29, 2013 by LockheedFix

[addict]

Obviously nothing happened to any leadership.

Except:

AW/CC - retired. He also danced around in MOPP 4 with NFL cheerleaders so his was inevitable

OG/CC - went to Scott, then retired

SQ/CC - ***White House Fellow***

SQ/DO - tucked away somewhere quiet until 20.

[BattleRattle]

Except:

AW/CC - retired. He also danced around in MOPP 4 with NFL cheerleaders so his was inevitable

Say what?

[whodat17]

It sucks this happened to you guys and I would never wish what happened to you on my worst enemy, but three years later this is your take away from what happened? You probably don't realize it but hundreds of young co-pilots read this forum. You really still think the appropriate action after a four-engine flameout is to run zero checklists and pray the guy the in the other seat can maintain control of the plane? There was NOTHING you could have done to improve the outcome of the situation besides put the gear and flaps down? Good on you for starting this thread, but coming in with the attitude that you did nothing wrong is clearly erroneous.

For the record, I do think it was a huge foul for the AMC/CC to overturn the findings/recommendation of your FEB.

"2" on all this.

It's distressing to hear you say that there wasn't ANYTHING you'd do differently, when clearly you made errors. Not sure how your handful of hours of experience led you to think it was a good idea to disregard the checklist procedures, but to say that you wouldn't at least go back and run the checklists as written leads me to believe you haven't learned anything from this. From there, I question why you would even make this thread to begin with.

[LockheedFix]

"2" on all this.

It's distressing to hear you say that there wasn't ANYTHING you'd do differently, when clearly you made errors. Not sure how your handful of hours of experience led you to think it was a good idea to disregard the checklist procedures, but to say that you wouldn't at least go back and run the checklists as written leads me to believe you haven't learned anything from this. From there, I question why you would even make this thread to begin with.

Shack. That's what I was getting at but you said it better.

[Day Man]

It sucks this happened to you guys and I would never wish what happened to you on my worst enemy, but three years later this is your take away from what happened? You probably don't realize it but hundreds of young co-pilots read this forum. You really still think the appropriate action after a four-engine flameout is to run zero checklists and pray the guy the in the other seat can maintain control of the plane? There was NOTHING you could have done to improve the outcome of the situation besides put the gear and flaps down? Good on you for starting this thread, but coming in with the attitude that you did nothing wrong is clearly erroneous.

For the record, I do think it was a huge foul for the AMC/CC to overturn the findings/recommendation of your FEB.

"2" on all this.

It's distressing to hear you say that there wasn't ANYTHING you'd do differently, when clearly you made errors. Not sure how your handful of hours of experience led you to think it was a good idea to disregard the checklist procedures, but to say that you wouldn't at least go back and run the checklists as written leads me to believe you haven't learned anything from this. From there, I question why you would even make this thread to begin with.

My point was if I was guaranteed a safe landing again, I wouldn't do anything different. If I had turned the fuel switches off, would the engines had relit in time? If we had gone into holding to sort shit out, would 1 & 4 eventually catch fire? No one knows. We were lucky...if you want to test your theories (not in a sim), have at it.

Do I recommend this COA for the next guy? Probably not.

[Azimuth]

"2" on all this.

It's distressing to hear you say that there wasn't ANYTHING you'd do differently, when clearly you made errors. Not sure how your handful of hours of experience led you to think it was a good idea to disregard the checklist procedures, but to say that you wouldn't at least go back and run the checklists as written leads me to believe you haven't learned anything from this. From there, I question why you would even make this thread to begin with.

Where was the AC and why wasn't he being an AC during this EP? Oh wait, I read that unfortunate answer in the SIB when asked what he thought day man was doing.

And why did you, as the copilot, decide that you were going to not accomplish the complete checklist? Did your AC/crew agree with this?

Edited September 29, 2013 by Azimuth